BY Ye Yint Thet Zwe
တိတ္ဆိတ္မႈ အရိပ္ေအာက္မွာ
ဆူညံတဲ့ ေၾကကြဲမႈေတြရွိတယ္
၀င္ကစြပ္ေကာင္တို ့ရဲ ့လွည့္စားမႈမွာ
ေဆာင္းညမ်ား မအိပ္ႏိုင္ မစားႏိုင္ရွာ
၀ဋ္နာ ကံနာ တခုလို
လေရာင္ေအာက္မွာ ။
အံုနဲ ့က်င္းနဲ ့ လက္ခံခဲ့ရတဲ့ ေ၀ဒနာ
နံရိုးအၿပိဳင္းၿပိဳင္းမွာ တူညီတဲ့
ယံုၾကည္မႈေတြရွိတယ္
ေဟရာကလိုက္တပ္စ္ ရဲ ့အာေဘာ္
(ျမစ္တျမစ္ထဲကို လူတေယာက္ႏွစ္ခါမဆင္းႏိုင္)
ငါ့ကို နဲနဲ ေအာ္ခြင့္ေပးပါ ။
ရင္ဘတ္ေတြနဲ ့စိုက္ပ်ိဳးခဲ့ၾကၿပီး
ဘယ္လို ရွင္သန္ဖူးပြင့္ခဲ့ၾကရတယ္ဆိုတာ
ပုခံုးေပၚကတာ၀န္ေတြကို ၾကည့္လိုက္ရံုနဲ ့
ေခတ္တခုလံုး ဆလိုက္ထိုးျပသလိုမ်ိဳး
တကြက္ၿပီး တကြက္
ငါ့မွာ ရင္သတ္ရႈ ့ေမာ ။
ေဆာင္းညမ်ားထဲမွာ
ေစြးေစြးနီတဲ့ေသြးမ်ား
ရဲရဲရင့္ရင့္ စီးဆင္းၾက
ရဲရဲရင့္ရင့္ သမိုင္းမွတ္တိုင္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္္ စိုက္ထူၾက
စြန္ ့လႊတ္စြန္ ့စားသြားသူမ်ားရဲ ့
နာနာက်ည္းက်ည္း ေရရြတ္သံမ်ား
ပဲ့တင္လိႈင္းခတ္ လႈပ္ရွား
ဒီဇင္ဘာရဲ ့ ေဆာင္းညမ်ားမွာ ။
ဘယ္သူေရ ၊ ဘယ္၀ါေရ
ကယ္ပါ ကူပါ ငါ မေျပာလိုေတာ့ပါ
ဇြန္ပန္းရံုအနီး လွည္းဘီးနစ္ေနတာ
ရာစုတ၀က္တိုင္ခဲ့ေပါ့ ။
--
Posted By Ye Yint Thet Zwe to Ye Yint Thet Zwe at 3/03/2009 11:30:00 AM
Monday, March 9, 2009
ေမွ်ာ္တလင့္လင့္
USDA Close to Unveiling New Political Party
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=15243
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By WAI MOE Thursday, March 5, 2009
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The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), the main mass organization of the Burmese military junta, is reportedly very close to announcing the formation of a pro-junta political party for the 2010 general election.
USDA sources said that a pro-junta political party might be announced before Burma’s New Year Festival in April, if the election law is made public by then.
Some USDA units across the country are preparing to transform into a political party, sources said. The name of the political party has not yet been approved by senior members of the organization.
The USDA will remain as a mass organization even after the formation of a political party.
The organization has collected personal information on constituency candidates who will run in the 2010 election as pro-junta candidates at the township level.
In the 1990 election, there were 492 constituencies for the People’s Assembly. However, there are 440 constituencies for the People’s Assembly established under the 2008 constitution.
A total of 330 constituencies, or three-quarters, will be elected by vote in the 2010 election. A quarter, or 110 seats, will be selected by the commander-in-chief of Burma’s armed forces.
The number of parliamentary seats to be elected by citizens has decrease by 162, when comparing the 1990 election and the 2010 election, giving the junta a guaranteed majority and control over the parliament.
The USDA is considering pro-junta candidates from among core USDA members and respected people in local communities who are not USDA members, sources said.
“Candidates have been chosen on the basis of how they are respected among people; how they are clean from anti-government movements; how their character is good; how they are patriotic, and whether they have strong business experience,” one source said. Other USDA selection criteria include political and economic vision and contributions to society.
In the past, the former regime (1962-1988), the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), had chosen its candidates from among its party members.
Ahead of the 2010 election, the regime launched development programs for local communities, such as road building and improvement projects, more community libraries and other programs to try to gain local support.
The USDA recently provided soft loan credit to poor people in Rangoon’s poverty areas, such as Southern Dagon Myothit Township and Hlaingtharyar Township, a journalist in Rangoon told The Irrawaddy on Thursday.
The organization reportedly plans to start a daily newspaper in the country, according to journalists in Rangoon. Some USDA members attended a journalism training course in February, sponsored by the Ministry of Information in Rangoon.
The USDA runs training courses for its members, teaching public management, foreign affairs, public relations and debating skills. USDA members also are sent to training courses, forums and meetings in neighboring and Asian countries.
According to the USDA official Web site, 17 members of the USDA Youth Delegation left for Japan on March 3 to attend the Invitation Programme for Young Politicians from Five Mekong Countries, from March 4 to March 12.
Two USDA members also traveled to Malaysia to attend the International Youth and Counter Terrorism Meeting on February 25 to 28.
Two offers for two Wa factions
The military rulers of Burma, through their local commanders in Shan State East, have set out different conditions for two different Wa factions on the Thai-Burma border, according to Thai and Shan sources.
To the ex-KMT (Kuomintang) faction, led by Wei Xuegang, Commander of the United Wa State Army (UWSA)’s 171st Military Region, who is in effective control of 3 of the 5 brigades there, namely: 772nd, 775th and 778th, the options are:
Surrender
Transformation to pro-junta militia
Launching military operations against the anti-Naypyitaw Shan State Army (SSA) South
To the ex-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) faction, led by supreme leader Bao Youxiang, who has 2 brigades along the Thai-Burma border, namely: 248th (Hoyawd) and 518th (Mongyawn), the options somewhat diverge:
Surrender
Transformation to pro-junta militia
Withdrawal to the Sino-Burma border where a “Wa Self-Administered Division” has been designated by the 2008 Constitution
As for the main body of the UWSA that is based on the Sino-Burma border, the reported options are Surrender or Becoming a part of the Burma Army.
“If Wei decides to leave the UWSA and accepts any options offered by the junta, it will severely weaken the remaining Wa forces,” said a Shan businessman close to the Wa. “They will be forced to stand against the Burma Army without a strong economic base.”
The Wa main base east of the Salween and between the Namting in the north and Namkha in the south has been under siege since the New Year began.
So far the Wa have refused to consider the terms offered by the Burma Army.
The only problem appears to be that neither side is ready to start a war. “The junta does not dare to pressure them (the ceasefire armies) to the point of breaking the ceasefire agreements, as it will have severe repercussions,” Aung Kyaw Zaw, analyst based on the Sino-Burma border, told Mizzima News yesterday.
The likely repercussions, said a Thai security official, on condition of anonymity, would be:
Incurring China’s displeasure
The Wa joining hands with the SSA South
Other dissident groups flocking to the UWSA-SSA South alliance, among others
“The only hope therefore is that the ex-KMT faction that has made huge investments in military-ruled Burma will not be able to stand the strain and choose an easy and safe way out,” he ventured.
The UWSA concluded a ceasefire with Burma’s ruling military council in 1989 following its overthrow of the Communist leadership. The 20th anniversary of the mutiny is due to be celebrated on 17 April.
The Kokang ceasefire group Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) led by Peng Jiasheng is also holding its 20th anniversary celebrations, reported sources from the north, although the details are yet to be disclosed. The Kokang rebellion against the CPB on 12 March 1989 had sparked off a series of mutinies by other armed groups.
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News related to Shan & Burma, including other interested news items are collected and posted from time to time for your information. Those interested are requested to write to "Shan Herald Agency for News"
Aung San Suu Kyi given freedom of Glasgow
http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/news/display.var.2493351.0.Aung_San_Suu_Kyi_given_freedom_of_Glasgow.php
GERRY BRAIDEN
March 05 2009
Nobel Peace Prize winner and Burmese democracy campaigner Dr Aung San Suu Kyi was yesterday given the Freedom of the City of Glasgow.
Dr Suu Kyi remains under house arrest imposed by Burma's military regime, so the award was received by Dr Thuang Htun on her behalf at the ceremony at Glasgow City Chambers.
Dr Htun is a representative for United Nations Affairs for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. He also represents the democracy movement at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
The symbolic gesture has echoes of the decision by the city in 1981 to bestow the Freedom of Glasgow on Nelson Mandela, while he was incarcerated on Robben Island by South Africa's apartheid regime. He collected the honour in person 12 years later.
Dr Htun said: "The fact Aung San Suu Kyi should be given the Freedom of the City of Glasgow, a city far from her home, at a time she is denied even basic freedoms in her own country, is a sharp reminder of the mind-numbing reality of today's Burma.
"Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains the only Nobel Peace Prize winner currently incarcerated."
The Freedom of the City award was originally proposed by Amnesty International and Glasgow Women's Library.
Dr Suu Kyi is the daughter of Aung San, the wartime leader of Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League who was assassinated 1947. She has endured prolonged periods of detention and imprisonment over the past 20 years by Burma's oppressive regime.
She founded the National League for Democracy (NLD) in 1988 and was swiftly put under house arrest with the offer of freedom if she left Burma.
