http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0903/S00486.htm
Wednesday, 25 March 2009, 2:02 pm
Press Release: International Trade Union Confederation
Burma: Historic Trade Union Congress Reaffirms Campaign for Democracy and Workers’ Rights
Brussels, 24 March 2009 (ITUC OnLine): An historic three-day Congress of the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) concluded on the Thai-Burma border today, with the adoption of the organisation’s new Constitution, and the re-election of U Hla Oo as President and Maung Maung as General Secretary. The FTUB, which was founded in 1999, has been at the forefront of the struggle for democracy and human rights since its inception. The Constitution confirms the status of the FTUB as an independent, democratic trade union organization, committed to bringing about respect for labour rights, in particular the standards of the International Labour Organisation, for all Burmese workers.
SEARCH NZ JOBS
Congress delegates expressed their thanks to the international trade union movement for the strong solidarity shown by trade unions across the globe in support of their Burmese colleagues, and pledged to strengthen cooperation with trade unions around the world.
A key feature of the Congress was the re-affirmation of the FTUB’s commitment to and end to military rule and the introduction of democracy. The Congress called for a boycott of the military’s sham “elections” in 2010, which are intended to bring a measure of credibility to the regime without it having to concede the absolute power that it currently holds. The Congress also pledged to carry on the fight against the systematic use of forced labour by the military, with evidence that the regime has been using forced labour on reconstruction projects following the devastating Cyclone Nargis of May 2008.
The FTUB also maintained its call for economic sanctions against the military junta, noting that 90% of the people of Burma have to live on less than 1US$ per day, and that the only people gaining any real benefit from Burma’s trade and economic relations with other countries are the small minority of the population who run the regime and their closest supporters.
“The FTUB comes out of this Congress strong, unified and determined to work for a better future for Burmese workers and the entire population of the country. The Federation clearly has extremely strong support within the country, despite the ongoing harassment and brutality of the regime towards anyone who they suspect of supporting genuine trade unionism. The ITUC and its international partners will continue and strengthen our support to the FTUB in its struggle for democracy, justice and workers’ rights,” said ITUC Deputy General Secretary Jaap Wienen, who represented the Confederation at the Congress.
The ITUC represents 170 million workers in 312 affiliated national organisations from 157 countries. http://www.ituc-csi.org http://www.youtube.com/ITUCCSI
ENDS
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
Campaign for Democracy and Workers’ Rights
The Scramble For A Piece of Burma
http://kaylatt.blogspot.com/2009/03/scramble-for-piece-of-burma.html
By Hannah Beech / Arakan and Kachin States Thursday, Mar. 19, 2009
Last year, the Chinese came. The villagers living in western Burma's remote Arakan state couldn't quite fathom what the Chinese told them, that below their rice fields might lie a vast reserve of oil. For three months the Chinese drilled the earth near the muddy Kaladan River in search of black gold. Then, just as suddenly, they left.
In December, the Indians arrived. Through Burmese intermediaries, they took the village's paddies as their own, depriving locals of their main source of income. Compensation was promised, villagers tell me, but none has been paid so far. So the impoverished residents of Mee Laung Yaw village, who lack electricity and eat eggplant curry as a poor substitute for meat, spend their days gazing at their expropriated fields, now fenced in and dominated by an oil-exploration tower that dwarfs their bamboo shacks. Several villagers took lowly construction jobs on the site but they were never paid so they've stopped showing up for work. "I hope they don't find any oil," says village chief Aye Thein Tun. "Because even if they do, none of it will come to us. It will just go to other countries."
The Western dialogue over what to do about Burma's repressive military regime is often framed as a single dilemma: whether or not to impose international sanctions. The debate is polarizing. The pro-sanctions crowd claims the moral high ground, deploring the enrichment of a clutch of ethnocentric Burmese generals whose impulses are most brutal against the roughly 40% of the population that, like the villages of Arakan state, is composed of ethnic minorities. The engagement side preaches practicality, arguing that some investment will trickle down to the populace and that cultural exchange is better than imposed isolationism. When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Asia on her inaugural foreign trip last month, she weighed in on the Burma question, acknowledging: "Clearly the path we have taken in imposing sanctions hasn't influenced the Burmese junta ... [which is] impervious to influence from anyone." (See pictures of Burma's discontent.)
The truth about Burma, renamed as Myanmar by its generals, is that the sanctions debate is immaterial. While American and European foreign policy thinkers ponder how to financially strangle an army government that has ruled since 1962, Burma's regional neighbors are embarking on a new Great Game, scrambling to outdo each other for access to this resource-rich land. "Sanctions don't work if most countries ignore them," says Naw La, an exiled environmentalist with the Kachin Development Networking Group in Thailand. "The military is selling our natural heritage without any concern for our people."
The Mosquito Coast
In return for oil, natural gas, timber, hydropower, gemstones, cash crops and a periodic table's worth of minerals, countries like China, India, Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea are propping up — and massively enriching — Burma's top brass. In the first nine months of 2008, foreign investment in Burma almost doubled year on year to nearly $1 billion, according to government figures that don't even take into account significant underground economic activity. Burma today is estimated to produce 90% of the world's rubies by value, 80% of its teak, and is home to one of Asia's biggest oil and natural-gas reserves. The country's jade is the world's finest, and its largely untouched rivers promise plentiful hydropower for its neighbors. "Multinationals are getting rich off Burma, and so is the military regime," says Ka Hsaw Wa, co-founder of EarthRights International, an NGO that sued U.S. energy giant Unocal, which eventually provided out-of-court compensation to villagers who are believed to have toiled as slave labor for the Yadana gas pipeline from southern Burma to Thailand. "It is the local people who are suffering and dying," says Ka Hsaw Wa.
But as resource-hungry countries cozy up to the junta, they are discovering that Burma's natural wealth is most bountiful in areas where ethnic minorities simmer under the rule of the ethnic Burmese generals. Officially, the Burmese junta recognizes that the country is a union of at least 135 distinct groups. Yet the top ranks of the military are practically devoid of any non-Burmese presence. Army persecution of Burma's diverse tribes has festered for decades, and the proliferation of junta-controlled mines and concessions in the minority regions only exacerbates the tensions. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic villagers have been forced to relocate or have been conscripted into chain gangs, according to human-rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Even when operations begin, paid jobs land disproportionately in the hands of ethnic Burmese migrants, not those of local minorities. A new report by the Geneva-based International Displacement Monitoring Center estimates that in eastern Burma alone nearly half a million minority people have been displaced.
The British, trying to hold together an ethnic patchwork of a colony, knew too well the perils of Burma's tribal politics. They resorted to divide-and-conquer schemes, much as the current military regime has done. Intense negotiations by the junta led to many ethnic insurgencies laying down their guns in the 1980s and '90s — and opened up a vast territory for resource exploitation. But as the inequities between the Burmese majority and the tribal groups — the Arakanese, the Shan, the Kachin, the Karen, the Mon, the Wa and the Chin, to name a few — yawns ever wider, the chance of renewed armed conflict grows stronger. "To the military, we [ethnic minorities] are like mosquitoes," says a young Arakanese Buddhist monk, who participated in the crushed antigovernment uprising of September 2007 and chafes at Burmese discrimination against his people. "We buzz in their ear, and they slap at us and don't care if they kill us." But, he adds, "there are many mosquitoes." In the end, it may be the foreign participants in this new Great Game, unschooled in how to navigate ethnic complexities, who will get bitten.
Minority Report
Arakan's capital, Sittwe, is a sleepy port near the Bay of Bengal where the pace of life inches along at the speed of a pedicab. But nearby, the rush for oil and gas is intense; last year, Russian, Thai and Vietnamese companies signed exploration deals with the junta. In late December, a consortium of four foreign companies, led by South Korea's Daewoo, inked an agreement with the junta and China National Petroleum Corp. to extract natural gas from Arakan's offshore Shwe fields and pipe it northeast through Burma to China's Yunnan province. The pipeline, along with a plan for a new deepwater port in Arakan where ships laden with Middle Eastern oil can dock and disgorge their valuable cargo, gives China an alternative to the expensive and sometimes dangerous Strait of Malacca by directly supplying energy to its landlocked west. The Shwe project is Burma's largest ever foreign-investment commitment. (The second largest is the Yadana pipeline to Thailand.) Though Arakan sits on the country's biggest oil and natural-gas fields, Sittwe only gets three hours of electricity a day. The town boasts an "e-library" located in a government building, but all the computers sit unused because there is no power during office hours.
When I flew on a wheezing Myanma Airways plane to Sittwe, a squad of military officers with pistols on their hips boarded the flight. As the plane climbed into the air, two men in uniform stood in the aisle and unrolled a large, laminated map that showed the Shwe pipeline route in red. Yet the general public in Arakan has not been told what many suspected and what the map I saw indicated: that the pipeline, on which construction is scheduled to begin this year, will travel through populous areas and will likely result in extensive village relocations. (Both Daewoo and the Indian company exploring for oil in Arakan did not respond to Time's requests for comment.) For locals, reporting what I had seen on the plane could land them in a labor camp for compromising national security. The week before I arrived, several Arakanese with vaguely political backgrounds were rounded up by the police and haven't been seen since. "They close our ears and they close our mouths," says an Arakanese political dissident, noting the heavy Burmese security presence that can make even casual conversation at a teahouse fraught. "And now, they are taking our treasures, our oil and gas. What do we get in return? Nothing."
The inequity is straining the network of fragile cease-fires in tribal areas. "We have sent many letters registering our complaints to the government, but we haven't heard back," says Colonel Gun Maw. Not hearing back from the Burmese junta is something to which the spokesman for the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) is accustomed. An ethnically based movement in northern Burma's Kachin state, the KIO waged a long insurgency against the Burmese regime before signing a peace treaty in 1994. Most Kachin are Christian, and they believe their faith makes them particularly vulnerable to persecution by the exclusively Buddhist junta. In a complicated arrangement, the KIO controls some territory on Kachin's border with China. Chinese trucks that rumble through KIO turf pay taxes on the jade, gold and timber they're carrying, and KIO officials say the Chinese generally pay up, lest instability infect the area. "China wants Burma as a buffer state," says Gun Maw. "It wants Burma to be secure — so China will be secure."
Today, the KIO is waging an information campaign on a series of seven planned dams in Kachin, which will flood hundreds of villages and could threaten many others because the region's frequent seismic activity could trigger reservoir floods. (Two previously built dams in Kachin were rendered useless after breaking, and nearby villagers, who never received any electricity, were killed by the rush of water.) The dams, which are slated to generate seven times Burma's entire current electricity capacity, are being jointly developed by state-owned Chinese companies and a Burmese firm, Asia World, whose managing director was the target of U.S. sanctions last year. China will receive most — if not all — the generated power, leaving the Kachin people literally in the dark. The largest dam will be at Myitsone, where two rivers meet to become the mighty Irrawaddy. Chinese engineers and ethnic Burmese workers are already on-site. "All we can do is pray that the dam doesn't get built," says Nlam Brang Nu, the Baptist pastor of Tang Hpre village, which will be inundated when Myitsone is completed. "It is in God's hands."
Cycle of Depression
The Chinese are learning that the Kachin, like other ethnic groups in Burma, may not be willing to turn the other cheek much longer. Last year, armed KIO soldiers showed up at a pair of dam sites staffed by Chinese workers and demanded work cease until the Chinese paid them taxes. The projects are located in an area nominally under KIO control, but the former rebels were angry that the dam deal was negotiated directly between the Burmese government and Chinese hydropower firms without their input. (Eventually, the Chinese paid up.) More foreigners could get caught in the cross fire. Next year, Burma's generals will oversee nationwide elections, two decades after they ignored the results of the last polls. But for the cease-fire groups to participate in the balloting, the junta requires them to give up their guns. For many ethnic organizations, the KIO included, that's not acceptable. Between sips of whiskey chased by Red Bull, a gun runner in the Kachin capital Myitkyina tells me that he's fielding more orders for Chinese-made arms from various ethnic insurgent groups. "We have to defend ourselves," he says. "Otherwise the government will keep taking from us until we have nothing left."
That's the plight of most everyone in Burma, even the ethnic Burmese. Balancing on a narrow bamboo raft in the middle of the Irrawaddy River, ethnic Burmese migrant Aung Tun sifts for specks of gold. Over the past decade, Chinese demand for gold has skyrocketed, and thousands of ethnic Burmese have moved to Kachin to pan for the mineral, as well as mine jade. But for the right to float his raft on the river, Aung Tun must pay fees to the Burmese government, the Burmese police and the KIO. If the specks of gold add up, he can make the payments. Otherwise, Aung Tun goes into debt. If he survives, that is. During the five years that Aung Tun has panned the Irrawaddy, 25 people have died in his work group, which numbers no more than 40 laborers at one time. Some drowned during storms, while others succumbed to malaria or never came up after diving deep into the river. "The foreigners want gold," he says, squinting for yellow dust in the brown silt. "So we look for it." The equation in Asia's new Great Game is simple — and deadly.
Posted by Kay Latt at 11:11 AM
Coalition group will not contest 2010 election
http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/03/24/burmese-political-coalition-group-the-forum-for-democracy-in-burma-has-stated-that-it-opposes-the-planned-2010-elections-and-will-educate-burmese-people-about-the-problems-with-the-election/
Burmese political coalition group the Forum for Democracy in Burma has stated that it opposes the planned 2010 elections and will educate Burmese people about the problems with the election.
2009 March 24
tags: 2010 Election, Burma, Human Rights, Junta, world focus on Burmaby peacerunningCoalition group will not contest 2010 election
Mar 24, 2009 (DVB)–Burmese political coalition group the Forum for Democracy in Burma has stated that it opposes the planned 2010 elections and will educate Burmese people about the problems with the election.
The statement was made at the end of a five-day seminar, which took place from 18 to 22 March, held at an unspecified place along the Thai-Burma border.
The FDB is a coalition of exiled organisations and activists. The seminar was attended by 32 coalition group members and five observers.
Dr Naing Aung, leader of the FDB, said the coalition had chosen to stand strong against the ruling State Peace and Development Council’s plan to hold elections in 2010, and vowed that the group would cooperate with the public for their campaign.
“We will be educating our people more about the election,” he said.
“The aim of the election is to bring the 2008 constitution to life which would lead us to remain as slaves of the military the same as 20 years ago,” said Naing Aung.
