Peaceful Burma (ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းျမန္မာ)平和なビルマ

Peaceful Burma (ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းျမန္မာ)平和なビルマ

TO PEOPLE OF JAPAN



JAPAN YOU ARE NOT ALONE



GANBARE JAPAN



WE ARE WITH YOU



ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ေျပာတဲ့ညီညြတ္ေရး


“ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတာ ဘာလဲ နားလည္ဖုိ႔လုိတယ္။ ဒီေတာ့ကာ ဒီအပုိဒ္ ဒီ၀ါက်မွာ ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတဲ့အေၾကာင္းကုိ သ႐ုပ္ေဖာ္ျပ ထားတယ္။ တူညီေသာအက်ဳိး၊ တူညီေသာအလုပ္၊ တူညီေသာ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ရွိရမယ္။ က်ေနာ္တုိ႔ ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတာ ဘာအတြက္ ညီၫြတ္ရမွာလဲ။ ဘယ္လုိရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္နဲ႔ ညီၫြတ္ရမွာလဲ။ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ဆုိတာ ရွိရမယ္။

“မတရားမႈတခုမွာ သင္ဟာ ၾကားေနတယ္ဆုိရင္… သင္ဟာ ဖိႏွိပ္သူဘက္က လုိက္ဖုိ႔ ေရြးခ်ယ္လုိက္တာနဲ႔ အတူတူဘဲ”

“If you are neutral in a situation of injustice, you have chosen to side with the oppressor.”
ေတာင္အာဖရိကက ႏိုဘယ္လ္ဆုရွင္ ဘုန္းေတာ္ၾကီး ဒက္စ္မြန္တူးတူး

THANK YOU MR. SECRETARY GENERAL

Ban’s visit may not have achieved any visible outcome, but the people of Burma will remember what he promised: "I have come to show the unequivocal shared commitment of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar. I am here today to say: Myanmar – you are not alone."

QUOTES BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Without participation of Aung San Suu Kyi, without her being able to campaign freely, and without her NLD party [being able] to establish party offices all throughout the provinces, this [2010] election may not be regarded as credible and legitimate. ­
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

Where there's political will, there is a way

政治的な意思がある一方、方法がある
စစ္မွန္တဲ့ခိုင္မာတဲ့နိုင္ငံေရးခံယူခ်က္ရိွရင္ႀကိဳးစားမႈရိွရင္ နိုင္ငံေရးအေျဖ
ထြက္ရပ္လမ္းဟာေသခ်ာေပါက္ရိွတယ္
Burmese Translation-Phone Hlaing-fwubc

Thursday, March 19, 2009

A STATEMENT ON 21TH ANNIVERSARY OF BURMA’S HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

ANTI-DICTATORSHIP, PEOPLE’S FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN BURMA


A STATEMENT ON 21TH ANNIVERSARY OF BURMA’S HUMAN RIGHTS DAY
(March 13, 1988)



The brutal gunned down death of an engineering student of the famed Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) named Phone Maw on this day 21 years ago, ultimately culminated in the toppling of 26-year authoritarian rule of the late military despot Ne Win and another two successive rules of his Burma Socialist Program Party.

The students’ demands for justice for Phone Maw’s death led subsequently to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s debut on the political scene of Burma, heralding an era where the people of Burma made public their desire for freedom and majority rule worldwide. Non-violent political confrontation against the brutality was born along with the death of Ko Phone Maw, and widespread among the political oppositions ever since then.

Over twenty years, a sophisticated “symbolic action” by way of non-violence was overwhelmed among the oppositions both inside and overseas. It was very powerful movement appealing the international community’s sympathy and intervention against the regime’s continuous atrocities and human rights violations. We the oppositions had done a remarkable job pushing Burma’s agenda at the UNSC table to do what the world body has supposed to act upon finally.

The failure part of the UN with its useless rules and regulations, which kept on sending ineffective missions consecutively to Burma, had prolonged the confusion of the international community hoping something good might eventually came out of it for more than a decade. Finally, the UN’s failure to intervene the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007 has concluded that UN has no clue how to handle the regime that has set to go on its own legalizing its endless rule via 2010 elections regardless.

