Bernama - Wednesday,
October 1Over 2.4 million people were affected by the cyclone in South of Yangon and Irrawaddy Delta on May 2 and 3 which saw 132,000 people dead or missing while 780,000 hectares of agriculture land were submerged in 19 townships.
TCG said it continued to foster cooperation and serve as a mechanism to resolve issues affecting efficient aid delivery, such as access.
Currently, 1,676 visas for foreign aid workers have been issued and 2,036 group travel authorisations provided.
"Solid relief efforts have been done. The Government of Myanmar appreciates the support by the international community and welcomes the continued operations," said TCG chairman and Deputy Foreign Minister U Kyaw Thu.
UN Resident Coordinator Bishow Parajuli underlines the importance of continuous support through the various recovery phases and calls upon the international community not to forget the cyclone survivors as the months pass.
There are concerns of possible water scarcity in the coming dry season because of the increased salinity of pond water due to the cyclone and the far below-average rainfall.
-- BERNAMA
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
MYANMAR'S CYCLONE EFFORT - 2
Myanmar discovers new large coal mine in Shan state
YANGON, Oct. 1 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar has discovered a new large coal mine in northern part of the country's Shan state and mining of the mineral will start with a local private company soon, the local weekly 7-Day News reported Wednesday.
The newly-found coal mine in Mongma area has the highest deposit of quality coal and it is estimated to yield thousands of tons of the mineral annually to help meet a domestic demand for at least 30 years, the report said.
The exploitation of the coal mine by the AAA Company will begin at the end of this year, it added.
There are about 10 coal mines in the northeastern state in operation, according to the report.
Statistics showed that with a total of 82 coal mining blocks in the whole country, Myanmar produced 282,655 tons of coal in the fiscal year 2007-08 which ended in March, up 19.5 percent from 2006-07.
Editor: Wang Hongjiang
COMMENT: Winds of change fail to stir Myanmar,コメント: 変更の風はミャンマーをかき混ぜない
http://www.nst.com.my/Tuesday/Columns/2363085/Article/index_html
James Rose
LAST September, peaceful demonstrations let the world know that the people of Myanmar had enough of the crushing oppression of the military junta, yet, today, exactly one year later, Myanmar still languishes in a haze of terror and deprivation.
この前の9月、平和なデモンストレーションは世界にミャンマーの人々に軍の会議の押しつぶす圧迫の十分があった、けれども、今日、丁度後で1年、ミャンマーはまだ恐怖および剥奪の霞で憂鬱な生活を送ることを知らせた。
Another year goes by and those monks who are left after the military cracked down after the demonstration are contemplating huge risks once again because the world just didn't get it last time.
別の年は世界がどうしてもそれに最後を得なかったのでデモンストレーションが巨大な危険をもう一度熟視した後軍隊が割れた後残っているそれらの修道士過ぎ。
If Myanmar is a part of the global family, it is perhaps its most neglected, like a child cast away simply because it was mugged by some bullies and has been held hostage by them ever since. As with most situations of this kind, ostracisation is as much the story of the ostraciser as the ostracised.
ミャンマーが全体的な家族の部分なら、何人かのいじめっ子によって襲われ、ずっとそれらによって握られた人質その後行うので多分単に投げられる子供のように最も無視されて。 この種類のほとんどの状態と同じように、ostracisationはその位追放されるostraciserの物語である。
It certainly doesn't make sense to ignore the people. Most risk their lives daily in keeping the Saffron Revolution alive and in trying to get the message to the world, they need help.
それは確かに人々を無視する意味を成していない。 ほとんどはサフランの回転を生きた保つことの生命を毎日危険にさらし、世界にメッセージを得ることを試みることで助けを必要とする。
それは確かに人々を無視する意味を成していない。 ほとんどはサフランの回転を生きた保つことの生命を毎日危険にさらし、世界にメッセージを得ることを試みることで助けを必要とする。
Led by the community of monks in this devoutly Buddhist country, known as the Sangha, a network of activism has firmed throughout the country since last September. Monks have boycotted the military and continue to thwart their attempts to crush the country's spiritual soul. The military have been largely cut off from the Buddhist clergy and the monks have openly campaigned for an international arms embargo as a means of taking the tools of oppression away from their oppressors.
Sanghaとして知られているこの心から仏教の国の修道士のコミュニティによって導かれて実行主義のネットワークはこの前の9月以来の国中固まった。 修道士は軍隊をボイコットし、国の霊歌の精神を押しつぶす彼らの試みを妨害し続ける。 軍隊は仏教の聖職者から主として断ち切られ、修道士は彼らの圧迫者からの圧迫の用具の取得の手段として国際的な武器禁輸のために率直に運動をした。
The Sangha provided the aid and accommodation services the military refused to give to some 70 per cent of homeless survivors from May's Cyclone Nargis in Yangon and around the Irrawaddy delta.
Sanghaは援助を提供し、調節はヤンゴンのそしてIrrawaddyのデルタのまわりの5月のサイクロンNargisからのホームレスの生存者の約70%に与えるために断られる軍隊を整備する。
This is a case of the civil overwhelming the political; of citizens and their spiritual leaders, not their political leaders, taking up the slack left neglected by the government.
これは市民の例であり政治を圧倒する; 市民および彼らの精神的指導者の、不足を補っているない彼らの政治指導者政府によって残無視されて。
Perhaps this is why the community of nations finds it difficult to respond more firmly in Myanmar -- notions of state sovereignty run deep and tend to undermine many of the good souls who would dearly love to effect positive change in a much-maligned country. A flavour of this was seen in the immediate aftermath of Nargis, as civil aid groups found it more or less impossible to deliver aid over and around an unwilling state government.
多分こういうわけで国家集団はミャンマーでもっとしっかりと答えることは難しいと思う -- 深く動く州の主権の概念は心から多く中傷国の肯定的な変更をもたらしたいと思うよい精神の多数の下を掘りがちで。 これの味はNargisの直後で市民援助グループがそれを不本意の州政府上のそしてのまわりの援助を提供することもっとまたはより少なく不可能見つけたので、見られた。
Perhaps this is why the global community and its more influential members refuse to demand the release of some 2,000 political prisoners in the country, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; nor find the will to dam the arms flowing in from Russia and China.
多分こういうわけで全体的なコミュニティおよびより影響を及ぼすメンバーはノーベル平和賞受賞者Aung San Suu Kyiを含む国の何人かの2,000人の政治犯の解放を、要求することを断る; ロシアおよび中国から流れる腕を遮ぎる発見の意志。
Perhaps this is why the world will not act even as the military backbone to the ruling junta bends and weakens under the force of its own people clamouring for an end to the nightmare.
多分こういうわけで世界は支配する会議への軍の背骨が不快感に端のために叫んでいる自身の人々の力の下で曲がり、弱まる一方で機能しない。
Structural shifts and widespread dissatisfaction among the ranks, including regular desertions, are enfeebling an already untenable organisation, yet still no one moves to show the generals the door.