The 1990 elections were won by the opposition National League for Democracy in a landslide victory but the military government ignored the results and has continued to rule.
“We will be looking for various methods to fight for our rights,” he added.
“It is unlikely that we would be on safe ground when calling for our rights since Burma is ruled by an oppressive government.”
Myanmar builds over 8,000 more basic education schools for past 20 years
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90781/90879/6620444.html
Myanmar built 8,748 basic education schools for the past 20 years, bringing the total to 38,162 as of 2008 since 1988, according to the latest official progress-indicating figures published in Monday's New Light of Myanmar newspaper.
These basic education schools include primary, middle and high schools, of which the primary schools stood the most with 31,329 and schools with multi-media classrooms being 1,829.
A total of 20 teacher ship education colleges were introduced over the two decades.
Relating to higher education, 17 university colleges were built over the period, bringing the total to 44 in 2008.
Other figures revealed that the number of teachers and students went to over 260,000 and 8.83 million respectively as of 2008.
With regard to science and technology education, 30 technological universities, 4 such colleges and 26 universities of computer studies were constructed with one each of Aerospace Engineering University and maritime university added over the period.
Meanwhile, Myanmar has been striving for the increase of the country's adult literacy rate annually with the figures attaining 94.83 percent in 2008, up from 83 percent in 1996.
The Ministry of Education, international agencies, governmental and non-governmental organizations, regional and local authorities and the communities reportedly made the efforts.
In the formal education sector, endeavors for 100 percent enrollment for all school age children and all students to complete basic education were exerted as a mass movement.
The education authorities urged more active participation in the literacy campaign to improve the education and socio-economic life of the people.
Moreover, Myanmar is also striving for the rural schools to keep pace with urban ones to reduce the development gap of education between the two areas.
Source: Xinhua
Number of Internet cafes jumps in Myanmar
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3141685
Tuesday, March 24, 2009 11:37 AM
YANGON, Mar. 24, 2009 (Kyodo News International) -- Number of Internet cafes in Myanmar has jumped 11 percent in less than three months, a local weekly paper reported in its latest issue.
The number of cybercafes increased from 409 in January to 455 in mid-March, the Weekly Eleven newspaper reported, quoting figures from state-run Myanmar Infotech, the only provider authorized to issue Internet cafe licenses in Myanmar.
Of the total, 353 are located in the country's largest city Yangon and in nearby areas, while 13 are in the country's second largest city Mandalay, the report said.
Myanmar started allowing Internet cafes, which are officially called Public Access Centers, in 2004.
The number of such centers stood at only around 20 in Yangon in 2006 but has grown significantly as Myanmar Infotech began more generously issuing licenses to promote education.
Myanmar is one of the 12 countries listed as ''Internet Enemies'' by Paris-based Reporters Without Borders in its latest annual report on Internet freedom, issued March 12.
The country not only has one of the lowest Internet penetration rates in the world but its users are among the most threatened, the press freedom organization said.
''Going on line is itself seen as a dissident act,'' it says, adding that laws relating to electronic communications and the dissemination of news online ''are among the most dissuasive in the world, exposing Internet-users to very harsh prison sentences.''
The other countries on the list are Saudi Arabia, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
(Source: iStockAnalyst )
Five African soccer players agree with Myanmar private professional club
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/24/content_11065468.htm
www.chinaview.cn 2009-03-24 19:24:07 Print
YANGON, March 24 (Xinhua) -- A local private professional soccer club, the Yadanarpon FC, which will enter the Myanmar National League Cup in May, has agreed with five African players to be included in its squad, local media reported on Tuesday.
The Yadanarpon FC has already agreed with three Cote d'Ivoire players and two Senegal players to play for the club, the First Eleven sports journal said.
The club not only has called goalkeeper Yin Min Aung from the premier club, Yangon City Development Committee, with a transfer fee of 1.5 million kyats (about 1,500 US dollars) and a salary of 500,000 kyats (about 500 dollars) but also is trying to call some local famous soccer players for the team, it added.
The Yadanarpon FC has already hired French coach Rohan and the Belgium technical director Robert for the club since early this month and the calling of all the local players essential for the club is targeted to complete in March and the camping of the players will start on April 1, the club's owner Sai Sam Tun said earlier.
He allocated a fund of 500 million kyats (about 500,000 dollars) for the expenditure of the club for one year.
The Yadanarpon FC will give a salary of 1.5 million kyats (about 1,500 dollars) for a foreign player and 500,000 kyats (about 500 dollars) for a local player, Sai Sam Tun said at a press conference on transformation of Myanmar football to professional one earlier this month.
Myanmar to hold National League Cup soccer tournament in May this year, participated by eight local professional clubs, as its first introduction of professional soccer in the country.
It will be the first tournament of transformation of Myanmar football to a professional one, in which up to five foreign professional players will be allowed for the first time to include in each squad.
The Myanmar National League Cup soccer tournament will be held in two zones, upper Myanmar and lower Myanmar, with four local professional clubs each in one zone. The matches for the upper Myanmar zone will feature in central Mandalay and those for the lower Myanmar zone in the former capital of Yangon with home and away system.
Kanbawza FC, Yadanarpon FC, Magway FC and Zeya Shwe Myay FC will be included in the upper Myanmar zone, while Yangon United FC, Southern Myanmar FC, Okkthar United FC and Delta United FC in lower Myanmar zone.
The top two teams each from the two zones will appear in the semifinals of the Myanmar National League Cup, which will have to play home and away basis in Yangon and Mandalay, while the champion of the League Cup will be decided with only one match in Yangon.
Meanwhile, the points-system Myanmar National League soccer tournament will be introduced in January 2010, participated by the eight local professional clubs.
Initially invested by local entrepreneurs, the eight professional clubs will make preparation for the next-year Myanmar National League from March to December this year and the professional clubs will be increased up to 12 in 2011.
Editor: Fang Yang
Threats in Indian Ocean
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2009/03/137_41852.html
By Lakhvinder Singh
Recently, many conventional and unconventional threats have begun emerging in the Indian Ocean. Recent incidents of piracy and hijacking have once again highlighted the growing dangers to the sea-lanes of communication there.
Today, piracy is the No. 1 threat to security in the region with the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea the main areas of pirate activity.
Though there could be many reasons for the growing phenomena, it's mainly attributed to regional economic conditions and the mindset of the coastal people. Piracy is invading the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and the area seems to be more dangerous and lethal.
Earlier piracy often involved the mere stealing of valuables from ships with very few cases of associated violence. However, lately, it has evolved into a deadly and destructive force, as many crewmembers have lost their lives and ships have been destroyed in recent incidents.
Piracy, though important, is not the only serious threat to the safety of the sea-lanes of communication in the region. Many other factors of transnational nature have also begun to pose serious threats to peace and security.
Foremost is the growing threat of maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean. As trade by sea has increased substantially, so has the threat of maritime terrorism.
The sealed containers used to transit goods from one port to another often pass through ports without undergoing thorough inspections and may hide anything from a small nuclear devise to dirty radiological bombs to human suicide bombers.
The growing use of sea routes by drug traffickers is also a serious threat to the safety and security of the sea-lanes in the region. Illegal drug trade and maritime terrorism are often intertwined. Funds and profits made from drugs often fuel terrorist activities and insurgencies.
Terrorist groups have been sighted working in tandem with drug cartels active in this region.
The emerging centers of the drug trade, namely the Golden Crescent (Iran and Pakistan) and the Golden Triangle (Myanmar and Thailand), are heavily dependent upon the sea routes to supply their products to drug cartels around the word.
This nexus between drug traffickers and maritime terrorist organizations poses one of the greatest threats to prosperity, peace and stability to counties in the Indian Ocean region.
The growing menace of gunrunning is another major problem. It, too, is deeply intermingled with drug trafficking and maritime terrorism in the region.
The link between the three is so deeply rooted and widespread that one cannot be eliminated without affecting the other two.
The sea is the least risky and fastest means for gunrunning and the most lucrative for gunrunning. Nearly every insurgent group in the region relies extensively on drug profits to continue their movement and equip their cadres with the latest weapons.
The Taliban movement in Afghanistan, which heavily depends on drug money, is a case in point. Until and unless this drug money is halted, the hope of wining the war against the Taliban might remain a mere dream for American and European forces.
Apart from these major transnational threats, other looming causes of serious security threats include oil-related disasters at sea, sea pollution and sea mining.
In addition to creating ecological havoc and affecting maritime security, oil related disasters seriously hinder economic activity in the region.
The extensive use of sea mining by many regional countries to deter illegal ships from docking on their shores threatens to disrupt sea traffic.
In some recent cases, even a mere threat or a well-calculated disinformation campaign about the laying of a minefield has deterred many merchant ships from entering certain areas.
The increasing threat to the safety of the sea-lanes of communications, mitigated by the economic and political interdependence of regional countries, has forced many to work together in the management and protection of sea-lanes.
These emerging transnational threats are making the nations think with inter-regional perspectives to tackle this growing menace. Many now feel the urgency for a concrete security regime that can establish security arrangements and prevent future problems and tensions in the region.
India and Korea have great potential for cooperation in this regard. Already two of the largest economies in Asia, they are poised to play important and leading roles in the economic growth of the region.
While most trade and other economic activities are done through the troubled sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean, it is the smooth flow of ship movement that creates economic and industrial stability for both countries.
India-Korean cooperation in the Indian Ocean can go a long way in securing the sea-lanes.
India, trying to control growing terrorism, must act together with other regional countries to deny free access of the Indian Ocean to rogue elements. Korea, with its own high stakes in the security of sea-lanes, can help.
Lakhvinder Singh, senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, is president of the Indo-Korean Business and Policy Forum. He can be reached at www.ikbforum.com.
Singapore to launch tougher public order law
http://in.reuters.com/article/lifestyleMolt/idINTRE52N25920090324
Tue Mar 24, 2009 4:03pm IST
By Nopporn Wong-Anan
SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Singapore, which already has tough restrictions on freedom of assembly, plans to tighten them further ahead of a major Asia-Pacific summit in the city-state.
The Public Order Bill, introduced in parliament on Monday before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November, was needed to "squarely address gaps in the current framework to enhance the ability of the police to ensure security during major events," the Ministry of Home Affairs said.
Under the proposed law, police could prevent activists from leaving home if they knew they were going to a political rally. It would also allow police to order a person to leave an area if they determine he is about to break the law.
All outdoor activities that are cause-related will need a police permit, no matter how many people are involved. That is a change from the current law requiring a permit for gatherings of five or more people.
Opposition politicians and activists were quick to criticize the proposed law. "Even in communist China, peaceful protests are tolerated," said Chee Siok Chin of the opposition Singapore Democratic Party.
The bill allows police to stop people from filming law enforcement if it could put officers in danger. The bill cited live media coverage of Indian police trying to rescue hostages in the Mumbai attacks last November as posing risks to the officers.
Police could stop small peaceful protests against unpopular visiting government leaders, such as from Myanmar, if the law was introduced, activists said.
Last week, three Singaporeans tried to present a bouquet of orchids to visiting Myanmar Prime Minister Thein Sein for him to give to detained Myanmar opposition leader Aung Sann Suu Kyi.
Thein Sein was having an orchid named after him at the Botanical Gardens, a Singapore tradition for visiting heads of government.
The law is certain to pass, since the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) has an overwhelming majority in parliament.
It also passed an amended law on Monday to ease a decade-long ban on political party documentary-like films, but introduced restrictions on dramatized political videos.
"These two sets of amendments should be viewed as part of the longstanding periodic adjustments the PAP has made to limit politics to tightly controlled electoral contests conducted in the absence of a meaningful civil society," said Garry Rodan of Murdoch University in Western Australia.
Others said the two laws were pre-emptive measures for the government to prevent a repeat at the APEC meeting of confrontation between police and protesters that took place during the World Bank/IMF meeting in 2006, and also to deal with potential social unrest during Singapore's worst-ever recession.
"As long as the government feels a threat, it needs greater measures to deal with greater problems," said Terence Chong at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.
(Editing by Neil Chatterjee and Bill Tarrant)
© Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world.
Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests.
From Stalin to Burma, a history lesson
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/1880-from-stalin-to-burma-a-history-lesson.html
by Harry Poppkick
Monday, 23 March 2009 19:28
They may wear different cloaks, but under the surface all dictators are similar. As the memory of dictators like Joseph Stalin fades, mistakes of the past repeat themselves with a vengeance in forgotten places like Burma.
One writer said of Stalin: “He had found Russia working with wooden ploughs and left it equipped with atomic [stock]piles.” But perhaps the true question doesn’t regard Stalin’s undisputable impact on humanity, but whether the legacy justified all the human sacrifice. To Stalin, the millions killed as a consequence of his ambitious drive were simply stepping stones along the road to national prosperity. However, such a Machiavellian frame of mind can neither be justifiable nor ethical.
Stalin utilized numerous harsh methods in attempting to meet his ‘utopian’ goals. Collective farms were prevalent, while each Five Year Plan sought to leapfrog Russia ahead of competing nations and systems. Toward this end, virtually every industry fell under the direct control of the government and its de facto and shackled workforce. And the sad truth, more often than not, was results never met by an increasingly impoverished population.
Stalin’s principle instrument for maintaining control over his country was his secret police. Through this institution, fear was instilled in the hearts of the people. The final death toll from Stalin’s regime is indeed staggering, with estimates ranging from 10 to 20 million people having perished.
Stalin was under the belief that all his actions, extreme or otherwise, were necessary in order to pull Russia into the industrial age. Yet, ultimately, the major flaw in Stalin’s reasoning was that he claimed all sacrifices were necessary and for the future of Russia. “Life has improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous,” he once remarked. And while he was thinking about the future of the country and the generations to come, the standard of living within Russia had plummeted.
Today, forgetting that dictatorship is a self inflicted wound, some intellectuals and humanitarians reason that simply sending more aid and increasing engagement are starting points to improving the political situation in Burma. But when they begin to regard the active opposition, as symbolized by Aung San Suu Kyi, as increasingly irrelevant, the time has come to refresh their memory about Joseph Stalin and the enormous price of dictatorship. It is one thing to want to bring Burma into the international community, but it is another to coddle and nurture tyrants without speaking out against their inhumane acts.
