http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-04-08-voa1.cfm
By VOA News
08 April 2009
A film about underground reporters who risk their lives to document political repression in Burma has turned out to be the big winner at the Full Frame Documentary Film Festival in the southeastern U.S. state of North Carolina.
Burma VJ - Reporting from a Closed Country - won in three categories at the festival, the most for any entry.
Burma VJ, which was directed by Andreas Ostergaard, captured the "Grand Jury Award." The film also won the "Center for Documentary Studies Filmmaker Award" and the "Full Frame/Working Films Award" at the three-day festival that ended on April 5.
The film festival, in the city of Durham, is an annual international event. Organizers say it is dedicated to the theatrical exhibition of non-fiction cinema.
The other films honored include Unmistaken Child, which is about the search for the reincarnation of a Tibetan mediator and Love on Delivery, a story about a woman's efforts to help Thai women find Danish husbands.
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Film About Underground Reporters in Burma Captures Top Honors
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1946-burmese-oppositions-aligned-to-form-a-united-front.html
Burmese oppositions aligned to form a ‘United Front’
by Ko Wild
Tuesday, 07 April 2009 22:26
Chiang Mai (Mizzima) – Several Burmese opposition groups during a meeting last week in Thai-Burmese border had decided to form an inclusive united front to strengthen unity and consolidate.
The meeting held from April 2 to 4 was attended by representatives of pro-democracy organizations, including women’s and ethnic united fronts and the coalition government in exile.
"We badly need unity and consolidation at this juncture. We need to pave the way for setting up of a sole, unified and consolidated united front, which will be more effective. We will oppose the 2010 election, but how. So we discussed these at the meeting," Pado David Taw, Joint-Secretary (1) of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) said.
The meeting was attended by 58 delegates representing seven alliance organizations namely the 'National Council of Union of Burma' (NCUB), 'Ethnic Nationalities Council' (ENC) (Union of Burma), 'Women’s League of Burma' (WLB), 'Forum for Democracy in Burma' (FDB), 'Students and Youths Congress of Burma' (SYCB) and the 'Nationalities Youth Forum' (NYF).
The goal of the meeting was to explore and adopt a common programme for the Burmese democracy movement.
The meeting decided to form a 14-member working committee from among the delegates; to draw and adopt the basic principles for forming the alliance. But it did not set a deadline for completing these basic principles.
Pado David Taw said that one of the common programmes adopted in the meeting was the 'elimination programme' of the new 2008 constitution. This is fundamental for the implementation of democratic transition and conforms to the principle with the four-point agenda being called for by the NLD and political forces for 'reviewing the constitution'.
"In fact, the stand of our revolutionary forces is total elimination. But as for the NLD, its stand is reviewing the constitution. We concluded that it was difficult for the NLD to call for total elimination explicitly. So we added one more point in the agenda in keeping with their demand," he said.
The timing of trying to set up a single united front by merging all the seven separate alliance organizations coincides with the pressure being mounted on the oldest revolutionary group among them, the 'Karen National Union' (KNU), to enter into a dialogue with the Burmese junta by the Thai government.
But KNU Central Executive Committee member Pado David Taw said that KNU will only discuss political affairs with the regime, not territorial and economic issues so that it will not reflect on the stand and expansion of the alliance organizations.
Pado David Taw also said that the KNU delegation led by 'Karen National Liberation Army' (KNLA) Chief of Staff Gen. Mutu Saypho and comprising KNU Vice-Chairman Pado David Tarkapaw and General Secretary Naw Zippora Sein held discussions with Thai officials on Monday.
But who represented the Thai side and the subject of the meeting are not yet known.
SSA deplores clashes between DKBA, KNU
http://www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2528:ssa-deplores-clashes-between-dkba-knu&catid=86:war&Itemid=284
Wednesday, 08 April 2009 18:28 Hseng Khio Fah
Col Yawd Serk, Chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the political arm of the Shan State Army (SSA) South, said he was distressed to hear about clashes among the same nationality, the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).
“It is not good to take personal problems into the national problems. It brings no benefit to one’s own nationality,” said Col Yawd Serk.