In 1990 the NLD won the general election decisively and once again Dr Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest. The election result was nullified by a military junta. This was also the year she was awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.
The following year she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and donated the $1.3 million (£900,000) prize money to establish a health and education trust for the people of Burma.
Presenting the honour to Dr Htun, Glasgow's Lord Provost, Bob Winter, said: "It is with profound respect and admiration for Dr Aung San Suu Kyi's unflinching bravery that the Council has conferred upon her the Freedom of the City of Glasgow. This is tempered with frustration that she cannot be here today, in person.
"However, I am delighted that her loyal representative Dr Htun has been able to visit our city to accept the award in her absence. He goes with our very best wishes for Dr Suu Kyi, a shining beacon of hope in her country."
John Watson, Amnesty's International's Scottish programme director, said: "Aung San Suu Kyi is an inspiration to the people of Burma and to those around the world who applaud bravery and dignity in the face of oppression. Amnesty International congratulates Glasgow City Council on its decision to present her with its highest award"
Plans to contest 2010 election begin to take form
http://www.mizzima.com/news/election-2010/1815-plans-to-contest-2010-election-begin-to-take-form.html
by Nem Davies
Saturday, 07 March 2009 16:07
New Delhi (Mizzima) – A Rangoon-based political group comprised of those who support the Burmese junta's seven-step roadmap will hold a meeting on the 15th of this month to form a 'Joint Action Committee' with an eye to the 2010 general election.
The Union of Burma National Political Force, comprising 11 political organizations, is organizing the meeting in connection with contesting the 2010 election as an alliance, as opposed to independent candidates with separate political parties.
"The main theme of this meeting will be contesting the election as a group, collectively, not as individuals," remarked Ohn Lwin, who is involved with organizing the joint committee.
The group is comprised of: delegates from the National Convention, National Political Association (Taungdwingyi), Wunthanu NLD (Burma), Demo NLD (Sagaing), National Political Front (Rakhine State) and New Generation Students of Study of Modern Science and Political Economy.
The group was established in 2007 and previously conducted political activities related to the emergence of the new constitution as well as the anti-sanction and pro-referendum campaigns.
The meeting is expected to be attended by about 50 people, including some independents and four additional organizations besides those already mentioned above.
"What we will do in the meeting is joint action for common work. If they don't agree with us, they can stay away from us. We shall ask them their will and opinion in the meeting. Then we will issue a statement," said Ohn Lwin.
He also said that the group would work for national reconciliation, education, social development and modernization, and in opposition to sanctions and smear campaigns against the state.
"Our position is endorsing the government's seven-step roadmap as the way out from the current political and economic crises," Ohn Lwin added.
However the National League for Democracy, the election winning party in the 1990 general election, remains opposed to the junta's new constitution, which was approved through a tightly controlled referendum in May 2008.
Speaking out on the future of Burma
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fl20090305f1.html
Thursday, March 5, 2009
As Burma heads toward its 2010 elections, Jeff Kingston asks political observers about prospects for reform
By JEFF KINGSTON
Special to The Japan Times
These are tough times for the people of Burma. They have endured decades of economic mismanagement, low living standards and brutal political oppression under an incompetent and negligent military junta that shows no signs of relinquishing its grip on power. Indeed, as the country approaches elections in 2010, the regime has cracked down on its opponents, imposing prison terms of 65 years on relief workers, comedians, writers, intellectuals, monks and others.
Aung Zaw, editor of Irrawaddy in Burma JEFF KINGSTON PHOTOS
No challenges to the junta are allowed and thus those who joined peaceful demonstrations in the Saffron Revolution of 2007 or tried to help the survivors of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 were targeted by the regime for sentences that in many cases ensure the imprisoned will die behind bars. The number of political prisoners has more than doubled since 2007 and stands at 2,100.
The junta has sent a message to prodemocracy activists that they should not confuse the upcoming 2010 elections with an opportunity to build democracy in Burma. Unlike in 1990 when the military was embarrassed by a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, a result it has steadfastly ignored, this time around the results will be rigged.
The model for this sham-in-the-making is the constitutional referendum staged in May 2008 when an unbelievable 92 percent of voters approved a document that almost nobody had seen. There were widespread and credible reports of gross irregularities and there is a consensus that the referendum was not remotely free or fair.
As a result, the new constitution imposed by the regime that preserves political power for the military and excludes Suu Kyi has zero credibility, further undermining the legitimacy of a government that is overwhelmingly despised by it citizens.
And why wouldn't they despise it? In cracking down on the Saffron Revolution in 2007 — a monk-led, grassroots response to dreadful and declining living standards — the military murdered, imprisoned and tortured many monks, a transgression that trampled cultural taboos, triggering outrage and a smoldering resentment. People were seething at the sheer brutality of the junta, but were totally unprepared for the government's mind-boggling response to Cyclone Nargis.
In early May 2008, Cyclone Nargis ripped through the Irrawaddy Delta region, claiming an estimated 138,000 lives, displacing some 800,000 survivors and leaving some 2.5 million people desperately in need of food, shelter and medical treatment. Any government would be hard-pressed to respond effectively to such a massive natural disaster, but instead of focusing on relief efforts the government prioritized the constitutional referendum. As a result, the government was slow to respond and even impeded relief efforts by international agencies by withholding approval of visas for relief specialists.
Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst based in Chiang Mai, Thailand
The world looked on in disbelief as the junta devoted scarce resources to a sham referendum while ignoring the needs of survivors.
In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, there has been renewed debate about how the international community should respond and whether punitive sanctions and isolation are working to promote reform. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has indicated that the United States is reviewing its hard line policies toward the regime.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) provides in-depth analysis of conditions in Burma, but is often criticized for being overly solicitous of the military junta. The principal author of the ICG reports, Morten Pedersen, argues that the current strategy of imposing sanctions and isolating the military junta is not working, creating a stalemate that shows no signs of resolution. He asserts that sanctions and isolation actually strengthens the junta's grip on power, allowing them to pose as defenders of the nation. In his view, the military leaders will not bow to pressure for political reform and are well insulated from economic sanctions, especially with rising LNG revenues.
The problem is that the people of Burma are not insulated from the usual problems of endemic poverty — the United Nations estimates that 30 percent of the population faces acute poverty — and many are swept up in a gathering humanitarian crisis. Yet, despite appalling conditions, international aid to Burma is only about 5 percent per capita of what comparable developing nations typically receive. The ICG advocates broader, sustained engagement and a sharp increase in aid to fund "sustainable humanitarian development."
Win Min, a Burmese political commentator, also based in Chiang Mai
Pedersen acknowledges the brutality and venality of the military regime, but does not think that regime change is a viable option because government institutions have withered during four decades of military rule, meaning across-the-board capacity deficits that amplify the difficulties of coping with Burma's staggering challenges. The military is the strongest institution in a country known for its pervasive disfunctionalities and as such, he asserts, must continue to play a key role in any transition scenario.
In October 2008, the ICG issued a report arguing that the Nargis experience demonstrates the need to normalize aid relations and suggests a way forward out of the stalemate. The ICG points out that after the initial fumbling response, a normal relief operation was apparent by July 2008 and goes on to argue that the donor community now has an opportunity to build on this enhanced cooperation to transform and expand the aid agenda.
Credit for this turnaround goes to the Trilateral Core Group (TCG), a problem-solving task force that has one representative each from the Burmese government, the U.N. and ASEAN. The TCG, according to the ICG, proved effective in addressing operational problems and cutting through red tape, allowing aid organizations to conduct their projects as they would in any similar situation and monitor how development aid was used.
Yuki Akimoto, director of Burma Info in Tokyo, is more skeptical about the TCG and disputes the ICG's assessment, arguing, "The TCG has a built-in limitation in that one of the three parties is the military regime. The ICG assessment lacks credibility because it misrepresents the reasons why Burma is suffering socio-economically and not receiving development assistance. It is one thing to advocate for increased engagement with the regime, but it is an entirely different matter to defend the military regime, as the ICG assessment effectively does.
"ICG avoids holding the military regime accountable for the situation the regime itself has caused through its brutally self- interested actions and policies, which have enriched the generals and their cronies while impoverishing the nation."
Thant Myint U, former U.N. diplomat and currently a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, believes that the Nargis relief operations have helped build a better working relationship between the junta and international donors, saying, "The Nargis relief efforts have led to a big shift in attitudes. Now many in the government understand that there is no great danger in providing access to international aid workers, while on the reverse side many donors see the possibilities of working in Burma while meeting international standards of transparency and accountability."
The ICG, in calling for normalizing aid as a strategy for promoting change, maintains that the TCG can be the model for broader engagement elsewhere in the country, presenting it as a task-based, problem-solving approach that nurtures capacity-building, transparency and accountability. The ICG also argues that, "aid cannot be used as a bargaining chip, but should be seen as a valuable instrument in its own right for improving governance and promoting socioeconomic change."
Thant Myint U is less optimistic about copying the TCG model for expanded aid efforts elsewhere in Burma: "What is certain about the TCG is that it has been an invaluable mechanism for delivering emergency aid to affected people in the Nargis-affected areas. The international aid community has been given unprecedented access and it appears that space for ongoing relief and recovery operations can be sustained. Whether it can be expanded to other parts of the country is unlikely. We need creative solutions and shouldn't be tied to the TCG model. What's important is not the mechanism per se but finding ways to deliver aid in a way that meets basic international norms."