So far, newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama and Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton have taken a cautious and slow approach toward Burma. But in a world of competing interests and ideology, it will be a great tragedy if they fail to take a firm stand against the dictators in Burma.
After all, the United States and its allies helped reform the militaries in Indonesia and Turkey within democratic transitions and transformations. Now, the U.S., United Nations, ASEAN and the European Union need decisive and effective leadership to help Burma. Obama and Clinton have a great chance to seize this mantle…if they are willing to seriously take on the leadership role.
Today, even as Burma’s generals tragically act more and more like Stalin, could it not be that the army as an institution in Burma was originally inspired by similar beliefs to those of countries such as Indonesia and Turkey? This should offer an important clue as to where to begin with Burma.
(Harry Poppick is a student in the United States and his mother is from Burma. This paper was written for a history class project.)
KNU Willing to Talk, but not on Burmese Territory
http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=15358
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By LAWI WENG Tuesday, March 24, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Karen National Union’s deputy chairman, David Takapaw, has welcomed Thailand’s offer to mediate talks between the KNU and the Burmese regime, but said they would have to be held outside Burma.
“We are always ready for peace talks,” he told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday. “But we will not attend any talks in Burma at this time. Talks must be held in another country.”
Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, who met Burmese government leaders in Naypyidaw at the weekend, said he would approach the KNU in the hope of getting talks started. It was in Thailand’s interest for peace to reign in Burma, he said.
Thai army officials recently asked Karen rebel leaders living in the Thai border town of Mae Sot to return to KNU-controlled areas of Karen State. The rebels belong to the KNU’s armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).
Burmese researcher Aung Thu Nyein said the Thai government’s efforts to help bring about peace talks between the Burmese regime and the KNU would increase pressure on KNU leaders who live in Thailand.
“Thailand needs border stability for trade with the Burmese regime,” he said. “From an economic point of view, this might put more pressure on the KNU leaders to talk to the regime.”
The KNU has engaged in peace talks with the Burmese regime four times since the present regime took power in 1988.
The late chairman of the KNU, Gen Saw Bo Mya, held peace talks with regime leaders in Rangoon in 2005, two years before his death. Contacts have been at a standstill since then.
Takapaw said whenever the KNU talked to the regime “they always insist that we give up our arms and return to the ‘legal fold.’ But how we can agree to live under a regime that isn’t the official government?”
Takapaw said that if the KNU agreed to talks on Burmese territory the Burmese negotiators would have the upper hand. “Such a meeting wouldn’t be on equal terms,” he said.
The KNU has been in conflict with the Burmese army for more than 50 years. It turned to guerrilla tactics after regime forces overran its headquarters in 1995.
Burmese army offensives have been accompanied by the destruction of Karen villages, displacement of local populations, the killing of civilians and other serious human rights abuses. More than 100,000 Karen villagers have sought refuge in camps along the Thai-Burmese border.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Myanmar opposition asks for Suu Kyi meeting
http://nz.news.yahoo.com/a/-/world/5427452/myanmar-opposition-asks-for-suu-kyi-meeting/
March 24, 2009, 8:42 pm
YANGON (AFP) - Myanmar's opposition Tuesday issued a fresh appeal for permission to see Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained leaders, after a UN panel said the ruling junta broke the country's own law by holding her.
The Nobel laureate's National League for Democracy (NLD) issued a statement asserting its right to meet with all its central executive committee members, including those in detention, to discuss the party's future plans.
The party had sent a request to the leader of the military regime, Senior General Than Shwe, last Thursday but had not yet received a reply, it said.
"As the NLD is a legally operating political party according to political party registration law, it is essential that we draw up party policies, regulations, aims and future plans," the statement said.
"The time has come to make decisions by holding discussions with all central executive commmittee members... including vice-chairman U Tin Oo and general secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi ," it said, using honorific forms of their names.
Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo have been detained at their homes since being arrested together in May 2003, after a pro-government mob attacked their convoy during a political visit to central Myanmar .
The 62-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi has spent most of the past 19 years under house arrest because of her political activities, while Tin Oo has undergone several periods of incarceration since the 1970s.
A United Nations rights panel on Monday released documents saying that the junta's continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi violated Myanmar's own law, in addition to international law.
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention said that Myanmar was breaking its own 1975 State Protection Law, which only allows detention without charge for those who pose a risk to state security or public peace.
Aung San Suu Kyi's party won a landslide victory in elections in 1990 but the junta never allowed it to take office.
Myanmar has been ruled by the military since 1962.
Authorities plan to hold elections in 2010 but the NLD has refused to take part as Aung San Suu Kyi is barred from standing.
Rights groups have accused the junta of trying to suppress dissenting voices ahead of the elections, which have been derided as a sham by activists.
Monday, March 30, 2009
Suu Kyi detention breaks Myanmar law - UN body
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN23295737
Myanmar law
* U.N. Secretary-General Ban urged to visit country
WASHINGTON, March 23 (Reuters) - A United Nations body has ruled the detention of Myanmar democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi is illegal under the domestic laws of her own country, the former Burma, her lawyer said on Monday.
It was the first time the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found that the confinement of Suu Kyi, who has spent more than 13 of the last 19 years under house arrest, illegal under Myanmar law, said her lead attorney, Jared Genser.
"The Working Group requests the government to immediately release, without any condition, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi from her continued placement under house arrest," said the ruling, issued in November but made public only this week.
The latest decision was the fifth time since 1992 that Suu Kyi's detention was declared arbitrary and illegal under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, said Genser, president of Freedom Now, an advocacy group for political prisoners.
Genser said it was unlikely the military junta that has ruled Myanmar since 1962 and has refused to recognize a 1990 landslide election victory of the Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy would release her.
"At the same time, there has been increasing pressure being placed not only on the junta from the international community but also on the U.N. to deliver," he told Reuters.
"I would call on U.N. Secretary-General (Ban Ki-moon) to go to Burma and directly engage with the junta."
It is not clear whether Ban has plans to visit the Southeast Asian country.
Last week, Tomas Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, called on the junta to release more than 2,100 political prisoners. (Reporting by Paul Eckert; Editing by John O'Callaghan)
Burma's generals are afraid of telephones and the internet
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/03/24/opinion/opinion_30098633.php
By HTET AUNG KYAW
Published on March 24, 2009
LAST WEEKEND, the Paris-based media watchdog, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) published a report entitled "Enemies of the Internet", which named Burma as one of 12 countries that actively practices censorship and restricts freedom of speech on the Internet.
"The 12 enemies of the Internet … have all transformed their internet into an intranet in order to prevent their populations from accessing 'undesirable' online information," the RSF report said.
As I work for a daily news service, this report is nothing surprising for me. But I was surprised when I learned that a group of hackers from the jungle capital of the low-speed intranet country attacked high-speed websites in the world's richest country.
"Yes, this cyber attack was made by Russian technicians. However, they are not in Moscow but in Burma's West Point cyber city", claimed Aung Lin Htut, the former deputy ambassador to Washington and a former spy for ousted Burmese prime minister Gen Khin Nyunt. (Many Burmese observers compare the country's Maymyo Academy of Defence Services to the US Army's West Pont academy).
Last September, which was the anniversary of the "saffron revolution" led by Buddhist monks, the Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) website and two others leading websites (of the Chiang Mai-based Irrawaddy magazine and Delhi-based Mizzima) were attacked by unknown hackers.
"We can easily say that the Burmese government is behind this attack," said a DVB statement. They used DdoS, or distributed denial-of-service, which overloads websites with an unmanageable amount of traffic."
But the DVB technicians doubt that the attackers are government-backed hackers who are based in Russia. "Technically, it is of course difficult to say who is behind the attack," the statement said.
According to Aung Lin Htut, thousands of Burmese army officers are studying Defence Electronic Technology at the Moscow Aviation Institute (MAI), and hundreds of them return to Burma each year to work in Maymyo after they receive the four-year Masters Degrees. The subjects for Burmese officers studying there are computer software programs, nuclear technology, short range and long range missiles, and aeronautics and engineering.
"There is full-scale electricity supply and hi-speed Internet connections at Napyidaw (the country's official capital city) and the West Point cyber city. The cyber attack is just the beginning of their plan to attack the democracy movement," the former spy told this correspondent in an electronic conversation from Washington.
I asked how these officers would be able to apply their knowledge in Burma, where the electricity supply is intermittent.
Although the two VIP locations are very advanced in IT, the rest of the country is still in the dark. There is not enough electricity, telephone lines, or hi-speed Internet connections for the general population.
"Our office telephone line has been cut for over two years. There is no response from the authority whenever we ask the reason," said Nyan Win, a spokesman for the opposition National League for Democracy.
"To open an e-mail address for the NLD may lead me to Insein (prison)" he added.
The junta recently arrested dozens of students and activists, including Min Ko Naing's 88 Generation students' group, which took part in the September 2007 uprising and who were involved in distributing relief after Cyclone Nargis ripped through the country last year. A number of the students and activists were sentenced to 65 years in prison for violations of the electronic law, meaning that they had used cellphones, cameras, e-mail and the internet without permission from the authorities.
"I'm very interested in IT and so I learned something about it on the Internet. This is only my guilt that will send me to Insein," said one activist named Zagana as a judge sentenced him to jail.
A recent UN report says that 6 out of every 10 people in the world use a mobile phone.
"But I think the NLD is the only political party in the world that has no telephone, no Internet or website in the 21st century," Nyan Win lamented to me during a cellphone (which he rents from friends) conversation from Rangoon. The NLD members and activists have no permission to buy a cellphone, and are not permitted to own or even use an Internet line or a laptop computer in Burma. If you live in Burma, you need permission from the authorities to buy a cell or land phone, a fax machine, an Internet line, computer, camera, satellite TV, or short-wave radio.
"This is an unacceptable condition for the party that won the 1990 election, while the junta allows everything for the USDA - the pro-government Union Solidarity Development Association - for the 2010 election campaign," said Soe Aung, a spokesman for exiled 88 Generation students and the Forum for Democracy in Burma.
"Cellphones and the Internet are daily basic necessities for politicians and the party," he said to this correspondent in a text message from his Blackberry. "This is very useful and you will see how US President Obama does his daily job using this phone," he added from Bangkok.
But in Burma, the ageing NLD leadership in Rangoon and the army generals in Napyidaw have no Blackberry or cellphone. The generals have banned cellphones in the capital for security reasons, while the NLD leaders have not been able to get either a land phone, a cellphone or an e-mail account.
"This is not just the nature of a generation gap between Obama and Than Shwe. Burma's politics is wrong indeed," Soe Aung added.
Htet Aung Kyaw is a senior journalist for the Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma.
A victim who escaped sexual abuse says Burmese migrant women should not work as domestic workers in Thailand
http://www.ghre.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=193:a-victim-who-escaped-sexual-abuse-says-burmese-migrant-women-should-not-work-as-domestic-workers-in-thailand&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=70
Monday, 23 March 2009 10:06
A Burmese domestic worker who ran away from sexual abuse by her employer said Burmese Migrant Women should not work as domestic workers in Thailand.
The girl, who is 20 years old and from the Pago Division of Burma, was working as a domestic worker in Thailand when she finally escaped from her employers who had been making many sexual advances towards her. She arrived at the Burmese Association in Thailand yesterday.
“I had been about 3 months in Bangkok. My employer’s wife is bisexual and she showed me sex movies all the time. When I took a bath she touched my body and sometimes they had sex in front of me. That made me really embarrassed and I was ashamed. They asked me to make another wife of him. I wanted to make money from my work, I did not want to be someone else’s wife” said the girl.
The employer is over 60 years old and his wife is about 30 years old. The girl had to stay in the same room as them so she was not safe. She was waiting to find the right opportunity to run away from the house. Now she and another Burmese maid have managed to run away from the house.
“I heard that he has since called the broker who sent me to Bangkok and asked him to send me back to him again. The two brokers who are Karen women are looking for me everywhere in Bangkok. I’m so sad that Burmese brokers are making profit from Burmese workers. Especially as I was not even happy for one day at that house. I had to work day and night, the food was not good and we did not have enough to eat” said the girl.
Daw Thet Thet Oo who is an organizer and women’s program coordinator said “We have come across many cases like this. However we try to help them in any way we can, even though we are also migrant workers. They can live and eat with us together. Our organization has no money to help the workers. For their health needs we have had to ask other organizations. We explained to the workers that what we have is knowledge. In Bangkok we need effective organization to help migrant workers. This is a very large area and many of the factory and house owners do not even allow the workers to go outside. I would like to urge the women not to work as domestic workers as it gives them no security, they could endanger their lives.
If victims of exploitation have no work permit or legal status in Thailand they are still held in detention or “safe houses” to be deported back to Burma, even if those migrant workers have been abused by their employer. Moreover, during the court case the female victims must stay at the government-run women’s shelter for about a year without any income. It also takes a long time for even NGOs and other labor agencies to help get justice for the victim.
House Of Peace
Summer Camps
Cyclone Nargis Report
InSIGHT Out!
Save The Migrants
Migrant News
[ANM/MMN Open Letter] THAILAND: CALL FOR AN OPEN INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AND KILLING OF ROHINGYA BY THAI AUTHORITIES
January 20, 2009
Locked Outside The System
January 11, 2009
Road Safety Project
December 18, 2008
Link to the pictures the kids took
September 08, 2008
(from MAP Foundation)
DOE opens for national verification of migrant workers from Lao PDR and Myanmar from 1 September 2008 – 28 February 2009
Grassroots HREDC
P.O Box 13, Takuapa Office, Takuapa, Phang Nga 82110, Tel (076) 420-351
Thinking Big in Crisis Time-JAPAN
http://www.ips-dc.org/articles/1162
Op-Ed by John Feffer.
Published March 12, 2009 12:00AM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan has entered a season of grand strategising. Government commissions, business associations, leading foundations, and academic working groups are all developing blueprints for a new, 21st-century Japanese role in the world.
It might seem like the worst possible time for Tokyo to think big. The global economic crisis is hitting Japan hard. The current government of Taro Aso is scraping the bottom of public opinion polls.
And with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party poised to suffer a game-changing defeat in the upcoming elections, the domestic political environment is chaotic to say the least.
Michael Green, the Japan chair at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, counter-intuitively believes the time is ripe for such grand strategising on Tokyo’s part.