On 6 April, a joint force of Burma Army and DKBA attacked Waleki, a base camp of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed wing of KNU.
He said that the Burma Army is using two strategies to fight the KNU to be weak. One is psychological and the other is actual fighting.
On the other hand, some KNU’s officers and Thai Foreign Ministry’s officials on the same day held a meeting in Bangkok, according to the New Era Journal, 6 April.
Col Yawd Serk
The Burma Army is asking Thailand to help facilitate talks with ethnic resistance movements to join its seven-step roadmap toward national reconciliation when Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya made his two day visit to Burma on 22-23 March.
“It is good that KNU held meeting with Thailand. But I don’t think KNU will benefit on it as we all know the Burma Army is bent on walking the same trail that it is used to,” commented Col Yawd Serk.
To solve the political problems in Burma one must endeavor to solve the root cause of the problems, that is, the Panglong agreement, he said.
“SSA is always ready to hold talks with the Burma Army, but the meeting must be held in the third country and there must be observers. We must build mutual trust first,” he added.
Whoever wants to mediate must know the root cause of the political problems in Burma. The main key to change Burma into a genuine Union is based on the unity of all groups. Without this unity, nobody can help them, he said.
The junta and the SSA had agreed to hold talks on 23 May 2007 but it failed to take place when the Burma Army delegation failed to appear at the venue.
KNU accepts junta’s offer for peace parleys
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1948-knu-accepts-juntas-offer-for-peace-parleys.html
by Salai Pi Pi
Wednesday, 08 April 2009 15:33
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Burma’s leading ethnic armed resistance group, the Karen National Union has accepted the offer of the Burmese military junta for peace talks through Thailand’s Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya on Monday.
Saw David Takapaw, Vice-president of the KNU on Wednesday told Mizzima that KNU had reacted positively to Kasit at the informal meeting held in Bangkok for over one hour on Monday regarding the offer of the Burmese regime for peace parleys.
“We told them (Thailand) that we have accepted the offer of the junta on peace talks, as we want to solve political problems by political means,” Takapaw said. “
However, he said the date and venue for the talks are yet to be fixed.
KNU delegates led by Takapaw and General Secretary Naw Ziporah Sein met Kasit, the facilitator for the talks between KNU and the Burmese regime, and other officials from Thailand’s Foreign Ministry in Bangkok.
During the meeting, Takapaw said, Kasit revealed the message of the Burmese Prime Minister General Thein Sein that the junta would like to hold a dialogue with the KNU for national reconciliation.
“They (Thai) informed us that Thein Sein would like to talk to us regarding national reconciliation,” he said. “He (Kasit) said he will act as facilitator.”
Last month, Thein Sein sought help from Kasit during his two-day visit to Burma to persuade the KNU to contest the ensuing 2010 election.
“If the regime is willing to solve problems peacefully, we are ready to talk,” said Takapaw, adding that the KNU will insist the regime first convene a tripartite dialogue and amend the constitution.
Meanwhile, Takapaw alleged, the Burmese Army is supporting the KNU splinter group, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in launching fresh offensives against its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Kawkreit district in Karen state close to the Thai-Burma border. KNLA battalions have been retaliating using guerrilla tactics.
“Recently, the Burmese Army backed up the DKBA which was attacking us in Kawkreit district. We also retaliated in guerrilla warfare style,” he said.
“We (KNU and the junta) attack each other while we also talk to each other,” he added.
The KNU has held talks with the Burmese regime on five occasions previously since launching their campaign for self-determination in 1948.
The two sides were able to reach a verbal ceasefire agreement, commonly known as the “Gentlemen's Agreement," after the last round of formal talks between the KNU’s late leader, General Bo Mya, and former military intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, in the former capital Rangoon in 2004. The talks, however, came to a halt after Khin Nyunt was purged from the military hierarchy.
The KNU’s statement on peace efforts issued last month said, “Peace negotiations between the KNU and successive Burmese regimes have consistently failed because of lack of sincerity on the part of the regime in power.”
According to Burma’s state media ‘The New Light of Myanmar’ on April 4, Nay Soe Mya, son of the late KNU leader Gen Saw Bo Mya, led 71 Karen rebels and defected to the junta on March 30.
