By Hiroki Sugita TOKYO, May 1, Kyodo Every time the U.S. president visits Asia, there are agreements, such as the "Global Alliance" or the "Strategic Partnership," which are well received in Asian countries but very modest in terms of concrete actions and effectiveness. In his late April visit to Asia, President Barack Obama was gracious enough to tell the people in the countries he visited exactly what they wanted to hear. Of course, Asians are happy right now, but we cannot ignore deeper doubts about whether he will follow through on what he said. In Tokyo, the first stop of President Obama's Asian trip, he said that the Senkaku Islands fall under the Japan-U.S. security treaty, in a show of U.S. commitment to defending the Japanese-administered islands against any attempt by China to seize them. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan praised Obama's statement, which no previous U.S. president has voiced, as "epoch-making." Japanese security experts say that the statement is the best way to deter China from starting any military operations against the islands in the East China Sea. Then, in Seoul, Obama rebuked Japan and pleased South Korea. At a press conference with President Park Geun Hye he described "comfort women" as a "terrible and egregious" violation of human rights and for the first time urged Mr. Abe to address the issue with the South Korean government. Many of the comfort women who were forced to work at Japanese military brothels during World War II were from the Korean Peninsula. President Park followed Obama by saying delightedly, "I really look forward to efforts made by the Japanese side." In Manila, Obama announced a defense pact that would give American forces greater access to Philippine military bases and facilities, including airfields and seaports. The main purpose of the pact is to fend off China's military expansion in the South China Sea. Asians except Chinese welcome all of Obama's words and policies. Many Japanese even support the "comfort women" statement. Although Obama's comfort women comment clearly puts Abe in an awkward position, it may act as a catalyst to end the bickering between Japan and South Korea over this issue. According to U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice, the remark was in line with the purpose of Obama's trip, namely to cement ties with Japan and South Korea and to encourage improved dialogue between these nations. However, the question is: to what extent can Obama oversee the implementation of these words and agreements? Asians were joyful when Obama announced the U.S. pivot to Asia three years ago after its long and enduring Middle East military ventures. But, we soon found in dismay the policy (later called "rebalancing") more rhetorical than real, as it lacked follow-up measures. Since the pivot announcement, Obama has cancelled two trips to Asia to deal with domestic political affairs, and last year he gave silent approval to China's Air Defense Identification Zone, over protests from Japan. One of the pillars of the pivot is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, which was intended to create an Asia-Pacific free trade zone. During this trip to Asia, Obama made it clear that the United States would not make meaningful concessions to Japan and other TPP countries on trade negotiations for fear of angering some U.S. industries. Again, it is clear that Obama places domestic politics above Asia rebalancing. Even the Senkaku statement is not so assuring. At the Tokyo press conference, Obama avoided answering a question about the use of U.S. military force if China were to make a military incursion into the Senkakus. He explained that what he had said about the U.S. commitment to the islands was nothing new; it just repeated the U.S.'s historical interpretation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This response gave the impression that he would be very hesitant to use any kind of force. Given Obama's weak reaction to his declared redline regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria and his ineffective response to the crisis in Ukraine, some Japanese naturally wonder whether the Senkaku statement is another Obama redline that would be easily ignored. Considering China's substantial economic and military strength, it is highly unlikely that the United States would get involved in a confrontation with China over a group of small and inhabited islands. Because of strict budget cuts, the U.S. military cannot meaningfully strengthen its presence. Yoko Iwama, a professor at the National Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, noted, "The Ukraine crisis shows the U.S. still has to put a great deal of efforts into Europe to counter Russia. It is too much to ask the U.S. to show strong presence both in Asia and Europe." Although security ties with the United States are the foundation for stability in the region, Asian countries would be wise not to expect much from the United States in the events of conflicts. It is equally important that Asian countries strengthen their own individual defense capabilities and build better relations with China. Obama has a unique capability to please host countries, as we saw in his April trip to Asia. In November, he will go to Beijing to attend the annual Asia-Pacific leaders' meeting. He most likely will reiterate strategic relationships with China for global and regional agendas, which the Japanese and Filipinos will not be happy to hear. In Tokyo he called on Japan to have talks to de-escalate the tension over the Senkakus saying, "I've said directly to the prime minister that it would be a profound mistake to continue to see escalation around this issue rather than dialogue and confidence building measures between Japan and China." If the issue is not resolved by November, then Obama in China may blame Abe for not doing enough. Asians should not be happy or disappointed each time the U.S. president makes a statement on the region. We can't expect magic bullets from the United States for Asian problems because they do not have quick solutions. Therefore, we Asians must find our own solutions to the Senkakus, comfort women, China, and any other issues we face. (Hiroki Sugita is managing feature writer of Kyodo News.) ==Kyodo
Sunday, May 25, 2014
Friday, May 23, 2014
China's Xi Warns Asian Countries on Military Alliances
May 21, 2014 2:54 AM Chinese President Xi Jinping warned Asian countries against building what he sees as unhelpful military alliances, in what is seen as a swipe at nations that have developed closer defense ties with the United States. The comments came Wednesday in Shanghai at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), a regional grouping China hopes to use to offset U.S. influence. "We should stick to the basic norms in international relations such as the respect for the independence of sovereignty and integrity of territory, mutual non-interference into internal affairs. We should respect the political systems and development methods different countries choose willingly. We should respect and look after the reasonable security concerns of every country. It is disadvantageous to the common security of the region if military alliances with third parties are strengthened,” said Xi. Many of China's neighbors have boosted their military cooperation with the U.S. in response to what they see as China's increasing use of force and intimidation in its many territorial disputes. In particular, Beijing's maritime spats with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea have worsened in recent months. During a visit to Asia last month, President Barack Obama sought to reassure allies such as Japan and the Philippines that his long-promised strategic shift towards Asia and the Pacific, widely seen as aimed at countering China's rising influence, was real. The CICA grouping includes Vietnam, while the Philippines and Japan are not members but had representatives at the meeting. The group also excludes the U.S., while including nations such as Iran and Russia. Anti-Chinese violence flared in Vietnam last week after Chinese state oil company CNOOC deployed an oil rig 150 miles off the coast of Vietnam in waters also claimed by Hanoi. The rig was towed there just days after Obama left the region. The move was the latest in a series of confrontations between China and some of its neighbors over the potentially oil-and-gas rich South China Sea. Washington has responded with sharpened rhetoric toward Beijing, describing a pattern of “provocative” actions by China. The CICA is relatively obscure in comparison to other Asian regional groupings, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but Beijing, which took over as chair of the CICA from Turkey this week, hopes to use the group and others like it to help expand Chinese influence across the region. President Xi said the grouping should help create a "new regional security cooperation architecture." Although he provided few details, he said this could include a "defense consultation mechanism" and a "security response center" in case of regional emergencies. Addressing China's territorial feuds, he said Beijing is "committed to seeking peaceful settlement of disputes with other countries over territorial sovereignty, and maritime rights and interests." State broadcaster China Central Television aired the arrival of various leaders for the meeting live, but, underscoring the sensitivity of China's territorial disputes, it cut away from images of Xi shaking hands with the representatives from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Chinese President Xi Jinping warned Asian countries against building what he sees as unhelpful military alliances, in what is seen as a swipe at nations that have developed closer defense ties with the United States. The comments came Wednesday in Shanghai at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), a regional grouping China hopes to use to offset U.S. influence. "We should stick to the basic norms in international relations such as the respect for the independence of sovereignty and integrity of territory, mutual non-interference into internal affairs. We should respect the political systems and development methods different countries choose willingly. We should respect and look after the reasonable security concerns of every country. It is disadvantageous to the common security of the region if military alliances with third parties are strengthened,” said Xi. Many of China's neighbors have boosted their military cooperation with the U.S. in response to what they see as China's increasing use of force and intimidation in its many territorial disputes. In particular, Beijing's maritime spats with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea have worsened in recent months. During a visit to Asia last month, President Barack Obama sought to reassure allies such as Japan and the Philippines that his long-promised strategic shift towards Asia and the Pacific, widely seen as aimed at countering China's rising influence, was real. The CICA grouping includes Vietnam, while the Philippines and Japan are not members but had representatives at the meeting. The group also excludes the U.S., while including nations such as Iran and Russia. Anti-Chinese violence flared in Vietnam last week after Chinese state oil company CNOOC deployed an oil rig 150 miles off the coast of Vietnam in waters also claimed by Hanoi. The rig was towed there just days after Obama left the region. The move was the latest in a series of confrontations between China and some of its neighbors over the potentially oil-and-gas rich South China Sea. Washington has responded with sharpened rhetoric toward Beijing, describing a pattern of “provocative” actions by China. The CICA is relatively obscure in comparison to other Asian regional groupings, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but Beijing, which took over as chair of the CICA from Turkey this week, hopes to use the group and others like it to help expand Chinese influence across the region. President Xi said the grouping should help create a "new regional security cooperation architecture." Although he provided few details, he said this could include a "defense consultation mechanism" and a "security response center" in case of regional emergencies. Addressing China's territorial feuds, he said Beijing is "committed to seeking peaceful settlement of disputes with other countries over territorial sovereignty, and maritime rights and interests." State broadcaster China Central Television aired the arrival of various leaders for the meeting live, but, underscoring the sensitivity of China's territorial disputes, it cut away from images of Xi shaking hands with the representatives from Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. Some information in this report was contributed by Reuters.