Citing Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Nixon — who all produced grand strategy in the midst of political turmoil — Green told a panel organised by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Washington, DC on Tuesday: "I am encouraged by Japanese domestic crisis. I think that a good grand strategy will come out of it."
One of Japan’s leading grand strategists of the liberal internationalist variety is Takashi Inoguchi, a professor at Chuo University in Tokyo who also believes that in crisis lies the opportunity for governments to craft grand strategies.
"I like to argue that at a time of great uncertainty and prevailing chaos, you have to have a certain strategy to solidify your strengths and alleviate your weaknesses," Inoguchi says. "Japan has many strengths but has not taken advantage of them. Japan also has many weaknesses, but these are getting worse."
To guide the Japanese government in its strategising, Inoguchi has issued six commandments.
Because of China’s rise, the potential for a modest decline in U.S. capabilities, and unpredictability on the Korean peninsula, he argues that "it is essential to enhance Japan’s self-defense capabilities."
This enhancement, Inoguchi hastens to add, should take place within a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and according to Japan’s constitution, but it should also include support of U.N.-sanctioned military operations.
Further, Tokyo should focus on bolstering its peaceful engagement with the world through participation in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, and development programs.
This active engagement should be accompanied, Inoguchi argues, by an "aggressive legalism" in which Japan plays a strong role in the development and promulgation of rules in multilateral settings.
Finally, Inoguchi maintains, Japan should be an idea leader in the world. And, as a non-member of the nuclear club, it should work toward the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, an associate professor at Canada’s Simon Fraser University, offers a realist counterpoint to Inoguchi’s six commandments. Instead of focusing on how to supply international public goods, Japan should instead evaluate its position according to the global distribution of power.
Looking toward 2025, Kawasaki imagines a multipolar system divided into two major blocs. In the status quo bloc are the United States, the European Union, and Japan. In the bloc of rising powers are China, Russia, and India.
"Japan’s overall objective," Kawasaki argues, "is to help maintain the global balance of power in favor of the status quo and avoid war with rising powers like China." In this context, Japan should resist any divisions in the status quo camp, particularly in the alliance with the United States, and simultaneously cultivate better relations with India and Russia.
Finding merit in both camps, Green endorses Japan’s quest for greater soft power. Japan routinely tops the surveys of countries most respected in the world - for its global engagement on diplomacy and development as well as for its commitment to multilateralism.
"Japan is a leading nation on environmental technology and improving energy efficiency, and it can leverage that technology," Green said citing as example cutting-edge soft power.
However, Green adds, "Japan is most influential when it has money and good people behind its ideas. Japan was influential in the Cambodian peace process because it put money behind it and deployed people to implement policy."
At the same time, Green urges Japan to strengthen its security policy. But instead of focusing on new military capacities, such as a unilateral counterstrike capability, he prefers that Tokyo team up with neighbors such as Australia to address China’s rising military power.
Green was uncomfortable with Japan resigning itself to middle-power status. "I want an ambitious Japan internationally," he says. Japan’s grand strategy should be a "marriage of an external balance-of-power view with progressive social policy at home."
Such progressive social policy — more liberal immigration laws, greater empowerment of women — would begin to address Japan’s significant demographic problems. Japan’s population is expected to drop by 20 percent by 2050.
Not everyone puts a strengthened alliance with the U.S. at the heart of Japan’s grand strategy. Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor at Australian National University and author of ‘Client State: Japan in the American Embrace’, believes that Japan should respond to the current economic and environmental crisis in a fundamentally different way.
"I am convinced that the door to serious grappling with these issues will not be opened till Japan gains independence, grows out of its dependent subservience on the United States, renegotiates that relationship, and attains ‘popular sovereignty’ (shuken zaimin, as the constitution puts it)," McCormack says. "Only then will Japan be able to look seriously at its past, its neighbors, and the world."
Japan’s grand strategy depends a great deal on leadership. "The leadership doesn’t worry about the long term. They worry about corruption and making mishaps in their statements," Inoguchi observes. "It is very hard to raise the standard of leadership."
Many Japanese await the next Junichiro Koizumi, the charismatic prime minister from 2001 to 2006. "In terms of leadership styles, Japan has had strong leaders who haven’t talked at all," Green notes. "There are many younger politicians on both sides of the aisle who are impressive. Their time will come. But no one will be able to do anything without a mandate and more time in office than one year."
"It won’t necessarily be a Koizumi," Green concluded. "And remember, Koizumi in the 1990s was not considered a very serious candidate."
Material published and distributed by the Institute for Policy Studies represents the views of the author(s) and does not necessarily represent the views of the board members or staff of IPS or its projects. IPS is committed to sponsoring a broad public dialogue about U.S. domestic and foreign policy and the role of the United States in the world.
1112 16th St. NW, Suite 600, Washington DC 20036 [map]. 202-234-9382 . info@ips-dc.org
Except where otherwise noted, content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
In Russia, criminal ties to government fuel impunity
http://cpj.org/blog/2009/03/in-russia-criminal-ties-to-government-fuel-impunit.php
By Sergei Sokolov/Deputy Editor, Novaya Gazeta
In Russia, even official statistics present a depressing picture: Contract-style murders of journalists, more often than not, remain unsolved. Even the rare investigations that result in trials do not answer the main question: Who ordered the killing?
Such was the case of Larisa Yudina, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Sovetskaya Kalmykiya Segondnya who was killed in 1998; such, too, was the case of Igor Domnikov, the slain Novaya Gazeta editor.
One can draw several conclusions from this. The main one criminals can draw themselves: Killing journalists is allowed, no one will be punished for it, and no one will seriously investigate the crime. Journalists in Russia can be beaten, they can be threatened, and none of the law enforcement structures will look into their appeals or follow up on their reports. All this creates an atmosphere of impunity, which nourishes only one thing--the continued growth of crimes against journalists.
Why are we in this predicament? How is it that journalists who investigate corruption and wrongdoing by government officials are being killed or beaten? Why is it so dangerous for those who study the criminal underworld, which is fully controlled by Russian law enforcement agencies and secret services? It is so because "servants of the law" represent the main criminal powers in our society and country. And they won't ever capture themselves.
The investigation of any crime or corruption charge can expose the entire pyramid of the criminal underworld--of which officials of various levels and law enforcement agents from various structures constitute an integral part. Journalists are the main enemies of the criminal state in Russia. And this criminal state not only does not want to guarantee journalists their right to press freedom. And it does not want to guarantee them their right to life.
Editor's note: Four Novaya Gazeta journalists have been murdered since 2000.
Wrong man for the wrong flower
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/letters/1876-wrong-man-for-the-wrong-flower.html
by John Moe
Monday, 23 March 2009 11:24
Dear Editor
Burmese and Singaporean pro-democracy activists should be outraged over the Singaporean government’s latest act of adulation shown toward Burma’s military rulers, the christening of a new orchid at the National Orchid Garden named after Burma’s unelected Prime Minister, General Thein Sein.
Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders have failed to contemplate whether the hypocritical Burmese general deserves to have an orchid, the "Dendrobium Thein Sein", named after him. Instead, the government of Singapore continues to direct its relations with Burma’s military junta according to the principle of economic self-interest – utterly ignoring the desires of ordinary Burmese.
Singapore's bilateral trade with Burma reached 1.2 billion dollars in fiscal year 2007-08, with Singapore standing as Burma's third largest trading partner. The total amount of Singaporean exports to Burma accounted for 816.3 million dollars, while imports from Burma amounted to 401.8 million dollars.
Yet, amidst a vibrant trade relation, leaders of the Lion City seldom have a critical word for Burma’s men in green. The Singaporean government rarely mentions the situation of either the democratic process or human rights in Burma. Nonetheless, true-hearted Singaporean activists continue to show their concern for Burma and detained Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
Recently, Singaporean activists dedicated a bouquet of eight orchids in honor of the 8-8-88 uprising of August 8, 1988. On that day, student protests spread throughout Burma. Hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of life – monks, children, university students, housewives and professionals – demonstrated against the then government. However, the military violently suppressed the aspirations of the people. Do PAP leaders know of the role of Prime Minister General Thein Sein during the 8-8-88 uprising and subsequent crackdown?
Actually, as opposed to their naming of a flower after a general of the Burmese junta, leaders of a first world country – such as Singapore – should honor a world class democracy icon such as Aung San Suu Kyi with a garden and street dedicated to her.
It should be remembered that just as Singapore has a founding father in Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Burma has its own in Aung San, the father of the now embattled opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
In fact, Singapore government is well aware of the corruption within Burma’s military and their mismanagement of the economy. Commenting on the extravagant nature of the wedding of Senior General Than Shwe’s daughter, Lee Kuan Yew said, "Flaunting these excesses must push a hungry and impoverished people to revolt," and that the ruler's daughter looked "like a Christmas tree" in the video.
Lee further once commented that Burma's ruling generals “are rather dumb generals when it comes to the economy. How could they so mismanage the economy and reach this stage when the country has so many natural resources?"
Current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong should be aware that according to the 1990 general election result, Aung San Suu Kyi earned the right to be Prime Minister, as leader of the National League for Democracy, but that the military to this day continues to deny her this right.
As a matter of fact, the PAP government very much hesitates to appreciate a democracy icon such as Aung San Suu Kyi. Instead, thousands of Burmese nationals who are working in Singapore find a flower-naming ceremony in recognition of Burma’s current military Prime Minister hugely demoralizing.
While Burmese are overwhelmed with the solidarity and support they receive from Singaporean activists, such as the gift of the eight orchids, these actions should not be misunderstood as in any way coming from PAP – which instead insists on standing alongside Burma’s military leaders.
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Myanmar asks Thai help with ethnic rebels
http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20090323-130551.html
Mon, Mar 23, 2009
AFP
BANGKOK (AFP) - Myanmar's military government has asked Thailand to help negotiate with ethnic minority groups still battling junta rule ahead of elections promised for next year, a Thai minister said Monday.
Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya, who has been visiting Myanmar since Sunday, said that his counterpart Nyan Win and Myanmar Prime Minister Thein Sein asked for Thai assistance.
"Myanmar has confirmed that the election will be held next year and Myanmar has asked Thailand to help talk with minority groups to join in the reconciliation process," Kasit told reporters by telephone from Myanmar.
"Thailand is willing to help," he said.
Myanmar has been ruled by the military since 1962 and ignored the results of the last election in 1990, instead keeping the victorious opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for most of the last two decades.
The generals have promised multi-party elections in 2010, but democracy activists say the polls are simply a ruse to entrench military rule because Aung San Suu Kyi is barred from participating.
Kasit said that Myanmar government officials told him "they are listening for Aung San Suu Kyi's position", but gave no further details.
Myanmar's junta partly justifies its firm grip on power by claiming the need to fend off ethnic rebellions which have plagued remote border areas for decades.
The impoverished nation formerly known as Burma is home to at least 135 different ethnic groups, but over the years most rebel groups fighting central rule have reached ceasefire agreements with the junta.
Kasit singled out the Karen National Union for possible talks, a group which has been fighting for independence since 1949.
Tens of thousands of Karen civilians have fled fighting in the past two decades and crossed the border to refugee camps in Thailand.
"If Thailand helps talking with minority groups, maybe the problems on the border will be resolved too," said Kasit, who returns to Thailand later Monday.
In Burma, Even a Sham Election Is a Cause for Hope
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887085,00.html
Sometimes the tea was bitter. Others it was cloyingly sweet. But the whispered questions at teahouses across Burma were always the same: What did I, as an American who had the good fortune to vote in one of the most exciting presidential races in recent memory, think of Burma's upcoming national elections?
Two decades after ignoring the results of Burma's last polls, the country's long-ruling junta has promised another electoral exercise next year, most likely by spring. Few doubt that the generals' henchmen will stuff ballot boxes to try to ensure that the opposition doesn't prevail as it did back in 1990, when the National League for Democracy (NLD) crushed the military's proxy party. (In a troubling portent last year, official approval of the May 10 constitutional referendum was tabulated at a credulity-straining 92.4%.) But the query put to me in teahouses across the country got to the heart of a fundamental political dilemma: Is an election, even one that surely will be as flawed as Burma's promises to be, better than nothing at all? (See pictures of destruction in Burma after Cyclone Nargis.)
My answer, of course, was less important than what Burmese living under one of the world's most Orwellian regimes thought. What they said surprised me. Yes, some deemed the elections "useless." Others conceded that the obstacles to even a semblance of electoral freedom are formidable. Before a single vote is cast, Burma's elections will be rigged. The newly minted constitution ensures that top leadership posts are reserved for the military, which, above all, appears to be motivated by self-preservation. Many members of the political opposition — including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who still languishes under house arrest — have been excluded from participating in the polls by regulations both arcane and outlandish. This month, five members of her NLD were arrested, joining an estimated 2,100-plus political prisoners who suffer in Burmese jails — double the number from two years ago, according to a recent United Nations report. Some opposition parties have vowed to boycott the elections unless the prisons are cleared of political detainees.
But even as Burmese friends piled up caveats as high as the spires of the tallest pagoda, I could sense an awakening political consciousness that excited them. One young man in a remote town confided that he and his friends had organized a study group to debate the merits of electoral politics. (One of the participants also contributes to society by offering a free class called "The Secrets of Gmail: A Pre-Advanced Course.") In northern Burma, where minorities recall that ethnic-based parties came in second and third in the 1990 polls — the army's party finished fourth — former insurgent groups often bogged down by infighting are now considering electoral alliances. A strategic show of unity could easily fracture into shards of self-interest, particularly as the junta tries to drive wedges within and between tribes. But without an electoral catalyst, there might be little prospect for an end to intra-ethnic squabbling.
Nearly a decade ago, I covered village elections in China, where the victors — farmers in Mao suits with dirty fingernails — were barred from taking office by the incumbents and eventually jailed on trumped-up charges. One man was so harassed that he committed suicide. This doesn't sound like a heartwarming tale of democracy's triumph. But what has since evolved in these villages — despite all the injustice — is a dawning sense that people, even poor people, have rights. In societies cowering under oppression, such a realization is revolutionary.