As a result, more than 2000 political prisoners are still held in prisons, not to mention Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and others deprived of their freedom and right to participate in the politics of their country also, has added much credulity and less credibility on the upcoming military farce 2010 elections, certainly to be rigged as most believed.

The prevailing circumstances have reminded us especially the opposition leaders and the ethnic leaders that this is the time for us to find an alternative way to go on our fight to bring down the regime. Remember, we did what we supposed to for twenty years. The failure part is not ours but the UN itself. As a result it is the time for us to abandon the ”UN Approach” and to engage in the “strategic action” that allow the people to join in our struggle by giving them the hope they desperately needed and by convincing them that we can bring down the regime on our own if we really are united. Daw Suu had repeatedly said that if you really want democracy, put your own effort. Don't wait for somebody else. You are the master of your soul. We are on our own to fight back the regime. We are the ones who can make up our own history by showing the world that we can achieve the international standard democracy at our own cost. Our courage, determination and unity will be tested in this battle.

Since we have been calling on the Anti-Dictatorship, People’s Freedom Movement for quite sometime, we strongly believe in the power of the people. While marking the 21TH ANNIVERSARY OF BURMA’S HUMAN RIGHTS DAY, we vow to fight for freedom and democracy in Burma along with the people of Burma until victory.



Campaign Planning Committee
Washington DC
USA
March 13, 2009





--- On Wed, 3/11/09, Bo kyauk wrote:

From: Bo kyauk
Subject: [8888peoplepower] Fwd: request letter to Burmese People
To: 8888peoplepower@ yahoogroups. com, aungmm210@gmail. com, winmaw.88@gmail. com, "Maung Soe" , shwedone1@yahoo. com, "steveyoker@ gmail.com" , nwin40@gmail. com, 007zawzaw@gmail. com, "ubazin kusala" , "min htay" , maungtoo@gmail. com, "Min Oo" , maunglwin8888@ gmail.com
Date: Wednesday, March 11, 2009, 1:11 AM

သို ့
ရဲေဘာ္မ်ားအားလုံး(မိမိကိုယ္ကို ဗမာႏိုင္ငံသားလို ့ခံယူထားသူအားလုံး) နည္းမ်ဳိးစုံတိုက္ပဲြထဲမွာ တန္ျပန္တိုက္ခိုက္ေရးလဲ လုပ္မွ ဒုတိယလြတ္လပ္ေရး ရမွာဗ်။ လက္မွတ္ေတြပဲ ထိုးဖို ့ တိုက္တြန္းမေနၾကနဲ ့ တန္ျပန္တိုက္ခိုက္ေရးအတြက္လဲ အားျဖည့္ဖို ့ လုပ္ၾကပါအုံး/




---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: wbu rf
Date: 2009/3/10
Subject: request letter to Burmese People
To: wailinnzin@gmail. com, bokyauk1967@ gmail.com


ဗမာႏိုင္ငံလုံးဆိုင္ရာ ပူးေပါင္းေတာ္လွန္ေရးအင္အားစု က ျပည္သူလူထုသို ့ ပန္ၾကားခ်က္ကို အားလုံးသို ့ ျဖန္ ့ေ၀ေပးေစလိုပါသည္၊


ေအာင္မင္းႏိုင္

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Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22847&prog=zch

Minxin Pei
Foreign Affairs, March 12, 2009

Until recently, most leading China watchers thought the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had become remarkably resilient. Through learning and adaptation, it seemed, the world's largest and most powerful one-party regime had become politically nimble and skillful enough to overcome difficulties that would have overwhelmed lesser autocratic rulers. For two decades, the party has compiled an impressive list of achievements: at home it has kept the economy growing at a gravity-defying double-digit rate, while abroad it has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy, avoiding confrontation with the United States and methodically gaining prestige and influence.