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
By J J KIM Tuesday, September 8, 2009
While the Western world continues to debate whether economic sanctions can make change in Burma, the sale of gas to China from the offshore Shwe gas fields in Arakan State threatens to raise the junta’s revenue from foreign investment to new heights and strengthen business ties throughout Asia.
Furthermore, the parallel gas and oil pipelines, which are reportedly starting construction this month from Arakan State to Yunnan Province, China, via Magwe Division, Mandalay Division and Shan State, have been criticised by human rights groups as a major contributing factor to the recent conflict in northern Shan State.
According to a report titled “Corridor of Power” released by the Shwe Gas Movement (SGM), the pipeline will make the junta at least US $29 billion over the next 30 years. Much of this is expected to be spent on military expansion, despite the current famine in Arakan State and poverty across the country.
Source: Shwe Gas Movement
Moreover, the report claims, construction of the pipelines, which are being built primarily by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), is likely to lead to human rights abuse across the country and a “re-ignition of fighting between the regime and ceasefire armies stationed along the pipeline.”
According to Khur Hseng from Shan Sapawa, who has been researching the impact of the pipeline in Shan State since 2007, these fears were confirmed during the armed confrontation between the military government and the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in late August. The fighting took place just 50 km from the proposed pipeline route, killing 200 people and leading to a mass exodus of up to 30,000 civilians to China.
“The main objective of the SPDC is to clear all opposing forces from the area for development projects, including the Shwe Gas pipeline,” said Khur Hseng. “They are trying to clear the people who will be against the plans and control the area so the true information about the project can’t get out. China needs this as well because they limit their media too.”
According to Wong Aung, the international coordinator of SGM, despite reports from the Chinese media about the project’s commencement, in fact the risk of local opposition and conflict is too great for the project to make much progress this year.
“It is impossible to start now; maybe just some foundations in Arakan State or Magwe. Before they start they will have to clear out all political, ethnic and conflict issues on the border. They will have to deploy propagation in so many places along the pipeline first, to ensure security.”
The sale of gas and oil is currently the junta’s biggest earner, bringing in almost US $3.5 billion annually. According to the report, from 2013 onwards the Shwe Gas Project, which is headed by the South Korean company Daewoo International, will bring in close to another US $1 billion.
This has raised concerns among pro-democracy campaigners and analysts, who say the deal will entrench military rule in the country by financing the regime and strengthening their political clout in the region.
Wong Aung said “It will harm the democratic process if the regime continues to receive the revenue from this sector… . The regime is receiving that money and creating conflicts in the ethnic areas. Basically, institutional investors and companies who are supporting the regime's projects are damaging the stability of the region.”
According to Larry Jagan, a long-term observer of Sino-Burmese relations, “One of China's main concerns is natural resources, so any major project is important to them from an economic point of view.”
This is of particular significance with the pipeline agreement as it offers China an alternative trade route for oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East too. Until now, such imports have had to pass through the US-Navy controlled Malacca Strait taking seven days longer than they would through Burma.
“One thing that is apparent [from the recent conflict in northern Shan State] is that Burma holds the cards. The opposition thinks that China could influence Burma if they want to, but these projects give Burma the upper hand”
“Although economically important to China, Burma is also strategically crucial to China as it is its staunchest ally in Southeast Asia [and] opposed to US interests in the region.”
“There is no doubt that Chinese investment and Burma’s trade with the rest of Asia reduces the impact of Western sanctions,” Larry said.
Experience from past gas and oil developments in Burma have led SGM to believe that the pipelines will cause “forced labour, forced relocation, land confiscation and a host of abuses by soldiers deployed in the area.” According to SGM's report, there are currently an estimated 13,200 soldiers stationed along the pipeline route, mostly in areas that haven’t seen significant armed conflict for decades.
According to Naing Win of Kyauk Phyu Township in Arakan State, where the pipeline will begin, “Most people depend on fishing for survival, but they are prohibited by the navy to fish within 10km of the gas fields. The Navy often steal their fish and gas and oil and [harass] them outrageously.” Because of this, local people find it difficult to survive and provide an education for their children.
Another major concern is the threat of forced relocation of civilian families to make way for the pipeline and other related infrastructure. Stretching around 1,000 km in Burma, the pipeline will cut through many densely populated areas. According to Khur Hseng, “Thousands of people will be forced to leave their homes in Shan State alone.” Recent projects in the region, such as the Tasang Dam, have forced hundreds of thousand of men, women and children into the jungle and to other countries to start a new life.
As the report highlights, while the regime’s profits from the export of electricity and fossil fuels become increasingly lucrative, civilian energy needs are persistently neglected. The national per capita energy consumption currently amounts to less than 5 percent of that in Thailand or China. Arakan State, the source of the gas, is not connected to the national grid and over 90 percent of the population still use candles for light and firewood for cooking.
While the junta continues to make war in ethnic regions and display no regard for civilian needs, many campaigners feel that change can only come when all foreign companies and financial institutions halt investment in such projects. Despite sanctions and Western rhetoric, both CNPC and Petrochina, who will distribute the gas in China, have received significant financial backing from the West in recent years, from banks such as Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs.
According to Wong Aung “The USA and EU need to re-impose stronger sanctions and consider a practical way to get a positive outcome because the regime has so many channels to oppose the sanctions compared with 10 years ago. While locally registered companies continue to gain financial backing from the USA and EU, sanctions are becoming just a notion for these governments.”
“I would like to raise this issue among foreign governments, companies and the various institutional investors involved in this project: they should support the democratic process for Burma,” he said.
JJ Kim is a freelance writer based in Thailand.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy. org
http://www.irrawadd y.org/article. php?art_id= 16740
Wednesday, July 22, 2009
Clinton Declares the US 'Is Back' in Asia
By ROBERT BURNS / AP WRITER Wednesday, July 22, 2009
BANGKOK — on her second trip to Asia as US secretary of state, Hillary Rodham Clinton is carrying a no-nonsense message about American intentions.
"The United States is back," she declared Tuesday upon arrival in the Thai capital.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (L) speaks during a press conference with Thai Deputy Prime Minister Korbsak Sabhavasu (R) at the Governement house in Bangkok on July 21. (Photo: Getty Images)
By that she means the administration of President Barack Obama thinks it's time to show Asian nations that the United States is not distracted by its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and intends to broaden and deepen its partnerships in this region.
Clinton trumpeted that line Wednesday in an appearance with a prominent TV personality before flying to a seaside resort at Phuket for two days of international meetings to discuss North Korea, Burma and a range of other regional issues.
Clinton said she would, as previously announced, sign Asean's seminal Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a commitment to peacefully resolve regional disputes that has already been signed by more than a dozen countries outside the 10-nation bloc.
The US signing will be by the executive authority of Obama and does not require congressional ratification, said a senior administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the move publicly.
The administration of President George W Bush had declined to sign the document; Obama sees it as a symbolic underscoring of the US commitment to Asia.
On her arrival here Tuesday, Clinton reiterated Obama administration concerns that North Korea, already a threat to the US and its neighbors with its history of illicit sales of missiles and nuclear technology, is now developing ties to Burma's military dictatorship.
Clinton held out the possibility of offering North Korea a new set of incentives to return to negotiating a dismantling of its nuclear program if it shows a "willingness to take a different path." But she admitted there is little immediate chance of that.
A Clinton aide said the United States and its allies are looking for a commitment by North Korea that would irreversibly end its nuclear weapons program. The aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal US government deliberations, said there is no sign that North Korea intends to make such a move, keeping the US focus on enforcing expanded UN sanctions.
In her remarks about a possible Burma-North Korea connection, Clinton did not refer explicitly to a nuclear link but made clear that the ties are disconcerting.
"We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North Korea and Burma which we take very seriously," she said at a news conference in the Thai capital.
"It would be destabilizing for the region, it would pose a direct threat to Burma's neighbors," she said, adding that as a treaty ally of Thailand, the United States takes the matter seriously.
Later, a senior administration official said that Washington is concerned about the possibility that North Korea could be cooperating with Burma on a nuclear weapons program, but he added that US intelligence information on this is incomplete. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the matter.
The United States, in a joint effort with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, is attempting to use UN sanctions as leverage to compel North Korea to return to the negotiating table over its nuclear program. A major element of the international concern about North Korea is the prospect of nuclear proliferation, which could lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia and beyond.
Clinton spoke to reporters after meeting with Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva at the outset of a three-day visit to Thailand.
Clinton sharply criticized the military rulers of Burma for human rights abuses, "particularly violent actions that are attributed to the Burmese military concerning the mistreatment and abuse of young girls."
She said an Obama administration policy review on Burma is on hold pending the outcome of the trial of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who is accused of violating the terms of her house arrest. The Noble Peace Prize laureate faces up to five years in prison if convicted, as expected.
http://www.irrawadd y.org/article. php?art_id= 16377
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Huge Population of Rare Dolphins Discovered
http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/550615/
Newswise — The Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) announced today the discovery of a huge population of rare dolphins in South Asia—but warns that the population is threatened by climate change and fishing nets.
Using rigorous scientific techniques, WCS researchers estimate that nearly 6,000 Irrawaddy dolphins, which are related to orcas or killer whales, were found living in freshwater regions of Bangladesh’s Sundarbans mangrove forest and adjacent waters of the Bay of Bengal—an area where little marine mammal research has taken place up to this point. Prior to this study, the largest known populations of Irrawaddy dolphins numbered in the low hundreds or less.