However, Takapaw said, among the 71 Karen who had defected to the junta, only four are from the KNLA armed group including Nay Soe Mya while the rest are civilians.
He went on to say that 71 Karen broke away from KNU as the Burmese regime, particularly Maj. Gen. Saw Htay Maung led DKBA tempted them with money.”
“It is better for KNU that such corrupt people defect” he added.
Singapore’s Shame (Chapter 2 - A culture of fear)
http://wayangparty.com/?p=7491
April 7, 2009 by admin
Filed under James Gomez, Top Story
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By Dr James Gomez, Author, Self-Censorship: Singapore’s Shame
EDITORS’ NOTE:
(Self-Censorship: Singapore`s Shame written by Dr. James Gomez ten years ago focuses on the political behavior of citizens and foreigners living and working in Singapore. He is currently revising his book to consider the impact of the post-internet environment. Dr. Gomez invites readers and bloggers to post their reactions, suggestions and comments to his draft chapters which will be serialized here each week.You are invited to join his
Facebook Author’s Support Group at http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=59118927883 and check out his blog at http://www.jamesgomeznews.com/blog). His posting last week “Introduction” can be found here.)
When it comes to discussions of political culture, a commonly phrase used is the “culture of fear”. In Singapore, a culture of fear is seen as driving self-censorship. This culture of fear is something that has been constructed by the PAP government through its historical tightening of political controls in spite of its occasional rhetoric of openness.
This deliberately manufactured fear is aimed at securing social and political control over citizens and foreign residents in Singapore. It is the reason why people become anxious about political participation and justify self-censorship because a culture of fear exists. How has this fear been created in Singapore?
The culture of fear is related to political development in Singapore. Discussions on the political development in the city-state have been reviewed from a number of perspectives over the last three decades. One
writer attributed this political conservatism to the ideological hegemony of the ruling party and to Asian values (Chua, 1996).
While another argued that the economy of Singapore was used to as tool of social control and to nurture political conservatism in the republic (Tremewan, 1994), others have suggested that the character of the middle class has something to do with this state of affairs (Rodan, 1992; Jones and Brown, 1994). The tactics of the PAP and its authoritarian character have also been identified as having explanatory potential (Rodan, 1993). Much earlier, local political scientist Chan Heng Chee had explained conservatism as a result of “politics” being absorbed into the state bureaucracy (Chan, 1975).
Former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew’s political style, together with his use of legal action at the courts, have also been proffered as contributing to the state of political conservatism here (Haas, 1999; Seow, 1994 and 1998;
Selvam, 1991; Minchin, 1986). However, the centrality of Lee’s role in Singapore politics is now being challenged on several fronts. For instance, one book that tries to map the contributions of his other colleagues (Lam
and Tan, 1999) while others include political autobiographies such as that of Said Zahari (2001 and 2007) which collectively challenge the centrality of Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore`s political history.
The contemporary structures of changes in Singapore have also been identified as shaping political conservatism in Singapore. Analyses have focused on the strategies of the PAP, the institutional restrictions against independent political expression and the reforms that have taken place to “accommodate” the demand for greater political participation (Heng, 1997; Rodan, 1997; and Lam, 1997) as well as restrictions place over the internet,
political films and public protests.
Issues concerning elections have also been considered relevant to the local political culture. One writer has provided an overall description of the Singapore electoral system and the accompanying changes over the years
(Thio, 1997) while another has focused on the failure of the electoral system in representing alternative voices (Rodan, 1996). There are also several local academics have sought to explain the general and other
elections in Singapore (Mutalib, 1992 and 1993; Singh, 1992; da Cunha, 1997). In my own PhD thesis on the impact of the internet on the electoral system, I concluded that political culture contributed in part to upholding
the electoral system in Singapore that continuously returns the PAP into power (Gomez 2008).
Some works on civil society, mainly emanating from PAP government think-tanks, seek to make a distinction between civil and political society (Ooi and Goh, 1999). Others claim that civil society will be the site of future political contestation (Tay, 1998). Implicit in local discussions on civil society is that “neutral” or “non-partisan” political culture of such groups is the preferred choice.