ランク間の構造転位そして広まった不満は、規則的な脱走を含んで、既に維持不能な組織、けれどもまだ誰も移動を大将にドアを示す衰弱させている。
The country continues to win all the sort of awards no one wants to win. It has the largest number of child soldiers anywhere in the world, many fighting the world's longest running civil war; it is the world's most corrupt country; and it has probably the world's highest military spending as a percentage of budgetary funds (40 per cent). It has Asia's second-highest child mortality rate and is the third-largest source of refugees in the world.
国は誰も獲得したいと思わないすべての一種の賞に勝ち続ける。 それは、world'を戦う多数子供の兵士の最大数を世界中どこでも有する; 最も長く内戦を動かすs; それはworld'である; ほとんどは国を買収する; そしてそれにworld'がおそらくある; パーセントとしての予算上資金(40%)として最も高い軍事費。 それにAsia'がある; 2番目に高い小児死亡率率は世界の避難者の3番目に大きい源であり。
This in a country with the 10th largest natural gas reserves in the world and in an economy which, despite much resource wealth remaining untapped, receives some US$150 million (RM500 million) per month in energy export revenues alone.
世界と未開発に残る多くの資源の富にもかかわらず、単独でエネルギー輸出収入の1ヶ月あたりのUS$150百万(RM500百万)を受け取る経済の第10最も大きい天燃ガスの予備が付いている国のこれ。
One year on from the Saffron Revolution, the world is highly distracted by an economic crisis largely of its own making. As the graphs and stock charts trend downwards, attention is justifiably on the family home, keeping one's job and hoping the whole shooting match doesn't come and end up with blood everywhere.
サフランの回転からの1年、世界は自身の作成の経済恐慌によって非常に主として混乱させる。 グラフおよび在庫として図表はone'を保つ実家に、注意正当にある下方に向く; sの仕事および全射撃のマッチdoesn'を望むこと; tは血で来、どこでも終る。
But this isn't the time to get caught up in our own crises. This is an opportunity to extend crisis thinking outwards. It is a time to remember that even as the world reels, there are those in Myanmar, as in Sudan, Tibet, North Korea, Chad, Zimbabwe, Western Sahara and elsewhere, who need some crisis thinking of their own. In dealing with the economic crisis, let's use that energy and fix-it thinking to extend to other areas.
しかしこれは捕われる時期私達の自身の危機ではない。 これは外側に考える危機を拡張する機会である。 それは世界は巻き取る一方でそれを覚える時期、そこにある専有物について考える危機を必要とするスーダンのようにミャンマーのそれ、チベット、北朝鮮、チャド、ジンバブエ、西サハラ他の所でであり。 経済恐慌をあつかう上で、私達を他の区域に伸びると考えるそのエネルギーおよび固定それを使用することを許可しなさい。
One year after the Saffron Revolution offers a moment to lift the long-suffering people of Myanmar.
ミャンマーの辛抱強い人々を持ち上げるためにサフランの回転が時を提供した1年後。
The writer is adviser to the Burma Fund, the policy think-tank of the New York-based National Coalition Government for the Union of Burma
作家はビルマの資金、ビルマの連合のためのニューヨークを基盤とする国民の連合の政府の方針のシンクタンクへ顧問である
US group studies potential war crimes by Myanmar military
WASHINGTON (AFP) — An independent US group is to carry out unprecedented studies to determine whether Myanmar's military rulers, accused of rampant human rights abuses, have committed international crimes.
The Center for Constitutional Democracy at Indiana University's school of law said it would launch the research based on anecdotal evidence of "severe mistreatment" of marginalized ethnic groups by the junta.
"At this stage of the project, I can't honestly say that there are international crimes," the center's executive director, David Williams, told AFP by telephone.
"What I can say is there may be, and part of our goal would be to gather the evidence and try to come out with some objective conclusions about whether there are or not," he said.
The center's goal, he said, was to make focused research "in areas where perhaps it is most likely that international crimes were committed."
Only the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) can determine whether international crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, have been committed by any individual or group.
So far, Williams said, there has been no institutional focus on possible international crimes committed by Myanmar's junta, which imposed a bloody crackdown of pro-democracy protests in September earning global condemnation.
The crackdown -- according to United Nations figures -- left 31 people dead and 74 others missing, and resulted in thousands of arrests.
The military rulers had also come under international fire and were called "heartless" by some humanitarian groups for initially not allowing foreign aid when a cyclone left 138,000 people dead or missing in May.
Myanmar also houses more than 2,100 political prisoners, including democracy icon and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, who has spent more than 12 of the last 18 years under house arrest.
Williams said that although the ICC had not initiated any study on the military junta's record so far, "ours might be a good place for them to get started.
"It might help the various investigators know where to go and what allegations to examine and so forth," he said.
When asked whether in his personal opinion some of the junta's actions could be deemed as international crimes, Williams said: "What I might be able to say is that it looks to me, in my professional opinion, like there is a good chance that it is.
"And it makes sense therefore to bring a prosecution because there is enough evidence that a court should be able to see it."
The university group's staff had been for the last six years helping ethnic groups inside Myanmar -- at their request -- draw up constitutional reforms in their struggle to win greater freedom and rights.
Law professor Williams had smuggled himself into Myanmar on various occasions and worked on constitutional reforms with the Karen ethnic group, fighting the government since 1947 in the world's longest running civil war.
"I am hearing endless stories about how the military government is murdering villagers, it's blowing up rice paddies so that they dry out, it's setting fires to villages, it's laying mines in those villages so that when the people come back some of them get blown up," he said.
"The result is that they have to move often to hills and find a new place to build a village and start growing rice. That means in a relatively short period of time there is famine because old rice paddies have to be abandoned."
Williams said while he did not witness the Myanmar military units attacking the Karen guerilla resistance units, he saw "evidence of the military going after the civilian population.
"That's just the tip of the iceberg in itself and that doesn't constitute conclusive evidence of an international crime but it makes you think," he said.
Traditional Myanmar rice style hurts older people 30 Sep 2008 07:18:00 GMT
Written by: HelpAge International
Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are the author's alone.
Retired doctor Maung Maung Shien, 75, reports on working with HelpAge International in Kyaik Lat and Dedaye townships on the Irrawaddy Delta after it was devastated by a cyclone in May. HelpAge is the only international agency providing health care services tailored to the needs of older people in these areas.
The sun has not yet risen as we begin loading boxes of medicines from the office in Yangon out into the car. Alongside me are four nurses, four junior doctors and Dr. Aung Thu, an old colleague who invited me to join HelpAge International's mobile medical units after Cyclone Nargis struck.
Being an older person myself, I find I can communicate better with the older patients. I also know that older people have knowledge, wisdom and experience, and are an underused resource in the relief effort.
It takes over six hours to reach the township. When we arrive, it's no surprise to find over 150 patients sat waiting in a queue outside the small hall where our clinic is held. The numbers are growing with each visit. In this area, the government provides only one health assistant, one nurse and five midwives. It's nowhere near enough, and certainly not sufficient to meet the specific needs that older people have.
Before Nargis, older people here were already living in extremely deprived conditions with limited access to healthcare, shelter, clean water and sanitation. The cyclone has compounded this situation further. Our surveys have shown that 98 per cent of older people in this area are experiencing significant illness.