Each discovery of Irrawaddy dolphins is important because scientists do not know how many remain on the planet. In 2008, they were listed as vulnerable in the IUCN Red List based on population declines in known populations.
The results of the study were announced today at the First International Conference on Marine Mammal Protected Areas in Maui, Hawaii and published in the Winter issue of the Journal of Cetacean Research and Management. Authors of the study include Brian D. Smith, Rubaiyat Mansur Mowgli, and Samantha Strindberg of the Wildlife Conservation Society, along with Benazir Ahmed of Chittagong University in Bangladesh.
“With all the news about freshwater environments and state of the Oceans, WCS’s discovery that a thriving population of Irrawaddy dolphins exists in Bangladesh gives us hope for protecting this and other endangered species and their important habitats,” said Dr. Steven E. Sanderson, President and CEO of the Wildlife Conservation Society. “WCS is committed to conservation of these iconic marine species from dolphins, sea turtles, sharks to the largest whales.”
“This discovery gives us great hope that there is a future for Irrawaddy dolphins,” said Brian D. Smith, the study’s lead author. “Bangladesh clearly serves as an important sanctuary for Irrawaddy dolphins, and conservation in this region should be a top priority.”
Despite finding this extraordinarily large population, the study’s authors warn that the dolphins are becoming increasingly threatened by accidental entanglement in fishing nets. During the study, researchers encountered two dolphins that had become entangled and subsequently drowned in fishing nets—a common occurrence according to local fishermen.
In a second paper, published in the March/April issue of Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystem, Smith and his coauthors report the additional long-term threat to the dolphin population of declining freshwater supplies, caused by upstream water diversion in India, coupled with sea-level rise due to climate change. These circumstances also threaten Ganges River dolphins, an endangered species with a range that overlaps with that of the Irrawaddy dolphins’ in the Sundarbans mangrove forest. The recent likely extinction of the Yangtze River dolphin, or baiji, is a potent reminder of how vulnerable freshwater dolphins are to extinction via the impacts of humans.
The Irrawaddy dolphin grows to some 2 to 2.5 meters in length (6.5 to 8 feet) and frequents large rivers, estuaries, and freshwater lagoons in South and Southeast Asia. In Myanmar’s Ayeyarwady River, these dolphins are known for “cooperative fishing” with humans, where the animals voluntarily herd schools of fish toward fishing boats and awaiting nets. With the aid of dolphins, fishermen can increase the size of their catches up to threefold. The dolphins appear to benefit from this relationship by easily preying on the cornered fish and those that fall out of the net as the fishermen pull it from the water. In 2006, WCS helped establish a protected area along the Ayeyarwady River to conserve this critically endangered mammal population.
WCS is currently working closely with the Ministry of Environment and Forests in Bangladesh on plans for establishing a protected area network for both Irrawaddy and Ganges River dolphins in the Sundarbans mangrove forest. Funding is critical to sustaining these activities along with WCS’s long-term efforts to study the effects of climate change on this habitat, support sustainable fishing practices, and develop local ecotourism projects.
Support for this study has been provided in part by the Kerzner Marine Foundation and Ocean Park Conservation Foundation, Hong Kong (OPCFHK). This study was also funded in part by the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission. The Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) has also supported WCS efforts as part of a regional program for cetacean conservation in the Bay of Bengal.
The Wildlife Conservation Society saves wildlife and wild places worldwide. We do so through science, global conservation, education and the management of the world's largest system of urban wildlife parks, led by the flagship Bronx Zoo.
Together these activities change attitudes towards nature and help people imagine wildlife and humans living in harmony. WCS is committed to this mission because it is essential to the integrity of life on Earth. Visit: www.wcs.org
Special Note to the Media: If you would like to guide your readers or viewers to a web link where they can make donations in support of helping to save wildlife and wild places, please direct them to: www.wcs.org/donation
Asian pharmaceutical products dominate Myanmar market
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/006200903301021.htm
YANGON (Xinhua): Pharmaceutical products from Asian countries are dominating Myanmar's consumers market with India standing as the country's largest pharmaceutical products importing country, the local weekly Flower News reported Monday.
Accounting for 40 percent of Myanmar's pharmaceuticals import, India is followed by Bangladesh, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam.
According to the statistics of the Ministry of Commerce, Myanmar imported over 5,000 categories of pharmaceutical products annually.
In the fiscal year 2007-08, Myanmar imported pharmaceutical products worth of 115.56 million U.S. dollars, an increase of 15.5 percent from 2006-07, earlier statistics shows.
Meanwhile, Myanmar's largest and most modern pharmaceutical factory in the northern city of Pyin Oo Lwin was established in December 2007 producing 162 kinds of medicines.
With the aim of reducing import-substitute medicines, the Pyin Oo Lwin Pharmaceutical Factory under the Ministry of Industry-1, produce high-quality modern medicines such as tablet, capsule, intramuscular, intravenous, lotion and powder.
There has been some five other pharmaceutical factories in Myanmar, including two special ones, respectively located in Yangon, Sagaing and Inyaung.
These factories are producing medicines that supply 40 percent of the domestic market.
Moreover, a famous Myanmar private pharmaceutical company, FAME, will produce seasonal medicines for Japan and South Korea as proposed by the two countries.
FAME is known as the first private pharmaceutical factory in Myanmar whose products meet the stringent Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) standards set by the World Health Organization ( WHO).
The company produces 45 different kinds of Myanmar traditional herbal medicines and its products were exported to countries or regions such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea , Germany and Japan.
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Business
Thursday, March 26, 2009
The Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia:
http://japanfocus.org/-Milton-Osborne/2448
Rivers, Dams, Cargo Boats and the Environment
Milton Osborne
When the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) released its list of the world’s top ten rivers at risk in late March, attention in Australia naturally focused on the fact that the Murray-Darling River system was one of those listed.[1] Very little attention was given in the Australian media to the other nine rivers so identified, which included the two longest rivers in the Southeast Asian region, the Mekong and the Salween. Both these rivers rise in the Himalayas in Chinese territory before flowing into Southeast Asia, and play a vital role for the populations in their basin areas; for the 60-70 million in the Mekong’s basin of nearly 800,000 square kilometres, and for the 6-7 million in the Salween’s basin of 272,000 square kilometres. The WWF’s claims about the risks facing the rivers it lists as ‘in danger’ are bound to generate controversy, with proponents of hydroelectricity sourced from dams bound to express scepticism. Nevertheless, current and future developments associated with both the Mekong and the Salween are certainly worthy of examination. For there is irrefutable evidence of the problems that can be caused by the construction of large-scale dams on previously free-flowing rivers. Moreover, a review of current developments associated with the Salween and the Mekong rivers is desirable at a time when environmental issues are increasingly a concern internationally. Such issues have particular relevance in Southeast Asia, both within individual countries and in terms of relations between individual Southeast Asian countries and their great neighbour, China.
Map 1: Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)
Source: International Rivers Network http://www.irn.org/img/nu/nu_map_pol.gif
In two Lowy Institute Papers, River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia (2004), and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia (2006), I discussed the many and complex range of relationships evolving between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours.[2] These relationships are multifaceted, involving politics, in the broadest sense, trade and economics, particularly as these relate to energy, and increasingly, for the mainland states, present and future environmental issues. A striking feature of all these relationships is the rapid pace of developments, so that snapshots of events taken at a particular moment rapidly become out-of-date. In this paper, and against that fast-changing background, I concentrate on two prominent current issues, principally involving China, Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand, and the Mekong and the Salween, as trans-national rivers.
The first of these issues relates to the controversies associated with plans for the construction of dams on the Salween River, the last free-flowing river in Southeast Asia; the second to developments associated with the greatly increased navigation of the Mekong River now taking place between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand. In the case of the Mekong, it is important to recognise that the rapid changes that have taken place in connection with navigation of the river should be seen as part of the much greater prospective changes to the river as a whole. These include the continuing program of dam construction being undertaken in China and new proposals which are contemplated in studies undertaken by the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Additionally, developments associated with various tributaries of the Mekong are a cause for concern. (These latter issues associated with the Mekong, and which are separate from the navigation developments, are discussed briefly in the Appendix to this paper.)
Long neglected outside the circles of advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the environment has increasingly become an issue of political importance in Southeast Asia and, now, in China.[3] While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that environmental concerns can, by themselves, determine government policy, there is no doubt that they have an importance that plays a part in decision-making, as demonstrated in the accounts that follow. The salience of this observation is given weight by the emphasis placed on environmental issues by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March 2007, when he said, ‘We must make conserving energy, decreasing energy consumption, protecting the environment and using land intensively the breakthrough point and main fulcrum for changing the pattern of economic growth.’[4] And in Thailand, a country which receives detailed attention in this paper, the environmental movement has played an increasingly active and politically important role for well over a decade, particularly in constraining the government from developing further dams to produce hydroelectric power within Thai territory.[5]
The Salween
Like the Mekong, the Salween River rises in Eastern Tibet at a height above 4,000 metres, where for several hundred kilometres it runs parallel to both the Mekong and the Yangtze, forming part of what is known as the ‘Three Parallel Rivers’ region. After passing through Yunnan, where it is known as the Nu Jiang, or ‘Angry River’, a reflection on the speed of its flow, it enters and flows through Burma. For a distance of some 120 kilometres during its passage through Burma it forms the national boundary between Burma and Thailand. It then resumes its course through Burma alone, finally emptying into the Gulf of Martaban at Moulmein. (For the purposes of this paper, I refer to the river under discussion as the ‘Salween’, when discussing its entire length and that section which flows through Burma and beside Thailand. I use the name ‘Nu’, or ‘Nu Jiang’ when discussing the river and its course in China. The river is also known as the ‘Thanlwin’ within Burma, a usage restricted to that country, but sometimes appearing in news reports generated in Burma but carried elsewhere.)