Sipping tea in one Burmese town, I listened as a companion recalled his favorite line from the U.S. presidential inaugural address by John F. Kennedy: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." Sitting between us was a shy young man who practiced this new English sentence over and over, savoring Kennedy's rhetorical flourish. The words took on a strange quality in Burma, a place where people don't expect their country to do much of anything for them. But the young student was willing to take up the challenge of the other half of Kennedy's equation. "It's my responsibility to my country to teach people about the elections," he said. "People say they are stupid, but we have nothing else to look forward to." I watched as the English-speaking waiter loitering a little too close to our table grinned. But it wasn't a smile of condescension from a government informant. It was a smile, I think, of hope.
South Africa’s decision to ban Dalai Lama outrages Nobel peace laureates
http://blog.taragana.com/n/south-africas-decision-to-ban-dalai-lama-outrages-nobel-peace-laureates-20758/
LONDON - Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama has been barred from entering South Africa to take part in a peace conference linked to the 2010 football World Cup, plunging the country into a diplomatic row.
The decision was met with outrage by fellow Nobel peace laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the former President F. W. de Klerk, who are organising the conference on March 27 with the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee.
Archbishop Tutu urged the South African Government, which has close ties to China, to reconsider its “disgraceful” decision and threatened to boycott the meeting, planned to promote the first World Cup tournament to be held in Africa, The Times reported.
“If His Holiness’s visa is refused, then I won’t take part in the upcoming 2010 World Cup-related peace conference. I will condemn the Government’s behaviour as disgraceful, in line with our abysmal record at the UN Security Council, a total betrayal of our struggle history.”
“We are shamelessly succumbing to Chinese pressure. I feel deeply distressed and ashamed,” he said from California.
South Africa vetoed proposals for tougher sanctions against Zimbabwe and Burma when it occupied a non-permanent seat on the Security Council last year.
An invitation to the conference was also issued in the name of Nelson Mandela, another laureate. He has not yet reacted to the Government’s decision.
A senior presidential aide told The Times that the Dalai Lama’s presence in the country “would not be welcome as it would divert attention away from the World Cup” towards the Tibet issue.
Dave Steward, a spokesman for the F. W. de Klerk Foundation, said that the former President has expressed concern to the presidency and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
South Africa is China’s main trading partner in Africa and accounts for more than 20 per cent of Beijing’s trade with the continent. (ANI)
Singapore urges Myanmar to reconcile with opponents
http://sg.news.yahoo.com/rtrs/20090318/tap-myanmar-singapore-c3bb44c.html
By Nopporn Wong-Anan
SINGAPORE, March 18 - Singapore urged Myanmar's military rulers to reconcile with the opposition and engage with West, even as the junta renewed a crackdown on pro-democracy activists.
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong told his Myanmar counterpart Thein Sein on Tuesday the city-state would "do what we can" to help the junta revive ties with the United States and Europe.
"Countries are grappling with the financial crisis, and asking themselves what is the most effective way to conduct their affairs with other regions," said Lee, whose People's Action Party has governed Singapore since independence in 1965.
"We hope Myanmar will seize this moment to take bolder steps towards national reconciliation and in engaging the international community," he said in a dinner reception speech.
The junta, which has ruled the former Burma since 1962, has refused to recognise a 1990 landslide election victory of the opposition National League for Democracy. Its leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest for most of the past two decades.
Hours before Lee's banquet speech, an NLD spokesman said Myanmar authorities had detained five of its members in Yangon last week, but did not know why. It was the latest in a series of arrests of pro-democracy activists ahead of an election next year, the last step in the junta's "roadmap to democracy".
Western governments have criticised the poll as a sham aimed at entrenching military rule.
WEALTH MANAGEMENT
Lee's remarks came as a U.N. investigator called on the junta to release more than 2,100 political prisoners and allow them to take part in the election.
Tomas Ojea Quintana, U.N. special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, also urged the military to halt its use of civilians in forced labour. [NLH943136]
Washington, whose sanctions on Myanmar include freezing assets of the ruling generals, wants the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations , which includes Singapore, to press for reform and political progress in Myanmar.
But Singapore, a strong U.S. ally and a growing centre for wealth management, has opposed sanctions on Myanmar and is believed to be home to the generals' offshore bank accounts.
Lee said resource-scarce Singapore would continue to develop business opportunities in resource-rich Myanmar, urging the junta to provide a "stable environment for businessmen to operate in, and take concrete steps to remove barriers and bureaucratic hassles".
Critics say the junta has turned the "Rice Bowl of Asia" into one of Asia's poorest nations, but the regime says it is pursuing its own seven-step "roadmap" to democracy and shrugs off calls for reform.
On Wednesday, Singapore's state-run Botanic Gardens hosted an "Orchid Naming Ceremony" for Thein Sein, the number four in the junta's hierarchy, a ceremony that the government traditionally conducts to honour visiting dignitaries.
Three Singaporeans at the gardens tried to present a bouquet of orchids to Thein Sein to give to Suu Kyi, and called for her release. Protests are rare in Singapore and gatherings of five or more people are illegal without a police permit.
"We feel it would be more fitting for the orchid flower to be honoured in the name of Miss Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the rightful leader of Burma," the protestors said in a statement. (Additional reporting by Kash Cheong; Editing by Neil Chatterjee and Bill Tarrant)
Email StoryIM StoryPrintable ViewBlog This Recommend this article
Average (1 vote)Recommend it: Most Recommended Stories »
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Related Articles: Singapore
Electric scooters to hit the roads from AprilChannel NewsAsia - Thursday, March 26
Gulf leaders confident of weathering economic storm, says President NathanChannel NewsAsia - Thursday, March 26
Reuters Southeast Asia News Highlights 0900 GMT March 25Reuters - Thursday, March 26
Singapore’s internet radio streaming dries upChannel NewsAsia - Wednesday, March 25
Singapore
Backpack doctors risk Burma's wrath
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/21/MNG216DFEU.DTL
(03-22) 04:00 PDT Mergui-Tavoy District, Burma -- Eh Dah Zu, a petite, 24-year-old woman, peeled back layers of white plastic and cloth wrapped around a sugarcane stalk - a prop simulating bone, muscle and skin - before cutting it with a thin cable saw to simulate an amputation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Images
View Larger Images
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
More News
Agency votes to raise NYC subway fares to $2.50 03.25.09
Administration seeks action on financial overhaul 03.25.09
Man slain in Union City garage 03.25.09
NZ charges Samoan woman after in-flight birth 03.25.09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The exercise, part of a trauma skills workshop in eastern Burma, was a stark reminder that there are no doctors or hospitals in this war-ravaged sliver of mountainous jungle near Thailand, where ethnic minorities have resisted the Burmese army for 60 years. The country's military junta provides little health care, or access to international humanitarian groups for an estimated 500,000 displaced villagers, many of whom suffer from rampant malaria, malnutrition and one of the world's highest rates of land-mine injuries.
In response, Burmese refugees in Thailand developed a unique program, effectively sneaking health care into their own country: A network of tiny mobile clinics now dot eastern Burma, where medics like Eh Dah Zu carry medical supplies in backpacks, walk for weeks through remote jungles and risk capture and injury to reach patients.
Essential health services
"It's extraordinary, and one of the only examples that exists in the world where refugees and displaced persons themselves are going back into their country to provide essential health services in a situation of clear state failure," said Dr. Chris Beyrer, professor of epidemiology and director of the Center for Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
The military junta, known officially as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, likens this health program to aiding the enemy. Since 1998, seven medics and one midwife have been killed by soldiers or land mines, dozens more have been captured and beaten, and their families threatened, according to human rights reports.
Aye Chan, a 28-year-old medic, has been chased and shot at. Four years ago, soldiers detained his father, demanding seven buffalo and $400 in exchange for his life. He paid them and then fled his village. Aye Chan has not seen him since. Like other health workers, he depends on villagers and armed guards for information to escape capture.
"If the SPDC is close, my heart beats fast, knees shake," Aye Chan said. "We are fleeing, so there's no time to feel scared. What I am afraid of is losing my backpack. Then I have no supplies, no way to treat patients."
Once considered the rice basket of Asia, decades of military rule in Burma, which is also known as Myanmar, have taken a blunt toll. The junta's top generals have reaped profits from mining, natural gas and logging, while reducing the resource-rich country to one of the world's poorest: Burma ranked 135 out of 179 countries in the United Nations' 2008 Human Development Index, and is tied with Iraq as the second most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International's 2008 rankings.
Exodus of Burmese
Politics and economics have pushed more than 1 million Burmese into neighboring countries over the past two decades, with another 1 million undocumented migrants in Thailand alone.
Pro-democracy activists, along with the country's numerous ethnic minority groups, have long been at odds with the government, and none longer than the Karen. Shortly after Burma's independence from Britain in 1948, the Karen National Liberation Army launched a war for autonomy now entering its sixth decade - the oldest civil conflict in the world.
A government counterinsurgency campaign in eastern Burma has demolished thousands of Karen homes, destroyed crops and conscripted civilians as slave laborers, human rights groups say. As a result, the region has one of the world's highest maternal and child mortality rates.
Training medics is key
Medic Eh Dah Zu spent four months hiking through the jungle before returning to the Thailand-Burma border region to attend training sessions, deliver patient data, and pick up supplies for her next stint. She earns $20 a month, which covers little more than the rice, chili oil, and seasonings she carries along with a medical kit containing a knife, malaria medicine, antibiotics, intravenous solution, gloves, sutures and anesthetic.
"The villagers are in a bad situation," Eh Dah Zu said. "I feel good, that this is helping my people."
But she has had her share of close calls. Last year, she pretended to be a villager's daughter after soldiers abruptly appeared.
But such risks seem to be no deterrent in recruiting staff for the backpack doctor program.
At a trauma workshop held last month at a village called Tee Moo Kee, Dr. Larry Stock, 47, clinical professor at UCLA medical school, and a member of Berkeley's Planet Care/Global Health Access Program; and Frank Tyler, 43, a paramedic and director of operations with Australian Aid International - ran through a gamut of trauma skills, from basic emergency first aid to surgical procedures.
"If they pick up 10 percent of the material, that's fine," said Stock, who trekked to the jungle training site in a region off-limits to foreigners. Such sessions can teach students how to stop bleeding, create an airway, saw through bone - skills that helped Eh Dah Zu save the life of a villager in 2007 after his left foot and ankle were blown off by a land mine.
"There's no backup out here. They can't refer a patient," Stock said. "These medics are it."
Mobile medics
In 1998, with spiraling mortality and disease in eastern Burma, refugee leaders in Thailand created the Backpack Health Worker Team. The organization is the backbone of a mobile health system capable of operating in a region where government troops and ethnic minority rebels have waged war for decades.
China's "barefoot doctors" of the 1960s provided the inspiration. But while Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution celebrated its rural health corps, Burma's military junta considers it aiding the enemy.
With technical support and funding from a dozen international relief groups, the backpack health program has trained and equipped more than 1,700 medics, health workers, midwives and village volunteers. These health workers provide free emergency, primary and preventive care to an estimated 270,000 impoverished villagers in eastern Burma, the Backpack Health Worker Team says.
For more information: Planet Care/Global Health Access Program: ghap.org; Mae Tao Clinic: maetaoclinic.org; Backpack Health Worker Team: www.geocities.com/maesothtml/bphwt - Janet Wells
E-mail Janet Wells at foreign@sfchronicle.com.
This article appeared on page A - 8 of the San Francisco Chronicle
The Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia:
http://japanfocus.org/-Milton-Osborne/2448
Rivers, Dams, Cargo Boats and the Environment
Milton Osborne
When the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) released its list of the world’s top ten rivers at risk in late March, attention in Australia naturally focused on the fact that the Murray-Darling River system was one of those listed.[1] Very little attention was given in the Australian media to the other nine rivers so identified, which included the two longest rivers in the Southeast Asian region, the Mekong and the Salween. Both these rivers rise in the Himalayas in Chinese territory before flowing into Southeast Asia, and play a vital role for the populations in their basin areas; for the 60-70 million in the Mekong’s basin of nearly 800,000 square kilometres, and for the 6-7 million in the Salween’s basin of 272,000 square kilometres. The WWF’s claims about the risks facing the rivers it lists as ‘in danger’ are bound to generate controversy, with proponents of hydroelectricity sourced from dams bound to express scepticism. Nevertheless, current and future developments associated with both the Mekong and the Salween are certainly worthy of examination. For there is irrefutable evidence of the problems that can be caused by the construction of large-scale dams on previously free-flowing rivers. Moreover, a review of current developments associated with the Salween and the Mekong rivers is desirable at a time when environmental issues are increasingly a concern internationally. Such issues have particular relevance in Southeast Asia, both within individual countries and in terms of relations between individual Southeast Asian countries and their great neighbour, China.
Map 1: Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)
Source: International Rivers Network http://www.irn.org/img/nu/nu_map_pol.gif
In two Lowy Institute Papers, River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia (2004), and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia (2006), I discussed the many and complex range of relationships evolving between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours.[2] These relationships are multifaceted, involving politics, in the broadest sense, trade and economics, particularly as these relate to energy, and increasingly, for the mainland states, present and future environmental issues. A striking feature of all these relationships is the rapid pace of developments, so that snapshots of events taken at a particular moment rapidly become out-of-date. In this paper, and against that fast-changing background, I concentrate on two prominent current issues, principally involving China, Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand, and the Mekong and the Salween, as trans-national rivers.
The first of these issues relates to the controversies associated with plans for the construction of dams on the Salween River, the last free-flowing river in Southeast Asia; the second to developments associated with the greatly increased navigation of the Mekong River now taking place between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand. In the case of the Mekong, it is important to recognise that the rapid changes that have taken place in connection with navigation of the river should be seen as part of the much greater prospective changes to the river as a whole. These include the continuing program of dam construction being undertaken in China and new proposals which are contemplated in studies undertaken by the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Additionally, developments associated with various tributaries of the Mekong are a cause for concern. (These latter issues associated with the Mekong, and which are separate from the navigation developments, are discussed briefly in the Appendix to this paper.)
