http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1599-dr-sein-win-re-elected-pm-of-government-in-exile.html
by Phanida
Sunday, 25 January 2009 18:12
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Dr. Sein Win has been re-elected the Prime Minister of the Burmese government in exile for another term in a routine MPU meeting.
The meeting of the 'Members of Parliament Union' had in attendance MPs in exile. The meeting was held in Dublin, Ireland over four days starting from 20 January. The meeting was attended by over 30 MPs in exile who elected the PM through secret ballot.
In the new seven-member cabinet, three new ministers were inducted along with existing ministers Bo Hla Tint, Dr. Tint Swe and Khun Mar Ko Ban. The three new ministers are Khun Myint Tun (Thaton constituency), Win Hlaing (Tatkon constituency) and Tun Win (Minbya constituency).
Mathematics Professor Dr. Sein Win (64) is the cousin brother of detained Nobel peace laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and he received his doctoral degree from Germany. His father U Ba Win is a martyr assassinated along with his younger brother Independence hero Bogyoke Aung San.
The Washington D.C. US based NCGUB was formed in 1990 with elected MPs in exile on the Thai-Burma border and Dr. Sein Win has been successively elected as Prime Minister since then.
In the Dublin MPU meeting, the 'credential challenge' issued, aiming to unseat the Burmese junta from the UN General Assembly as representative of the Burmese people, was rejected by MPs attending the congress. The exiled umbrella organization of the 'National Council of Union of Burma' (NCUB) is trying to unseat the Burmese junta from the UN as representative of the nation on the grounds of legitimacy.
The statement issued by NCUB on January 1 this year says it will form another parallel government in exile which stirred a hornet's nest in the exiled pro-democracy forces and triggered a heated debate among them.
The Burmese junta refused to recognize the 1990 general election results and hand over power to the elected parliament and said that the newly elected MPs were only responsible for the drafting of the new constitution, not to exercise State power. Then the junta drafted its constitution with their hand-picked representatives which is not accepted by the majority of the elected MPs.
Monday, January 26, 2009
Dr. Sein Win re-elected PM of government in exile
Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future -IRRAWADDY
CONTRIBUTOR
Ethnic Minorities Hold the Key to Burma’s Future
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By MIN ZIN Friday, January 23, 2009
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Ceasefires that cannot be transformed into political settlements and a lasting peace are typical examples of protracted deadlocks. When neither party seems willing or able to resolve this situation, the deadlocks have the potential to trigger an escalation strategy in conflict. This is the point that the Burmese military and ceasefire ethnic groups have now reached. The question is what strategy options are available for both parties.
The Burmese military has initiated ceasefire agreements with no less than 17 ethnic rebel groups since 1989 and has allowed the groups to retain their arms and control somewhat extensive blocks of territory over the past twenty years. This shows uncharacteristic tolerance on the part of the military, which, like the whole Burman population to some extent, has a chauvinistic and patronizing attitude toward ethnic minorities.
The Burmese junta has accepted this situation for at least three reasons. First, the ceasefire accords have allowed the military to avoid multiple enemy fronts in the aftermath of the 1988 pro-democracy uprising and to focus mainly on suppressing political opposition in central Burma.
Secondly, the ceasefire condition that prevails in the border areas has enabled the Burmese military to make unprecedented advances in its relations with neighboring countries¬ especially China and Thailand ¬in both security and economic terms. The neighbors that once supported Burma’s ethnic rebels along their borders as a key part of their buffer policy or because of an ideological affinity have now shifted to the policy of full economic cooperation with the Burmese junta through massive investment and border trade.
Lastly, the ceasefire accords give the military regime the much-needed political legitimacy that they have lost since the bloody crackdown on the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The regime constantly points to the ethnic ceasefire groups as the most defining feature of its “national reconsolidation” policy and as evidence of its claims to legitimacy.
However, the success of the military’s strategic tolerance is now about to be put to the test, as the regime must do two things before the 2010 elections to ensure that the progress it has made toward establishing a so-called “disciplined democracy” is meaningful.