In early February one of the ministers who served as Burma's leading representative in the TCG was transferred, and some analysts see this as a sign that the junta is withdrawing its support from the TCG. However, a senior diplomat (who like several others interviewed for this story did not wish to be named) suggests that this speculation is off the mark: "His promotion should not be seen as the junta pulling back from the process. Rather, his promotion to the ministerial level will make it easier for him to act and push the process."
Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist who has written numerous articles and several books on Burma since the mid-1980s, is one of the most eminent critics of the ICG analysis. He told The Japan Times at the end of 2008 that the ICG report shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the military and Burma, rejecting as "naive in the extreme the proposition that adopting a more respectful tone toward the junta, understanding their worldview and not making an issue of past misdeeds will make it more likely to act rationally and engage in substantive dialogue."
Bertil Lintner, a journalist who has covered Burma for more than two decades
According to Lintner, "The generals are not listening. They are doing what they want and ignore pressure, sanctions and engagement. Neither isolation or engagement have worked and there is no reason to believe that engagement and expanded aid will change their ways. They are happy to have the ICG doing their bidding. In Burmese they have a derogatory word for such people; they are not taken seriously."
In Lintner's view, the TCG does not offer a promising model for expanded engagement elsewhere in Burma, a point supported by several Burmese exiles in Thailand.
Aung Zaw, editor of Irrawaddy, the leading source of critical information about Burma, called it an "ivory-tower perspective written for people who want to increase aid programs. In reality it won't work and advocates should be ashamed of themselves for looking for any excuse to work with an authoritarian regime. But let them come and [Senior General] Than Shwe will teach them a lesson just like the Red Cross. He is good at using and manipulating international organizations and they are good at fooling themselves. He created a small opening in the delta, but can shut them down anytime he wants."
Zaw also scoffs at the ICG's assertion that the junta is able to exploit sanctions to portray itself to the public as defenders of the nation against foreign enemies, suggesting that the ICG has a condescending and inaccurate view of how gullible the people are. He acknowledges that Burmese do suffer from the sanctions and isolation, but says they see them as symbolically important, boosting people's morale because they know the junta is humiliated and that other countries care.
A U.S.-trained Burmese economist points out that the TCG was effective because there were only three ministries involved and each had talented representatives: "There is limited competence in the government and this makes it impossible to see how the TCG model can be expanded elsewhere. And, the government has made sure to insulate the rest of the country from the TCG opening. There is no political backing for an expanded TCG process, it is only for the delta. I can't imagine, for example, the government allowing such a process in Chin state where there is a famine and desperate need for relief."
Dr. Lian Sakhong, an ethnic Chin who is general secretary of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), also doubts the government will allow relief operations in his homeland and thinks the TCG process will not be extended to any of the ethnic areas where development aid is urgently needed. In his view, the regime is interested in pacification and assimilation, trying to impose a mono-ethnic, centralized model that fails to recognize Burma's rich ethnic diversity.
The military remains allergic to a federal model, but Sakhong, winner of the Martin Luther King Prize in 2007, insists greater autonomy is the only way to create lasting stability in a nation where ethnic groups constitute 40 percent of the population living in 60 percent of the land area.
Win Min, a Burmese political commentator based in Chiang Mai, notes that the ICG has developed cozy relations with midlevel officers and bureaucrats, but doubts this will lead to political reform because there is no top level political backing for reform. He thinks that the ICG is being manipulated and worries that expanding engagement and aid "is unlikely to lead anywhere while conferring legitimacy and stature on a regime that deserves neither."
Yuki Akimoto, director of Burma Info in Tokyo
In contrast, Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst also residing in Chiang Mai, says "possibilities exist only for programs that don't threaten the military. I agree with the ICG about a long-term gradual process of opening and reform and it's worth trying.
"The problem is that Burmese political culture tends toward extremes. There are no quick solutions and the problem is that the government and opposition have become mirror images of each other, unwilling to compromise.
"Sanctions have prevented change because the regime sees the West standing behind Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. These are targets they can hit. What you have to understand is that many military officers do want better relations with the U.S. They want to have a modern military and know they cannot rely on China."
"After the 2010 elections," he says, "Burma will need and seek lots of help. This is an opportunity for the West. Not just throwing money at the opposition, but in terms of capacity building across the board. The nitty-gritty of training programs is the basis for long-term engagement that will help the people."
A Burmese economist, fresh from running a project management workshop for Burmese monks, also suggests an engagement strategy that emphasizes technical assistance programs aimed at capacity building. He notes that monks play a critical role in filling gaping holes in providing social welfare services in Burma, including running orphanages and clinics. In his view, the Nargis response exposed just how inefficient and weak the government is.
Dr. Lian Sakhong, general secretary of the Ethnic Nationalities Council and winner of the 2007 Martin Luther King Award
"International disaster relief specialists who arrived found just how little institutional infrastructure there is to mount an effective operation," he says. "The lack of capacity is endemic and a major obstacle to raising living standards." Over the last 20 years, he observes, living standards have improved throughout Southeast Asia, except in Burma.
In his view, more happened in terms of engagement and capacity building in the second half of 2008 than in the past six years combined. He suggests building on this with a brick-by-brick approach, using technical assistance projects as a basis for incrementally ramping up capacity while raising living standards. Expanded technical assistance programs, he believes, would help shape the internal dynamics of the junta and improve prospects for the post-Than Shwe era.
When it comes to the 2010 elections, Byo Kyi, cofounder of Burma's Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, expects little and argues that if the junta is serious about democratization they can start by releasing all of the prodemocracy activists they have rounded up. He contends that "the military does not want to listen to the will of the people because they know it is against them."
David Scott Mathieson, Human Rights Watch's Burma expert, argues that the recent crackdown on dissidents was a mistake because it undermines the credibility of the elections: "Apart from being incredibly brutal, the regime was incredibly stupid in sentencing more than 300 dissidents to long prison sentences. Had they not done so, it might have been able to present this sham process as a legitimate, disciplined approach to democracy, giving the outside world grounds for working with it. Under the circumstances, HRW will not endorse the elections because they offer no glimmer of change. They are a dead-end."
His fear, shared by many other observers, is that several governments are eager to use the elections, even if deeply flawed, as a fig-leaf justifying resumption of normal ties. Mathieson believes, however, that major donors will now find it much harder to "ignore the absurdity of the elections."
Michael Green, a professor at Georgetown University and former director of Asian Affairs on the National Security Council during the Bush Administration, warns, "The junta has been adept at sowing division and exploiting the lack of coordination."
He worries that the elections have high potential for dividing the international community even if they are a sham, because they would provide cover for some countries eager to normalize relations with Burma. Given this risk, Green asserts it is crucial to quickly clarify and build an international consensus on what is minimally required for the elections to be recognized as legitimate by the international community.
A prominent Burmese observer suggests that forging this consensus will be difficult because the U.S. emphasis on human rights and democracy is at odds with the Indian and Chinese emphasis on maintaining stability in border regions. He also has a slightly more optimistic view about the elections: "In 2010 the junta will do as it says, hold elections and allow for the creation of a new government by the end of 2010. This will not represent a clean break with the past and the new government may well include some of the current leadership. But it is important not to underestimate the significance of this transition.
"There will be a generational change in the political leadership and there will be a slight broadening of the political base of the government as it attempts to bring more people and groups under its tent."
He worries less about the elections providing an excuse to engage than as a reason to continue isolation: "It may well turn out that the elections are deemed unacceptable by some Western donors and this would lead to a continuation of current policies and the stalemate. It would also mean a decline in Western involvement and influence in shaping outcomes in Burma and this would be regrettable for the Burmese."
"If there were free and fair elections," he adds, "any party led by Suu Kyi would win a sizable vote and probably a clear majority."
Alas, nobody thinks she will get this opportunity; thus the Burma tragedy will persist unless various stakeholders think creatively about exploiting opportunities the elections may create.
Jeff Kingston is director of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan campus.
Green Vs green: Jade Industry threatens environment
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/photo-essay/1801-green-vs-green-jade-industry-threatens-environment.html
by Phyusin Linn
Wednesday, 04 March 2009 18:39
Rangoon (Mizzima) - Hundred years ago, Phar Kant used to be a very quiet city nestled among the forests in northern Burma before someone found the great treasure lying beneath it.
Now Phar Kant is one of the most important and dynamic cities in the country's economic landscape. It is one of a few major places on earth that produce green gems – jade. Phar Kant always is a popular place in international gems market for its quality jade.
British people were noted to be the first explorers who started massively taking the green stones out in Phar Kant. Since then, that small city never had a chance to rest peacefully again. Since the country's independence in 1948, governments and rebels always had been trying to get control over it for their budget supports. During the socialist era, it was one of a few financial sources that allowed the government in Rangoon to keep marching on their dream road of so called Burmese way to socialism. But Phar Kant never forgot to support native Kachin ethnic rebels fighting for self-determination with its green treasure. Civil war in northern Burma was fuelled by Phar Kant for decades. It is a place where one can see both sides of Burmese Army officials and ethnic rebels digging stones out in the same place.
It is 100 miles north-west of Myitkyina, capital of Kachin State and is under control of Burma Armed Forces' Northern Command. It always is a place where every Commander who was appointed as the commander of Northern Command never missed to put their one eye on.
Nation wide uprising calling for multi party democratic system in 1988's changed the nation's political and economical features. Military government that promised to hold a free and fair election said that the country was opening its doors for market economy. And the new economic policy brought a new wave to the places like Phar Kant. New investors appeared and productivity was increased.