Long neglected outside the circles of advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the environment has increasingly become an issue of political importance in Southeast Asia and, now, in China.[3] While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that environmental concerns can, by themselves, determine government policy, there is no doubt that they have an importance that plays a part in decision-making, as demonstrated in the accounts that follow. The salience of this observation is given weight by the emphasis placed on environmental issues by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March 2007, when he said, ‘We must make conserving energy, decreasing energy consumption, protecting the environment and using land intensively the breakthrough point and main fulcrum for changing the pattern of economic growth.’[4] And in Thailand, a country which receives detailed attention in this paper, the environmental movement has played an increasingly active and politically important role for well over a decade, particularly in constraining the government from developing further dams to produce hydroelectric power within Thai territory.[5]
The Salween
Like the Mekong, the Salween River rises in Eastern Tibet at a height above 4,000 metres, where for several hundred kilometres it runs parallel to both the Mekong and the Yangtze, forming part of what is known as the ‘Three Parallel Rivers’ region. After passing through Yunnan, where it is known as the Nu Jiang, or ‘Angry River’, a reflection on the speed of its flow, it enters and flows through Burma. For a distance of some 120 kilometres during its passage through Burma it forms the national boundary between Burma and Thailand. It then resumes its course through Burma alone, finally emptying into the Gulf of Martaban at Moulmein. (For the purposes of this paper, I refer to the river under discussion as the ‘Salween’, when discussing its entire length and that section which flows through Burma and beside Thailand. I use the name ‘Nu’, or ‘Nu Jiang’ when discussing the river and its course in China. The river is also known as the ‘Thanlwin’ within Burma, a usage restricted to that country, but sometimes appearing in news reports generated in Burma but carried elsewhere.)
Although the second longest river flowing through Southeast Asia, the Salween at an approximate total length of 2,800 kilometres – this length is disputed, with some estimates giving its length as 3,200 kilometres – is much shorter than the Mekong (4,900 kilometres). The topography of the regions through which the Salween flows is sharply different from much of what exists along the Mekong’s course, particularly after the latter leaves China when it flows through a largely flat, immediately surrounding landscape. Until it reaches its delta in Burma, the Salween flows almost entirely through sharply rising gorges on either side of its banks. In Tibet and western Yunnan some of these gorges rise to a height of 3,000 metres above the river. Even in the region where the Salween flows between Burma and Thailand, where the height of the surrounding gorges is much reduced, the topography is such that it still provides an ideal physical setting for dam construction. (See Photograph 1 of the Salween taken at Ban Sam Laep, on the left [Thai] bank, where the river forms the boundary between Thailand and Burma.)
Photograph 1: Salween at Ban Sam Laep
Of great importance to any discussion of the Salween’s future as a prospective site for a series of dams is the rich biodiversity existing along its entire course. In addition there is a remarkably diverse set of minority ethnic population groups in the regions through which it flows, both in China and Burma. Indeed, the presence of ethnic minorities along the Salween in Burma has been the touchstone for the vigorous opposition to the plans for the construction of dams on the river from a varied range of advocacy NGOs, most particularly in Thailand. Both in Burma and in China there is concern among human rights advocates that dam building will lead to the displacement of populations. And this prospect, as discussed later, is seen by critics of the Burmese regime as yet another example of that government’s efforts to impose control over dissident minorities.
Map 2: Potential dam sites of the Salween River
Among advocacy NGOs concerned with environmental issues there has been considerable focus on the Three Parallel Rivers region already mentioned. This area was inscribed on the list of World Heritage sites in 2003 for its identity as the ‘epicentre of Chinese biodiversity’ which is ‘also one of the richest temperate regions of the world in terms of biodiversity’.[6] On the basis of a map published by the International Rivers Network, the designated Heritage area does not include the Nu itself, but rather is located close to the river’s right, or western bank, as well as taking in areas further east, close to the Mekong and the Yangtze. (See Map 1 entitled ‘Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)’, showing the course of the Nu and the sites of proposed dams in China.)
In both Burma and Thailand, areas bordering the Salween are rich in reserves of teak. And as is the case with the Mekong, the Salween is a major source of fish -- many of which are migratory -- for the populations living by or close to it, particularly in the rich agricultural region of its delta.[7]
What is planned, and why?
The possibility of constructing dams on the Salween River to generate hydroelectric power has been under discussion for some time, certainly for well over a decade. The plans under discussion fall into two categories: those for dams to be constructed in China, and those to be constructed either within Burma or on that section of the Thai-Burma border formed by the river. For the moment, and as detailed below, substantial uncertainty remains as to just how many of the dams will actually be built. What is more clear are the reasons why there are plans to build them, and why these plans have excited opposition. In the case of the dams projected for the Nu in China, the available evidence suggests that these have been conceived in the planners’ minds essentially for the provision of power to industry within Yunnan province.[8]
While Yunnan province, with its high concentration of minority peoples, was neglected by the Chinese central government for many years, it is now seen as an important region in Beijing’s ‘Develop the West’ strategy. And in this regard, it is now targeted for industrial development, particularly around the provincial capital, Kunming. Developing dams on the Nu for hydropower accords with the reasons behind the construction of the dams that have already been built or are under construction on the Mekong. (The dam currently under construction at Jinghong, in southeastern Yunnan, will be an exception to this general rule since it is designated to supply power to Thailand when completed.)
Among the dams planned for Burma, or on the Thai-Burma border, two are to be located in the Shan State. One will be at Tasang — which may consist of two linked reservoirs — while another, so far simply designated as the ‘Upper Thanlwin hydropower project,’ will be constructed further north on the river. Its exact location has not been given in news reports. Both are projected to be connected to the Mekong Power Grid, a project promoted as one of the programs developed within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) forum, with the backing of the ADB. Under this program, power generated by dams in Burma, China and Laos will supply electricity to Thailand and Vietnam. The dams planned for construction on the Thai-Burma border, at Wei Gyi and Dagwin, and possibly Hutgyi (also transliterated as Hut Gyi and Hatgyi), are projected to supply power to an even larger grid, the ASEAN Power Grid, a plan embraced by ASEAN with the goal of supplying electric power from a grid serving all ten member countries by 2011.[9]
China
Details of China’s current plans for dams on the Nu Jiang are not readily accessible, and the status of these plans is made more uncertain because of the lack of public information about the extent to which they are under reconsideration. The fact that there is this lack of information and uncertainty about Chinese plans is not surprising and conforms to a similar state of affairs in the early stages of the planning for dams on the Mekong. In the case of the Chinese dams on that river, very little was known about them outside of China until more than a decade after construction began on the first dam in the 1980s. This state of affairs reflects a Chinese view that it has no obligation to make public statements about developments within its own territory until a time of its own choosing. The account that follows is therefore open to qualification if and when new information becomes available.
It appears that a detailed proposal to build 13 dams on the upper section of the Nu was first put forward in 1999, by the State Development and Reform Commission. This were then elaborated in August 2003, when officials in Yunnan put forward plans which were subsequently approved by the central government.[10] The absence of information about the dams outside China was made strikingly clear when former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin admitted in December 2003, at a time when there was much public discussion about China’s plans for 13 dams on the Nu, that he had no knowledge of China’s intentions.[11] With the announcement of the plans it became clear that several of the dams would be located close to the Three Parallel Rivers heritage region, and their construction was set to involve the relocation of some 50,000 people.
To the considerable surprise of outside observers, the announcement that dams would be built on the Nu brought an unprecedented series of protests from within China itself, including from the Chinese Academy of the Sciences, two prominent Chinese NGOs, the China Environmental Culture Association and Green Watershed, as well as some prominent individuals. And an even greater surprise followed, given China’s poor record on showing concern for environmental issues, when the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, announced at the beginning of April 2004 that the plans to build 13 dams would not proceed and that the project was to be reconsidered.[12] Nevertheless, and without any further official statements having been made, a range of reports suggested that plans remained for four dams to be built on the Nu. In the absence of official statements it is necessary to rely on press reports in an effort to identify which dams were still likely to be built. And it may be that five, rather than four dams, will still be built.
So, despite the unavailability of firm information about China’s plans, it would certainly be wrong to assume that they have been completely shelved. There is evidence that officials in Yunnan were not reconciled to the announcement by Premier Wen, at least in the period shortly after he made it. According to an Associated Press report from 9 April 2004, the director of the Nu River Power Bureau in Yunnan, Li Yunfei, stated that he had not heard of any changes to the plans to construct dams. While this may only suggest that decisions taken in Beijing sometimes reach outlying provinces very slowly, there are other indications that preliminary preparations, at least, continue along the course of the river.
A detailed report of a journey along the course of the Nu in China in 2006 makes clear that preparations of various kinds, apparently linked to future dam construction, continue to be made. Published in the online journal, The Irrawaddy, of 28 February 2007, Rudy Thomas gives an account of visiting 12 of the 13 sites originally designated as dam sites.[13] Despite his reference to having visited 12 sites, Thomas in his article only refers specifically to activities at five sites as he travelled upstream from just above the Burmese border with China: these sites were at Yan San Shu, Saige, Abilou (this toponym is clearly a misprint for Yabilou), Maji and Songta. At none of these sites was actual dam construction taking place, in the sense that dam walls were being erected. Rather, what Thomas describes appears to be work preliminary to construction, such as core sampling, road construction and tunnelling.
In his article Thomas provides information on the planned size of two of the dams, those at Maji and Songta, that is consistent with the details provided by the International Rivers Network, by far the most active of all international advocacy NGOs in relation to river issues (see Table 1). At Maji, located ‘north of the riverside town of Fugong’, the planned dam will have a 300 metre high wall and will displace 20,000 people. While at Songta, ‘just north of the border that separates the Nu River Prefecture and the Tibetan Autonomous Region’, the planned dam’s wall will be 307 metres high, with a reservoir stretching back 80 kilometres. If these details are correct, the two proposed dams are very large, with dam walls roughly the same height as the Xioawan dam currently under construction on the Mekong. The dam at Xioawan is frequently spoken of as set to be the second largest dam in China after the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze. Another very recent reference to the Chinese dams on the Nu, in Asia Sentinel, states that Chinese construction crews ‘began the first efforts to dam the river this week’, that is, in the last week of February 2007.[14] Without further information, it remains unclear whether this report adds to the information provided by Thomas, or whether the reference is essentially to continuing preliminary construction works.
In contrast to the sizeable body of literature that exists discussing, and frequently condemning, the Chinese dams built on the Mekong for their predicted long-term detrimental environmental effects on the countries downstream of China, there has so far been little material published that analyses what dams built on the Nu will mean for the countries downstream of China: Burma and Thailand. The suggestion in the Asia Sentinel article cited above that the Chinese dams ‘are expected to raise government hackles in Rangoon’, is not borne out by other similar information or judgments. Given Burma’s extremely close relations with China, on which it is dependent in so many ways, it seems unlikely that the Burmese government would express a critical view of Chinese intentions, even if it did, indeed, hold concerns about the dams. At the same time, while NGOs which take an active role in relation to the proposed dams for Burma and Thailand make passing reference to possible developments in China, they have not developed arguments dealing with the possible effects of the Chinese dams in the downstream regions in the same manner as has been done in relation to the Mekong, and the effects on the countries downstream of China. Nevertheless, and when, as seems most likely, at least four dams will be built on the Nu, it is reasonable to expect that there will be more vocal and developed criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly in Thailand. This criticism is likely to be directed both at the possibility that Chinese dams will affect fish stocks in the river and at the human rights issues involved in population displacement.
There is little basis on which to assess China’s likely reaction to the protests that have been lodged in relation to the dangers to the heritage status of the proposed dams to be built in the Three Parallel Rivers region. As already noted, these protests have come from within China as well as from external bodies. The concerns expressed by the World Conservation Union were probably the most important of those coming from organisations outside China and which were considered at the twenty-ninth meeting of the World Heritage Committee meeting in Durban, in 2005. At that meeting the World Heritage Committee agreed to send ‘a reactive monitoring mission’ to evaluate the ‘progress made on the conservation of the property’, and to ‘assess the impact of planned dams on the outstanding universal values of the site, its integrity and downstream communities’.[15]
Before the monitoring mission made its visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, China submitted a statement to the World Heritage Committee, in January 2006, which stated that there were no plans for dams in the eight areas that make up the World Heritage site. The statement noted, however, that plans had been developed for hydropower stations (dams) adjacent to the site. Of these hydropower stations, to a total of 17, three were being considered for the Nu, with the others under study for the Jinsha (the upper reaches of the Yangtze) and the Lancang (Mekong) Rivers.[16]
Following their visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, the two-person monitoring team, composed of a representative each from UNESCO and the World Conservation Union, reported that the Chinese authorities with whom they consulted indicated an intention to reduce the area of the heritage area that had been inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2003 by approximately 20%, and more particularly that:
While the Mission noted the repeated commitment of accompanying officials to applying stringent Chinese laws and policies towards protection of the World Heritage Site, the evidence of intrusions from mining, tourism and proposed changes to inscribed boundaries and the lagging release of hydrodevelopment plans, continues to raise concerns about the future integrity of the inscribed property. The existing mining operations within some of the inscribed properties also suggest the possibility of listing the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger.[17]
At the Thirtieth Session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, in July 2006, and in the light of the monitoring mission’s report, the committee noted that although Chinese officials had given assurances that any future dams would not affect the World Heritage Site, this could not be corroborated since the mission’s members were not given any Environmental Impact Assessments or maps relating to the proposed dams that China intends to build. In addition, ‘evidence from maps, the inspection of hydro-power development exploratory works, unclear boundaries and advice on proposed dams in the vicinity of the World Heritage property suggest that direct and indirect impacts of dam construction on the property may be considerable’. Concluding that China’s positive conservation measures ‘are regrettably overshadowed by grave concerns about the, as-yet unreleased, plans for hydro-development’, the Committee called on China to submit a report by 1 February 2007 giving details on its plans for dams within the Site area.[18]
To date, I have not been able to find evidence that China has submitted the report the UNESCO committee requested. A lengthy report in the China Youth Daily of 17 July 2006 suggested that there was disagreement between national and local authorities about the possibility of building dams in the Three Parallel Rivers region, and that no ‘national approval’ had been given for the construction of dams on the Nu.[19] If reports such as those already noted suggesting, at the very least, that preparatory work for dam construction is already taking place are correct, this could be taken to mean that concerns to develop hydropower have trumped conservation considerations. If so, there is the likelihood that China will endeavour to retain the Three Parallel Rivers region’s heritage classification by excising the areas closest to the Nu, and other rivers from it. Whether this will be acceptable to the UNESCO Committee is difficult to assess, as is the degree of Beijing’s concern not to alienate international feeling as the 2008 Olympics draw ever nearer. The China Youth Daily reporter chose to be optimistic in concluding his article cited above with the comment that:
In the end the World Heritage Convention (sic) did not use its ‘yellow card,’ giving everyone a chance to rest a little easier, though we hope that at the next convention we will hear some good news about the Three Parallel Rivers Region.