Although the second longest river flowing through Southeast Asia, the Salween at an approximate total length of 2,800 kilometres – this length is disputed, with some estimates giving its length as 3,200 kilometres – is much shorter than the Mekong (4,900 kilometres). The topography of the regions through which the Salween flows is sharply different from much of what exists along the Mekong’s course, particularly after the latter leaves China when it flows through a largely flat, immediately surrounding landscape. Until it reaches its delta in Burma, the Salween flows almost entirely through sharply rising gorges on either side of its banks. In Tibet and western Yunnan some of these gorges rise to a height of 3,000 metres above the river. Even in the region where the Salween flows between Burma and Thailand, where the height of the surrounding gorges is much reduced, the topography is such that it still provides an ideal physical setting for dam construction. (See Photograph 1 of the Salween taken at Ban Sam Laep, on the left [Thai] bank, where the river forms the boundary between Thailand and Burma.)
Photograph 1: Salween at Ban Sam Laep
Of great importance to any discussion of the Salween’s future as a prospective site for a series of dams is the rich biodiversity existing along its entire course. In addition there is a remarkably diverse set of minority ethnic population groups in the regions through which it flows, both in China and Burma. Indeed, the presence of ethnic minorities along the Salween in Burma has been the touchstone for the vigorous opposition to the plans for the construction of dams on the river from a varied range of advocacy NGOs, most particularly in Thailand. Both in Burma and in China there is concern among human rights advocates that dam building will lead to the displacement of populations. And this prospect, as discussed later, is seen by critics of the Burmese regime as yet another example of that government’s efforts to impose control over dissident minorities.
Map 2: Potential dam sites of the Salween River
Among advocacy NGOs concerned with environmental issues there has been considerable focus on the Three Parallel Rivers region already mentioned. This area was inscribed on the list of World Heritage sites in 2003 for its identity as the ‘epicentre of Chinese biodiversity’ which is ‘also one of the richest temperate regions of the world in terms of biodiversity’.[6] On the basis of a map published by the International Rivers Network, the designated Heritage area does not include the Nu itself, but rather is located close to the river’s right, or western bank, as well as taking in areas further east, close to the Mekong and the Yangtze. (See Map 1 entitled ‘Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)’, showing the course of the Nu and the sites of proposed dams in China.)
In both Burma and Thailand, areas bordering the Salween are rich in reserves of teak. And as is the case with the Mekong, the Salween is a major source of fish -- many of which are migratory -- for the populations living by or close to it, particularly in the rich agricultural region of its delta.[7]
What is planned, and why?
The possibility of constructing dams on the Salween River to generate hydroelectric power has been under discussion for some time, certainly for well over a decade. The plans under discussion fall into two categories: those for dams to be constructed in China, and those to be constructed either within Burma or on that section of the Thai-Burma border formed by the river. For the moment, and as detailed below, substantial uncertainty remains as to just how many of the dams will actually be built. What is more clear are the reasons why there are plans to build them, and why these plans have excited opposition. In the case of the dams projected for the Nu in China, the available evidence suggests that these have been conceived in the planners’ minds essentially for the provision of power to industry within Yunnan province.[8]
While Yunnan province, with its high concentration of minority peoples, was neglected by the Chinese central government for many years, it is now seen as an important region in Beijing’s ‘Develop the West’ strategy. And in this regard, it is now targeted for industrial development, particularly around the provincial capital, Kunming. Developing dams on the Nu for hydropower accords with the reasons behind the construction of the dams that have already been built or are under construction on the Mekong. (The dam currently under construction at Jinghong, in southeastern Yunnan, will be an exception to this general rule since it is designated to supply power to Thailand when completed.)
Among the dams planned for Burma, or on the Thai-Burma border, two are to be located in the Shan State. One will be at Tasang — which may consist of two linked reservoirs — while another, so far simply designated as the ‘Upper Thanlwin hydropower project,’ will be constructed further north on the river. Its exact location has not been given in news reports. Both are projected to be connected to the Mekong Power Grid, a project promoted as one of the programs developed within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) forum, with the backing of the ADB. Under this program, power generated by dams in Burma, China and Laos will supply electricity to Thailand and Vietnam. The dams planned for construction on the Thai-Burma border, at Wei Gyi and Dagwin, and possibly Hutgyi (also transliterated as Hut Gyi and Hatgyi), are projected to supply power to an even larger grid, the ASEAN Power Grid, a plan embraced by ASEAN with the goal of supplying electric power from a grid serving all ten member countries by 2011.[9]
China
Details of China’s current plans for dams on the Nu Jiang are not readily accessible, and the status of these plans is made more uncertain because of the lack of public information about the extent to which they are under reconsideration. The fact that there is this lack of information and uncertainty about Chinese plans is not surprising and conforms to a similar state of affairs in the early stages of the planning for dams on the Mekong. In the case of the Chinese dams on that river, very little was known about them outside of China until more than a decade after construction began on the first dam in the 1980s. This state of affairs reflects a Chinese view that it has no obligation to make public statements about developments within its own territory until a time of its own choosing. The account that follows is therefore open to qualification if and when new information becomes available.
It appears that a detailed proposal to build 13 dams on the upper section of the Nu was first put forward in 1999, by the State Development and Reform Commission. This were then elaborated in August 2003, when officials in Yunnan put forward plans which were subsequently approved by the central government.[10] The absence of information about the dams outside China was made strikingly clear when former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin admitted in December 2003, at a time when there was much public discussion about China’s plans for 13 dams on the Nu, that he had no knowledge of China’s intentions.[11] With the announcement of the plans it became clear that several of the dams would be located close to the Three Parallel Rivers heritage region, and their construction was set to involve the relocation of some 50,000 people.
To the considerable surprise of outside observers, the announcement that dams would be built on the Nu brought an unprecedented series of protests from within China itself, including from the Chinese Academy of the Sciences, two prominent Chinese NGOs, the China Environmental Culture Association and Green Watershed, as well as some prominent individuals. And an even greater surprise followed, given China’s poor record on showing concern for environmental issues, when the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, announced at the beginning of April 2004 that the plans to build 13 dams would not proceed and that the project was to be reconsidered.[12] Nevertheless, and without any further official statements having been made, a range of reports suggested that plans remained for four dams to be built on the Nu. In the absence of official statements it is necessary to rely on press reports in an effort to identify which dams were still likely to be built. And it may be that five, rather than four dams, will still be built.
So, despite the unavailability of firm information about China’s plans, it would certainly be wrong to assume that they have been completely shelved. There is evidence that officials in Yunnan were not reconciled to the announcement by Premier Wen, at least in the period shortly after he made it. According to an Associated Press report from 9 April 2004, the director of the Nu River Power Bureau in Yunnan, Li Yunfei, stated that he had not heard of any changes to the plans to construct dams. While this may only suggest that decisions taken in Beijing sometimes reach outlying provinces very slowly, there are other indications that preliminary preparations, at least, continue along the course of the river.
A detailed report of a journey along the course of the Nu in China in 2006 makes clear that preparations of various kinds, apparently linked to future dam construction, continue to be made. Published in the online journal, The Irrawaddy, of 28 February 2007, Rudy Thomas gives an account of visiting 12 of the 13 sites originally designated as dam sites.[13] Despite his reference to having visited 12 sites, Thomas in his article only refers specifically to activities at five sites as he travelled upstream from just above the Burmese border with China: these sites were at Yan San Shu, Saige, Abilou (this toponym is clearly a misprint for Yabilou), Maji and Songta. At none of these sites was actual dam construction taking place, in the sense that dam walls were being erected. Rather, what Thomas describes appears to be work preliminary to construction, such as core sampling, road construction and tunnelling.
In his article Thomas provides information on the planned size of two of the dams, those at Maji and Songta, that is consistent with the details provided by the International Rivers Network, by far the most active of all international advocacy NGOs in relation to river issues (see Table 1). At Maji, located ‘north of the riverside town of Fugong’, the planned dam will have a 300 metre high wall and will displace 20,000 people. While at Songta, ‘just north of the border that separates the Nu River Prefecture and the Tibetan Autonomous Region’, the planned dam’s wall will be 307 metres high, with a reservoir stretching back 80 kilometres. If these details are correct, the two proposed dams are very large, with dam walls roughly the same height as the Xioawan dam currently under construction on the Mekong. The dam at Xioawan is frequently spoken of as set to be the second largest dam in China after the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze. Another very recent reference to the Chinese dams on the Nu, in Asia Sentinel, states that Chinese construction crews ‘began the first efforts to dam the river this week’, that is, in the last week of February 2007.[14] Without further information, it remains unclear whether this report adds to the information provided by Thomas, or whether the reference is essentially to continuing preliminary construction works.