Because of the global economic crisis, however, Beijing is in trouble. The problems are numerous: China's exports are plummeting, tens of millions of migrant laborers have lost their jobs, millions of college graduates cannot find employment, industrial overcapacity is threatening deflation, and the once red-hot real estate sector has nose-dived. The country's faltering growth is posing the hardest test yet to the CCP's resilience.



To be sure, the Chinese economy has fared less badly than many others. The country's insulated banking sector remains largely unscathed. Indeed, the government's fiscal balance sheet is strong enough to fund a $580 billion stimulus package (although only about a quarter represents genuinely new fiscal spending). China's colossal $1.9 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provide a comfortable insurance policy against global financial turmoil, and the country should be able to avoid an outright recession.

But a reduced annual growth rate -- now down to about seven percent from over 11 percent a couple of years ago -- will bring enough trouble. Every year, the Chinese labor market grows by more than ten million workers, the bulk of whom are leaving the countryside for urban areas in search of employment. Each percentage point of GDP growth translates into roughly one million new jobs a year, which means that China needs GDP to rise at least ten percent every year in order to absorb the influx of laborers.

With no end to the global crisis in sight, many are wondering how long China's economic doldrums will last and what the political impact of stagnation will be. The conventional wisdom is that low growth will erode the party's political legitimacy and fuel social unrest as jobless migrants and college graduates vent their frustrations through riots and protests. Although this forecast is not necessarily wrong, it is incomplete.

Strong economic performance has been the single most important source of legitimacy for the CCP, so prolonged economic stagnation carries the danger of disenchanting a growing middle class that was lulled into political apathy by the prosperity of the post-Tiananmen years. And economic policies that favor the rich have already alienated industrial workers and rural peasants, formerly the social base of the party. Even in recent boom years, grass-roots unrest has been high, with close to 90,000 riots, strikes, demonstrations, and collective protests reported annually. Such frustrations will only intensify in hard times.

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite.

Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom.

The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news.

Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

If popular unrest is not a true threat to the party's continued rule, then what is? The answer could likely be disunity among the country's elite. Those who talk of China's "authoritarian resilience" consider elite unity to be one of the CCP's most significant achievements in recent decades, citing as evidence technocratic dominance, a lack of ideological disputes, the creation of standardized procedures for the promotion and retirement of high officials, and the relatively smooth leadership succession from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.

But there are reasons to remain skeptical of such apparent harmony -- arrangements of power that are struck in times of economic prosperity often come undone when crisis hits.

The current Chinese leadership is a delicately balanced coalition of regional, factional, and institutional interests, which makes it vulnerable to dissension. To most Western eyes, China is blessed with strong, capable, and decisive leaders. But to the Chinese leaders themselves, the situation looks somewhat different. Their resumés are remarkably similar, as are their records as administrators. No single individual towers above the others in terms of demonstrated leadership, vision, or performance -- which means that no one is beyond challenge, and the stage is set for jockeying for preeminence.

So far, the real glue that has held the CCP together is a vast patronage system that has been underwritten by a long period of economic growth. The regime has used its financial resources to balance domestic interests, satisfy different constituencies, and purchase the contingent support of China's social elites. But this patronage system is extremely expensive -- administrative expenses alone consume more than 20 percent of China's government budget, and over 40 percent of China's GDP comes from fixed-asset investments such as factories and warehouses -- a sector that is state-dominated and stuffed with pork. In other words, China's nonideological ruling elites have stuck with the party because it has been paying them off. But when economic hardship ends the easy handouts, the elites' support and loyalty to the system can no longer be taken for granted.

Rising social discontent may not be enough to force the party out of power, but it might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage. Such political entrepreneurs could use populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks.

Any of these sources of elite dissension could lead to confusion and turmoil within the Chinese state's repressive apparatus, rendering it less capable of containing social instability and thus creating a vicious cycle of events that could result in progressive destabilization.