Over the course of the day, nearly all the older patients I see are suffering from peripheral neuritis, an inflammation of the nervous system causing pain and loss of sensation, which is linked to Vitamin B1 deficiency. Many older people wash rice too many times before cooking it, draining all the vitamins out. Education on cooking and other areas of health and hygiene must play an important role in any humanitarian work here.
I've dubbed one woman I see "The Iron Lady". She is very old and lives alone, yet every day she walks determinedly round the village selling household wares, earning just enough money to survive.
Seeing her reinstates my conviction that, although many are vulnerable, some older people are active and play an important role in their communities. A significant number are looking after orphaned grandchildren, sustaining themselves but also their extended families without any support.
Another patient is a blind older woman who, a colleague tells me, has been asking over the past few visits about the possibility of regaining her sight.
Eye treatment is a common health need for older people, and one which is extensively overlooked in the humanitarian effort.
On examination, I see only a small operation is needed. That evening I call an old friend who is an oculist at one of the eye hospitals in the southern part of Myanmar. He offers to conduct a free operation at the hospital. Now all we have to do is arrange travel and accommodation for this patient, who will need a couple of days to recover.
Reuters AlertNet is not responsible for the content of external websites.
Emulate Japan to cope with oil shocks
By Dilip Hiro
With the price of oil rocketing to the unprecedented level of US$130 a barrel and more, there is a talk of another oil shock. Unlike past instances, this one is unlikely to subside and may indeed keep intensifying. The only way out is for Western nations, the gluttonous users of petroleum, to cut their consumption and emulate Japan in its consistent drive for energy efficiency and alternate sources.
The present explosion in oil prices, the fourth of its kind, is different from the previous ones in 1973-74, 1980 and 1990-91. The earlier oil shocks were caused by interruption of supplies from the Middle East, respectively due to the war between the Arabs and Israel, the Iranian revolution, and Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Once peace returned, the new order
became established or the invader was expelled, supplies returned to normal.
This time there's an imbalance between supply and demand, with no short-term prospect of the two balancing each other.
While responding to a tight market, oil prices rose steadily over the past several years, the upward trend accelerating last summer. In August, the subprime mortgage crisis hit the financial markets, drastically reducing the market value of banks and other allied companies on the stock exchanges. The concomitant downturn in other equities led speculators and investment-fund managers to channel their cash into such commodities as gold, oil and even food grains. Another contributory factor for the rise in oil prices has been the steady decline in the foreign-exchange value of the US dollar in which oil is traded.
Over the past decade there has been under-investment in exploration by the state-owned companies in oil-bearing nations as well as Western oil corporations, partly because the cost of materials, such as steel for rigs and pipelines, and skilled manpower required for the purpose has risen sharply.
In the past, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries failed to oblige by raising its output, non-OPEC nations like Britain, Norway, Mexico and Russia stepped up their production. Now the output of non-OPEC states is either static, as in Russia, or declining, as in Britain, Norway and Mexico. This widening shortfall cannot be filled by tapping into tar sands in Canada.
The key point is that the total petroleum reserves of the non-OPEC nations are only a third of OPEC's. In other words, the ultimate source of OPEC's strength is its possession of three-quarters of the global oil deposits.No amount of arm-twisting of OPEC by the Western powers can alter that fact of nature.
While the supply side remains static, the demand side shows no sign of tapering off. The main sources of new demand are China and India, which together make up two-fifths of the human race. To maintain their annual expansion rates of 8% to 11%, to lift tens of millions of Chinese and Indians out of poverty every year, they need ample sources of energy, and oil is a vital part of their energy basket as it has been in the developed world. An average American uses 34 times more petroleum than an Indian and 12 times more than a Chinese.
Whereas India has established itself as a leader in software, half of Indian households still do not have electricity. Where electric power is available, outages are commonplace as demand often exceeds supply. While gasoline and diesel are required for buses and trucks as well as irrigation pumps, kerosene is a basic need for the Indian masses as a source of light and fuel for cooking. So the government finds it almost mandatory to subsidize petroleum products to protect the public from high prices in the international market. This is also the case in China.
Little wonder then that these two mega-nations now account for three-fourths of the annual growth in demand for petroleum.
Both China and India are on the threshold of a car revolution. At present there are only 10 cars for every 1,000 Indians, whereas there are 778 vehicles for every 1,000 Americans. To raise India to the level of a mere 100 automobiles per 1,000 Indians would require an immense jump in petroleum usage.
Since supply is unlikely to rise appreciably in the near future, the stress must be laid on curtailing demand. That can only happen in the Western nations. As it is, in the face of soaring prices at gasoline stations, US demand fell by 3% during the first three months of this year.
It's worth noting that a similar decrease occurred in America after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74. That oil shock led to a drive for fuel efficiency in the United States, West Europe and Japan. It also gave a boost to developing renewable sources of energy. But whereas Japan has followed a consistent, long-range policy, and reduced its petroleum usage, America has not.
During the presidencies of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the United States improved fuel efficiency for vehicles as required by a federal law. Carter announced a $100 million federal spending on solar-power research and development and set a personal example by installing a solar-water heater on the White House roof.
Oil prices fell sharply during the Ronald Reagan presidency, and there was a reversal of the policies on energy efficiency and conservation, and developing of renewable sources of energy, dramatized by Reagan's removal of the solar panel from the White House roof. In the private sector, US utilities cut their investments into energy efficiency by half. President George H W Bush, an oil man, followed Reagan's lead.
But Japan's government and private companies stayed on course. By 2006, Japan produced almost half of the total global solar power, well ahead of the United States, where Russell Ohl invented a silicon solar cell, the building block of solar photovoltaic panels, which convert sunshine into electricity.
The Japanese companies made their electrical and electronic consumer items and factories more energy efficient. Today Japan produces one ton of steel using 20% less energy than in the United States, 50% less than in China.
On the whole, the Japanese cars offer better fuel efficiency than American cars. In 1995, Toyota introduced a "concept" hybrid car, combining an internal combustion engine with batteries, and began mass production seven years later. Now it's another Japanese corporation, Nissan, that has promised to cut the cost differential between a standard and a hybrid car from $5,000 to $2,000.
Starting in 2002, Toyota leased hydrogen cell cars at $10,000 a month for 30 months, to government bodies, research institutions, and energy-related companies for trial runs. Japan already has 13 state-owned hydrogen fueling stations, most of them in the Tokyo area, and a few energy-related companies also have their own fueling facilities.
In 2006, another Japanese company, Mazda, came up with a hybrid car combining hydrogen cells and gasoline. In the absence of a hydrogen fueling station, it runs on gasoline and uses existing engine parts and production facilities to lower costs.
Little wonder that the oil usage in Japan has dropped by 15% over the past dozen years.
The United States and other Western nations ought to follow the example of Japan to bring about savings in oil consumption which can then satisfy the rising demand in China and India without causing a price explosion. For the present, though, there's no quick fix for the current hike in prices.
Dilip Hiro is the author of Blood of the Earth: The Battle for the World's Vanishing Oil Resources, (Nation Books, New York; Politico's Publishing, London; and Penguin Books, New Delhi).
(Copyright 2008 YaleGlobal Online, a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization. Republished from Policy Innovations with kind permission.)