First of all, the military needs to redraw the map of Burma under its new constitution. The basic state structure, consisting of seven centrally located regions surrounded by seven ethnic states, will remain the same. This favors the continuing dominance of the Burman majority, who live mostly in the seven regions. Some states, however, will see their maps being redrawn, with five Self-Administered Zones (for Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Pa Laung and Kokang ethnic groups) and one Self-Administered Division (for Wa ethnic group) designated by the military. The seventeen “special regions” established in the ethnic ceasefire areas are due to expire when the military redraws the map in accordance with the new constitution. Re-mapping must also be done soon so that the junta can establish new electoral constituencies in the country, especially in the ethnic areas. However, there is still no consensus among all parties concerned with regard to the drawing up of a new map, and this issue remains contentious.
Secondly, and more importantly, the military needs to disarm the ceasefire groups, reclaim territory from them, and push them to transform themselves into political parties ready to contest the 2010 election. This will be a major test of the military’s “contained Balkanization” of the ethnic areas; failure to achieve these goals could trigger an outright conflict and, in the worst case scenario, initiate another era of regional instability.
The question is how ethnic ceasefire groups will respond to the regime’s plans for their future. The indications so far suggest that ethnic groups will not likely give in to the junta’s demands. The United Wa State Party (UWSP), for example, now refers to itself as the “Government of Wa State, Special Autonomous Region, Union of Myanmar” in official documents. The UWSP, which has long pressed the regime to designate the Wa territory as a “state” in the constitution, has refused to call the area under its control “Shan State Special Region 2” in accordance with the terms of their ceasefire agreement or “Shan State Self-Administered Division” in accordance with the military’s new constitution.
Two other strong ceasefire groups, ¬the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), ¬have already officially stated that they will not contest the 2010 election. The NMSP even went so far as to say that it does not accept the military’s constitution.
There are two things the ceasefire groups can and should do. The first would be to resist the regime’s forced disarmament under the current conditions. Some groups may take part in the 2010 election through their proxy ethnic parties, but they must not give in to the regime’s demands for the disarmament of their troops or the loss of territories under their control.
Secondly, they should convey the message to neighboring countries, ¬particularly China and Thailand, and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations¬, that the 2010 election, which will be held under the military’s constitution, will in no way contribute to stability or a smooth political transition to democracy and ethnic autonomy.
Genuine national reconciliation and nation-building must precede the restructuring of the state. The neighboring countries and the regional group should, therefore, be reminded that the situation of “contained Balkanization” in Burma could easily lead to a resumption of localized arm conflicts between certain ethnic ceasefire groups and the Burmese army unless the latter negotiates an acceptable political resolution with fourteen major ceasefire groups whose strength reaches over 40,000 armed troops. Such a situation would particularly alarm China, since the most volatile areas are around the Sino-Burmese border, where formidable Wa and Kachin ethnic groups are based.
The aforementioned resistance and warnings should be accompanied by two political demands: a review of the constitution, and the release of political prisoners, including Shan ceasefire leader Hso Ten and Shan MP-elect Khun Htun Oo. These demands are largely in line with those of the mainstream opposition in central Burma and the international community.
However, the ceasefire groups must be strategic and coordinated in their action. Otherwise, they will face inter-group divisions¬ with some groups giving in and others resisting against disarmament ¬as well as intra-group splits ¬with one part of a group surrendering and another part resuming fighting.
Many ceasefire groups have, in fact, issued collective statements in the past to raise their political demands with the junta. When the military resumed the National Convention in 2004, collective demands were issued to the regime on two occasions ¬by eight groups the first time, and by 13 the second (with the KIO and the NMSP joining in both efforts). Their demands included the right to discuss and revise the undemocratic principles and procedures of the convention, the right of elected representatives from the 1990 election to participate in the convention, and the clear distribution of power to the states.
Similar collective efforts should now be used to achieve the two key political goals of a constitutional review and the release of political prisoners. A broad, well-coordinated effort must be strategically articulated not only to consolidate the domestic power bases of ethnic groups, but also to persuade neighboring countries to engage in and facilitate an acceptable political resolution in Burma.
If the ceasefire groups fail to stand together and be strategic at this critical historical juncture, they will lose their ground and eventually succumb to the junta’s “divide and conquer” tactics.