In contrast to the sizeable body of literature that exists discussing, and frequently condemning, the Chinese dams built on the Mekong for their predicted long-term detrimental environmental effects on the countries downstream of China, there has so far been little material published that analyses what dams built on the Nu will mean for the countries downstream of China: Burma and Thailand. The suggestion in the Asia Sentinel article cited above that the Chinese dams ‘are expected to raise government hackles in Rangoon’, is not borne out by other similar information or judgments. Given Burma’s extremely close relations with China, on which it is dependent in so many ways, it seems unlikely that the Burmese government would express a critical view of Chinese intentions, even if it did, indeed, hold concerns about the dams. At the same time, while NGOs which take an active role in relation to the proposed dams for Burma and Thailand make passing reference to possible developments in China, they have not developed arguments dealing with the possible effects of the Chinese dams in the downstream regions in the same manner as has been done in relation to the Mekong, and the effects on the countries downstream of China. Nevertheless, and when, as seems most likely, at least four dams will be built on the Nu, it is reasonable to expect that there will be more vocal and developed criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly in Thailand. This criticism is likely to be directed both at the possibility that Chinese dams will affect fish stocks in the river and at the human rights issues involved in population displacement.
There is little basis on which to assess China’s likely reaction to the protests that have been lodged in relation to the dangers to the heritage status of the proposed dams to be built in the Three Parallel Rivers region. As already noted, these protests have come from within China as well as from external bodies. The concerns expressed by the World Conservation Union were probably the most important of those coming from organisations outside China and which were considered at the twenty-ninth meeting of the World Heritage Committee meeting in Durban, in 2005. At that meeting the World Heritage Committee agreed to send ‘a reactive monitoring mission’ to evaluate the ‘progress made on the conservation of the property’, and to ‘assess the impact of planned dams on the outstanding universal values of the site, its integrity and downstream communities’.[15]
Before the monitoring mission made its visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, China submitted a statement to the World Heritage Committee, in January 2006, which stated that there were no plans for dams in the eight areas that make up the World Heritage site. The statement noted, however, that plans had been developed for hydropower stations (dams) adjacent to the site. Of these hydropower stations, to a total of 17, three were being considered for the Nu, with the others under study for the Jinsha (the upper reaches of the Yangtze) and the Lancang (Mekong) Rivers.[16]
Following their visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, the two-person monitoring team, composed of a representative each from UNESCO and the World Conservation Union, reported that the Chinese authorities with whom they consulted indicated an intention to reduce the area of the heritage area that had been inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2003 by approximately 20%, and more particularly that:
While the Mission noted the repeated commitment of accompanying officials to applying stringent Chinese laws and policies towards protection of the World Heritage Site, the evidence of intrusions from mining, tourism and proposed changes to inscribed boundaries and the lagging release of hydrodevelopment plans, continues to raise concerns about the future integrity of the inscribed property. The existing mining operations within some of the inscribed properties also suggest the possibility of listing the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger.[17]
At the Thirtieth Session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, in July 2006, and in the light of the monitoring mission’s report, the committee noted that although Chinese officials had given assurances that any future dams would not affect the World Heritage Site, this could not be corroborated since the mission’s members were not given any Environmental Impact Assessments or maps relating to the proposed dams that China intends to build. In addition, ‘evidence from maps, the inspection of hydro-power development exploratory works, unclear boundaries and advice on proposed dams in the vicinity of the World Heritage property suggest that direct and indirect impacts of dam construction on the property may be considerable’. Concluding that China’s positive conservation measures ‘are regrettably overshadowed by grave concerns about the, as-yet unreleased, plans for hydro-development’, the Committee called on China to submit a report by 1 February 2007 giving details on its plans for dams within the Site area.[18]
To date, I have not been able to find evidence that China has submitted the report the UNESCO committee requested. A lengthy report in the China Youth Daily of 17 July 2006 suggested that there was disagreement between national and local authorities about the possibility of building dams in the Three Parallel Rivers region, and that no ‘national approval’ had been given for the construction of dams on the Nu.[19] If reports such as those already noted suggesting, at the very least, that preparatory work for dam construction is already taking place are correct, this could be taken to mean that concerns to develop hydropower have trumped conservation considerations. If so, there is the likelihood that China will endeavour to retain the Three Parallel Rivers region’s heritage classification by excising the areas closest to the Nu, and other rivers from it. Whether this will be acceptable to the UNESCO Committee is difficult to assess, as is the degree of Beijing’s concern not to alienate international feeling as the 2008 Olympics draw ever nearer. The China Youth Daily reporter chose to be optimistic in concluding his article cited above with the comment that:
In the end the World Heritage Convention (sic) did not use its ‘yellow card,’ giving everyone a chance to rest a little easier, though we hope that at the next convention we will hear some good news about the Three Parallel Rivers Region.
Yet to conclude in this Panglossian fashion that ‘all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds’ may neither be justified, nor a reliable index of central government thinking on environmental issues. The World Heritage Committee appears to act in an essentially apolitical fashion in placing sites on its endangered list, and there is no certainty that it will not be ready to act in the same way in relation to the Three Parallel Rivers region. At the same time, and just as Wen Jiabao’s decision in 2004 to halt plans for the construction of 13 dams on the Nu was a surprise to many observers, the emphasis placed by the Chinese premier on environmental questions in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March suggests that it cannot now be assumed that the central government will simply disregard the World Heritage Committee’s concerns.
Thailand
Until the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, Thailand was deeply involved in planning for the construction of five dams on the Salween -- three in Burma and two on the border between the two countries -- after the river flowed out of China. This involvement reflected Thailand’s growing energy needs and concerns on the part of its Electricity Generating Authority (EGAT) to avoid building dams in Thailand itself, where they had become a highly controversial issue. Discussions about these dams began in 1994 when Thailand signed a preliminary agreement to purchase electricity from dams on the Salween that would be built in Burma. (Prospective sites for dams on the Salween are shown in Map 2.)
It was not until December 2005 that EGAT and the Burmese Ministry of Electric Power signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the construction of a dam at Hutgyi, in Burma, as the first of five planned dams on the Salween, either in Burma or on the Thai-Burma border. Later, in September 2006, EGAT was reported as finally formalising plans for the five dams, and as having stated that previous plans were being discarded since they could have been regarded as Thai interference in Burma’s domestic affairs. Under the December 2005 agreements between Thailand and Burma, preliminary plans were drawn up for dams that would be constructed at Hutgyi, Tasang, and a further unnamed location in Shan State, in Burma, and at Weigyi and Dagwin, where the river runs between Burma and Thailand. With an estimated total cost of US$10 billion, the dams were projected to be able to produce 10-15,000 MW of power, with Thailand receiving up to 90% of the energy produced. The remaining 10% generated was to be provided free to Burma. As of August 2006 an agreement was in place for the first dam to be built at Hutgyi by the major Chinese construction firm, Sinohydro, partly with Chinese funding, with work set to begin in December 2007.[20]
The plans for the Salween dams, as they stood before the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, attracted vigorous criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly those concerned with human rights, but also in relation to environmental issues. Prominent opposition political figures, such as former chairman of the Thai Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kraisak Choonhavan, were also active in condemning the planned dams.[21] The Tasang dam will, when constructed, be the largest dam in Southeast Asia, with a wall rising 228 metres and the capacity to generate 7,100 MW. During 2006 preliminary roadworks for access to the dam site at Tasang were carried out by a Thai real estate and construction firm, MDX. Now, in April 2007, reports have emerged stating that work has commenced on the dam proper. This news has coincided with the announcement of the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Burmese government and two Chinese firms for the construction of the Upper Thanlwin dam mentioned earlier in this paper, and which will have a generating capacity of 2,400 MW.[22]
Both the Tasang and Upper Thanlwin dam sites are in Burma’s Shan State, a region which has already experienced large-scale forced population relocation as part of the Burmese government’s concern to exercise control over dissident, and potentially dissident, minority populations. A variety of NGO reports estimate that up to 300,000 people have been forcibly relocated in Shan State over the past decade.[23]
Human rights issues, as these relate to ethnic minority dissidents, have also been raised in the case of the planned Hutgyi dam. The area in which the dam is to be built is home to members of the Karen minority, who have long opposed Burmese control, and there have been reliable reports of the Burmese government engaging in forced relocation of the population in the area as roads are built and villages are destroyed to make way for large-scale agriculture. One indication of the problems in the general Hutgyi area has been the increased flow of refugees across the border into Thailand. And as a sign of the militarisation of the area an EGAT employee engaged in survey work for the Hutgyi dam was killed by a landmine in May 2006.[24]
Following the military coup that ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin, the Energy Minister in the new interim Thai government, Piyasvasti Amranand, announced in October 2006 that he did not intend to go forward with the agreements reached between Thailand and Burma for the construction of five dams on the Salween. This announcement was greeted with surprise, but appears to accord with Piyasvasti’s reputation as an independent-thinking technocrat with well-established qualifications in the energy field. His independence was underlined by his decision to resign from his position as a deputy permanent secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, in 2003, following policy disagreements that included energy issues, particularly as these related to Thaksin’s hopes to privatise EGAT. In making his announcement, Piyasvasti mapped out his own view of how Thailand should meet its future energy needs, placing greater emphasis that had previously been the case on purchasing energy from Laos and sourcing gas supplies from the Middle East and from Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Nevertheless, and despite Piyasvasti’s announced decision not to proceed with the agreements Thailand had previously reached with Burma in relation to the suite of dams on the Salween, it has become clear that his government is still committed to the Hutgyi dam on the Salween.[25] And as already noted, construction of a dam at Tasang with the involvement of a Thai construction company has apparently begun.