There are only a few studies that have directly commented on political culture and behaviour in Singapore. Most works on the Republic’s political development, if they refer to political behaviour, use the term “political
culture” (Soin Tan, 1993; Khong, 1995; Jeyaretnam, 1997), though it is not adequately explained, described or gauged. Often, it is mentioned in passing, without any depth of deliberation.
Most discussions on self-censorship have often been used in relation to the media and local media in particular. The application of the concept self-censorship has only been used in a limited way to explain Singaporean political culture. Almost none discuss its role in a post-internet environment in Singapore.
Discussion on domestic political culture often go back to the features of traditional heritage, religion, political history of the region and ethnic origins of the migrant population in Singapore. Conventional explanations often state that the nature of political conservatism on the island can be attributed to ethnic culture. Understood in rigid ethnic categories, Singapore is made up of 75% Chinese, 14% Malay, 6% Indians and 5% Others. However, such categories are increasingly becoming irrelevant as more foreigners from non-traditional sources of immigration countries such as the Burma, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhere settle and work in Singapore.
One piece of work that attempted an ethnic explanation was an early study, which focused on the Chinese community (Clammer, 1985). The writer argued that their large numbers in Singapore sinicised the political culture of the
Republic. Hence, the disdain that the Chinese hold for politics is reflected across the board in Singapore, he said. The writer pointed out that the majority Chinese, as opposed to the minorities, are politically conservative. He believed that this was one reason why political development in Singapore has largely mirrored the cultural conservatism of the ethnic majority. He offered as reasons, the social structure and attitudes of the Chinese community towards politics.
The PAP government has been able to manipulate and stretch this cultural argument to all ethnic communities in Singapore, in the 1990s, to sell the idea of an “Asian values” system, which tries to render democracy as a culturally Western-style alien concept. Modeled after Confucianism, Asian values instead are said to entail a belief in good government by honest men and includes a reverence for authority. As such, direct opposition is not to be encouraged; instead, consensus building is to be supported.
While arguments from ethnicity can hold some explanatory relevance, the uncritical use of ethnic explanations for political behaviour, needs to be guarded against. For instance, it is important to recognise that Singapore`s
minority communities in the broad sense of the word are generally not involved in politics. In political parties, especially opposition parties, ethnic minority community participation is small, token or non-existent. Minority communities in Singapore have essentially abandoned politics and live their daily lives as a community unto themselves.
Often the plural ethno-religious make up of the city-state is used to pre-empt political change. Pictures of ethnic strife drawn from two early riots in the Republic’s history have been well utilised in government discourse to help the citizens and foreign residents to internalise risk aversive behaviour when it comes to politics. On the basis of frailties of statehood and a narrow range of policy instruments available for ethno-centered policies, the use of culture in this way aids the retention of the existing system.
The argument from ethnic culture attempts to paint alternative views as dangerous, anti-establishment, unreflective of aspirations of the majority and as “fringe” interests. In this way, it perpetuates popular attempts to endanger and marginalise alternative views. For instance, demands for political space are often represented as the wants
of minorities. The demand for political space is frequently depicted as a concern only of ethnic minorities, the English-educated, sexual minorities, academics and eccentric elements of society. Additionally, the push for
liberal values and democracy is portrayed as the demand by a small group of people who use such ‘romantic’ notions as a strategy to gain political attention.
But the explanation via ethnicity does not clarify why political participation in other East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan is large and highly impassioned. Further, it does not explain why a very
disparately constituted group of Chinese-educated, blue-collared workers and the man in the street elbowed for political space some 40 years ago in the Republic.
There is nothing inherent in Asian cultures that make self-censoring a necessary feature. Instead, much of the promotion of group solidarity and the rejection of self-assertion and individual rights are systemic of Asian one-party dominated regimes or military dictatorships such as in Burma, China, Laos, Vietnam and even Japan. Thus, there is a need to go beyond ethnic culture to look at structures to explain the political culture that is uniquely Singaporean, cutting across ethnic lines and affecting even those of other nationalities residing in the Republic. There is something deeper than ethnicity that explains the state of political culture and fear in Singapore.