In early 1990s, government in Rangoon achieved a cease fire with Kachin rebels. And Kachin leaders into a new newly cease fire were meant to be accommodated in region's new economy with prosperous incentives. The military government strategically accommodated the Kachin rebels by giving plots in Phar Kant. Kachin rebels who once were well known for their guerrilla tactics have become businessmen. Since then Burma Army and Kachin rebels have been digging the soil together in Phar Kant.
But they are not alone in Phar Kant but many groups out of a total 18 cease fired groups in the nation are involved in the jade industry.
China's economic miracle was escalating the production speed in Phar Kant and the buyers from China's Yunnan Province were behind everyone who was running business in Phar Kant. Appetites of Chinese people who always believe that those green stones bring good luck are met by Phar Kant's support. Phar Kant's stones go not only to the people in mainland China but to Taiwan and Chinese Diaspora across the world via merchants in Yunnan. The more people want to decorate themselves with the jades, the more diggers Phar Kant receive orders. The environment in the region has changed.
Miners sliced the mountains and the lakes became plain fields. Trees were removed from the ground and forests were swept away. Since every acre in the region could be having gems beneath, every piece of land becomes precious. Government issues the license to the companies at 40 million Kyat per acre and anyone who wants to mine the jade has to buy the licence from the licence holder at 150 million Kyat per acre. Cronies who got the license from the government easily earn big profit by selling their licence back to others without doing anything.
Whenever authorities and the companies have no place left to start a new site, villages were moved from their place where they had been living for generations. Those villages can stay in near by areas until they are asked again to move to another place.
U-Ru Creek has been flowing through Phar Kant for centuries. Until early 1990s, U-Ru was a clean and a green creek, said a man who migrated to Phar Kant 15 years ago. Its water was clear as crystal and even the fish under the water could be seen. And the environment also was still green with trees, he continued.
But now the classic creek has been threatened by miners. (As shown in the pictures) Miners impatiently are trying to block the Wai Khar Creek that flows into the U-Ru Creek since they want to have a short cut road between the mining site and the city. Since the water way is cut, water could not flow naturally and flood spread to the villages. The more the miners dig, the more soil comes out and blocks both of U-Ru and Wai Khar Creeks.
Seikmu Village in Phar Kant, along the Wai Khar Creek was flooded and buried deep under the mud. (As shown in the pictures) Local people simply had to leave their homeland without benefiting from the jade industry.
Once one of the greenest regions has become a plain field with a man made landscape.
Phar Kant is the mayhem of a nature where human beings are cutting the parts of the earth with their knives.
Pressure mounts on KNU to move out of Thailand: Sources
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1802-pressure-mounts-on-knu-to-move-out-of-thailand-sources.html
by Solomon
Wednesday, 04 March 2009 19:20
New Delhi (Mizzima) - Members of the ethnic Karen rebel group – Karen National Union – have began moving back into Burma, after Thailand warned them not to set up base in their territory, a source close to the rebel group said.
The source, who did not want to be named, said KNU leaders had recently been told by Thai military authorities in the border town of Mea Sot, to move out of the town and to avoid Thailand’s territory for their activities.
“The Thai authorities issued the notice informally about 10 days ago. The Thai military told KNU to move out of their territory and several KNU members have left,” the source said.
However, the source, said a few leaders had remained in Mea Sot town, but were keeping a low profile.
“Currently, the KNU leaders cannot move around as freely as they did in the past, they need to be more careful,” he added.
The KNU, however, denied any official comment.
KNU, the longest running insurgent group of Burma, which has been waging war against the regime, earlier had strong bases inside Karen state of Burma. But, they suffered a heavy blow after their stronghold – Manerplaw – was overrun by a joint group of the Burmese Army and a Karen splinter group – the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army – in 1995.
Since then, several leaders, including deceased KNU General-Secretary, Pado Mahn Shala Phan, had taken shelter in Thailand’s border town of Mea Sot. Although, the Thai authorities were aware of the KNU leader’s presence, they did not take any official stand against the group, which would force the KNU to leave Thailand.
Occasionally, Burma’s military rulers have news reports in the state mouthpiece, New Light of Myanmar newspaper, accusing Thailand of hosting the rebels, whom they term as ‘Destructive Elements’.
The source said, the current wave of pressure seems unlikely to be Thailand’s policy but the country could be acting on mounting pressure received externally. Thailand, has unofficially hosted the KNU and other ethnic rebels in their territories bordering Burma.
“It is unlikely to be Thailand’s official policy to force the KNU to move out of their territory, but it must be pressure coming from outside,” the source added.
The source, however, added that it was not the first time that members of the KNU and its armed wing Karen National Liberation Army, were forced to stay out of Thailand.
“It is not the first time, but things turn back to normal later,” the source added.
Nyo Ohn Myint, in-charge of the Thailand-based Foreign Affairs Committee of the National League for Democracy-Liberated Areas (NLD-LA) said, those who have long observed Thailand’s policy on Burma, said while they were not certain about the pressure on KNU, they did not rule out the possibilities.
“We heard that the KNU is facing pressure to stay out of Thailand, but we still cannot confirm it,” Nyo Ohn Myint said.
But, he added that he was aware of the KNU leaders moving out of the border towns and from Thailand’s territories.
It was also likely that Thailand had been urged to drive away the Karen rebels from their territory, during the Thai Army Chief’s visit to Burma, he said.
“Thailand might be acting on pressure from the Burmese junta, and the two countries might have reached an agreement during Thailand’s military commander’s visit to Burma,” he added.
Thailand’s Army Commander-in-Chief, Anupong Paochinda, in mid-February visited Burma on a two-day official trip and had met the Burmese Army’s top leader, Senior General Than Shwe.
After the Whirlwind: Post-Nargis Burma, the 2010 Elections and Prospects for Reform
http://japanfocus.org/_Jeff_Kingston-After_the_Whirlwind__Post_Nargis_Burma__the_2010_Elections_and_Prospects_for_Reform
Jeff Kingston
These are tough times for the people of Burma. They have endured decades of economic mismanagement, low living standards and brutal political oppression under an incompetent and negligent military that shows no signs of relinquishing its grip on power. Indeed, as the country approaches elections in 2010, the regime has cracked down on those it targets as opponents, imposing prison terms of up to 65 years on relief workers, comedians, writers, intellectuals, monks and others engaged in peaceful demonstrations or relief activities. No challenges to the junta are allowed and even local disaster relief workers are subject to arrest for embarrassing the regime. Those who joined peaceful demonstrations in the Saffron Revolution of 2007, or tried to help the survivors of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, have been singled out by the military junta for sentences that in many cases ensure the imprisoned will die behind bars. Moreover, political prisoners have been sent away to remote prisons where it is difficult for relatives to visit or to monitor their condition. Although the junta released about a dozen political prisoners in February 2009, the number of political prisoners has more than doubled since 2007 and stands at an estimated 2,100.
Burmese courts
The junta has sent a message to pro-democracy activists that they should not confuse the upcoming 2010 elections with an opportunity to build democracy in Burma. Unlike in 1990, when the military was surprised and embarrassed by a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, a result it has steadfastly ignored, this time around expert observers expect the results to be rigged. The model for this sham-in-the-making is the constitutional referendum staged in May 2008 when an unbelievable 92% of voters approved a document that almost nobody had seen. There were widespread and credible reports of gross irregularities and no Burmese, ethnic representatives or international observers interviewed for this article believes that the referendum was remotely free or fair. As a result, the new constitution imposed by the regime that preserves political power for the military and excludes Aung San Suu Kyi has zero credibility, further undermining the legitimacy of a government that is despised by most of it citizens. [1]
Junta slogans are a constant reminder of the political realities
And why wouldn’t they despise it? In September 2007, cracking down on the Saffron Revolution—a monk-led, grassroots response to dreadful and declining living standards—the military murdered, imprisoned and tortured many monks, a transgression that trampled cultural taboos, triggering outrage and a smoldering resentment. People were nevertheless totally unprepared for the government’s mind-boggling response to Cyclone Nargis. In early May 2008, Nargis ripped through the Irrawaddy Delta region, claiming an estimated 138,000 lives, displacing some 800,000 survivors, and leaving some 2.5 million people desperately in need of food, shelter and medical treatment. Any government would be hard-pressed to respond effectively to such a massive natural disaster, but instead of focusing on relief efforts the government prioritized the constitutional referendum. As a result, it was slow to respond and even impeded relief efforts by international agencies by withholding approval of visas for additional relief workers while devoting scarce resources to a sham referendum and ignoring the needs of desperate survivors.
Monks in Mrauk U, Rakhine
Nuns inSagaing, Mandalay
Win Min, a Burmese political commentator and professor in Chiang Mai, Thailand suggests that the junta’s response reflects its risk-averse, security first approach. [2] They saw international relief workers as potential democracy activists who had to be kept out. However, the shame of appearing overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, rather than sympathy for the people, eventually led the regime to open a narrow space for relief efforts that he believes is temporary.
Win Min
Whither Reform?