In the long run, ethnic minorities will be the ultimate losers under the military’s constitution. Burma will remain a highly centralized state in the post-2010 era. The undemocratic power of the president and the brooding presence of the military at every level of government in the ethnic states will not produce anything approaching the level of autonomy desired by ethnic minorities.
While military-owned businesses, junta cronies, foreign investors and traders, and ethnic drug lords and elites plunder the natural resources of the ethnic states, local ethnic populations will continue to be denied economic opportunities. This situation is already common in many areas. For example, logging companies from China bring their own cutters, drivers and laborers to work their concession in the Wa ethnic area, leaving locals impoverished and susceptible to social ills such as drug abuse, prostitution and diseases.
In the post-2010 era, ethnic states will also see their environment further destroyed by greedy businesses and bad governance. The preservation of ethnic identity will be at serious risk as states or self-administered communities will have almost no authority over the issues of language or cultural and religious rights.
Moreover, since a military chief will independently administer military affairs in the post-2010 era, including the recruitment of troops and the deployment of military forces, the issues of child soldiers, forced relocations, forced labor, landmines, internally displaced persons, the flow of refugees to neighboring countries, and rape and other rights violations – all of which are associated with the military’s unchecked interests and behavior¬ – will remain unresolved, especially in ethnic minority areas.
Relentless repression and the darkest side of economic globalization will continue to cause lives in the ethnic states to be, as Hobbes described, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
It is now up to the leaders of ceasefire groups to decide whether they will betray the 60-year long struggle for their ethnic people or stand together with an effective strategy to fight for equal ethnic rights. The rest will be history.
Min Zin is a Burmese journalist in exile and a teaching fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Journalism.
A New U.S. Strategy for Burma
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/1600-a-new-us-strategy-for-burma.html
by Zo Tum Hmung
Sunday, 25 January 2009 19:46
The inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States will mark major changes in policy in many areas at home and internationally. However, the Obama administration is highly likely to continue the Bush policy of pushing for restoration of civilian democratic rule in Burma. The new administration should try a new strategy toward the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military regime in Burma by finding a common ground among key international players on the situation in Burma.
Because time is of the essence, now is the time to think differently – before Burma's 2010 election.
The United States has pursued bilateral sanctions against the SPDC for years. Burma's powerful neighbors, China and India, have frustrated this. People close to the Indo-Burma Kaladan project, a $100 million port project in Burma, have confirmed to me that India is fully funding it to foster closer ties with Burma. In order to pursue economic recovery on domestically, Washington will need closer ties with both Beijing and Delhi. Neither India nor China will abandon their strategic relations with Burma, until the United States works with them as equal partners in solving Burma's problems.
The Bush administration began to engage with members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China and India bilaterally to put pressure on the Burmese military regime. The new administration should convene a multilateral talks involving all the parties concerned.
The Bush administration also put Burma on the agenda of the UN Security Council – an idea initially pushed by a June 2003 report from the Council on Foreign Relations task force. The Council members including Senators Richard Lugar (then the chair of the Foreign Relations Committee), Diane Feinstein, and Mitch McConnell, and the late Congressman Tom Lantos. The report by Vaclav Havel and Archbishop Desmond Tutu in September 2005 reinforced the notion of Burma as a threat to international peace and security. When a draft resolution finally made it to the Security Council in January 2007, both Russia and China vetoed it. In October 2007, however, Russia and China agreed to a Presidential Statement from the Security Council, condemning violence against protests in Burma and calling for concerned parties to form a dialogue on national reconciliation.
In addition to the unitateral sanctions and working through the Security Council, the United States has supported the efforts of the UN Special Envoys. When Suu Kyi was released in 2002, the United States was hopeful for change. However, the Special UN Envoy Ismael Razali was soon frustrated by the lack of progress and resigned. In 2003, Suu Kyi was arrested again and has remained under house arrest ever since. The appointment of Ibrahim Gambari as a UN envoy led to further hopes, but has yet to produce meaningful results.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also convened an informal consultation of "Friends of the Secretary-General on Burma," 14 nations, to discuss the matter but not pursue specific action. The Secretary General was almost on the right track with his "Friends," but the process was informal and there were too many nations involved.