Yet to conclude in this Panglossian fashion that ‘all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds’ may neither be justified, nor a reliable index of central government thinking on environmental issues. The World Heritage Committee appears to act in an essentially apolitical fashion in placing sites on its endangered list, and there is no certainty that it will not be ready to act in the same way in relation to the Three Parallel Rivers region. At the same time, and just as Wen Jiabao’s decision in 2004 to halt plans for the construction of 13 dams on the Nu was a surprise to many observers, the emphasis placed by the Chinese premier on environmental questions in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March suggests that it cannot now be assumed that the central government will simply disregard the World Heritage Committee’s concerns.
Thailand
Until the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, Thailand was deeply involved in planning for the construction of five dams on the Salween -- three in Burma and two on the border between the two countries -- after the river flowed out of China. This involvement reflected Thailand’s growing energy needs and concerns on the part of its Electricity Generating Authority (EGAT) to avoid building dams in Thailand itself, where they had become a highly controversial issue. Discussions about these dams began in 1994 when Thailand signed a preliminary agreement to purchase electricity from dams on the Salween that would be built in Burma. (Prospective sites for dams on the Salween are shown in Map 2.)
It was not until December 2005 that EGAT and the Burmese Ministry of Electric Power signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the construction of a dam at Hutgyi, in Burma, as the first of five planned dams on the Salween, either in Burma or on the Thai-Burma border. Later, in September 2006, EGAT was reported as finally formalising plans for the five dams, and as having stated that previous plans were being discarded since they could have been regarded as Thai interference in Burma’s domestic affairs. Under the December 2005 agreements between Thailand and Burma, preliminary plans were drawn up for dams that would be constructed at Hutgyi, Tasang, and a further unnamed location in Shan State, in Burma, and at Weigyi and Dagwin, where the river runs between Burma and Thailand. With an estimated total cost of US$10 billion, the dams were projected to be able to produce 10-15,000 MW of power, with Thailand receiving up to 90% of the energy produced. The remaining 10% generated was to be provided free to Burma. As of August 2006 an agreement was in place for the first dam to be built at Hutgyi by the major Chinese construction firm, Sinohydro, partly with Chinese funding, with work set to begin in December 2007.[20]
The plans for the Salween dams, as they stood before the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, attracted vigorous criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly those concerned with human rights, but also in relation to environmental issues. Prominent opposition political figures, such as former chairman of the Thai Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kraisak Choonhavan, were also active in condemning the planned dams.[21] The Tasang dam will, when constructed, be the largest dam in Southeast Asia, with a wall rising 228 metres and the capacity to generate 7,100 MW. During 2006 preliminary roadworks for access to the dam site at Tasang were carried out by a Thai real estate and construction firm, MDX. Now, in April 2007, reports have emerged stating that work has commenced on the dam proper. This news has coincided with the announcement of the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Burmese government and two Chinese firms for the construction of the Upper Thanlwin dam mentioned earlier in this paper, and which will have a generating capacity of 2,400 MW.[22]
Both the Tasang and Upper Thanlwin dam sites are in Burma’s Shan State, a region which has already experienced large-scale forced population relocation as part of the Burmese government’s concern to exercise control over dissident, and potentially dissident, minority populations. A variety of NGO reports estimate that up to 300,000 people have been forcibly relocated in Shan State over the past decade.[23]
Human rights issues, as these relate to ethnic minority dissidents, have also been raised in the case of the planned Hutgyi dam. The area in which the dam is to be built is home to members of the Karen minority, who have long opposed Burmese control, and there have been reliable reports of the Burmese government engaging in forced relocation of the population in the area as roads are built and villages are destroyed to make way for large-scale agriculture. One indication of the problems in the general Hutgyi area has been the increased flow of refugees across the border into Thailand. And as a sign of the militarisation of the area an EGAT employee engaged in survey work for the Hutgyi dam was killed by a landmine in May 2006.[24]
Following the military coup that ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin, the Energy Minister in the new interim Thai government, Piyasvasti Amranand, announced in October 2006 that he did not intend to go forward with the agreements reached between Thailand and Burma for the construction of five dams on the Salween. This announcement was greeted with surprise, but appears to accord with Piyasvasti’s reputation as an independent-thinking technocrat with well-established qualifications in the energy field. His independence was underlined by his decision to resign from his position as a deputy permanent secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, in 2003, following policy disagreements that included energy issues, particularly as these related to Thaksin’s hopes to privatise EGAT. In making his announcement, Piyasvasti mapped out his own view of how Thailand should meet its future energy needs, placing greater emphasis that had previously been the case on purchasing energy from Laos and sourcing gas supplies from the Middle East and from Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Nevertheless, and despite Piyasvasti’s announced decision not to proceed with the agreements Thailand had previously reached with Burma in relation to the suite of dams on the Salween, it has become clear that his government is still committed to the Hutgyi dam on the Salween.[25] And as already noted, construction of a dam at Tasang with the involvement of a Thai construction company has apparently begun.
Beyond the fact that this commitment will continue to be contested by human rights groups, and recently formed the basis of a major protest by advocacy NGOs on 28 February, the policies being followed by the interim Thai government that has replaced the Thaksin regime are clearly less accommodating to Burma than those of its predecessor. This policy, characterised by Thaksin as ‘forward engagement’, looked to Thailand’s closer association with the Burmese regime in a range of economic activities, of which dams on the Mekong was one of the most important. Other areas in which ‘forward engagement’ was to define policies included the proposed involvement of Thailand in the exploitation of gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal and also in projected mining and logging ventures. Given the increasing readiness of some ASEAN members to criticise the State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) regime in Burma, it will be of considerable interest to see whether this change in Thailand’s policies, with the decision to draw back in relation to the Salween dams as a key element, results in further pressure on Burma to make at least some gestures towards reform. There are few signs that this is likely.
Navigating the Mekong
When River at risk was published in 2004, clearance of obstacles to navigation in the Mekong River between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand had just been completed. This operation followed the signature, by China, Burma, Laos and Thailand, in April 2000, of the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Mekong-Lancang River, which envisaged the eventual clearance of the river as far as the former Lao royal city of Luang Prabang. Despite the Environmental Impact Statement for the clearance program delivered in 2001 -- in which China had a major input -- being sharply criticised by outside observers, clearance began the following year. Financed entirely by China, and with the work largely undertaken by Chinese work crews, 23 separate rapids, reefs and other obstacles were removed from the river bed to make possible year-round navigation of the Mekong by vessels up to 150 Dead Weight Tons (DWT) as far as Chiang Saen.[26]
Although the original plan for this first stage of the clearance operation envisaged obstacles being removed from the river as far as the Thai river port at Chiang Khong (and its Lao neighbour located directly across the Mekong, Huay Xai), unresolved boundary issues have meant that a final, major set of obstacles just upstream from Chiang Khong remain ― the boundary issues involved appear to relate to concerns on the part of Thai authorities that the removal of these obstacles might affect the thalweg, which is the national boundary between Thailand and Laos, as well as affecting the territorial status of sandbanks that regularly appear in the river during periods of low water. For the moment, with these obstacles still in place, Chiang Kong effectively functions as a terminal for Lao river vessels, but it is not accessible to large Chinese vessels that berth at Chiang Saen.
It also seems likely that no action has been taken to clear this remaining obstacle since there is a recognition that Chiang Khong will relatively soon become an important link in the road system that is being developed to run from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province in China, to Bangkok. This highway will pass through Laos and will eventually cross the Mekong over a bridge at Chiang Khong. Approval for the construction of this bridge has already been given by the Thai government.[27] As for the rest of the river clearance plan that was the subject of the agreement concluded between China, Burma, Laos and Thailand in 2000, and which would have seen clearance extend into Laos as far as Luang Prabang, there are no current signs that any of the parties are pressing for this to take place.
In terms of the parts played by the four parties to the 2000 navigation agreement since the clearances were completed, the roles of China and Thailand have been much more important than those of Burma and Laos. Burma’s interest in the Mekong, despite the river’s forming a national boundary, is limited by the fact of sparse settlement in the region past which the river flows. For the Burmese authorities the Irrawaddy River is of greater importance as a navigable waterway, a fact that is important to the Chinese, also, who see it as a future link in a road/river transport system that would give it access from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal. As for Laos, as noted below its vessels appear unable to compete with Chinese cargo boats over the cleared section of the river.
In terms of the expansion of navigation on the Mekong since 2004, what has occurred is remarkable, even though there is a dearth of accurate and fully up-to-date statistics to quantify developments. In China there are now two fully functioning river ports capable of handling cargo vessels throughout the year. These are at Jinghong, the last major settlement in southern Yunnan, and Guan Lei, an almost entirely new town only recently carved out of the surrounding jungle. Major dockworks were still being built when I visited Guan Lei, in February 2003, to board a cargo boat for travel down the Mekong. These dockworks have now been completed. And in Thailand substantial developments at Chiang Saen have made that river port, and current terminal for vessels coming downriver from China, both an important trade link and a settlement in the process of demographic transformation.[28]
As recently as 2006, most Chinese vessels coming to Chiang Saen were still loading and unloading their cargo a little upstream of the town. They did this by mooring next to a section of the river’s bank that had been concreted for stability. There, with gangs of labourers employed to shift the cargo, it was carried over planks stretched between the boats and the shore. This very basic method of shifting cargo was apparently designed to circumvent paying port charges. This was despite the existence of port facilities constructed by the Thai authorities as long ago as 2004. These facilities are now in full use, as I witnessed them in January of this year. They consist of two covered pontoon docks equipped with conveyor belts and ramps suitable for truck traffic. At the time I observed the port in action, the pontoon docks were servicing eight vessels. Despite the presence of the conveyor belts linked to each dock, much of the cargo handling was still being carried out by labour gangs, with the bulk of the cargo being unloaded from China consisting of fresh fruit and vegetables.
Some heavier goods were being loaded on to trucks on the docks and trucks were also being used to bring Thai palm oil and sacks of soybean meal as backloading of the Chinese vessels for their return trip. A mobile crane was also in use for even heavier items than those picked up or delivered by truck. In the light of the current activity around this existing port, there are plans to build a further facility downstream from Chiang Saen, which will be capable of servicing vessels up to 500 DWT.[29] Although some of my informants spoke of work already being under way for this new port, with feasibility studies supposed to have been completed by 2006, I did not see any indication of this during my visit to Chiang Saen. (See Photograph 2 of Chinese vessels moored at the existing Chiang Saen facilities in January 2007.)
Photograph 2: Chinese vessels at Chiang Saen
As a reflection of the Chinese dominance in this river trade, when I was in Chiang Saen, there were no fewer than 24 Chinese vessels in port and strung out over a distance of some kilometres along the river. This was in contrast to the three Lao vessels I observed, and the total absence of Thai vessels. Anecdotal accounts from Thai informants to whom I spoke in both Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong suggest that the imbalance between Chinese and Thai vessels travelling on the river is of the order of 90% to 10%. In general, Thai vessels are smaller and less powerful than their Chinese counterparts; this fact was the cause for some controversy and resentment during the 2003-04 dry season, when the Mekong fell to unusually low levels. Although this fall was certainly connected to an unusually short wet season and subsequent drought, there is no doubt that the low levels also reflected the fact that the Chinese authorities were holding back water discharges from their dams on the Mekong, at Manwan and Daochaoshan. They did this so that they could then release water in sufficient quantity for Chinese vessels to travel to and from Chiang Saen. The less powerful Thai vessels were unable to make the same transits in the relatively short period the river’s water levels remained navigable.[30]
There are no reliable statistics for the number of Chinese vessels using the port on an annual basis, though it is certain that the figure of 3,000 vessels claimed for 2004 -- an increase from 1,000 the year before -- has most certainly been exceeded. As for the figures for the trade that passes through Chiang Saen, unofficial figures compiled by researchers for the Indochina Media Memorial Foundation, in Chiang Mai, for 2006, show a balance heavily in Thai favour, with imports from China totalling approximately US$36 million, while exports to China were approximately three times larger at US$115 million.[31] These figures take little account of the impact China’s imports are having in northern Thailand, a point emphasised by former senator Kraisak Choonhavan, in conversations I had with him in both 2005 and 2007. He draws attention to the fact that the bulk of Chinese goods shipped into northern Thailand is made up of fruit and vegetables. These are often landed at prices against which local farmers cannot compete. This is particularly the case with garlic and onions, though there have been periods when poor growing conditions in China reversed this situation.
In March 2006 a little-publicised agreement was signed by Burma, China, Laos and Thailand to permit the transport of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan. Under this agreement, the amount of refined oil to be shipped from Chiang Saen was set at 1,200 tons each month. Although a relatively small amount, the agreement immediately sparked environmental concerns, not least because the oil was to be shipped in barrels rather than in specially constructed vessels, so that a collision or grounding of vessels carrying oil would pose a major risk to the Mekong and its fish stocks. So far there has only been a report of one shipment having been made, of 300 tons -- with 150 tons of oil being loaded on each of two vessels. But Chinese officials have indicated that they have much bigger plans in mind and have spoken of future shipments of up to 70,000 tons per year. In speaking in these terms, a Chinese official linked the shipment of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan with his country’s concern about the possibility of Middle Eastern oil shipments through the Straits of Malacca being blocked by the United States should there be conflict between China and Taiwan. Leaving aside the likelihood of such a development occurring, the suggestion that 70,000 tons shipped up the Mekong would represent a major answer to China’s energy security concerns appears to be a notable exercise in hyperbole. Today, even a moderately sized tanker carries that amount of oil. Possibly more to the point is the fact that Thailand subsidises the cost of oil so that shipments made by way of the Mekong will be landed in Yunnan at a lower price than would otherwise be the case for oil brought overland from Chinese coastal ports.[32]
Of considerable interest is the impact that the Mekong River trade is having on Chiang Saen town, and more generally within Chiang Rai province, within which the town is located. Until the early 1980s Chiang Saen, which I visited several times during that decade, was little more than an overgrown village beside the Mekong River. Once the site of a small, fourteenth century kingdom, whose walls remain to the present day, it and the river plains surrounding the town were the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Burmese armies in the eighteenth century, to the point where the settlement had almost disappeared by the nineteenth century. Although, by the late 1990s, Chiang Saen had grown in size and was used in a limited fashion as a terminal for trade between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand, its status was transformed by the navigation clearances completed in 2004. Most particularly, its growth in size has been accompanied by what, for want of a better word, may be described as its ‘Sinification’.