In the wake of Nargis, there has been renewed debate about how the international community should respond and whether punitive sanctions and isolation are working to promote reform. Indeed, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her recent Asian tour spoke of the need to review US policy towards Burma, saying that the current policies have not worked.[3] The US has not yet made any moves to lift sanctions or travel bans, but she has made it clear that the Obama Administration is reconsidering its options and policies, a shift that mirrors elements of international discourse concerning reform in Burma. Any moves towards softening the US policy will face tough opposition in the Congress where there has been bi-partisan support for hard-line policies, including most recently the sanctions on trade in hardwood, gems and mining projects included in the Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Burma Democracy Promotion Act of 2007.[4]
Teak for export is subject to US sanctions
Michael Green, Bush’s nominee for special envoy to Burma—Congress has yet to act on this nomination since it has not yet been endorsed by the Obama Administration—notes that Senator John Kerry advocates large increases in humanitarian aid to Burma, but he does not expect lifting of sanctions any time soon.[5] Indeed, he strongly supports “coercive diplomacy” and if approved as special envoy he would seek to strengthen international cooperation on sanctions and isolation aimed at pressuring the regime to reform and allow the democratic opposition to participate in fair elections in 2010. Articulating the hard-line position he says,
“We are good at the smart sanctions targeting bank accounts and tracking the flow of money. What we need is better cooperation. Singapore was very helpful with North Korea and I am certain they will help us on Burma. We are hoping that Austria and Australia will tighten up on enforcement. It is important for us to get our “sticks” in a row, close loopholes, tighten targeted sanctions and improve our gathering and analysis of intelligence by the NSA. This is how we will get the junta’s attention…hitting them where it hurts.”
The International Crisis Group (ICG) provides in-depth analysis of conditions in Burma, but is often criticized for being overly solicitous of the junta. The principal author of the ICG reports on Burma, Morten Pedersen, argues that the current strategy of imposing sanctions and isolating the military junta is not working, creating a stalemate that shows no signs of resolution.[6] He asserts that sanctions and isolation actually strengthen the junta’s grip on power, allowing them to pose as defenders of the nation. In his view, the military leaders will not bow to pressure for political reform and are well insulated from economic sanctions, especially with rising LNG revenues. The problem is that the people of Burma are not insulated from the usual problems of endemic poverty—the UN estimates that 30% of the population faces acute poverty—and many are swept up in a gathering humanitarian crisis. However, despite appalling conditions, international aid to Burma is only about 5% per capita of what comparable developing nations typically receive. This is one of the costs of isolation that harms the people. The ICG advocates broader, sustained engagement and a sharp increase in aid to fund “sustainable humanitarian development”.
Pedersen acknowledges the brutality and venality of the military regime, but does not think that regime change is a viable or sustainable option because government institutions have withered during four decades of military rule, meaning across-the-board capacity deficits that amplify the difficulties of coping with Burma’s staggering challenges. The military may run a loathsome regime, but it is the strongest institution in a country known for its pervasive dysfunctionality and as such, he asserts, must play a key role in any efforts aimed at improving development, governance or human rights.
In October 2008 the ICG upped the ante, arguing that the Nargis relief experience demonstrates the need to normalize aid relations and suggests a way forward out of the stalemate.[7] The ICG points out that after the initial fumbling response, a normal relief operation was apparent by July 2008 and goes on to argue that the donor community now has an opportunity to build on this enhanced cooperation to transform and expand the aid agenda. Credit for this turnaround goes to the Trilateral Core Group (TCG), a problem-solving task force that had one representative each from the Burmese government, the UN and ASEAN. The TCG, according to the ICG, proved effective in addressing operational problems and cutting through red tape, allowing aid organizations to conduct their projects as they would in any similar situation and monitor how development aid was used.
The TCG conducted the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) in June 2008 to assess needs in the affected areas. The ICG defends PONJA from critics who argue that it was little more than a government-manipulated public relations exercise, maintaining that its statistical findings are reliable while pointing out that government representatives did not take part in the interviews or serve as translators. The needs assessment by PONJA has been followed by TCG monitoring initiatives regarding relief operations and use of aid. Neither PONJA or the ICG found evidence suggesting large scale diversion of relief supplies and, based on TCG assessments, ASEAN’s Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan has called for an additional $700 million in relief aid over the next three years. One Bangkok diplomat closely involved in this effort suggests this may be too ambitious a target as major donors remain concerned about the pace and direction of political reform.
Yuki Akimoto, Director of BurmaInfo in Tokyo, disputes the ICG’s seal of approval, arguing that PONJA was deeply flawed and asserts that there are credible reports of aid being diverted. Indeed, Dr. Nyo Nyo Thinn, a researcher at UN University in Tokyo, visited Burma in the cyclone’s aftermath and heard reports of significant diversion of relief supplies from people active in the relief effort. She also witnessed relief items for sale in Yangon markets. [8]Akimoto adds,
“The ICG assessment lacks credibility because it misrepresents the reasons why Burma is suffering socio-economically and not receiving development assistance. It is one thing to advocate for increased engagement with the regime, but it is an entirely different matter to defend the military regime, as the ICG assessment effectively does. ICG avoids holding the military regime accountable for the situation the regime itself has caused through its brutally self-interested actions and policies, which have enriched the generals and their cronies while impoverishing the nation.”[9]
Thant Myint U, former UN diplomat and currently researcher with the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, believes that the Nargis relief operations have helped build a better working relationship between the junta and international donors, saying,
”The Nargis relief efforts have led to a big shift in attitudes. Now many in the government understand that there is no great danger in providing access to international aid workers while on the reverse side many donors see the possibilities of working in Burma while meeting international standards of transparency and accountability."[10]
Thant Myint U, author of River of Lost Footsteps
He argues that it is imperative to build on the Nargis relief experience.
"Cyclone Nargis created a sense of urgency in the donor community and it responded with great generosity in addressing the emergency humanitarian needs of millions of people all over the delta. But there is a lot more work to be done and urgent humanitarian needs elsewhere in the country as well. What's important is to find a way to respond that is acceptable to everyone.“
The ICG, in calling for normalizing aid as a strategy for promoting change, maintains that the TCG can be the model for broader engagement elsewhere in the country. A task-based, problem-solving approach to engagement and development, it argues, offers reassurances to the various stakeholders and has, at least in the Irrawaddy Delta, worked to the benefit of the people. It is also, according to the ICG, a process of urgently needed capacity-building involving human resources, governance, transparency and accountability. The ICG also argues that, “… aid can not be used as a bargaining chip, but should be seen as a valuable instrument in its own right for improving governance and promoting socio-economic change.”
Thant Myint U, grandson of UN Secretary General U Thant, is less optimistic about copying the TCG model for expanded aid efforts elsewhere in Burma. He observes,
"What is certain about the TCG is that it has been an invaluable mechanism for delivering emergency aid to people in the Nargis-affected areas. The international aid community has been given unprecedented access and it appears that space for ongoing relief and recovery operations can be sustained. Whether it can be expanded to other parts of the country is unlikely. We need creative solutions and shouldn't be tied to the TCG model. What's important is not the mechanism per se but finding ways to deliver aid in a way that meets basic international norms.“
Yuki Akimoto agrees, adding,
”The TCG has a built-in limitation in that one of the three parties is the military regime whose priority has been to sustain and enrich itself, not to help Burma's people. Therefore it would be difficult for 1) the TCG to develop programs and projects that are designed genuinely to benefit those most in need; and 2) independent parties (international organizations or the press) to monitor the implementation of such programs and projects. I think the TCG was useful in channeling urgently needed relief and recovery assistance. But for longer-term engagement, however, including reconstruction assistance, I believe donors should explore other options.”
Yuki Akimoto
Green also dismisses the TCG model and faulted the ICG report as, “Terrible. They always manage to find the silver lining in despicable regimes and support softening sanctions and pressure, undermining everything we are doing to promote reform.”
Bertil Lintner, a veteran journalist who has written numerous articles and several books on Burma since the mid-1980s, is one of the most eminent critics of the ICG analysis. He dismisses the ICG report for what he views as a fundamental misunderstanding of the military and Burmese politics. He rejects as “… naïve in the extreme the proposition that adopting a more respectful tone toward the junta, understanding their worldview and not making an issue of past misdeeds will make it more likely to act rationally and engage in substantive dialogue.” [11] According to Lintner,
”The generals are not listening no matter what, they are doing what they want and ignore pressure, sanctions and engagement. Neither isolation nor engagement has worked and there is no reason to believe that engagement and expanded aid will change their ways. They are happy to have the ICG doing their bidding. In Burmese they have a derogatory word for such people…they are not taken seriously.”
In Lintner’s view, the TCG does not offer a promising model for expanded engagement elsewhere in Burma, a point supported by several Burmese exiles in Thailand. Aung Zaw, editor of Irrawaddy, the leading source of critical analysis and information about Burma, called it an,
“…ivory-tower perspective written for people who want to increase aid programs. In reality it won’t work and advocates should be ashamed of themselves for looking for any excuse to work with an authoritarian regime. But let them come and [Senior General] Than Shwe [the junta’s leader] will teach them a lesson just like the Red Cross. He is good at using and manipulating international organizations and they are good at fooling themselves. He created a small opening in the delta, but can shut them down anytime he wants.“ [12]
Aung Zaw
Aung Zaw also scoffs at the ICG’s assertion that the junta is able to exploit sanctions to portray themselves to the public as defenders of the nation against foreign enemies, suggesting that the ICG has a condescending and inaccurate view of how gullible the people are. He says that Burmese do suffer from the sanctions and isolation, but see them as symbolically important, boosting people’s morale because they know the junta is humiliated and that other countries care.
One Burmese economist who requested anonymity points out that the TCG was effective because there were only three ministries involved and each had talented representatives.
“There is limited competence in the government and this makes it impossible to see how the TCG model can be expanded elsewhere. And, the government has made sure to insulate the rest of the country from the TCG opening. There is no political backing for an expanded TCG process, it is only for the delta. I can’t imagine, for example, the government allowing such a process in Chin state where there is a famine and desperate need for relief.”
Lian Sakhong, an ethnic Chin who is General Secretary of the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC) also doubts the government will allow relief operations in his homeland and thinks the TCG process will not be extended to any of the ethnic areas where development aid is urgently needed. In his view, the regime is interested in pacification and assimilation, trying to impose a mono-ethnic, centralized model that fails to recognize Burma’s rich ethnic diversity. [13] The military remains allergic to a federal model, but Dr. Sakhong, winner of the Martin Luther King Prize in 2007, insists this is the only way to create lasting stability.