Beyond the fact that this commitment will continue to be contested by human rights groups, and recently formed the basis of a major protest by advocacy NGOs on 28 February, the policies being followed by the interim Thai government that has replaced the Thaksin regime are clearly less accommodating to Burma than those of its predecessor. This policy, characterised by Thaksin as ‘forward engagement’, looked to Thailand’s closer association with the Burmese regime in a range of economic activities, of which dams on the Mekong was one of the most important. Other areas in which ‘forward engagement’ was to define policies included the proposed involvement of Thailand in the exploitation of gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal and also in projected mining and logging ventures. Given the increasing readiness of some ASEAN members to criticise the State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) regime in Burma, it will be of considerable interest to see whether this change in Thailand’s policies, with the decision to draw back in relation to the Salween dams as a key element, results in further pressure on Burma to make at least some gestures towards reform. There are few signs that this is likely.
Navigating the Mekong
When River at risk was published in 2004, clearance of obstacles to navigation in the Mekong River between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand had just been completed. This operation followed the signature, by China, Burma, Laos and Thailand, in April 2000, of the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Mekong-Lancang River, which envisaged the eventual clearance of the river as far as the former Lao royal city of Luang Prabang. Despite the Environmental Impact Statement for the clearance program delivered in 2001 -- in which China had a major input -- being sharply criticised by outside observers, clearance began the following year. Financed entirely by China, and with the work largely undertaken by Chinese work crews, 23 separate rapids, reefs and other obstacles were removed from the river bed to make possible year-round navigation of the Mekong by vessels up to 150 Dead Weight Tons (DWT) as far as Chiang Saen.[26]
Although the original plan for this first stage of the clearance operation envisaged obstacles being removed from the river as far as the Thai river port at Chiang Khong (and its Lao neighbour located directly across the Mekong, Huay Xai), unresolved boundary issues have meant that a final, major set of obstacles just upstream from Chiang Khong remain ― the boundary issues involved appear to relate to concerns on the part of Thai authorities that the removal of these obstacles might affect the thalweg, which is the national boundary between Thailand and Laos, as well as affecting the territorial status of sandbanks that regularly appear in the river during periods of low water. For the moment, with these obstacles still in place, Chiang Kong effectively functions as a terminal for Lao river vessels, but it is not accessible to large Chinese vessels that berth at Chiang Saen.
It also seems likely that no action has been taken to clear this remaining obstacle since there is a recognition that Chiang Khong will relatively soon become an important link in the road system that is being developed to run from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province in China, to Bangkok. This highway will pass through Laos and will eventually cross the Mekong over a bridge at Chiang Khong. Approval for the construction of this bridge has already been given by the Thai government.[27] As for the rest of the river clearance plan that was the subject of the agreement concluded between China, Burma, Laos and Thailand in 2000, and which would have seen clearance extend into Laos as far as Luang Prabang, there are no current signs that any of the parties are pressing for this to take place.
In terms of the parts played by the four parties to the 2000 navigation agreement since the clearances were completed, the roles of China and Thailand have been much more important than those of Burma and Laos. Burma’s interest in the Mekong, despite the river’s forming a national boundary, is limited by the fact of sparse settlement in the region past which the river flows. For the Burmese authorities the Irrawaddy River is of greater importance as a navigable waterway, a fact that is important to the Chinese, also, who see it as a future link in a road/river transport system that would give it access from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal. As for Laos, as noted below its vessels appear unable to compete with Chinese cargo boats over the cleared section of the river.
In terms of the expansion of navigation on the Mekong since 2004, what has occurred is remarkable, even though there is a dearth of accurate and fully up-to-date statistics to quantify developments. In China there are now two fully functioning river ports capable of handling cargo vessels throughout the year. These are at Jinghong, the last major settlement in southern Yunnan, and Guan Lei, an almost entirely new town only recently carved out of the surrounding jungle. Major dockworks were still being built when I visited Guan Lei, in February 2003, to board a cargo boat for travel down the Mekong. These dockworks have now been completed. And in Thailand substantial developments at Chiang Saen have made that river port, and current terminal for vessels coming downriver from China, both an important trade link and a settlement in the process of demographic transformation.[28]
As recently as 2006, most Chinese vessels coming to Chiang Saen were still loading and unloading their cargo a little upstream of the town. They did this by mooring next to a section of the river’s bank that had been concreted for stability. There, with gangs of labourers employed to shift the cargo, it was carried over planks stretched between the boats and the shore. This very basic method of shifting cargo was apparently designed to circumvent paying port charges. This was despite the existence of port facilities constructed by the Thai authorities as long ago as 2004. These facilities are now in full use, as I witnessed them in January of this year. They consist of two covered pontoon docks equipped with conveyor belts and ramps suitable for truck traffic. At the time I observed the port in action, the pontoon docks were servicing eight vessels. Despite the presence of the conveyor belts linked to each dock, much of the cargo handling was still being carried out by labour gangs, with the bulk of the cargo being unloaded from China consisting of fresh fruit and vegetables.
Some heavier goods were being loaded on to trucks on the docks and trucks were also being used to bring Thai palm oil and sacks of soybean meal as backloading of the Chinese vessels for their return trip. A mobile crane was also in use for even heavier items than those picked up or delivered by truck. In the light of the current activity around this existing port, there are plans to build a further facility downstream from Chiang Saen, which will be capable of servicing vessels up to 500 DWT.[29] Although some of my informants spoke of work already being under way for this new port, with feasibility studies supposed to have been completed by 2006, I did not see any indication of this during my visit to Chiang Saen. (See Photograph 2 of Chinese vessels moored at the existing Chiang Saen facilities in January 2007.)
Photograph 2: Chinese vessels at Chiang Saen
As a reflection of the Chinese dominance in this river trade, when I was in Chiang Saen, there were no fewer than 24 Chinese vessels in port and strung out over a distance of some kilometres along the river. This was in contrast to the three Lao vessels I observed, and the total absence of Thai vessels. Anecdotal accounts from Thai informants to whom I spoke in both Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong suggest that the imbalance between Chinese and Thai vessels travelling on the river is of the order of 90% to 10%. In general, Thai vessels are smaller and less powerful than their Chinese counterparts; this fact was the cause for some controversy and resentment during the 2003-04 dry season, when the Mekong fell to unusually low levels. Although this fall was certainly connected to an unusually short wet season and subsequent drought, there is no doubt that the low levels also reflected the fact that the Chinese authorities were holding back water discharges from their dams on the Mekong, at Manwan and Daochaoshan. They did this so that they could then release water in sufficient quantity for Chinese vessels to travel to and from Chiang Saen. The less powerful Thai vessels were unable to make the same transits in the relatively short period the river’s water levels remained navigable.[30]
There are no reliable statistics for the number of Chinese vessels using the port on an annual basis, though it is certain that the figure of 3,000 vessels claimed for 2004 -- an increase from 1,000 the year before -- has most certainly been exceeded. As for the figures for the trade that passes through Chiang Saen, unofficial figures compiled by researchers for the Indochina Media Memorial Foundation, in Chiang Mai, for 2006, show a balance heavily in Thai favour, with imports from China totalling approximately US$36 million, while exports to China were approximately three times larger at US$115 million.[31] These figures take little account of the impact China’s imports are having in northern Thailand, a point emphasised by former senator Kraisak Choonhavan, in conversations I had with him in both 2005 and 2007. He draws attention to the fact that the bulk of Chinese goods shipped into northern Thailand is made up of fruit and vegetables. These are often landed at prices against which local farmers cannot compete. This is particularly the case with garlic and onions, though there have been periods when poor growing conditions in China reversed this situation.
In March 2006 a little-publicised agreement was signed by Burma, China, Laos and Thailand to permit the transport of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan. Under this agreement, the amount of refined oil to be shipped from Chiang Saen was set at 1,200 tons each month. Although a relatively small amount, the agreement immediately sparked environmental concerns, not least because the oil was to be shipped in barrels rather than in specially constructed vessels, so that a collision or grounding of vessels carrying oil would pose a major risk to the Mekong and its fish stocks. So far there has only been a report of one shipment having been made, of 300 tons -- with 150 tons of oil being loaded on each of two vessels. But Chinese officials have indicated that they have much bigger plans in mind and have spoken of future shipments of up to 70,000 tons per year. In speaking in these terms, a Chinese official linked the shipment of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan with his country’s concern about the possibility of Middle Eastern oil shipments through the Straits of Malacca being blocked by the United States should there be conflict between China and Taiwan. Leaving aside the likelihood of such a development occurring, the suggestion that 70,000 tons shipped up the Mekong would represent a major answer to China’s energy security concerns appears to be a notable exercise in hyperbole. Today, even a moderately sized tanker carries that amount of oil. Possibly more to the point is the fact that Thailand subsidises the cost of oil so that shipments made by way of the Mekong will be landed in Yunnan at a lower price than would otherwise be the case for oil brought overland from Chinese coastal ports.[32]
Of considerable interest is the impact that the Mekong River trade is having on Chiang Saen town, and more generally within Chiang Rai province, within which the town is located. Until the early 1980s Chiang Saen, which I visited several times during that decade, was little more than an overgrown village beside the Mekong River. Once the site of a small, fourteenth century kingdom, whose walls remain to the present day, it and the river plains surrounding the town were the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Burmese armies in the eighteenth century, to the point where the settlement had almost disappeared by the nineteenth century. Although, by the late 1990s, Chiang Saen had grown in size and was used in a limited fashion as a terminal for trade between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand, its status was transformed by the navigation clearances completed in 2004. Most particularly, its growth in size has been accompanied by what, for want of a better word, may be described as its ‘Sinification’.