Michael Green, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, recently wrote in Foreign Affairs that the UN approach has failed. In September 2007, I wrote in Mizzima News that the UN approach had failed to secure the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners.
The realistic prospect of regime change either through the support of opposition groups in the 2010 election or through the support of internal uprisings is very slim. The military regime has already reserved 25 percent, of the parliamentary seats for the Army, giving themselves the upper hand before a single vote has been cast. They are determined not to repeat the 1990 election, when Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory. The military regime will protect its power by any means necessary.
The current strategy has failed for years to produce any meaningful results. Pursuing it further has even less chance of success. This argument does not suggest abandoning this course completely, especially pursuing a Security Council resolution. Rather, it is suggesting coordination of all the concerned parties through a formal framework which could eventually lead to a Security Council resolution.
Given the frustrations of the current, unilateral, uncoordinated approach, Washington should redouble its efforts, and lead all the parties concerned with Burma's future in a formal, multilateral framework to find a common ground. There are three keys to a successful process.
First, President Obama should appoint a U.S. Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma as called for by Rep. Lantos' Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 as soon as possible. The Representative should be someone with extensive experience in negotiations and diplomacy.
Second, the Representative should take the lead in framing formal "Seven-Party Talks" involving China, India, ASEAN, the European Union, and the United Nations. I suggested in September 2007 in Mizzima News that a framework similar to the negotiations over North Korea would be the most effective way of reaching a negotiated settlement on Burma's future. After he left his post with the Bush administration, Michael Green suggested six-party talks, leaving out the United Nations.
Third, the Representative should lead the Seven Parties in sending a common message to the SPDC. It will not be easy, but it is crucial to speak with one voice. The message should include the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as other political prisoners, along with democratic reforms. In delivering this message, the carrot offered to the SPDC should be reassurance that they are part of solution for Burma. The stick should be the promise of punitive action against them and the prospect of holding them accountable for all their actions.
There is no easy solution. But the new administration should launch a new strategy immediately. Given President Obama's strength and popularity abroad and at home, and bipartisan Congressional support for action on Burma, Obama has a unique opportunity to forge a new path to reform.
Zo Tum Hmung is a former president of the Chin Freedom Coalition. He received a master's degree from Harvard University, where he concentrated on foreign policy.
North Korean leader's eldest son could still be heir: analysts - World news
http://www.euronews24.org/world/north-korean-leaders-eldest-son-could-still-be-heir-analysts---world-news/
A comment by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's eldest son Kim Jong-nam that he is not interested in the issue of succession does not imply he is out of the competition to run the country, analysts said on Sunday.
In comments to reporters at a hotel in Beijing on Saturday, the younger Kim said I have no interest, when asked if he was interested in the leadership succession issue, according to Yonhap News Agency.
He said succession was only for his father to decide, as he had also stated earlier when he met reporters upon arriving at a Beijing airport.
The response by Kim Jong-nam doesn't imply that he isn't willing to succeed, said Moon Hong-sik, Research Fellow at Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS).
It's rather a prudent answer coming from a highly possible successor, without being disrespectful to his father as it may lead to misunderstandings.
Kim arrived in Beijing from Pyongyang along with a senior level Chinese official, Wang Jiarui, who met Kim Jong-il in the North Korean capital on Friday.
The meeting with a foreign visitor was seen as evidence the North Korean leader, who U.S. and South Korean officials said fell seriously ill last year, was well enough to run Asia's only communist dynasty and make decisions about its nuclear program.
The eldest son, in his late thirties, said he was in China on a personal visit and he had no plans to meet with Chinese officials, Yonhap reported.
Analysts said Kim's visit has no great significance as he often travels abroad to Hong Kong, Macao and Beijing.
Kim said he had no information regarding recent reports on Kim Jong-il's third and youngest son, Jong-un, being picked as the successor, adding it is not right to make assumptions before anything is decided, the report said.
(Reporting by Angela Moon; Editing by Jerry Norton)
Myanmar puppet players to perform in Tokyo
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/25/content_10716918.htm
YANGON, Jan. 25 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar professional puppet players from the ancient city of Mandalay has been invited to perform in Japan's capital of Tokyo under the title of "Puppet Opera In Myanmar", the local weekly Yangon Times reported in this week's issue.