An immigration conundrum in Japan
By Peter Taberner
Immigration policy has always launched heated debate in Japan, where decades of government administrations have failed to create an expansive legal framework for migrant workers. But a declining population will perhaps create a fresh awareness and cultural outlook concerning foreign nationals living and working in Japan.
Last month, a new immigration plan proposed by 80 Liberal Democrat lawmakers and led by the party's former secretary general, Hidenao Nakagawa, pushed for Japan to loosen its borders and by 2050 to have 10% of the Japanese population consisting of immigrants - an intake of at least 10 million people.
The proposal claims that the population is shrinking as deaths now outnumber births and immigration remains tightly controlled. According to communications company CNC Japan KK, the number of Japanese will shrink to just under 90 million in 2055, from the current total of 127 million.
Nakagawa's plans are revolutionary; not only adjusting numbers to cope with labor market shortages but also inviting workers' family members to live in Japan. Inviting relatives is aimed at creating a vibrant sense of multiculturalism as opposed to simply making up the labor shortfall in the low-paying health or agricultural sectors.
The plan calls for a central immigration agency to be established, and assume all border duties. Such a move has also been requested recently by seven prefectures, including Nagoya and Nagano. Other tenets of Nakagawa's proposal include extending student and working visas to five years from three, and the construction of Japanese culture and language institutions abroad. There was even a call to outlaw racism.
Recently, there have been two significant developments which suggest a thaw in Japan's traditionally cold reception of foreign workers. First, a court ruling that Japanese children of unmarried foreign mothers can now be granted citizenship "for the protection of basic human rights". And second, as part of a trade agreement with Indonesia, a deal has been brokered to allow Indonesian nurses and health professionals to live and work in Japan.
The conditions for the nurses' arrival and participation in the health sector will be strict. There will spoken and written Japanese language examinations as well as a three-year training course for nurses and a four-year course for health workers requiring more technical qualifications. Only when these requirements are successfully completed will Indonesian health workers be treated as full wage workers. They will receive a "training wage" up to that point.
Similar deals exist with the Philippines, but this is limited to nurses only. Japan's diplomatic relations with Thailand have not extended into an immigration policy.
These arrangements could be viewed as pilot schemes for any attempt to infuse the population with more overseas workers. At the moment, however, they are no more than part of trade agreements and nothing like the scope that Nakagawa proposes.
Will Japan be able to cope with the extra numbers? Japanese society cannot boast of a harmonious relationship with immigrants and there are many examples of begrudging migration policies throughout its history. However, Japan pales in comparison to some European nations which maintain immigrant populations of up to 15%.
Before World War II, there were migrant flows from Korea after Japan colonized the country in 1910. Millions of laborers were brought into Japan on a conscription basis, but the flow stopped after 1945. When independence was declared in 1952, all non-nationals were declared gaijins or "foreigners" and given no welcome entry into Japanese society. Few gaijins were encouraged to settle long-term.
Later, the Immigration Control Law (ICL) was introduced and became the framework of all ensuing migrant policies. It has held that all foreign workers must sign into an alien registration scheme which must be repeated every year. The ICL also provided means to monitor workers who only planned to stay for a short time.
During the spiraling economic progress of the 1960s and 1970s, machines became preferred to foreign labor; a policy propelled by government and major corporations alike which resulted in low migrant labor numbers during this period.
In response to more transnational networks - and the growing power of a strong yen to attract overseas workers - the ICL was reformed in 1989. The overhaul aimed to buck the rise in expired short-term visas as well as an influx of low-skilled labor. It established strict guidelines for employers concerning illegal or black-market employment of foreigners.
Foreigners have not always enjoyed a favorable reputation in Japan, and have widely being blamed for the rise in crime and increased use of drugs in the country.
Tokyo's governor Shintaro Ishihara is one of Japan's most prominent right-wing figures. In 2006, he was quoted as saying, "Roppongi [Tokyo's most populous foreign section] is now virtually a foreign neighborhood. Africans - I don't mean African-Americans - who don't speak English are there doing who knows what. This is leading to new forms of crime such as car theft. We should be letting in people who are intelligent."
Still, the obvious necessity for change may provoke a change in such entrenched attitudes.
"Opinions from Japanese people are diverse at the moment and there is an increasing realization that demographic patterns are going to change and that we need a younger population," said Akio Nakayama, of the International Organization for Migration's Tokyo office. "Many more local communities know that there is no other alternative, and in the major cities they already have migrant communities and their knowledge of multiculturalism is growing. We have 2.15 million migrants in the country now and look at the amount of Brazilians that now reside in Japan since the Nikkeijin policy was introduced allowing descendents of Japanese emigrates to live here. This has only been recent."
Nakayama added, "Tokyo has a high proportion of foreigners and has the experience of welcoming labor. But the skepticism [about] foreigners and the perception that they often cause crime is not based on reality and official crime figures confirm that. This image is manipulated."
However, criticism of foreign workers still points to a loss of national culture, social instability and the burden of unemployed migrants.
Goro Ono, author of Bringing Foreign Workers Ruins Japan, argued that salaries will determine whether migrants are needed. Nor does Ono believe an increase in migration is a necessity: "If industries where labor is in high demand pay adequate salaries, people will work there."
Nakagawa is an influential politician and his proposal is the strongest indication yet that policies must change. Still, his proposal is unlikely to become law in its current form and will almost certainly have to be watered down.
Across the Diet opinions are diverse. The Democrat Party, which took control of the House of Councilors after last year's elections, has put forward its own proposal which is much more limited in scope than Nakagawa's, but is supportive of an immigration overhaul.
Japan's immigration debate is heating up once again.
Peter Taberner is a freelance journalist based in the United Kingdom for the past four years. He has also reported directly from Bosnia.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Koizumi's retirement rocks Japan
By Kosuke Takahashi
TOKYO - "Flowers are flowers and people are people only when they know the proper time to fall," says a traditional Japanese haiku (poem), once quoted by former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi to a large audience.
Koizumi, who was premier from 2001-2006, has now decided it his his time to fall; on Thursday he confirmed he would retire from politics, bringing to an end what Japanese call the "Koizumi theater" - his media-savvy tactic of dramatizing politics.
Koizumi, 66, said he would not stand for re-election to parliament from his seat in Yokosuka, a city at the mouth of Tokyo Bay, whenever elections are next called. He named his second-eldest son, Shinjiro, to run in his constituency.
Following the confirmation of Taro Aso as the new premier on Wednesday, snap elections are expected within the next few months.
Koizumi has always been a man full of surprises, and he has a strong will. While premier, he aggressively promoted structural reforms, including privatization of government-held assets. He unexpectedly made two trips to North Korea - in September 2002 and in May 2004 - for talks with reclusive leader Kim Jong-il and secured the repatriation of five Japanese abductees and their families. He remained a staunch supporter of the United States and stubbornly made annual visits to the war-related controversial Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo.
Koizumi may have recognized that as he is no longer a leader, that he is not in step with the times. He opposed Aso's bid to become prime minister by offering support in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to rival Yuriko Koike, a former high-profile TV anchorwoman who was seeking to become Japan's first female leader.