Chinese immigration into Thailand has, of course, a long history What is striking about developments at Chiang Saen, and in Chiang Rai province as a whole, is the rapidity with which a new Chinese element has become part of the demographic and commercial landscape. This change was well described by Joshua Kurlantzick, of the Carnegie Institute, in an article published in the Bangkok Post in October 2005, in which he wrote of the sudden burgeoning in the number of Chinese restaurants in Chiang Saen, signs in Chinese advertising cheap telephone calls to Yunnan and the apparently dominant presence of Chinese nationals in the town’s commerce.[33] The picture Kurlantzick offered appeared entirely justified in the course of my own visit in January 2007. But, more to the point, it is also the view of the range of Thai informants with whom I discussed the impact of Chinese in-migration, both legal and otherwise, into Chiang Saen and Chaing Rai province. These informants, who included a senior Thai politician, business figures in both Chiang Mai and Chiang Khong, and Thai NGO representatives, provided an anecdotal picture of unregulated Chinese immigration into Chiang Saen, with illegal immigrants marrying Thai women in order to regularise their status and become eligible to own land. In no case were my informants able to quantify the number of Chinese immigrants who had settled in the area around Chiang Saen, but there seems no basis for doubting the basic validity of their accounts.
One reason this is so is the quite clear indication that illegal and undocumented Chinese immigration into Burma, Laos and Thailand has been taking place for some time. It is now accepted that Lashio and Mandalay in Burma have Chinese populations exceeding 50% and 25% respectively. As recorded in The paramount power, illegal Chinese immigration into Laos is a real, if undocumented, fact, with the new arrivals ranging from poor rural peasants to minor businessmen. Chinese settlement in northern Thailand, in Chiang Rai province, is taking place at a time when there has been a major increase in Chinese commercial activity in the region, with the most active role being played by interests based in Yunnan. While the announcement of plans, such as those for an industrial estate in Chiang Saen, may not always proceed at the pace their promoters promise, the overall picture is one of Chinese corporations playing an increasingly active role in the region. According to Dai Jie, deputy director of Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, a three-phase project consisting of a ‘commodities city, duty-free zone and a supplier’s centre,’ close to Chiang Saen town, is set to be completed in 2014.[34]
As already noted in relation to the shipments of oil up the Mekong from Chiang Saen to Yunnan, the environmental costs of the commercial activity now centred around Chiang Saen are a subject for concern among the active Thai advocacy NGOs that monitor developments linked to the Mekong River. More generally, these groups draw attention to the decline in fish catches along the course travelled by vessels between Chiang Saen and Yunnan, and particularly in relation to catches in the area immediately around the town. They also argue that as a result of changes in flow patterns along the river between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong river banks and sandbanks used for horticulture in dry seasons continue to be adversely affected. These variations in flow patterns are, the NGOs argue, the product both of the dams that have already been built in China and of the negative hydrological effects of the clearances that have been undertaken to facilitate navigation.[35]
Concluding Remarks
The developments discussed in this paper point to the manner in which environmental issues, and frequently those issues combined with concerns relating to human rights, are playing an increasingly important part in the politics of the Asian region. Concern for the environment is no longer a fringe issue, and there is no more striking illustration of this fact than the domestic opposition that was mounted within China to the proposed dams on the Nu, and which sparked the important but unexpected reaction by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to step in and put plans for the construction of 13 dams on hold. Attention has also been drawn in the paper to the important part played by Thai environmental activists in relation to their government’s policies, both towards the Salween and the Mekong.
Although the broader issue of climate change has dominated global discussion of environmental issues, the politics of water, of its use and its availability are receiving ever-greater attention. And this is likely to be increasingly the case as the future use of rivers in China and Southeast Asia intersects with policies linked to energy and increased irrigation. The centrality of rivers and their exploitation to a broad range of political issues is strikingly illustrated in the two cases examined in this paper. In the case of the Salween, energy resources in China, Burma and Thailand, human rights in Burma and intra-ASEAN relations are all issues that stem from the contested future of a river. And for the Mekong, while attention has previously focused chiefly on China’s dam-building activities, the new navigation regime has raised environmental issues while playing a part in the increasing Chinese presence in northern Thailand. That UNESCO should now be involved in what is currently an unresolved issue over the heritage status of the Three Parallel Rivers region, through which the Nu, Mekong and Yangtze all flow, is a testimony to increasingly broad reach of environmental factors.
Neither the Salween nor the Mekong are close to the parlous state of China’s Yellow River, which is suffering from the combined effects of overuse, recurrent droughts, and the decrease of snow-melt as Himalayan glaciers contract in size. The river’s dire condition has prompted consideration within China of the possibility of a transfer of water from other rivers, including even one as far distant as the Yangtze, in an effort to return its flow to a healthy state. So while the Mekong and the Salween are currently in a notably healthy state by comparison with the Yellow River, and indeed, the lower reaches of the Yangtze, their futures are not automatically assured. The fact that both are vital to the well-being of the countries through which they flow make the matters examined in this paper issues of real consequence.
At another level, the issues examined in this paper reinforce the judgments made in The paramount power, as China’s involvement with the countries of Southeast Asia continues to grow. So, at the same time as China seeks to develop hydropower on the Nu within its own territory, it is closely involved through Chinese-based commercial companies in the developments taking place on the Salween beyond its borders. And, as is clear from the information provided on developments associated with navigation of the Mekong, China is both integral to the navigation process itself and becoming ever more deeply involved in the commercial life of Thailand’s Chiang Rai province, in which the river port of Chiang Saen is located. All of these developments reinforce a judgment that China continues to build on its previous successes in dealing with the countries of Southeast Asia — particularly those of the mainland region — to project further its influence on a peaceful basis and in cooperation with those states.
APPENDIX
A brief overview of current, and controversial, issues associated with the Mekong
The content of this paper has, in relation to the Mekong, been essentially concerned with navigation and associated developments. At a broader level, the release of two key documents during 2006 seems likely to spark further controversy in relation to the uses made of the river and the institutions that play a role in determining its future. These documents are: a Mekong River Commission (MRC) draft document, ‘Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No. 8, Flow-regime assessment,’ of February 2006, and a joint World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) working paper, ‘Future directions for water resource management in the Mekong basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy’, released in June 2006.
The first of these two documents has been released at a time when there is very active discussion about the future role of the MRC, in particular the extent to which it can play a role in which its trans-national responsibilities can supersede the interests of its four, individual national members.[36] And, most importantly, it bears on the question of the extent to which the MRC should play a role in promoting development (infrastructure such as dams and water diversion projects) as opposed to its role to date as, essentially, being a repository of knowledge about the Mekong River and its basin.[37] The particular salience of this latter issue is illustrated by the fact that the MRC document discusses in detail a range of predicted and costly effects that could occur in Cambodia -- where fish form the overwhelming source of the population’s protein intake -- in the event of three different ‘flow regimes’.[38]
The WB/ADB Working Paper, which, most usefully, should be read in conjunction with the MRC paper just discussed, states in its ‘Executive Summary’ that the ‘bottom line message of this Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy is that the analytical work on development scenarios has, for the first time, provided evidence that there remains considerable potential for development of Mekong water resources’. In the light of this conclusion, and conceived in terms of the river’s trans-national character, the paper urges a move away from ‘the more precautionary approach of the past decade that tended to avoid any risk associated development, at the expense of stifling investments’. While not disregarding risks, the paper argues that ‘balanced development’ should be ‘the driving principle for the management and development of the Mekong River Water resources in the coming years’.[39]
The issues involved in these two documents go the heart of the Mekong’s future and that of the people of the Mekong basin. As such they deserve extended analysis, which is beyond the compass of this brief note. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that should the assumptions in the two documents prove to be incorrect the cost in human terms could be high indeed. One of the reasons for this sombre conclusion is to be found in the problems that are already apparent in the case of infrastructure development on two rivers that are tributaries of the Mekong, the Se San and the Sre Pok, which rise in Vietnam but flow into the Mekong in Cambodia.
As discussed in River at risk, Vietnam’s decision to build dams on Mekong tributaries has resulted in substantial and damaging effects on Cambodian communities living downstream.[40] Despite the warm political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, no solution has been found to the problems caused by the presence of these dams and the consequences of water releases from them.[41] With the prospect of a very substantial increase in the number of dam projects being undertaken in Vietnam and Laos, some of which are on Mekong tributaries that are trans-national in character, the need to put in place a future, equitable governance of the Mekong system as a whole — an issue central to the MRC and WB/ADB documents — is clearly of great importance. The manner in which this issue is resolved, or a failure to do so, will be of the greatest importance for the 70 million people who live in this great river’s basin.
This article was originally published at Lowy Institute for International Policy, Ausutralian National University, May 2007. Posted at Japan Focus, June 11, 2007.
Milton Osborne is an Australian historian, author, and consultant specializing in Southeast Asia.
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[1] World’s top 10 rivers at risk, Gland, Switzerland, WWF International, March 2007. The other rivers listed, in addition to the Murray-Darling, Mekong and Salween, were the Danube, La Plata, Rio Grande-Rio Bravo, Ganges, Indus, Nile and Yangtze.
[2] River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 02, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004; and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 11, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2006.