Chinese immigration into Thailand has, of course, a long history What is striking about developments at Chiang Saen, and in Chiang Rai province as a whole, is the rapidity with which a new Chinese element has become part of the demographic and commercial landscape. This change was well described by Joshua Kurlantzick, of the Carnegie Institute, in an article published in the Bangkok Post in October 2005, in which he wrote of the sudden burgeoning in the number of Chinese restaurants in Chiang Saen, signs in Chinese advertising cheap telephone calls to Yunnan and the apparently dominant presence of Chinese nationals in the town’s commerce.[33] The picture Kurlantzick offered appeared entirely justified in the course of my own visit in January 2007. But, more to the point, it is also the view of the range of Thai informants with whom I discussed the impact of Chinese in-migration, both legal and otherwise, into Chiang Saen and Chaing Rai province. These informants, who included a senior Thai politician, business figures in both Chiang Mai and Chiang Khong, and Thai NGO representatives, provided an anecdotal picture of unregulated Chinese immigration into Chiang Saen, with illegal immigrants marrying Thai women in order to regularise their status and become eligible to own land. In no case were my informants able to quantify the number of Chinese immigrants who had settled in the area around Chiang Saen, but there seems no basis for doubting the basic validity of their accounts.
One reason this is so is the quite clear indication that illegal and undocumented Chinese immigration into Burma, Laos and Thailand has been taking place for some time. It is now accepted that Lashio and Mandalay in Burma have Chinese populations exceeding 50% and 25% respectively. As recorded in The paramount power, illegal Chinese immigration into Laos is a real, if undocumented, fact, with the new arrivals ranging from poor rural peasants to minor businessmen. Chinese settlement in northern Thailand, in Chiang Rai province, is taking place at a time when there has been a major increase in Chinese commercial activity in the region, with the most active role being played by interests based in Yunnan. While the announcement of plans, such as those for an industrial estate in Chiang Saen, may not always proceed at the pace their promoters promise, the overall picture is one of Chinese corporations playing an increasingly active role in the region. According to Dai Jie, deputy director of Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, a three-phase project consisting of a ‘commodities city, duty-free zone and a supplier’s centre,’ close to Chiang Saen town, is set to be completed in 2014.[34]
As already noted in relation to the shipments of oil up the Mekong from Chiang Saen to Yunnan, the environmental costs of the commercial activity now centred around Chiang Saen are a subject for concern among the active Thai advocacy NGOs that monitor developments linked to the Mekong River. More generally, these groups draw attention to the decline in fish catches along the course travelled by vessels between Chiang Saen and Yunnan, and particularly in relation to catches in the area immediately around the town. They also argue that as a result of changes in flow patterns along the river between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong river banks and sandbanks used for horticulture in dry seasons continue to be adversely affected. These variations in flow patterns are, the NGOs argue, the product both of the dams that have already been built in China and of the negative hydrological effects of the clearances that have been undertaken to facilitate navigation.[35]
Concluding Remarks
The developments discussed in this paper point to the manner in which environmental issues, and frequently those issues combined with concerns relating to human rights, are playing an increasingly important part in the politics of the Asian region. Concern for the environment is no longer a fringe issue, and there is no more striking illustration of this fact than the domestic opposition that was mounted within China to the proposed dams on the Nu, and which sparked the important but unexpected reaction by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to step in and put plans for the construction of 13 dams on hold. Attention has also been drawn in the paper to the important part played by Thai environmental activists in relation to their government’s policies, both towards the Salween and the Mekong.
Although the broader issue of climate change has dominated global discussion of environmental issues, the politics of water, of its use and its availability are receiving ever-greater attention. And this is likely to be increasingly the case as the future use of rivers in China and Southeast Asia intersects with policies linked to energy and increased irrigation. The centrality of rivers and their exploitation to a broad range of political issues is strikingly illustrated in the two cases examined in this paper. In the case of the Salween, energy resources in China, Burma and Thailand, human rights in Burma and intra-ASEAN relations are all issues that stem from the contested future of a river. And for the Mekong, while attention has previously focused chiefly on China’s dam-building activities, the new navigation regime has raised environmental issues while playing a part in the increasing Chinese presence in northern Thailand. That UNESCO should now be involved in what is currently an unresolved issue over the heritage status of the Three Parallel Rivers region, through which the Nu, Mekong and Yangtze all flow, is a testimony to increasingly broad reach of environmental factors.
Neither the Salween nor the Mekong are close to the parlous state of China’s Yellow River, which is suffering from the combined effects of overuse, recurrent droughts, and the decrease of snow-melt as Himalayan glaciers contract in size. The river’s dire condition has prompted consideration within China of the possibility of a transfer of water from other rivers, including even one as far distant as the Yangtze, in an effort to return its flow to a healthy state. So while the Mekong and the Salween are currently in a notably healthy state by comparison with the Yellow River, and indeed, the lower reaches of the Yangtze, their futures are not automatically assured. The fact that both are vital to the well-being of the countries through which they flow make the matters examined in this paper issues of real consequence.
At another level, the issues examined in this paper reinforce the judgments made in The paramount power, as China’s involvement with the countries of Southeast Asia continues to grow. So, at the same time as China seeks to develop hydropower on the Nu within its own territory, it is closely involved through Chinese-based commercial companies in the developments taking place on the Salween beyond its borders. And, as is clear from the information provided on developments associated with navigation of the Mekong, China is both integral to the navigation process itself and becoming ever more deeply involved in the commercial life of Thailand’s Chiang Rai province, in which the river port of Chiang Saen is located. All of these developments reinforce a judgment that China continues to build on its previous successes in dealing with the countries of Southeast Asia — particularly those of the mainland region — to project further its influence on a peaceful basis and in cooperation with those states.
APPENDIX
A brief overview of current, and controversial, issues associated with the Mekong
The content of this paper has, in relation to the Mekong, been essentially concerned with navigation and associated developments. At a broader level, the release of two key documents during 2006 seems likely to spark further controversy in relation to the uses made of the river and the institutions that play a role in determining its future. These documents are: a Mekong River Commission (MRC) draft document, ‘Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No. 8, Flow-regime assessment,’ of February 2006, and a joint World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) working paper, ‘Future directions for water resource management in the Mekong basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy’, released in June 2006.
The first of these two documents has been released at a time when there is very active discussion about the future role of the MRC, in particular the extent to which it can play a role in which its trans-national responsibilities can supersede the interests of its four, individual national members.[36] And, most importantly, it bears on the question of the extent to which the MRC should play a role in promoting development (infrastructure such as dams and water diversion projects) as opposed to its role to date as, essentially, being a repository of knowledge about the Mekong River and its basin.[37] The particular salience of this latter issue is illustrated by the fact that the MRC document discusses in detail a range of predicted and costly effects that could occur in Cambodia -- where fish form the overwhelming source of the population’s protein intake -- in the event of three different ‘flow regimes’.[38]
The WB/ADB Working Paper, which, most usefully, should be read in conjunction with the MRC paper just discussed, states in its ‘Executive Summary’ that the ‘bottom line message of this Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy is that the analytical work on development scenarios has, for the first time, provided evidence that there remains considerable potential for development of Mekong water resources’. In the light of this conclusion, and conceived in terms of the river’s trans-national character, the paper urges a move away from ‘the more precautionary approach of the past decade that tended to avoid any risk associated development, at the expense of stifling investments’. While not disregarding risks, the paper argues that ‘balanced development’ should be ‘the driving principle for the management and development of the Mekong River Water resources in the coming years’.[39]
The issues involved in these two documents go the heart of the Mekong’s future and that of the people of the Mekong basin. As such they deserve extended analysis, which is beyond the compass of this brief note. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that should the assumptions in the two documents prove to be incorrect the cost in human terms could be high indeed. One of the reasons for this sombre conclusion is to be found in the problems that are already apparent in the case of infrastructure development on two rivers that are tributaries of the Mekong, the Se San and the Sre Pok, which rise in Vietnam but flow into the Mekong in Cambodia.
As discussed in River at risk, Vietnam’s decision to build dams on Mekong tributaries has resulted in substantial and damaging effects on Cambodian communities living downstream.[40] Despite the warm political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, no solution has been found to the problems caused by the presence of these dams and the consequences of water releases from them.[41] With the prospect of a very substantial increase in the number of dam projects being undertaken in Vietnam and Laos, some of which are on Mekong tributaries that are trans-national in character, the need to put in place a future, equitable governance of the Mekong system as a whole — an issue central to the MRC and WB/ADB documents — is clearly of great importance. The manner in which this issue is resolved, or a failure to do so, will be of the greatest importance for the 70 million people who live in this great river’s basin.
This article was originally published at Lowy Institute for International Policy, Ausutralian National University, May 2007. Posted at Japan Focus, June 11, 2007.
Milton Osborne is an Australian historian, author, and consultant specializing in Southeast Asia.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] World’s top 10 rivers at risk, Gland, Switzerland, WWF International, March 2007. The other rivers listed, in addition to the Murray-Darling, Mekong and Salween, were the Danube, La Plata, Rio Grande-Rio Bravo, Ganges, Indus, Nile and Yangtze.
[2] River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 02, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004; and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 11, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2006.
[3] China’s long history of pursuing policies without notable concern for the physical environment is charted in Mark Elvin’s, The retreat of the elephants: an environmental history of China, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2004. An important survey of contemporary environmental issues in China is Elizabeth C. Economy’s, The river runs black: the environmental challenge to China’s future, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2004.
[4] Jim Yardley, Chinese Premier focuses on pollution and the poor, New York Times, 5 March 2007.
[5] See Osborne, River at risk, pp 31-2, in relation to the Pak Mun dam and the subsequent policy shift by the Thai government.
[6] UNESCO World Heritage, Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas.
[7] Background information on the Salween is usefully provided in, The Salween under threat: damming the longest free river in Southeast Asia, published by Salween Watch, Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), and the Center for Social Development Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Chiang Mai, 2004. Although quite clearly an advocacy document, there is no reason to question the basic facts provided in it.
[8] Jim Yardley, Chinese project on the Nu-Salween River pits environmentalists against development plans, New York Times, 3 January 2005. See, also, Yunnan hydropower expansion: update on China’s power industry reforms & the Nu, Lancang & Jinsha dams, a paper prepared by Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research and Green Watershed, Kunming, People’s Republic of China, February 2004.
[9] For details of the ASEAN Power Grid, see here.
[10] Yardley, as cited in footnote 6.
[11] Bangkok Post, 18 December 2003.
[12] Osborne, River at risk, pp 12-13, and footnote 17.
[13] Please visit here.
[14] Nava Thakuria, India and Burma: such good friends, Asia Sentinel, 27 February 2007.
[15] Executive Summary, Report of a Joint Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas, China, from 5 to 15 April 2006, pp 2-3.
[16] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, Asia-Pacific, 8-16 July 2006, pp 5-6.
[17] Ibid, footnote 15.
[18] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, 8-16 July 2006, Asia Pacific, pp 7-8.
[19] Zhang Kejia, Three Parallel Rivers region focus on monitoring mission. China Youth Daily, 17 July 2006.
[20] These developments are summarised in Will Baxter, Dam the Salween, damn its people, Asia Times Online, 15 September 2006. See, also, Salween Watch Media Advisory, Press conference and submission of petition letter against the Salween Dams in Burma, 28 February 2007.
[21] Interview with Khun Kraisak Choonhavan, 9 January 2007, Bangkok.
[22] Myanmar signs deal with Chinese firms to build hydroelectric plant, International Herald Tribune, carrying an Associated Press report of 7 April 2007. The Chinese firms involved are, Farsighted Investment Group Company Limited and Gold Water Resources Company Limited.
[23] Shawn L. Nance, Unplugging Thailand, Myanmar energy deals, Asia Times Online, 14 November 2006.
[24] Will Baxter, Dam the Salween as cited in footnote 20.
[25] Will Baxter, Thailand and Myanmar at odds over Salween dams, Burma, Archives of global protest, 13 December 2006.
[26] This and the immediately succeeding paragraph draw directly on River at risk, pp 25-9.
[27] The Nation, (Thailand), 9 March 2004.
[28] I visited Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, most recently, over the period 15-17 January 2007. I first visited this region in 1979 and have continued to visit it on an irregular basis since that time.
[29] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong, South China Morning Post, 19 February 2004.
[30] See, River at risk, pp 19-20.
[31] Vaudine England, Trade turns Mekong into river of plenty, International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2006.
[32] On the oil shipment, see, Marwaan Macan-Markar, Sparks fly as China moves oil up Mekong, Asia Times Online, 9 January 2007.
[33] Joshua Kurlantzick, China stepping into US vacuum, Bangkok Post, 31 October 2005.
[34] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong.
[35] Montree Chantawong, The Mekong’s changing currency, Watershed: People’s Forum on Ecology, Vol. 11, No. 2, November 2005 – June 2006, pp 12-25.
[36] Philip Hirsch, Kurt Morch Jensen, with Ben Boer, Naomi Carrard, Stephen FitzGerald and Rosemary Lyster, Executive Summary, National interests and transboundary water governance in the Mekong, May 2006.
[37] For some very recent discussion of this issue, see, Richard P. Cronin, Destructive Mekong dams: critical need for transparency,’ RSIS Commentaries, a publication of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 26 March 2007.
[38] Mekong River Commission, Water Utilisation Program, Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No.8, Flow-regime assessment, Draft 1 February 2006, p 57.
[39] WB/ADB Joint Working Paper on ‘Future directions for water resources management in the Mekong River basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy,’ June 2006.
[40] River at risk, pp 32-4.
[41] For recent discussion of the Vietnamese dams, see, Montree Chantawong, as cited in footnote 35, and, Sam Rith and Cat Barton, Vietnamese dams proposed for Cambodian river, Phnom Penh Post, 21 September-5 October 2006. (In addition to the discussion of Vietnamese dams, Montree Chantawong’s article also provides details on flow variations, and their effects, in the section of the Mekong between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong).
Created by Data Momentum
Posts