The Aso administration wants to adopt a Keynesian-style fiscal expansionary policy with increased public investment and tax reductions in preparation for the snap election expected as early as late October.
This is a big retreat from Koizumi’s aggressive restructuring policies during his five years and five months at the helm, the third-longest term for a Japanese prime minister in the post-World War II period.
"Koizumi was a prominent politician in the post-war period by doing what other politicians could not do,” said Yoshiaki Kobayashi, professor of political science at Keio University. “The rest of the world could easily understand what he was aiming for. He may want to retire by looking at the lineup of the Aso’s cabinet, which denies his reformist policy.”
His retirement announcement came as the nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier George Washington arrived at its new home port in Yokosuka, Koizumi’s constituency.
Koizumi has always affirmed the importance of the now strained Japan-US alliance. Much of the public, backed by the nation's pacifist sentiment, has hesitated in becoming fully involved in the US's military operations in the international fight against terrorism.
The government failed once last year to have the Diet (parliament) extend a law for Japan's refueling mission for US-led coalition vessels in the Indian Ocean, a symbol of Tokyo's commitment to the two nations' bilateral military alliance. This reversal was a consequence of the LDP's devastating defeat in the July, 2007, Upper House elections, which enabled the opposition camp to block the passage of key bills.
"That would be just like him to do that gracefully," Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara said of Koizumi's retirement announcement. "With the Liberal Democratic Party having no shortage of qualified personnel, it's better to keep the party's metabolism running." The city governnor's family is related to Koizumi by marriage.
The loss of Koizumi's popularity will be a major setback for the LDP in the polls. As it is, Aso's popular support remains at about 50% in various opinion polls, below even the rate of his predecessor Yasuo Fukuda at the time of his administration's inauguration last year.
Economically, Japanese stocks and government bonds, and even the yen, may be sold further as there is some risk the LDP will lose power without the reformist Koizumi. This would be a major power shift after more than 50 years of de facto one-party rule and would raise concern over the nation’s ballooning budget deficit.
The world’s second-largest economy is being buffeted amid the deteriorating global economic conditions, a domestic slowdown and ailing social welfare and medical systems.
Unlike in Koizumi’s time, Japan's diplomatic ties with its neighbors may not suffer during Aso's term, as some critics say, because Aso has said he won’t visit the Yasukuni shrine.
In a sign of growing public frustration with the parliamentary gridlock, people are becoming increasingly inward-looking, suggesting Japan won't take a more assertive global role in the near future - certainly not until the next polls.
Kosuke Takahashi, a former staff writer at the Asahi Shimbun, is a freelance correspondent based in Tokyo. He can be contacted at letters@kosuke.net.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Iran keeps China in a chokehold
By Yitzhak Shichor
Over the past few weeks, Iran has amplified its threats that, if attacked, it would immediately close the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint nestled between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commander Mohammad Ali Jafari has warned, in no uncertain terms, that if attacked "one of [Iran's] reactions will be to take control of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz". He added, "[our] capabilities in these crucial naval passages are so extensive that, in the case of an attack, not only the enemy but also all those who assist him will no doubt sustain [considerable] harm."
If Iran takes control of the Strait of Hormuz, the price of oil will spike considerably, said Jafari.
He also recently said that the strait is within the range of Iran's weapons and could easily be blocked for an unlimited period of time, while Hassan Firouzabadi, chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, has insisted, "If the country's interests are jeopardized … we will not let a single vessel pass through the strait."
Expressing alarm, Persian Gulf governments led by Qatar have launched a series of consultations in anticipation of the blocking of the strait to guarantee the continuation of oil export - for which emergency plans had already been drafted. A Saudi editorial headlined Closing Hormuz: Iranian Suicide warned that blocking the strait would not only upset the United States but would turn the entire world into a united front against Iran.
Hormuz is by no means a new vista for China. It was mentioned in Yuan Dynasty sources and visited by Admiral Zheng He's naval expedition in 1412-13 and 1430-31. At least four Hormuz diplomatic missions came to China [1]. The History of the Ming Dynasty says: "The country of Hulumusi [Hormuz] is situated on the utmost border of the Western Sea. The trading vessels of the southern barbarians come thither, and the nations of the Great Western Sea, as well as the merchants of the Xiyu [Western Asia] meet for commercial purposes."
Today's China is one of them. Heavily dependent on Persian Gulf crude oil imports and maintaining friendly relations with all parties involved, Beijing, however, has not yet officially responded to Tehran's threats [2], though undoubtedly it has been making its own preparations.
Following the US-Iran naval incident in the Hormuz Strait earlier in the year, Hua Liming, former Chinese ambassador to Iran, told China Daily: "Neither Washington nor Tehran seems to have a political will strong enough for a military showdown in the Persian Gulf in the near term."
This issue was not raised publicly during President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's recent meeting with Hu Jintao during his one-day visit to China on September 6. This was their third meeting, Ahmadinejad’s second visit to China and his first to Beijing. The Iranian president's stay was cut short by half and a scheduled press conference was cancelled - no reason was given.
Using very general terms, Hu Jintao said that the two countries "would strengthen international cooperation and jointly safeguard regional and world peace and stability". Before his departure Ahmadinejad said in a reserved tone that "good decisions" had been made; that the prospects of economic relations are "good"; and that bilateral relations have been "satisfactory".
Beijing did not demonstrate much enthusiasm about Ahmadinejad's reelection, has endorsed UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, and failed to support Iran's admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) - despite its "dependence" on Iran's oil.
Growing, yet limited, dependence
China's oil imports vary considerably not only from year to year but also from month to month. Yet the overall trend is clear: the Persian Gulf is a major source of Chinese crude oil and in the long run China will likely become even more dependent on this region for its energy needs than it is today.
The reason is that while Beijing has been attempting - albeit unsuccessfully - to diversify its external oil resources - which are currently spread all over the world - many of these resources are forecasted to dwindle and dry up within the next two to three decades, while the same cannot be said of the supply in the Persian Gulf.
According to most recent estimates, oil reserves of the Persian Gulf countries account for nearly 56% of the world's total and, at current output levels, assure continuous supply for 80 to 110 years [3].
In May 2008 nearly 30% of the world's total crude oil was produced behind the Hormuz Strait, with the main producers being Saudi Arabia (with 9.4 million barrels per day [bpd] or 12.62%); Iran (4 million bpd, 5.38%); the United Arab Emirates (2.7 million bpd, 3.64%); Kuwait (2.6 million bpd, 3.5%); Iraq (2.5 million bpd, 3.3% and Qatar (938,000 bpd, 1.26%) [4]. Some of this oil goes to China.
China's oil imports have been growing steadily, well above GDP growth. In the first quarter of 2008 China imported 44.95 million tons of crude oil, up 14.9% over the same period last year, while GDP growth lagged behind with "only" 10.6%. In 2007 China's crude oil imports rose 12.4% compared to 2006.
At present, around one-third of China's oil imports flow through the Hormuz Strait. In the first half of 2008 (January-June), 29.75% of China's oil import came from Saudi Arabia (656,000 bpd, 17.92%) and Iran (433,000 bpd, 11.83%) [5]. Much smaller amounts came from other Persian Gulf countries.