Lian Sakhong
Win Min notes that the ICG has developed cozy relations with mid-level officers and bureaucrats, but doubts this will lead to political reform because there is no top level political backing. He echoes the concerns of many experienced Burma-hands that the ICG is being manipulated and worries that expanding engagement and aid, “…is unlikely to lead anywhere while conferring legitimacy and stature on a regime that deserves neither. “
In contrast, Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst living in Chiang Mai, says
“I agree with the ICG about a long-term gradual process of opening and reform and it is worth trying. The problem is that Burmese political culture tends towards extremes. There are no quick solutions and the problem is that the government and opposition have become mirror images of each other, unwilling to compromise. Sanctions have prevented change because the regime sees the West standing behind Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. These are targets they can hit. What you have to understand is that many military officers do want better relations with the US. They want to have a modern military and know they can not rely on China.” [13]
Aung Naing Oo
The Burmese economist, fresh from running a project management workshop for Burmese monks, suggests an engagement strategy that emphasizes technical assistance programs aimed at capacity building. He notes that monks play a critical role in providing social welfare services in Burma, including running orphanages and clinics. In his view, the Nargis response exposed just how inefficient and weak the government is. “International disaster relief specialists who arrived found just how little institutional infrastructure there is to mount an effective operation. The lack of capacity is endemic and a major obstacle to raising living standards.” Everywhere in Southeast Asia over the last 20 years, he observes, except in Burma, living standards have improved.
He finds the ICG analysis flawed because,
“… it fails to acknowledge that the regime kept international engagement at arms length. The relief operations were sequestered and the Nargis relief operation was a one-off exception reflecting the regime’s desperation. The junta has made sure the TCG has not set the tenor for regime policies. It has done everything possible to insulate the nation from this model.”
He further asserts that replicating the TCG model elsewhere in Burma is “way too ambitious” and there is no basis for believing that the same results could be achieved elsewhere given the lack of capacity and the fact that the regime will not permit the same civic space needed. He also doubts that the UNSC will lift sanctions and believes that the World Bank and IMF will remain locked out for the foreseeable future, further undermining the ICG engagement scenario.
Nonetheless, in this economist’s view more happened in terms of engagement and capacity building in the second half of 2008 than in the past 6 years combined. He suggests a brick-by-brick approach to reform, using technical assistance projects as a basis for incrementally ramping up capacity while contributing to improvement of living standards. Expanded technical assistance programs, he believes, would help shape the internal dynamics of the junta and improve prospects for the post-Than Shwe era. In his view, the current predatory economic model is unsustainable, based on the military monopolizing LNG revenues as a way of consolidating its power and eliminating rivals.
“Whoever succeeds Than Shwe faces a steep learning curve and will need to find out where the money is stashed. The big difference over the past 20 years is that before there was shared poverty and now there are huge disparities caused by institutionalized corruption. Everything on the surface looks the same, but now there is a new rich elite. Contrary to my expectations, the economy seems to be thriving in urban areas and there are lots of goods available, but relatively few seem to be sharing in this.“
Than Shwe in 1999 photo
Elections and Beyond
Bo Kyi, co-founder of Burma’s Assistance Association of Political Prisoners, expects little from the 2010 elections and argues that if the junta is serious about democratization they can start by releasing all of the pro-democracy activists they have rounded up. He contends that, “The military does not want to listen to the will of the people because they know it is against them.” [14]
Prisoners in Burma are often sent to labor camps
David Scott Mathieson, Human Rights Watch’s Burma expert, argues that the recent crackdown on dissidents was a mistake because it undermines the credibility of the elections.
“Apart from being incredibly brutal the regime was incredibly stupid in sentencing more than 300 dissidents to long prison sentences. Had they not done so it might have been able to present this sham process as a legitimate, “disciplined” approach to democracy, giving the outside world grounds for working with it. Under the circumstances, HRW will not endorse the elections because they offer no glimmer of change. They are a dead-end.” [15]
His fear, shared by many other observers, is that several governments are eager to use the elections, however deeply flawed, as a fig-leaf justifying resumption of normal ties. Mathieson believes, however, that major donors will now find it much harder to, “…ignore the absurdity of the elections.”
Michael Green warns, ”The junta has been adept at sowing division and exploiting the lack of coordination.” He worries that the elections have high potential for dividing the international community even if they are a sham because they would provide cover for some countries eager to normalize relations with Burma. Given this risk, Green asserts it is crucial to quickly clarify and build an international consensus on what is minimally required for the elections to be recognized as legitimate by the international community mentioning monitoring and political participation by pro-democracy groups and ethnic-based parties. He says it is essential that, “the junta will have no doubt about the ‘carrots and sticks’ it can expect.”
A prominent Burmese observer suggests that forging this consensus will be difficult because the US emphasis on human rights and democracy is at odds with the Indian and Chinese emphasis on maintaining stability in border regions. He also has a slightly more optimistic view about the elections, arguing,
"In 2010 the junta will do as it says, hold elections and allow for the creation of a new government by the end of 2010. This will not represent a clean break with the past and the new government may well include some of the current leadership. But it is important not to underestimate the significance of this transition. There will be a generational change in the political leadership and there will be a slight broadening of the political base of the government as it attempts to bring more people and groups under its tent.“
He worries less about the elections providing an excuse to engage than as a reason to continue isolation, saying, “It may well turn out that the elections are deemed unacceptable by some Western donors and this would lead to a continuation of current policies and the stalemate. It would also mean a decline in Western involvement and influence in shaping outcomes in Burma and this would be regrettable for the Burmese.”
The democratic opposition has given up, in his view, on the 2010 elections.
"The NLD remains opposed to the referendum and the elections and still clings to its victory at the polls in 1990. The chances of those results ever being recognized are virtually nil. If it decides to run in the 2010 elections it will be accepting much less than it could have had at several points in the recent past. It is like an investor who has seen his stocks lose 90% of their value. They are holding on because they don't have much more to lose. So far it looks like they are not in a bargaining mode and are sticking to a hard line position on the elections and won’t participate, and are hoping for a huge, unexpected political change."
He adds, however, "If there were free and fair elections any party lead by Aung San Suu Kyi would win a sizeable vote and probably a clear majority.” Alas, nobody thinks she will get this opportunity and thus the Burma tragedy will persist unless various stakeholders think creatively about exploiting opportunities the elections may create.
Aung Naing Oo says, “After the 2010 elections Burma will need and seek lots of help. This is an opportunity for the West. Not just throwing money at the opposition, but in terms of capacity building across-the-board. The nitty-gritty of training programs is the basis for long-term engagement that will help the people.”
Nobody interviewed for this essay believes that the 2010 elections will lead to significant reforms although some observers are more optimistic than others about the potential dynamics that may emerge. The elections appear to be a gambit by the junta to appease international critics, but even if new faces emerge, the military retains a constitutional veto power over elected governments, retains key portfolios, has reserved representation in the parliament and, ultimately, has the guns to carry the day.
Indonesia and Vietnam represent regional models for reform. The Indonesian model (military returning to the barracks and returning political power to civilian politicians in exchange for immunity) is attractive, but unlikely. In Indonesia, the military formally withdrew from politics after the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and since then the country has been led by democratically elected civilian presidents although the current president Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono is a retired military general. Agus Widjojo, a retired Indonesian general closely associated with reformists in the military who decided to withdraw from politics, has visited Yangon and believes there is little interest in such reforms in the Burmese junta even though they are interested in resumption of military ties with the US, including training programs. [16]
The US Department of Defense, according to Green, is looking at the possibility of resuming IMET (International Military Education and Training) programs with Burma if circumstances improve to the degree that this is feasible and desirable, suggesting the ball is in the junta’s court. IMET represents an attractive carrot for the military and interest among relatively senior officers has been conveyed. The DOD is also looking at improving disaster relief coordination in the region, possibly reflecting the frustration of US forces conducting military exercises in the region when Cyclone Nargis hit. The junta refused permission to land in the delta and deliver relief supplies.
The key in Indonesia lay in officers like Widjojo who had overseas training and experience who came to understand the need for the military to protect its institutional interests by ceding politics to civilians. Bertil Lintner, however, has little hope for the younger officers in Burma, saying they are poorly educated, more indoctrinated and more blindly obedient than the current leadership. In his view, they represent scant hope for reform and are more likely to pursue similarly draconian policies.
According to the Burmese economist,
“There has been a steep decline in military education and mid-career officers and below lack a cosmopolitan perspective. They are much more indoctrinated and are not a likely force for reform. Burma’s problem is that we can’t expect regime change from within the military and we can’t expect the democratic opposition to negotiate a transition towards democracy.”
Thant Myint U is also pessimistic about an Indonesian scenario, pointing out that,
"The West often focuses very narrowly on politics at the top while neglecting the other numerous challenges facing Burma. If there had been no trade sanctions and boycotts over the past 20 years and if international financial institutions and Western donors had been engaged there would at least have been greater economic development and arguably a far better landscape for reform. The Indonesian landscape of the 1990s doesn't exist in Burma. Indonesia had a reasonably good record on economic development and had received lots of international support and assistance. There was a much bigger middle class. The Indonesian army had a good relationship with the US and didn't feel they were facing a hostile international environment and the possibility of outside intervention. They trusted skilled technocrats, and had allowed fairly strong civil society organizations to develop. Millions of tourists had opened up the country. All that is absent in Burma. Thus the back to the barracks scenario is very unlikely."