Does this mean the CCP's rule is doomed? Not yet. The government has weathered the early stages of the crisis successfully, and even tensions within its upper ranks might yield something less than regime change. But as the economic slowdown continues, some political impact in China is likely -- and any change is apt to come from the top rather than the bottom.

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Limitations of the global human rights paradigm

http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/1832-limitations-of-the-global-human-rights-paradigm-.html

by Morten B. Pedersen
Thursday, 12 March 2009 10:18

Since the 1988 uprising, Burma campaign groups have adopted the standard approach of the transnational human rights movement everywhere, advocating shaming and sanctions to induce the military regime to comply with international norms.

This approach has propelled some significant advances at the global level. But it has mainly made inroads in countries which are substantially integrated into the international political and economic system. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that much of the progress is more apparent than real. While more and more governments are signing international human rights treaties, national implementation is halting far behind. Similarly, any celebration of the dramatic increase in the number of countries holding national elections for government office should be tempered by the failure of many of them to allow a genuine contest for power, never mind to provide broader human rights. Rather than the oft-proclaimed victory of liberal democracy, the post-Cold War era has seen the growth of electoral authoritarianism and illiberal democracy.



Shaming only works with rulers who are significantly concerned about their international reputation. As for sanctions, they rarely work under the best of circumstances and nearly always fail when directed against autocratic regimes for the purposes of bringing about broad reforms such as democracy and human rights. Even when changes do result, the fact that they have been forced upon governments by external pressure rather than originating internally in the countries in question means that they tend to only be skin deep.

In the case of Burma, these structural limitations of the global human rights paradigm should have set warning lights flashing. The country’s military rulers are deeply insular, steeped in a xenophobic nationalism which produces a highly defensive, indeed hostile, response to international interventions in what they perceive as their internal affairs. No Burmese officer could ever allow himself to be seen to give in to such pressure. Advocates of sanctions may believe the generals can be beaten into submission, but international status is of little consequence for this regime and its material dependence on the West is marginal. It is a moot point whether universal sanctions would make any difference, because neither the agenda nor the methods of Western countries have any support among Burma’s neighbors and primary trading partners.

To make matters worse, the domestic opposition is weak and divided. The few political parties and organizations that are active are top-heavy with feeble organization and, generally, weak links between them. Civil society, including the private media, is expanding, but hardly any groups have a democratic or overt human rights agenda. Indeed, very few people are politically active. Although the monkhood, to a degree, stands out from this pessimistic picture, it is – for cultural and institutional reasons – more likely to step in temporarily in times of crisis than to provide sustained political leadership. These weaknesses are the result, in large part, of decades of state repression, but they are by now so deeply rooted in the broader social and economic realities that it is hard to be optimistic about the prospects for opposition-driven reform in the foreseeable future – which is not to deny the immense courage and sacrifices made by those who struggle against the odds.

Regrettably, these conditions are often ignored. Many of the leading advocates of sanctions against Burma came out of the anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa and have sought to replicate it with little apparent thought to the major differences between the two cases. To others, sanctions are simply a moral choice. But neither analogy, nor morality, is adequate grounding for policy, which requires careful analysis of the circumstances of each particular case.


Problems with current sanctions on Burma

Sanctions might – if properly directed and implemented – elicit smaller concessions by the military regime in particular areas of human rights. But the existing sanctions regime breaks every rule in the book, reflecting its origins in moral politics rather than purposeful policymaking.

Numerous studies show that to be successful sanctions must be used strategically as part of a bargaining process, involving incentives as well as disincentives. The goals must be clearly specified and realistic, and the impact must be regularly reviewed to facilitate adjustments. Further, there is today broad expert agreement that any harm to the wider population must be minimized, for practical as well as ethical reasons. Current sanctions on Burma satisfy none of the following criteria.

First, the numerous pieces of overlapping sanctions legislation in the US in particular expound different and often entirely unrealistic conditions for lifting sanctions. At this point, it is hard to envision any changes short of the transfer of power to an Aung San Suu Kyi-led government that would lead to the lifting of American sanctions or, for that matter, European consumer boycotts. This may be an admirable ambition, but it all but guarantees that the military leadership will resist whatever Western countries throw at them. After all, it is not normal human behavior to give up power and privileges, never mind risk prosecution and potentially harsh punishment.