When weighed against the rapid expansion of China's international economic relations, the share of the Persian Gulf in China's foreign trade is quite modest, though steadily increasing: in 2006 it reached a little over 3% of China's trade turnover, or nearly 4% of its total imports, mostly crude oil.
Much more heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil, other Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, India and Singapore obtain a much higher share of their oil through the Hormuz Strait.
Almost two thirds of the oil traffic in the strait is directed at Asia. Of about 17 million bpd shipped through the Hormuz Strait, 16% goes to Europe, 11% to the United States and 66% to Asia. China is by no means the most important customer.
In 2007 Japan accounted for 17.7% of Saudi Arabia's export, the Republic of Korea 9.1% and China for only 7.2%. Taiwan and Singapore accounted for 4.7% and 4.5% respectively, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Put differently, the share of Japan in Saudi trade, and consequently its vulnerability to trade disruptions, is nearly 2.5 times greater than China's. Japan imported 90.3% of its oil from the Middle East in July, of which 82.6% was from suppliers that use the Hormuz Strait: 31.03% from Saudi Arabia, 30.96% from the UAE, 15.89% from Qatar, 14.33% from Iran and 7.79% from Kuwait.
China's Iran connection: Oil and arms
China's limited reliance on Persian Gulf oil relative to the other Asian economies in spite of the region's strategic significance, as well to its overall international economic relations, is one reason for Beijing's reluctance to flag the Hormuz Strait as an issue. Other reasons include the fact that China does not want to jeopardize its economic benefits and political advantages.
Despite Iran's threat to prolong the conflict, its capability to cork the Hormuz bottleneck is limited and expected to be relatively short, say analysts. "Iran could not 'close the Gulf' for more than a few days to two weeks" [6].
China, hypothetically, could withstand such an interruption, given the buildup of its four strategic oil reserves that are expected to become operational by the end of this year. With a total capacity of 16.4 million cubic meters (or around 100 million barrels) they account for three months of Persian Gulf oil supply to China - or about one month of total supply.
The Chinese undoubtedly prefer to conceal the fact that some of the weapons that Iran and its Revolutionary Guards deploy along the Hormuz Strait, and that are planned to be used for enforcing its closure, are either made in China or based on Chinese technology sold to Iran.
Estimated at $4.483 billion - or 31.7% of the total - from 1979 to 2007, China's arms sales to Iran are second only, and very close, to the former Soviet Union and Russia which provided Iran with $4.967 billion of weapons - or 35.1% of the total [7].
These exported Chinese arms include the following anti-ship cruise missiles and technologies for license production: the YJ-8 Sardine, Iran's derivation: Kosar; the Saccade, Iran's derivation: Noor; the TL-10, TL-10A and possibly TL-10B version; and the TL-6 and YJ-7 [8]. With a range of between 40 and 120 kilometers these weapons could cover the entire area of the Hormuz Strait.
China began to supply Iran with anti-ship missile in the mid 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, HY-2 missiles (also known as Silkworm, Iran's derivation: Raad) were deployed at Larak Island and at Kuhestak, covering the narrow bend of the Hormuz Strait.
It is estimated that about ten HY-2s were fired by Iran before a ceasefire was enforced on August 20, 1988. Still, most of them were fired at Kuwait (from the Fau Peninsula seized from Iraq) -
Page 2 of 2
Iran keeps China in a chokehold
By Yitzhak Shichor
rather than at the Strait - hitting Kuwait's Sea Island offshore supertanker export oil terminal as well as two US-owned oil tankers.
Another HY-2 was fired in early December 1987 bringing the number of Iranian-fired HY-2s to seven that year. Since then Iran has deployed along a number of more advanced anti-ship missile batteries, either Chinese or license-produced using Chinese technologies, along the strait [9].
Some of these missiles are installed on Chinese-made fast missile boats, notably type Houdong, of which Iran has received
10 to 15, or according to some sources, about 40 [10]. Iran was also the first customer of at least five C-14 China Cat Class fast attack missile craft, each equipped with up to eight C-701 anti-ship cruise missiles.
In addition, over 11 French-designed missile patrol boats are equipped with two to four Chinese-made anti-ship missiles [11]. However, while most attention is focused on Iran's Chinese-made missiles and missile boats, an equally significant Chinese-made weapon that is specifically relevant to a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz should by no means be overlooked.
In the 1990s, Iran purchased from China sophisticated EM-52 and EM-53 bottom-tethered mines. Their rocket-propelled 300-kg warhead is capable of hitting the hull of its target vessel at speeds in excess of 80 meters per second. They "are thought to be deactivated by coded acoustic signals to allow the safe passage of friendly vessels, and again activated to prevent the transit of those of an enemy" [12].
So unless Tehran provides Beijing with the codes (which is inconceivable), incoming or outgoing Chinese shipping in the strait could be hit by Chinese-made weapons. Given its indirect presence in the Gulf, how would Beijing behave in case of a confrontation in the Hormuz Strait?
Escape from predicament
It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would intervene in such a confrontation. Following its time-honored behavior, Beijing would likely avoid any involvement, calling to settle the conflict peacefully by diplomatic means.
In the situation escalation China would fail to use its veto power and Tehran knows it - either before or after the strait is blocked. Iranian editorials and commentaries occasionally warn the government not to trust Beijing (and Moscow), and an article in the Iranian press questioned China's (as well as Russia's) decision to veto UN Security Council sanctions on Zimbabwe but approve sanctions on Iran.
While the Chinese do not likely intend to actively protect their assets in the Gulf in case of a crisis, they have undoubtedly made preparations to minimize the damage.
As mentioned above, although the Chinese are heavily dependent on Persian Gulf oil, they are less vulnerable than other Asian countries, as China still provides about half of its oil needs and sources for the other half are distributed all over the world aware of Iran's risky situation.
In early 2006, Beijing accepted Saudi Arabia's offer to supply China with whatever oil it needs in case of sanctions or use of force against Iran. Yet, if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked by Iran, no Saudi oil could flow to China. Possible alternatives for Beijing are to increase oil imports from Oman and Yemen, though this could be no more than a stopgap solution as their oil export capabilities are substantially smaller.
Compared to Saudi Arabia's crude oil reserves, estimated at nearly 267 billion barrels, Oman's reserves are estimated at 5.5 billion and Yemen's at 3.3 billion. While Saudi Arabia's share in the world's total oil production in 2007 stood at over 12%, Oman's share was 0.85% and Yemen's 0.38%.
Another alternative is to ship Saudi oil through the 745-mile long Petroline (or East-West Pipeline) crossing from Abqaiq to the Red Sea terminal at Yanbu. This would not only add four to five days travel time, not to mention its smaller capacity, but would also force oil transportation to pass through Bab al-Mandab, another risky chokepoint that could be blocked, possibly by terrorists.