According to the Burmese economist who at times advises the government,
”The military is impressed by the Vietnam model of doi moi because economic reform has not entailed political change. To improve living standards, there is an urgent need to improve food security. This will require technical assistance in the agricultural sector combined with the introduction of market reforms that give farmers an incentive to produce more. This has worked in China and Vietnam without causing political reform.”
In his view, doi moi thus represents a more attractive option to the junta than the Indonesian model.
In off-the-record comments a senior Bangkok-based diplomat opined,
"If Burma was a priority for the Obama administration I think they would come to the same conclusions about the need for more extensive engagement, but I don't think it is a priority and there may well be no one willing to stand up and take the heat to promote a shift in the US policy of sanctions and isolation. It seems that none of the lessons from the 1990s about dealing with failed states have been learned. There was a missed opportunity in the 1990s with the beginning of the ceasefires and the regime signaling that it wanted to open the economy and open up to the outside world. The West should have responded positively and locked that in, but it maintained a hard-line policy. The fundamental flaw in western policy towards Burma is the narrow focus on democracy, ignoring the economy, the armed conflicts, and the different priorities of Burma's giant neighbors India and China. India and China understandably prioritize stability on their borders. This perspective seems lost on the West. The nightmare scenario for China is a resumption of armed conflict on its southern border. China is happy with the ceasefires achieved by the regime and is seeking to maximize stability after 50 years of civil war between the government and dozens of armed groups. Any realistic approach towards Burma must take into consideration the interests and priorities of India and China.“
Even, he argues, at the expense of democracy.
Conclusion
The possibility exists that the junta will stage elections in 2010 that meet minimum international standards, possibly including some form of monitoring and participation of democratic opposition groups. Indeed, at the recent ASEAN Summit held in Thailand, Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein reportedly said he would allow United Nations officials and developed countries to monitor the 2010 elections. It is not encouraging, however, that the junta has not yet promulgated the ground-rules for the elections, more than 2,000 of pro-democracy activists remain imprisoned, Aung San Suu Kyi, the still popular and influential icon of the democracy movement, remains under house arrest and is also barred from holding office by the new constitution. Under these circumstances, the junta has dug itself a very deep hole in trying to convince the international community, much less its own citizens, that it is embarking on substantive political reforms.
Aung San Suu Kyi
If the NLD, landslide winner of the last elections, decides to boycott the elections as it now seems inclined to do, it risks political irrelevancy. However, its aging leadership and threadbare organization already run that risk and a boycott would cast a pall over the outcome, making it a very hard sell to even those nations eagerly seeking some fig-leaf to resume fuller engagement. Some NLD supporters in Tokyo and Chiang Mai advocate participation, maintaining that it can better expose the shortcomings of the election, and lobby against international acceptance of the outcome, if it participates.
In any case, following elections in 2010, the junta’s western opponents will have to decide whether to stay the course on isolation or develop a new strategy that conforms to a desire to improve living standards, human rights and accountability. The wild card is the US, a nation that has long taken the hardest line against the military junta. It has browbeaten and cajoled allies to support sanctions and isolation, but to little effect. The ICG-view on ramping up humanitarian aid and development assistance is gaining broader international support, especially within Europe, while in Washington prioritizing regime change has given way to support for democratic reform, increased humanitarian assistance and improved governance. Cyclone Nargis did give Washington an opportunity for regime change, but it decided not to intervene. Asked to confirm reports that the US considered a military invasion aimed at toppling the junta in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, Green smiled and said that an assessment indicated that anti-aircraft batteries could be suppressed and the delta region could be easily controlled, but that the risk to aid workers and other foreigners in the country was unacceptable.
The trouble with the Bush Administration’s policy towards Burma, one broadly supported by Burmese in exile because of its forthright condemnation of human rights abuses, was the difficulty in translating moral opprobrium into effective policies to achieve desired outcomes. It was a “feel good” policy with minimal cost and minimal impact.
Secretary of State Clinton has sent a signal to Naypyidaw, the generals’ new capital, that there is scope for dialogue, but there seems little likelihood that the junta will take this up. Congress may agree to relaxation of bans on top level contacts, increase humanitarian aid and, if there are encouraging developments, lift some of the blanket sanctions like bans on the import of garments manufactured in Burma that are seen to harm ordinary Burmese more than the junta. However, such a shift will only happen if the junta adopts dramatic reforms that presently seem unlikely.
Some optimists suggest that these elections are the first step towards reform, one that will produce inadvertent and unanticipated forces of change in a country that has languished in stagnation. They see possibilities for transforming the dynamics within the junta and also have an eye on the post-Than Shwe (age 76) era. In their view, it behooves supporters of democratic reform, improved governance and human rights to nurture this process through expanded and sustained engagement. Development programs and technical assistance projects are most often cited as the means to nurture Burma’s capacity to build on this process, gradually and incrementally.
China and India have a decisive role in Burma and from their perspective stability trumps democracy, and the slow and steady scenario outlined above is vastly preferable to regime change. This suggests that they will accept the outcome of the elections even if they are a sham and continue their policies of expanding engagement. Burma is in the enviable position of being geo-strategically important and endowed with key natural resources, ensuring that it is much more likely to be wooed than isolated by its neighbors. For Burma’s leaders, support and accommodation by regional powers will insulate it from international pressure and lessen unwanted western influence and meddling.
The Burmese people, however, might just change these dynamics favoring the status quo. After all, who would have imagined that the military would be so humiliatingly repudiated in 1990? Who would have imagined that so many monks and others would take such risks during the 2007 Saffron Revolution, knowing as they did the horrific fate of the 1988 anti-government activists? And, the 2008 Nargis relief efforts organized by ordinary Burmese and monks suggest there is more to civil society in Burma than meets the eye. Indeed, Dr. Thinn believes that the capacity of civil society to address Burma’s many challenges is overlooked and calls for international aid agencies to nurture greater local empowerment in order to tap into this dynamism. She adds that the monks have the moral authority, social networks, skills and sense of duty to make a huge difference if given more scope for action.
Certainly the junta is stacking the odds against the people and has demonstrated how ruthless it can be in dealing with pro-democracy activists, but 2010 could bring some inspiring, and possibly tragic, surprises. There is much to despair in Burma, but the people have demonstrated time and time again a capacity for heroic actions that indict and undermine the authoritarian edifice, both in the colonial era and now under the military. Should they make a stand yet again it is hard to imagine much of the world lining up behind a bloodied fig-leaf. Such a scenario would compel the international community to hit the reset button on broader engagement and yet again focus attention on an odious regime and the need for accountability.
Much is at stake for the Burmese people and for Burma’s neighbors. Bearing in mind that India and China prioritize stability in border areas, it is imperative that the elections shore this up by gaining the participation, and trust, of ethnic groups in these regions that constitute 40% of the population occupying 60% of the nation’s territory. The cease-fires negotiated by the current regime are a major accomplishment, creating a fragile peace in areas that have been devastated by prolonged civil war. These ethnic regions are subject to a gathering humanitarian crisis, however, and are desperately in need of assistance on a scale that only international donors can deliver. Credible elections can make this possible and thus shore up political stability and improve human rights while disenfranchising the ethnic groups and ignoring their call for greater autonomy imperils stability.
The 2010 elections are the culmination of the junta’s 7-step roadmap to “disciplined democracy” and as such constitute an important barometer for reform. There are at least three election scenarios the junta can contemplate. First, under the fig-leaf scenario it can run reasonably fair and peaceful elections and launch a new government that looks somewhat different than the current regime and regain just enough credibility to facilitate a resumption of somewhat more engagement by much of the international community, meaning gradual and incremental improvement over the current situation as donors test the pace and direction of reform. Second, the junta can persist in targeting pro-democracy activists, tightly restrict the space for political activity, impede monitoring, muzzle the media, rig the elections in an obvious manner and claim a hollow victory. Under this pariah scenario, the situation could turn ugly, deteriorating into yet another bloody crackdown that further undermines the roadmap, alienates the international community and prolongs the stalemate. Third, under the dream scenario the junta can call on the UN to play a role in the elections, allow monitoring and media coverage, permit the democratic opposition and ethnic groups to run and count on its superior organization and resources to enable its’ proxy party to win most of the seats while the fragmented opposition and ethnic vote gain a respectable representation that confers legitimacy on the elections. Under this scenario, Burma can count on robust engagement by the international community and the resources necessary to launch the ICG plan for sustainable humanitarian development. This scenario could facilitate expanded ties with the US, lifting of sanctions and access to military hardware and training programs. The generals would welcome this development because it would offset China’s growing presence and influence. Transforming the current nightmare into this dream scenario remains a very remote chance, however, because the junta fears the peoples’ will and is risk averse.
Jeff Kingston is Director of Asian Studies, Temple University (Japan Campus) and a Japan Focus associate. He wrote and photographed this article for Japan Focus. He is the author of “Burma’s Despair,” Critical Asian Studies, 40:1 (March 2008), 3-43, several recent articles on East Timor and Japan’s Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2004).
Posted at Japan Focus on March 4, 2009
Recommended citation: Jeff Kingston, “After the Whirlwind: Post-Nargis Burma, the 2010 Elections and Prospects for Reform” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 10-1-09, March 4, 2009.
Notes
[1] Burmese I met randomly while travelling in Burma and others I interviewed in Thailand and Tokyo openly criticize the military junta in the harshest terms and assert that the overwhelming majority of Burmese oppose the military junta. They also maintain that many of the millions of Burmese who are members of USDA (Union Solidarity and Development Association), an organization with close links to the military, are reluctant participants who feel compelled to join. For a sense of the anti-junta mood in Burma based on fieldwork conducted not long after the Saffron Revolution was quashed see, Jeff Kingston, “Burma’s Despair: Critical Asian Studies, 40:1 (March 2008), 3-43.