Economics has also been used to explain local political behaviour. Linked to the presence of a patron-client relationship between the PAP and the majority of the voters, the economic success of the republic is said to have
created gratitude, loyalty and dependency among citizens and foreigners residing in Singapore for the ruling party. The fact is the PAP government is literally the largest employer in terms of percentage of total jobs in
the economy. This position as the lead employer includes the number of government jobs (not just civil service, but includes all quasi-government and non-government entities that receive government funds or come under some
form of government control). Add to this the percentage of total value of the stock market under state control (through Temasek, Government Investment Corporation, etc) versus that which is in truly private hands (bearing in
mind that a lot of ‘private’ owners are active participants in the patronage system).
Work in also the size of small and medium enterprises versus the size of MNCs and PAP government controlled businesses (Singapore Airlines, SingTel, etc) and this shows the link between the level of self-censorshiphow much the PAP government controls the livelihood of its citizens and foreign workers. Most people are not willing to do something to jeopardize their career or livelihood. The connection of the Republic’s economic
success to the PAP is manifested in the way individuals and groups preface remarks about politics, especially their desire for greater political participation, with accolades for the ruling party and its leaders that is
at the same time coupled with expressions of gratitude and loyalty. It is a ritual that is clearly observable at local conferences, meetings and speeches at events.
The political behaviour of the middle-class is highly relevant in any study of the nation’s economic culture. Based on it; size, some commentators note that middle-class behaviour represents the political culture of Singaporean
society. They argue that the republic’s large middle-class, whose material consumption is linked to the state, does not want to upset the status quo. This special dependency is in part supported by the people’s obsession with
material gain.
Since citizens and foreign workers alike in Singapore are motivated by the need to constantly gather material advantage and get ahead, a national trait referred to locally as kiasuism is seen as an intrinsic character of this middle class. The ruling party taps this deep-seated desire of the people for materialism and therefore continually plays the economic card for its political ends. Feelings of anxiety and uncertainty displayed by the economically dependent middle class’ whenever the ruling party raises the spectre of economic downfall have been linked to the slow rate of the democratisation process in Singapore (Jones and Brown, 1994).
Even though some have endeavoured to show that the middle class itself is complex (Chua and Tan, 1995), economic dependency has been accepted as one explanation why the Singapore middle-class does not initiate political
change. One writer speaks in terms of an ideological consensus between the PAP government and the electorate that has been based on a shared interest in economic growth (Chua, 1998). In 2008 when the mini-bond issues broke out
in Singapore following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the initial crowds that gathered at the Speakers Corner eventually dissipated without building on the momentum for mass political action.
But the similarity between the political culture of the elite class and the masses, arising out of a centralised and punitive political system, goes beyond economics and the citizenry. This phenomenon has also affected the
behaviour of foreign residents in the Republic and other foreigners who have dealings with the country. Those who do not publicly subscribe to this larger political culture or have actively taken part in what is seen as
antagonistic political activity have been deported or their resident, work or student permits terminated or not renewed. This larger impact of political culture reveals lacunae in theories of democratisation that
expected a course of political action from the middle-class.
Another account of political conservatism in the Republic focuses on the popular fear that the PAP will persecute any independent political expression. This fear originates from the perception that the government takes punitive action against its political opponents. In Singapore, there have been numerous examples of individuals who have challenged the political leaders of the country and suffered from detention without trial or have had defamation, bankruptcy and tax evasion suits filed against them. The challengers’ names and characters have been subjected to negative
campaigning through a compliant local press. Such examples of negative campaigning of civil society activists and various opposition politicians in the past and present stay vivid in the minds of the people and perpetuate
the fear. Memories lead opposition figures subjected to negative campaigning include Chia Thye Poh, Tan Wah Piow, JB Jeyaretnam, Francis Seow, Chee Soon Juan, and in 2006 when I contested the general elections against the PAP, I
joined the ranks of these figures as PAP objects of negative campaigning.