Secondly, Western governments and campaign groups have consistently failed to respond in kind to strategic concessions by the regime. Burmese officials often comment that it makes little difference what they do. So, there is no motivation for them to engage in the kind of interest-based bargaining on which sanctions depend to have an impact. On the contrary, sanctions have fuelled a vicious cycle of hostility and alienation, which raise the costs of compromise on all sides and push change further and further into the future.

Thirdly, no meaningful impact assessments were done before the introduction of any of the current sanctions, nor have any attempts been made to properly review existing measures, which are simply routinely extended every year because it would seem “wrong” – and be too politically costly – to do otherwise. In other words, the sanctions process has come to be driven largely by domestic political imperatives in Western capitals rather than an independent assessment of its impact in Burma.

According to Benedict Rogers of Christian Solidarity Worldwide, sanctions have only been put in place in recent years and need more time to work. But such an understanding is merely a “red herring”. The most serious sanctions – the excommunication of the military rulers from international society and denial of most forms of international assistance – have been in place since 1988. Moreover, sanctions don’t usually take “time to work”. On the contrary, they tend to lose their potency over time as the shock value diminishes and the target finds alternative sources for fulfilling its needs. This is exactly what has happened in Burma, which since 1988 has built a state capitalistic economy oriented almost entirely towards its neighbors.

Although there is some scope for further tightening financial sanctions against regime members and supporters, it is folly to believe that this would convince them to give up the privileges of power, which has made them rich in the first place. Without regional cooperation, sanctions will remain largely symbolic measures, which may feel gratifying to those imposing them, but won’t do much good for the Burmese people.

There are, of course, benefits from expressing moral values, independently of the effect it has in the target state. But any such external benefits must be weighed against the damage sanctions do to people suffering under an abusive regime and to the longer-term development prospects of the country. In the case of Burma, such damage includes the loss of hundreds of thousands of existing or potential jobs, the denial of any meaningful aid or protection for millions of deeply impoverished families, and a further erosion of the country’s civilian institutions and overall capacity for governance.


Need for fundamental policy changes

Rogers appears to concede that the single-minded pursuit of maximum sanctions by many campaign groups in the 1990s was misled. Indeed, he has expropriated much of the traditional language of sanctions critics, who for years have been calling for better targeting of sanctions, greater diplomatic engagement and increased aid. But in the end his recommendations amount to little more than cosmetic reforms of a policy regime that is in urgent need of a fundamental overhaul.

I agree that sanctions can be useful, to some extent, to keep change on the agenda both inside and outside Burma. But no amount of international sanctions is going to induce Burma’s rulers to relinquish power. There is too much at stake for them, personally as well as institutionally, and they are under little sustained pressure domestically to do so. Sanctions, therefore, need to be used far more selectively and strategically than is the case today – not as a primary tool, but in support of serious diplomatic and other engagement.

While further sanctions, strictly targeted and flexibly applied, may be appropriate, broad economic boycotts or embargoes are not. American bans on investments and imports should be lifted unconditionally, as should European consumer boycotts on labor-intensive industries and the general suspension of development aid – not because the generals deserve it (they don’t), but simply because these measures hurt ordinary people and undermine the country’s future under any government. It will make little difference politically, the generals are secure enough in power as it is. In fact, it may help generate a more positive atmosphere in which dialogue and compromise become more feasible.

I agree, too, that high-level diplomatic engagement is essential. But it will make no significant difference unless international leaders also adopt a more realistic agenda. Burma’s rulers will reject any and all demands that threaten their vital interests, in whatever shape or form they are made. They might, however, be persuaded to allow further liberalization, undertake limited economic reforms or reduce the impunity with which the army and other state agencies exploit local communities, especially if they got something in return. Such limited strategic objectives should be the immediate focus of international pressure and dialogue, not sweeping demands for regime change, which – however welcome it would be – is entirely unrealistic and best kept only as a long-term aim.