[2] Interview Chiang Mai,Thailand Dec. 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[3] Glen Kessler, “Clinton Signals Possible Shift in US Policy on Burma”, Washington Post, Feb 18, 2009.
[4] BLOCKJADE ACT, HR 3890 RFSEAS, 110th CONGRESS In the Senate of the United States, 1st Session December 19, 2007.
[5] Interview Tokyo Dec. 17, 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[6] Interview Nov, 2008, Tokyo. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[7] International Crisis Group (ICG), Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations, 20 October 2008. Asia Report N°161.
[8] Personal communication, Nov. 2008. Subsequent attributions to her draw on this communication. For a detailed critical assessment of the Nargis relief effort see here.
[9] Interview Tokyo Feb. 7, 2009. She is the author of “Post-Nargis Analysis-The Other Side of the Story” (October 2008).
Subsequent quotes attributed to her draw from this interview.
[10] Telephone interview Feb. 8, 2009. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[11] Interview, Chiang Mai, Dec. 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[12] Interview Chiang Mai Dec. 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[13] Interview Chiang Mai Dec. 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[14] Interview Chiang Mai Dec. 2008. Subsequent quotes attributed to him draw from this interview.
[15] Telephone interview Feb. 9, 2009.
[16] Telephone interview Feb. 8, 2009.
[17] Interview Jakarta Dec. 1, 2007
Dealing with Burma Through China?
http://burmadigest.info/2009/03/04/dealing-with-burma-through-china/
Mar 4th, 2009
By Prof Kanbawza Win
Kanbawza Win (a) Dr Ba Than Win is a former secretary of foreign affairs to the Burmese prime minister. He is now the Dean of AEIOU program (the Burmese University in Diaspora) at Chiangmai University Thailand, and an adjunct professor of the School of International Studies at Simon Fraser University of British Columbia, Canada; also a patron of BURMA DIGEST team.
THE PEOPLE of Burma have high hopes for Barack Obama. Burmese still look to Washington — rather than Beijing, New Delhi, or Moscow — to provide reliable political support for democratic change. But other foreign policy issues pressing in on the Obama administration may quickly push the Southeast Asian country to the back burner.
The United States continues to play a key role in Burma. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on her current tour of Asia, singled Burma out for attention, signaling a potential shift in U.S. policy away from the current sanctions regime. But the country with much greater influence on the ground is China. With Clinton sitting down with the Chinese to discuss comprehensive cooperation, can Beijing and Washington hammer out a “bipartisan consensus” on Burma?
East vs. West
The United States has two schools of thought when it comes to dealing with the Burmese junta. One side blindly opposes anything having to do with the Burmese military dictators, viewing the junta as evil and advocating for more sanctions to further isolate the regime. The other side, led by academics, intellectuals, and others, feels that the current stalemate and the isolation of the junta do not serve the interests of the American or Burmese people. They believe in dialogue, but not necessarily “constructive engagement” as practiced by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
While U.S. policies on Burma have been traditionally paralyzed by this standoff, China has approached Burma slowly and deliberately, based on national interest. Their policy makers are experts on Burma and they speak fluent Burmese. Most importantly, they know the culture and the motivation of the Burmese, especially the mindset of the generals. Chinese officials regularly visit Burma to closely monitor the pulse of the ruling elite. They study the players carefully, they know the sensitive nature of Burmese nationalism, and they are not arrogant in their dealings with either the government or the opposition.
China supports the present regime, but it has also taken care not to antagonize the opposition. The Chinese have met with many opposition players and have made particular efforts to build working relationships with a younger generation of leaders in exile who have the temperament to develop good diplomatic skills, and an understanding of Western thinking and policy formulation. In other words, China is looking after its own interests by dealing with the current Burmese government but also hedging its bets in case of another uprising and the toppling of the military regime.
The Chinese have considerable energy interests in Burma. They are interested not only in purchasing natural gas from the gas fields off the Burmese coast being developed by South Korean and Indian firms. They also want to convert the state of Arakan on Burma’s west coast into an oil depositary like Texas and Louisiana. They hope to ship oil from the Middle East to Arakan and then pipe it to the south China state of Yunnan, bypassing the entire trip through the Straits of Malacca to the East China Sea. In this way, Burma becomes a vital part of China’s energy security plan. Knowing the strategic importance of their natural resources and geographical location, however, the Burmese leaders are now trying to play the Russian card by seeking to build a strategic alliance with Moscow as well. This alliance with Russia would gain the Burmese generals another UN veto, just in case the Chinese get too cozy with the Americans in the Security Council. Burma is also turning to North Korea and Iran for assistance.
In this context, the United States has an important role to play in Burma but must share leadership with the Chinese. Only the Chinese have the necessary influence to convince the ruling generals to find a durable solution for Burma.
A New U.S. Policy
The Burmese junta has barely flinched in the face of the suspension of economic aid, the imposition of an arms embargo, the ban on U.S. visas for senior junta leaders, and the ban on new U.S. investment in Burma. UN special representative Ibrahim Gambari has recently returned empty handed from his seventh visit to the country. It’s time for the new American administration to review its policy. The U.S. policy of imposing unilateral trade and investment sanctions against Burma has proven to be a failure on all fronts. Forcing U.S. firms to disengage from Burma has harmed American economic interests and done nothing to improve the living conditions or human rights of the people of Burma. Furthermore, unilateral sanctions have alienated American allies in the region and strengthened the hand of China.
In light of worsening conditions in Burma and significant changes in global power politics since the turn of the millennia, a change in strategy is needed. To best achieve U.S. objectives, this strategy should leverage all four major instruments of power — economic, military, information, and diplomacy. A more focused approach consisting of smart sanctions coupled with diplomacy is necessary to force the recalcitrant military junta to respond positively. The Obama administration should lead a new effort to push the key regional states to act in unison, even as the U.S. Congress continues to highlight abuses and sustain the faith of the Burma’s various opposition forces.
A smart precondition before the Obama administration offers any carrots would be to insist that the Burmese junta unclench its fist by releasing political prisoners including Burma’s Nobel laureate Aung San Sui Kyi. The administration should also consider a high-profile special envoy for Burma. New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, for instance, has visited Burma and is familiar with regional politics.
As in the Six Party talks with North Korea, the United States and China should take the lead but bring in all major global powers to have their say and to speak in one voice. Instead of China mediating between the United States and the Burmese government, the United States and China must act together to find common ground and then, in turn, act as honest brokers in a discussion among Burmese stakeholders.
Unlike Vietnam and Iraq, Burma retains a heritage of democratic governance established in the wake of post-colonial rule. In 1988, a strong democratic opposition party gained the political validation of tens of millions of Burmese people across starkly different ethnic and demographic groups. Outside powers did not create this opposition; U.S.-led operatives didn’t form the National League for Democracy to undermine the legitimacy of an unfriendly government.
By teaming up with China, the United States can devise a policy that both respects this democratic opposition and also reaches out to the current Burmese government. If the two great powers can resolve their differences over Burma policy, despite different political systems, then they can set an example for the undemocratic Burmese government and the democratic opposition to achieve a compromise that can bring Burma, finally, into the 21st century.
* The views expressed by authors in the articles are their own, but not necessarily reflect the policy standpoint of BURMA DIGEST editorial team.
* Readers can also state their views in English in the comment box below; currently 2 Comments.
* This article is archived under Editorials & Op/Eds category.
2 Responses to “Dealing with Burma Through China?”
#1 Salai Ko Ko Oo Says:
March 5th, 2009 at 10:36 pm
You quotation in the paragraph of East vs. West, discriminated among activists as blindly oppose group and academics group. Your sounds likely blame who promote sanction that targeted to junta’s and opportunist businessmen. We, grassroots simple aware that only sanction not enough but Burma needed it as Pressure Mechanism. The reason Daw Aung San Su Kyi support the targeted sanction is a key point of Pressure Mechanism. Grassroots logically understand the disadvantage of sanction has been impacted the people of Burma. We need to find the way least harmful methods of powerful targeted sanction such as “Burma Jade Laws” “Blocking Visas”, and let Obama office review on the current the US sanction on Burma. In my opinion, Obama office should finds out instrument of “Economic sanction on Burma” to “Targeting sanction to Junta” that will not hurt businesses that provided jobs for Burmese. If the US government release the whole part of sanction and make a deal through China is less profitable to change the junta mind to walk on the way to democracy. If the world wouldn’t see the existing the military formation in Burma is the long term intension of holding power and superficially dealing with the UN, US and China, is just diplomacy of Naypidaw Regime. It’s maneuver of Junta ways to cheating the world and heartless academics of Burma such as Zaw Oo, Thaung Tun, Zarni, including you and pro abolish sanction. It’s so funny to see Burma academics’ illogical and ill-considered and prepare to enter 2010 election under the fake international watch. Now the UN’s waiting for a green light from China to send the UN watching team oncoming sucking election that based on pro-junta constitution. Why the UN and world some leaders are thinking unreasonable judgments on Burma issue. I strongly said that they will regret when junta lying again.
#2 saheel Says:
March 8th, 2009 at 5:25 am
Burma’s fascits junta is more stronger these days .Evil junta regiem is protected by China , Asean and now Evil junta have a few arab and Muslim friends also.
Seems junta will survive longer then we expected. Democracy agents have to cry some more .
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