Fear is also due to the presence of the Internal Security Department (ISD) and its surveillance of political activities. The ISD makes its surveillance activities fairly visible, especially during opposition party activities or when political figures meet members of foreign embassies, overseas opposition politicians and civil society actors. The surveillance also covers religious activities, academic, social and theatre gatherings. Tertiary institutions such as polytechnics and universities are also monitored by handlers through student and academic informers. The public can
get a fairly detailed account of the workings of the ISD, and its detention and interrogation techniques from Francis Seow’s book To Catch a Tartor: Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew’s Prison (Seow, 1994), supplementary information
can also be found in (Tan, Gomez, 1999) and ( Hong 2009; Tan, Teo and Koh 2009).
There is also an informal culture of curiosity over each others` perceived political activity and the accompanying rumour mongering that acts as a mass surveillance device that feeds the formal surveillance network. The fear
against surveillance is so widespread that presence of the ISD is evoked even when lay people speak of politics, make telephone calls or send messages via the Internet or post articles on blogs. With the arrival of the
internet, there is a perception and acceptance that internet content is constantly being monitored by the authorities.
Further, online anonymity that features prominently in internet chat rooms and in the comment sections
of blogs is accepted as non-existent. The belief is that the PAP government and its agents have the technical and financial means to track every single anonymous online entity and that “radical” bloggers are invited out for a
chat by government agents and persuaded to moderate their stance! Adding to this, are revelations that a Singapore-based company has supplied sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment to Burma’s military-rulers that is capable of intercepting all sorts of telephone and fax messages as well as e-mail and radio communications aggravates the situation even further (2nd September, Far Eastern Economic Review 1999).
Fear has also been attributed to an underlying apprehension that the vote is not secret, that voting against the ruling party could have a negative impact on voters’ livelihood, or that any alternative political views that individuals may have might be held against them. This mind-set is prevalent among many civil servants, employees in government-linked companies, and those who see themselves as being in one way or another connected to the state for their livelihood in Singapore. Being the largest employer and financial patron on the island, the PAP government has a psychological influence over the way a significant number of the people vote during elections. In 1997, the direct threats to withhold funding for precincts voting against the PAP had an immediate influence on voter behaviour (da
Cuhna, 1997). In the last two general elections in 2001 and 2006, the PAP has turned to giving cash incentives such as Singapore Shares and other cash rebates to appeal to voter materialism.
Perceptions of a whole network of informal pressures that pulsate through the state machinery also contribute to fear. This is believed to take the form of “advice” and “pressure” put on civil servants or those in employment outside the civil service but who are nonetheless susceptible to pressure in having their actions deterred or curtailed. A frequently cited example is that immediate superiors advise their junior workers on the wisdom of
engaging in particular political activities or associating with certain individuals and their causes. Failing to adhere to such advice is viewed as courting risk in losing one’s job, being demoted, being passed over for promotion or transferred to lesser departments in the organisation.
It is easy to agree that fear caused by perceptions of the surveillance and intimidation activities of the ISD, the wrath of the service machinery plus informal government pressures can be a powerful deterrent to alternative
political activity and thought. However, ethnicity, economics and fear offered as individual explanations of a typically Singaporean political culture are not satisfactory. They do not demonstrate clearly the relationship between the political structure and behaviour, and how the two are part of a complex interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship in a dominant one-party regime. More importantly they do not reveal the dynamics of political self-censorship and the act of censoring others that are central to how this political culture manifests itself in material form. Thus other perspectives and ideas are needed to complement present understandings of how the system is constantly reproduced.
Culture is often treated as an abstract value system but it has its physical manifestation in people’s behaviour. The structural determination of a dominant Singaporean political culture and its material manifestation are
significant. Censorship should not be understood in negative terms as an “absence” or failure in political life, of what is not done, but as an active material behaviour that itself shapes events in the real world. Censorship impacts on political structure and participation and is in turn constituted by these. Simply put, the current system is responsible for facilitating the censorial behaviour one witnesses in Singapore and such behaviour in return helps keep same the structure and fear in place. Each is necessary for the other.
In such an environment how does one think of political development or reform? What is the way forward? What strategies should one adopt? In the next chapter, Singapore’s political history is briefly surveyed to
trace the emergence and character of this dominant culture of self-censorship and the act of censoring others. It shows that it is mainly in contemporary Singapore that such a censorial climate emerged - a consequence of a systematic attempt by the PAP to contain alternative political expression.
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