Finally, in early 2007 the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation (CPECC) signed an agreement with Abu Dhabi's International Petroleum Investment Company to build a pipeline that would bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
The project involves the construction of a 360-km, 48-inch diameter pipeline with a capacity of 1.5 million bpd of crude oil from Habshan west of the Strait to al-Fujayrah east of the Strait, crossing the UAE and Abu Dhabi. Construction work started in March 2008 and the project is expected to be completed in March 2010 [14]. Still, when completed, it will be a drop in a bucket compared to the 17 million bpd of crude oil that passes through the Hormuz Strait today.
It is clearly in Beijing's interest that the closure of the Hormuz Strait (and much more so an overall confrontation) should be avoided and prevented at all costs - preferably by satisfying Tehran's claims and demands by political and diplomatic means. Yet, if a confrontation could not be avoided, its effects on China would be relatively limited.
A brief and early conflict means less disruption while China is less dependent on the Persian Gulf, while a longer and a later conflict means greater disruption and instability as China would be much more dependent on the Gulf - and therefore US protection.
Notes
1. Ma Huan, The Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores (Yingyai shenglan, 1433), tr. by JVG Mills (Halikut Society, 1970), pp 165-172.
2. The Chinese are, of course, aware of the problem. See "The Persian Gulf Bottleneck" (Bosihai pingjing) in: Wu Lei, China's Oil Security (Zhongguo Shiyou Anquan), Beijing, 2003, pp 152-158.
3. EIA, "International Oil Reserves", updated August 27, 2008.
4. Http://netoilexports.blogspot.com; EIA, Persian Gulf Region (June 2007).
5. China Custom Statistics quoted by: Walid Khadduri, "China's Oil Consumption Increased despite Price Hikes," al-Hayat, July 29, 2008.
6. Anthony H Cordesman, "Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz," CSIS (Washington: Center for Strategic Studies, March 26, 2007), p 6
7. SIPRI, updated September 1, 2008.
8. China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Iran. 9. Bates Gill, "Chinese Arms Exports to Iran," MERIA, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 2, No 2 (May 1998), pp 5-6.
10. www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/hudong.htm.
11. Cordesman, op cit p 5.
12. Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "China's Undersea Sentries," Undersea Warfare, Vol 9, No 2 (Winter 2007).
13. EIA, "International Oil Reserves", updated August 27, 2008. 14. www.zawya.com/projects/project.cfm/pid211106110219?cc .
Dr Yitzhak Shichor is professor of East Asian studies and political science at the University of Haifa, and senior fellow, the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2008 The Jamestown Foundation.)
False dawn in Myanmar
By Larry Jagan
BANGKOK - Myanmar's military junta claims its recent release of several political detainees and about 9,000 other prisoners marks the dawn of a new political era and another milestone in its roadmap to "disciplined democracy”, but analysts say it is merely part of a masterplan to dominate the next election.
The mass amnesty appears to be timed to coincide with the first anniversary of last year's 'Saffron Revolution' when police and soldiers brutally suppressed monk-led anti-government protests against spiraling inflation and a dramatic fuel price hike, leaving possibly hundreds dead and many more injured.
But the release also probably signals the start of preparations for the national elections in 2010, said Win Min, an independent Myanmar academic based in Chiang Mai, Thailand. "The regime knows it must find ways of controlling the outcome without looking too draconian ... [it] never does anything that is not part of a bigger game plan."
The elections are part of the country's roadmap to what the regime has referred to as "disciplined, flourishing democracy'', according to Myanmar military sources. There is no word yet if opposition icon Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), or other opposition parties, will be allowed to field candidates.
The mass release of prisoners has come as a surprise to diplomats and residents in Yangon, as while the regime frequently grants amnesties to mark important occasions, such as Armed Forces day or National Day, these are usually petty criminals, albeit with a handful of political prisoners.
Among those freed was Win Tin, reportedly aged 79, the country's longest serving political prisoner and a veteran journalist and political activist. At least four other prominent former members of the NLD were also released. Suu Kyi, however, remains under house arrest in the Yangon residence where she has spent more than 13 of the last 19 years, with no sign she will be freed any time soon.
"I will be happy only when all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, are released," Win Tin told local journalists shortly after his release. Two other NLD members were also released along with five other NLD politicians. One of them, Win Htain, was Suu Kyi's private assistant before he was detained in 1996 and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment.
"The release of these political activists, particularly those who were very close to Aung San Suu Kyi, must be seen as an olive branch to the pro-democracy leader on the part of the [Myanmar] leaders," a Yangon-based Asian diplomat told Inter Press Service. "It may not be an offer of dialogue, but it may represent a softening of the regime's hardened position towards the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi.
Win Tin served as a close aide to Suu Kyi and helped found the NLD with her in 1988. He was arrested on July 4, 1989 - days before the opposition leader was detained. He was initially sentenced to 14 years in prison in a military court for allegedly being a member of the banned Communist Party of Burma.
In 1996, he was sentenced to an additional seven years for writing to the United Nations about prison conditions and for writing and circulating anti-government pamphlets in prison.
A long-time editor, journalist and poet, Win Tin refused to allow prison to silence him. "He would write poems on the walls of his cell with ink made of brick powder and water," Zin Linn, a former political prisoner and close colleague of Win Tin, said.
Immediately after he was released, Win Tin vowed to continue fighting until Myanmar was a democratic nation. "I will keep fighting until the emergence of democracy in this country," he told journalists gathered outside his house in Yangon.
The international community has welcomed the releases - especially that of Win Tin. But most analysts and diplomats in Yangon do not believe this is the start of a mass amnesty for the country's remaining political prisoners. British-based human rights group Amnesty International estimates that there are more than 2,100 political prisoners still languishing in Myanmar's jails.
"While the release of U Win Tin and his fellow prisoners is certainly the best news to come out of Myanmar for a long time, unfortunately they represent less than 1% of the political prisoners there," Benjamin Zawacki, Amnesty International's Myanmar researcher said from London in a phone interview. "These handful of people should never have been imprisoned in the first place, and there are many, many more still in prison."
The regime recently announced through state-run media that thousands of prisoners would be released in the run-up to the elections because of good behavior and to allow them to serve the nation, with Myanmar's current leader, Senior General Than Shwe, attempting to paint the mass release as the start of a new era.
The amnesty is not without its precedents. More than 20,000 prisoners, including hundreds of political prisoners, were released over several months in 1992 to mark Than Shwe's becoming head of state and the start of the constitutional drafting process.
Similarly, more than 10,000 prisoners were freed after former prime minister and military intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt was ousted in November 2004, including many of the 1988 student generation such as Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi and others who had been imprisoned for 14 years. However, most were re-arrested for involvement in the 'Saffron Revolution' last year.
There are likely to be many changes in Myanmar's political scene in the weeks ahead as the regime gears up for the elections, but even though it has already begun to describe itself as a transitional authority, most of the these are likely to be cosmetic.
Information Minister Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan, told UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari when they met in Yangon last month that the transitional government would "oppose and wipe out those who attempt to jeopardize or harm the constitution".
This can only mean the military authorities will continue ruthlessly to suppress dissent, while there is little hope of the forthcoming elections being free and fair. “The military will not make the same mistake it did last time,” said Win Min, referring to the landslide victory the NLD won against the junta in 1990, which was ignored by the regime.
Larry Jagan previously covered Myanmar politics for the British Broadcasting Corp. He is currently a freelance journalist based in Bangkok.