Moreover, high-level diplomacy won’t do on its own. To make a difference, engagement must be a broader and deeper exercise, targeting all levels of the state and society. There needs to be many more international actors on the ground who can work with regime moderates and technical government personnel to push gradual reform, and who have the access to help nurture local civil society networks, as well as the flexibility and local knowledge to exploit openings in the ever-shifting political environment.

Although the limitations are obvious, international and non-governmental organizations, such as the International Labor Office (ILO), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), to mention but a few, have helped transform generalized pressure into specific policy and institutional changes. Others play similarly important roles in providing training and education and in nurturing social capital within the broader society. Such work has immediate benefits for victims of repression and bad governance, and helps build for the future.

Finally, I certainly agree that foreign aid should be increased. But new aid needs to go beyond support for exile democracy groups and narrow humanitarian assistance.

While Western aid for democracy forces is an important expression of solidarity, it should not be mistaken for effective action for change. Burma is not Eastern Europe. There is no democratic institutional legacy, which can be revived and revitalized to provide an effective counterweight to authoritarianism in the near future. It will have to be built from the bottom up, through long-term educational, social and economic reforms and support.

Similarly, although current humanitarian aid certainly saves lives, it does little if anything to address the causes of poverty. No humanitarian policy will be worthy of its name unless it engages with the government, as well as civil society, to change policies that limit people’s ability to make a living and build capacity for improved national and local governance.

The transparent subjugation of aid to Burma to the democracy agenda has heightened the suspicions of the military rulers to aid programs, thus triggering further restrictions on access and operational autonomy. Demands that aid agencies avoid any cooperation with the government not only compound this problem, but are also counter-productive as they limit the transfer of new ideas and best practices and impede the building of local constituencies for change.

In order to promote governance reforms, the international community needs to work simultaneously to encourage reformers within the regime itself and to empower Burmese society at large. Without willing army leaders no reforms will be possible, and without broad-based popular pressure reforms are unlikely to go beyond limited liberalization. Current policies fail in each of these respects. Indeed, they entirely lack a strategic perspective adequate to the massive task at hand, not to mention proper empirical grounding.


Looking ahead

Sanctions have a place in the broader web of Burma policies. But like any other tool they must be used strategically to try to nudge open Burma’s closed regime and society and promote gradual change, not simply to punish.

Burma’s problems have been greatly compounded by the long-standing isolation of the country, its rulers and its people from the world. Despotism flourishes in backward and isolated societies. More, not less, international linkages are needed to further the socialization of the regime into international norms and strengthen capacity across the state, civil society and the private sector to overcome the deep structural obstacles to progress.

None of this is to say that greater engagement and more development aid will bring about democracy in Burma. That will be a long and difficult process, driven primarily by domestic developments. What the international community can do is to help the Burmese people cope with the current situation and seek to nudge incremental changes, which over time can create the conditions for broader reform. This requires more sustained, across-the-board engagement, far greater attention and resources and, perhaps most importantly, a willingness to defer overly idealistic goals, such as liberal democracy, which provide a poor guide for effective action in one of the world’s most closed and impoverished societies.

I agree with Rogers that current policy debates often leave much to be desired. But he might want to look for the problems a bit closer to home. The mere listing of human rights violations does not present a case for any particular policy; it merely emphasizes that something needs to be done. Moral extortion of policymakers and companies may be an effective campaign strategy, but does nothing to further understanding and enlightened policies. As for pushing economic sanctions, including consumer boycotts, without any serious analysis of how they affect the target or innocent bystanders, such an approach is simply irresponsible.

We need more debate, not less. But mainly we need better debate, which challenges policymakers to think harder about ends and means and which forces everyone to take greater account of the realities on the ground in Burma and the impact international actions have on people there. Sanctions may feel morally just, but in this case they are neither effective nor even ethical.