[3] China’s long history of pursuing policies without notable concern for the physical environment is charted in Mark Elvin’s, The retreat of the elephants: an environmental history of China, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2004. An important survey of contemporary environmental issues in China is Elizabeth C. Economy’s, The river runs black: the environmental challenge to China’s future, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2004.
[4] Jim Yardley, Chinese Premier focuses on pollution and the poor, New York Times, 5 March 2007.
[5] See Osborne, River at risk, pp 31-2, in relation to the Pak Mun dam and the subsequent policy shift by the Thai government.
[6] UNESCO World Heritage, Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas.
[7] Background information on the Salween is usefully provided in, The Salween under threat: damming the longest free river in Southeast Asia, published by Salween Watch, Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), and the Center for Social Development Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Chiang Mai, 2004. Although quite clearly an advocacy document, there is no reason to question the basic facts provided in it.
[8] Jim Yardley, Chinese project on the Nu-Salween River pits environmentalists against development plans, New York Times, 3 January 2005. See, also, Yunnan hydropower expansion: update on China’s power industry reforms & the Nu, Lancang & Jinsha dams, a paper prepared by Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research and Green Watershed, Kunming, People’s Republic of China, February 2004.
[9] For details of the ASEAN Power Grid, see here.
[10] Yardley, as cited in footnote 6.
[11] Bangkok Post, 18 December 2003.
[12] Osborne, River at risk, pp 12-13, and footnote 17.
[13] Please visit here.
[14] Nava Thakuria, India and Burma: such good friends, Asia Sentinel, 27 February 2007.
[15] Executive Summary, Report of a Joint Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas, China, from 5 to 15 April 2006, pp 2-3.
[16] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, Asia-Pacific, 8-16 July 2006, pp 5-6.
[17] Ibid, footnote 15.
[18] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, 8-16 July 2006, Asia Pacific, pp 7-8.
[19] Zhang Kejia, Three Parallel Rivers region focus on monitoring mission. China Youth Daily, 17 July 2006.
[20] These developments are summarised in Will Baxter, Dam the Salween, damn its people, Asia Times Online, 15 September 2006. See, also, Salween Watch Media Advisory, Press conference and submission of petition letter against the Salween Dams in Burma, 28 February 2007.
[21] Interview with Khun Kraisak Choonhavan, 9 January 2007, Bangkok.
[22] Myanmar signs deal with Chinese firms to build hydroelectric plant, International Herald Tribune, carrying an Associated Press report of 7 April 2007. The Chinese firms involved are, Farsighted Investment Group Company Limited and Gold Water Resources Company Limited.
[23] Shawn L. Nance, Unplugging Thailand, Myanmar energy deals, Asia Times Online, 14 November 2006.
[24] Will Baxter, Dam the Salween as cited in footnote 20.
[25] Will Baxter, Thailand and Myanmar at odds over Salween dams, Burma, Archives of global protest, 13 December 2006.
[26] This and the immediately succeeding paragraph draw directly on River at risk, pp 25-9.
[27] The Nation, (Thailand), 9 March 2004.
[28] I visited Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, most recently, over the period 15-17 January 2007. I first visited this region in 1979 and have continued to visit it on an irregular basis since that time.
[29] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong, South China Morning Post, 19 February 2004.
[30] See, River at risk, pp 19-20.
[31] Vaudine England, Trade turns Mekong into river of plenty, International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2006.
[32] On the oil shipment, see, Marwaan Macan-Markar, Sparks fly as China moves oil up Mekong, Asia Times Online, 9 January 2007.
[33] Joshua Kurlantzick, China stepping into US vacuum, Bangkok Post, 31 October 2005.
[34] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong.
[35] Montree Chantawong, The Mekong’s changing currency, Watershed: People’s Forum on Ecology, Vol. 11, No. 2, November 2005 – June 2006, pp 12-25.
[36] Philip Hirsch, Kurt Morch Jensen, with Ben Boer, Naomi Carrard, Stephen FitzGerald and Rosemary Lyster, Executive Summary, National interests and transboundary water governance in the Mekong, May 2006.
[37] For some very recent discussion of this issue, see, Richard P. Cronin, Destructive Mekong dams: critical need for transparency,’ RSIS Commentaries, a publication of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 26 March 2007.
[38] Mekong River Commission, Water Utilisation Program, Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No.8, Flow-regime assessment, Draft 1 February 2006, p 57.
[39] WB/ADB Joint Working Paper on ‘Future directions for water resources management in the Mekong River basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy,’ June 2006.
[40] River at risk, pp 32-4.
[41] For recent discussion of the Vietnamese dams, see, Montree Chantawong, as cited in footnote 35, and, Sam Rith and Cat Barton, Vietnamese dams proposed for Cambodian river, Phnom Penh Post, 21 September-5 October 2006. (In addition to the discussion of Vietnamese dams, Montree Chantawong’s article also provides details on flow variations, and their effects, in the section of the Mekong between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong).
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Friday, February 20, 2009
Korea: Frenetic Clinton Hits Asia Running
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/21482?tid=37
Foreign 2009-02-20 16:37
South Koreans gather as they welcome the visit of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton near the U.S. embassy in Seoul, South Korea, Friday, 20 Feb 2009. (Photo courtesy: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, right, talks with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton during their meeting at the presidential Blue House in Seoul, 20 Feb 2009. (Photo courtesy: AP Photo/Jo Yong-Hak, Pool)
1 of 2SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA: Dashing through a kaleidoscopic tour of the far East in her first outing as U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton is back in full campaign mode.
But instead of selling herself as presidential candidate, Clinton is pitching the still-emerging foreign policy of her former rival, President Barack Obama.
While cautiously projecting Obama's careful diplomatic stances in her official meetings with diplomats and foreign leaders, Clinton has unleashed the ebullient public persona she showed in the final giddy stages of her unsuccessful 2008 campaign.
Clinton has appeared unabashedly delighted soaking up affectionate, sometimes gushing reactions that she evoked among foreign officials and onlookers.
At the Jakarta airport in Indonesia, she beamed as she was serenaded by rows of singing, swaying schoolchildren. Later, she visited the headquarters of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, waving and smiling broadly when hundreds of employees chanted "Hee-ler-ry," Hee-ler-ry" as she entered.
The bloc's secretary general, Surin Pitsuwan, appeared smitten and spoke in glowing terms about the former first lady, presenting her with an arrangement of 32 yellow flowers.
The tone of Clinton's diplomatic charm offensive was a significant departure from the traditional approach of some previous secretaries of state, who were on the road a great deal but tended to be more comfortable in private settings than out in public.
Her predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, an academic, was far more reserved and less effusive, while Colin Powell, a retired general and President George W. Bush's first secretary of state, was a portrait in stoic, gentile statesmanship.
But midway through her weeklong tour of Asia, it is clear Clinton has brought the urgent showmanship of an election season politician to the patient practice of diplomacy.
She has adopted a grueling public schedule with gusto.
In visits to Japan, Indonesia and South Korea _ China is still to come _ Clinton has kept busy late until night, seemingly unaffected by jet lag as she crams in official meetings, local media appearances and visits to cultural sites, such as the venerable Meiji shrine in Tokyo.
Some of her appearances have mirrored the countless town halls of her campaign days. But instead of gymnasiums crowded with American voters, Clinton showed up at college auditoriums in Tokyo and South Korea, plying audiences with anecdotes and fielding questions on topics from motherhood to politics.
"Wow, I feel more like an advice columnist than a secretary of state today," she said to loud laughter when asked about the subject of love by one of several thousand students who gathered to hear her speak at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
"We could be here for hours!" she said in response to the next questioner who asked Clinton to describe her relationship with her daughter Chelsea.
She has waded into crowds despite nervous glances from her security detail, worked rope lines and happily taken time to pose for photos with pretty much anyone who has gotten close enough to ask for one.
And the enthusiastic responses, much like those she got at rallies on the campaign trail, seem to have energized her while the grueling pace has exhausted her traveling staff and local embassy employees, not to mention the reporters accompanying her on the trip.
There have been so many news conferences and interviews that the State Department's efficient team of transcribers has been overwhelmed and unable to produce transcripts of her appearances, sometimes for days.
Yet Clinton is clearly relishing the limelight, and not even natural disasters can stop her.
On her first morning abroad as America's top diplomat, Clinton was jolted awake by one of Japan's frequent minor earthquakes.
"It woke me up. It was like I was in one of those hotel vibrating beds and accidentally dropped in some quarters," she said, recalling the shaking in her 10th floor suite that roused her in Tokyo's pre-dawn hours on Tuesday after the long flight from Washington.
The early wake-up call did not, however, slow her down. That day, Clinton had at least 12 official events, beginning at the Shinto shrine at 8am and ending with a 9pm post-dinner meeting with Japan's main opposition leader.
In between, she greeted staff at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, met the Japanese foreign and defense ministers, signed a military agreement, held a news conference, had tea with Empress Michiko, gave interviews to three television networks and several Japanese newspapers, spoke to university students at a town hall meeting and ate dinner with the prime minister.
Arriving in Jakarta the next afternoon after a seven-and-half hour flight, Clinton crammed in what might normally be an entire day's worth of meetings in the remaining daylight and evening. Then, she had dinner with a group of civic leaders.
Early the next morning, she was at it again, appearing on Indonesia's most popular youth television program, an MTV-style show, telling the audience about her surprise when Obama asked her to become secretary of state, opining about her favorite bands and joking about her inability to sing. (By MATTHEW LEE/ AP)
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