As the third invitation by the Japan Modern Foundation Puppet Center, the six-member Myanmar Mandalay puppet players will stage the two-week performance in Tokyo with its high-standard performing art.
Myanmar and Japan have been cooperating closely in the culture sector. Aimed at strengthening the mutual friendship and boosting cultural exchange between the two countries, a Japanese film festival was held in Myanmar's commercial city of Yangon last Sunday.
Four Japanese films, namely "Nabbie's Love", "Water Boys", "Linda Linda Linda" and "Ping Pong Bath Station" were introduced in the festival which lasted for four days.
The Japanese film festival will continue in Myanmar's second largest city of Mandalay from Feb. 23 to 26 with the same four films on the screen.
Meanwhile, an annual Japanese Literature translation contest at three levels is scheduled to take place in Yangon and Mandalay on Feb. 28, according to the Embassy of Japan.
China Rejects Currency Manipulation Charge
http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2009/01/china-rejects-currency-manipulation.html
By EDWARD WONG
BEIJING — The central bank of China on Saturday rejected an accusation by President Obama’s nominee for Treasury secretary that China was manipulating its currency to give it an unfair advantage in exporting goods to the United States and other markets.
The assertion was made by the nominee, Timothy F. Geithner, in written remarks to the Senate Finance Committee as part of his confirmation hearing. The remarks were in documents made public on Thursday.
“President Obama — backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists — believes that China is manipulating its currency,” Mr. Geithner said.
Xinhua, the state news agency, reported Saturday that Su Ning, the deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, said that Mr. Geithner’s accusation would sidetrack efforts to determine the real cause of the global financial crisis.
“Also, we should avoid any excuse that might lead to the revitalization of trade protectionism, because it will do no good in the fight against the crisis, nor will it help the healthy and stable development of the global economy,” Mr. Su said, according to Xinhua.
In 2005, the Chinese government ended a strict peg between the Chinese currency, called the renminbi or the yuan, and the American dollar. Since then, the yuan has floated in a narrow band against the dollar. The value of the currency is now 6.84 yuan to the dollar.
In the article on Saturday, Xinhua also quoted Zuo Xiaolei, a senior analyst with China Galaxy Securities, a Beijing-based financial company, as saying that Mr. Geithner may have been using his comment to feel out the Chinese government’s response.
In addition, Ms. Zuo told Xinhua that “the price advantage of Chinese exports may not be a result of currency issues, but the country’s lower costs of labor, resources and land.”
The global financial crisis has resulted in foreign companies placing fewer orders with exporters in China, leading to a severe downturn in the export industry. Chinese leaders now say the nation must move away from an economy so dependent on exports.
S’pore and Myanmar Red Cross sign agreement on Cyclone Nargis relief
http://sg.news.yahoo.com/cna/20090124/tap-673-spore-myanmar-red-cross-sign-agr-231650b.html
SINGAPORE : The Singapore Red Cross signed an agreement on January 22 with its Myanmar counterpart to provide humanitarian aid to victims of Cyclone Nargis.
For a start, the collaboration will see three rural health centres and a cyclone shelter being built in three townships in the Irrawaddy delta. Money to do this will come from funds raised by the Singapore Red Cross.
This latest development adds to other efforts the Singapore Red Cross has been making, as part of its cyclone relief work in Myanmar.
The organisation had collaborated with various Singapore welfare organisations, as well as agencies in Myanmar, to provide assistance to victims in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone.
Projects completed included the rebuilding of a new village at Auk Pyun Wa, which include homes, a school, a clinic, a cyclone shelter, a school and an orphanage in Thanlyin.
Projects underway include a cyclone shelter in Twantay, two schools, a cyclone shelter in Bogalay and another cyclone shelter in Kungyangone.
The Singapore Red Cross has received a total of S$11.6 million from members of the public and corporate sector for its Cyclone Nargis fund. Of this, almost S$9 million has been expended or committed.
The Singapore Red Cross will continue to be the custodian of the fund and says it will assist victims of Cyclone Nargis, so long as the funding remains available. — CNA /ls
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