The author is a research fellow at Centre for International Governance & Justice, Australian National University, specializing in international statecraft and human rights. He previously worked as senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Burma. He is the author of “Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy” (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007).


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Save the Mekong Coalition Launch

http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.11066.aspx

March 14th 2009 in Bangkok
A new coalition to save Southeast Asia’s Mekong River will be launched at a special photography exhibition in Bangkok this weekend.
The exhibition by one of Thailand’s leading photographers, Suthep Kritsanavarin, is entitled “Siphandone – Mekong Fishing Under Threat.”

The Siphandone area is located on the Mekong River in southern Laos, nearby to Thailand’s Ubon Ratchathani province and Cambodia’s Stung Treng province. It is just one area threatened by a series of eleven big hydropower dams proposed for the lower stretches of the mighty river, which is shared by China, Burma, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam.



The Save the Mekong coalition was formed in response to growing public concern about the effects big dams would have on the Mekong’s migratory fish stocks, regional food security, and the livelihoods of millions of people.

The coalition is open to non-government organizations, community groups, academics, artists and ordinary citizens within the Mekong region and internationally, anyone who shares concerns regarding the future of one of the world’s greatest river systems.

Save the Mekong aims to do two things: raise public awareness about the risks associated with damming such an important international river, and persuade policymakers to adopt more sustainable and peaceful ways of meeting people’s energy and water needs.

Over the coming months, Save the Mekong coalition partners in the Mekong region and internationally will launch a series of activities supporting the coalition’s message.
During March and April, Save the Mekong will be collecting signed postcards from people in the Mekong countries and around the world, urging the region’s political leaders to keep the Mekong flowing freely as a precious source of food, income and life for present and future generations.

People can also sign an online petition.

More information on the coalition and plans to build hydropower dams on the Mekong is available in English, Burmese, Chinese, Khmer, Lao, Thai and Vietnamese on the coalition’s web site www.SavetheMekong.org.

More information on the coalition and plans to build hydropower dams on the Mekong is available in English, Burmese, Chinese, Khmer, Lao, Thai and Vietnamese on the coalition’s web site www.SavetheMekong.org.
For more information, CONTACT:
Premrudee Daoroung, Co-Director, Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) Tel. 02-691-0718-20, 081-4342334 email: fer@terraper.org; www.terraper.org

Carl Middleton, International Rivers, Mekong Program Coordinator, Tel: 084-6815332 Email: carl@internationalrivers.org; www.internationalrivers.org



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Japan to help Myanmar upgrade public transportation in Yangon

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/12/content_10997978.htm

www.chinaview.cn 2009-03-12 11:17:29 Print

YANGON, March 12 (Xinhua) -- The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) will help Myanmar upgrade the urban public transportation of Myanmar's former capital of Yangon to international standard as part of the cooperation program between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The JICA, which is Japanese government's overseas aid agency, had conducted research for two times in Myanmar with a workshop being held on the move last year and the findings will be based to seek ways of improvement of the urban transportation, the Yangon Times weekly quoted the Myanmar Engineering Association as reporting Thursday.

According to statistics of the Yangon municipal authorities, there is a total of 310 bus lines with 6,330 buses transporting over 3 million passengers per day in the city.

As part of its efforts to reduce traffic jam and ensure safety in traveling, the Yangon traffic police authorities have started removing a total of 370 very-old-aged buses running in the former capital, which were left behind by the Second World War, and replacing them with modern ones. Of the total, 207 have been transferred to the remote suburban areas.



Instead, about 300 modern buses have been imported to reinforce the city's public transportation, the authorities said.

Meanwhile, except for authorized persons, motor cycles are banned for running in the municipal areas in Yangon division.

According to statistics, the number of motor vehicles operating in the whole of Myanmar stood at 1.9 million as of the end of last year, up from over one million correspondingly in the previous year.

Of the total, motor cycles accounted for 1.1 million, or 75 percent of the total, while passenger cars remained at 200,000, or 15 percent.


Editor: Wang Guanqun

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Myanmar, Thailand to cooperate in generating electricity from wind

http://www.macaudailytimesnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24005&Itemid=32

Thursday, 12 March 2009
Myanmar Ministry of Energy and its Thai counterpart have agreed to cooperate in generating electricity from wind in Myanmar's coastal regions during this year as a follow-up of a solar-system electricity production cooperation project, sources with the Myanmar Hydrology and Meteorology Department said yesterday.
Under a memorandum of understanding between the two parties, Thai electrical experts will come to Myanmar in the near future to make feasibility on installation of energy measurement apparatus.
Last year, the two parties had constructed five solar energy measurement towers in five regions of Yangon, Mandalay, Shwe Bo, Meikhtila and Pyay, the report said.
Meanwhile, Myanmar is making endeavors to apply tidal wave to generate electricity to electrify coastal villages in cyclone-hit region, according to engineering circle.
The project will be implemented by organizations led by the Myanmar Engineers Association during this year.
Such way of generating electricity was once applied in 2006 to affect Ngaputaw village in Ayeyawaddy division but due to cyclone Nargis last year, the project was put off.
Meanwhile, application of bio-digesters, which produce bio- energy out of animal waste, became widespread in 2007 after innovation years ago.
According to local report, since bio-digesters were introduced in Myanmar's two divisions of Bago and Ayeyawaddy, it has electrified over 2,000 houses in 12 villages.

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UNHCR to upgrade its mission in Myanmar

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/UNHCR/9685ef7a0871998b622c0ebf92f812bf.htm

12 Mar 2009 14:10:54 GMT
Source: UNHCR
Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are the author's alone.
Thursday, 12 March 2009

BANGKOK – The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, undertook a mission to Myanmar from 7-12 March. In the course of the visit, he travelled to the capital, Nay Pyi Taw, as well as to Sittwe and Myeik, where he had an opportunity to observe UNHCR operations in northern Rakhine State and in the South East of the country.

In Nay Pyi Taw, Guterres met with the Ministers of Home Affairs and Immigration, Foreign Affairs, and Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs.



Both sides agreed on the importance of a continued presence of UNHCR in northern Rakhine State and the South East. The extension of UNHCR's programme for the population of northern Rakhine State was agreed, bringing to a positive conclusion discussions that had been taking place with the government in this regard. A number of specific sectors were identified by the Minister of Home Affairs and the High Commissioner in which it was felt that increasing the scale of activities conducted directly by UNHCR or in conjunction with the UN country team and other partners would complement UNHCR's protection role in relation to voluntary return and reintegration. Sectors considered particularly important were health, education, water and sanitation, agriculture and infrastructure. The High Commissioner was informed that the government had designated the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs to coordinate a development programme for northern Rakhine State. Frank and open discussions also covered all areas of concern to UNHCR, from prevention of displacement to voluntary return, registration and legal status, and improvements to economic and social conditions.

On the basis of his observations and the discussions held, the High Commissioner came to the conclusion that UNHCR's current level of activities in northern Rakhine State does not correspond to the actual needs and a decision was taken to upgrade the programme with immediate effect. It was also agreed that UNHCR and the government would examine the scope for a strengthening of UNHCR activities in the South East of the country and the agency was invited to submit a concrete proposal to the Minister of Border Areas and National Races Development Affairs in this regard.

The visit included meetings with the Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team in Yangon. The High Commissioner encouraged the Country Team to develop a joint initiative for northern Rakhine State, including the five priority areas mentioned above. He also met with the Tripartite Core Group that coordinates assistance provided to the delta area in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. UNHCR has contributed to the emergency shelter sector of the relief operation and currently focuses its activities on protection of the most vulnerable.

In concluding his visit, Guterres expressed his appreciation for the hospitality that had been extended to him by the government and for the arrangements that had been made to facilitate his mission, including his field visits to northern Rakhine State and the South East that provided the opportunity to see at first hand the actual conditions on the ground.

UNHCR news





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