(With additional reporting by Inter Press Service)
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Myanmar on the cyber-offensive
By Brian McCartan
MAE SOT, Thailand - The distributed denial of service attacks, or DDoS, that hit and disabled several exile media websites between September 17 to 19, are widely held to be the latest attempt by Myanmar's military regime to silence its legion of critics.
The cyber-attacks, which flood a website with information requests which block regular traffic and eventually overload and crash it, coincided with the run-up to last year's "Saffron" revolution, in which soldiers opened fire and killed Buddhist monks and anti-government demonstrators. But the junta's cyber-warfare specialists appear to have wider designs than just censoring an uncomfortable anniversary and they are receiving plenty of foreign assistance in upgrading their political dissent-quashing capabilities.
The Defense Services Computer Directorate (DSCD) was set up by the War Office in around 1990, originally with the aim of modernizing the military's communications and administration systems. By the mid-1990s, however, the center had become much more focused on Information Warfare operations, according to a signals intelligence expert who spoke with Asia Times Online.
The center became responsible for monitoring telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and other forms of electronic data exchange. Another computer center was later set up at the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), Myanmar's main military intelligence service. The DSCD is aimed more at military communications, while the intelligence service's computer center is more politically focused, including monitoring opposition groups both within and outside Myanmar.
The service was disbanded in 2004 after the arrest of former prime minister and intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt. It was later reformed as the Military Affairs Security (MAS), which has also presumably taken over cyber-warfare functions, and its capabilities have reportedly substantially improved in recent years.
Singapore has been the military's main partner in bolstering those capabilities. The DSCD was originally set up with computers from Singapore and the city-state has been heavily involved in the cyber-units technological evolution, including upgrades to the regime's computerized information systems hardware and training, says the signals intelligence expert. The intelligence service's center was also set up with Singapore-provided assistance.
Several opposition media sources, including The Irrawaddy magazine and Democratic Voice of Burma satellite television station, have said they received information that the most recent attacks on their Websites may have been conducted by Myanmar military officers trained or undergoing training in Russia and China. A longtime analyst of Myanmar's signals intelligence capabilities noted that many of the officers who have undergone training in Russia and China have taken courses in computing and information technology.
While China has been heavily involved in improvements to the Myanmar military's radio communications and, together with Singapore, connecting major military commands with fiber-optic cable, it apparently has been less involved in developing the regime's cyber-warfare capabilities, experts say.
The opposition movement has become noted for its extensive usage of the Internet to send and receive information, reports and news the regime has tried to suppress. As activists and underground journalists have become more tech-savvy, the intelligence service has become more determined to counter the outflow of information. Much of this has taken the form of harassment and more recently DDoS attacks.
Long-running media list server, BurmaNet News, has been a target of Myanmar's junta, which is known to have posted misleading and often inaccurate information to discredit the pro-democracy movement. In 2000, a wave of e-mail messages were received by activists with attachments containing a virus that many suspected came from the regime.
Exile-run political groups, human-rights groups and non-governmental organizations have all repeatedly accused the regime of launching viruses, and Trojan horses, defacing websites, sending waves of spam e-mail and even purchasing domain names with political significance. Although it is difficult to prove who exactly is behind the waves of cyber-harassment, the sheer volume of the attacks points to the regime's trained cyber-specialists, experts say.
Last year, the day after the regime's violent crackdown on street protesters, the Thailand-based Burmese media organization The Irrawaddy was hit by a virus that also infected visitors to their site. The timing of the attack raised suspicions of the junta's involvement.
In July 2008, the websites of the exile-run, Oslo-based Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) and New Delhi-based Mizzima News were hit by DDoS attacks that shut down their websites for several days. The attacks followed both news organizations' extensive reporting on the junta's inept and some say corrupt response to the Cyclone Nargis disaster.
On September 17, another wave of DDoS attacks was launched, this time against The Irrawaddy, DVB and the Bangkok-based New Era Journal. Two community forums, Mystery Zillion and Planet Myanmar, were disabled and shut down by similar attacks in August. Although not political in nature, both websites provided information and instruction on how to circumvent the regime's tough Internet controls and firewalls, which include blocks on internationally hosted e-mail services gmail and Yahoo!.
Strategic attacks
Analysts say the cyber-attacks have notably ramped up during the anniversaries of the August 1988 pro-democracy uprising and military repression, and the September 2007 crackdown. Servers involved in the most recent attacks have apparently been situated in Russia and China - however, experts say this may have been done by hackers trying to cover their tracks.
According to communications security expert and Australian National University Professor Desmond Ball, DDoS attacks are relatively simple and can be engineered without the aid of powerful computers or an advanced computer science degree. Similar attacks, he says, have been carried out against Taiwan and Japan for years by young nationalistic Chinese hackers.
DDoS attacks, redirection and defacing of websites are all overt forms of cyber-harassment, but the real essence of cyber-warfare, says Ball, lies in the ability to penetrate a computer or a network, cover your tracks to avoid detection on the way in and out and steal information or disrupt systems without the target knowing that they have been hacked.
The military regime's capabilities in this regard may be where the real danger lies, he says. So far there is little known about the ability of Myanmar's government cyber-warriors to carry out these attacks, partly because the nature of these kinds of attacks is to remain undetected.
Internet security among computer users worldwide is notoriously lax and this includes Burmese exile political and media organizations. Without firewalls and anti-virus programs configured properly and IT specialists monitoring computer systems - an expensive proposition for most exile groups - they are at a distinct disadvantage against the junta.
Domestically, the regime has spent considerable effort to block the flow of information into the country through the use of filtering software that block certain media, human rights and political sites, as well as gambling, pornography and other sites deemed socially unacceptable. Through the use of proxy servers and encrypted webmail services, many of Myanmar's citizens have been able to circumvent some of these controls.
Their tech savvy was shown to the world in September 2007, when graphic images and video of the military's brutal crackdown on protesters were broadcast from an instant army of citizen reporters, who sent their files to outside news organizations over the Internet. In Myanmar's heavily controlled communications environment, there are only a handful of Internet service providers (ISPs), all of them either state-owned or with strong government ties, and thus easy for the regime to disconnect.
Exile groups and much of the media pointed to the three-day period between the beginning of the crackdown in late September 2007 and the shutdown of the Internet as evidence of the junta's lack of technical expertise. Ball, however, contends that the opposite is true.
The generals were willing to endure some international criticism in order to monitor who was communicating with whom before shutting the system down altogether. This information would likely have fueled their post-demonstration manhunts, where thousands were put behind bars, he says.
Myanmar's original ISP is the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, which was later joined by Bagan Cybertech, a private communications company established by the son of former intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. Following his arrest, the company was partially taken over by the government and renamed BaganNet/Myanmar Teleport.
A third ISP was reportedly set up by the government-supported mass organization the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) in 2007 and is known as Information Technology Central Services. In July 2008, a fourth ISP was launched called Hanthawaddy National Gateway.
Established with technical assistance from China's Alcatel Shanghai Bell, the service is currently only available to military officers, but is expected to eventually expand throughout the country. Alcatel Shanghai Bell is represented locally by Myanmar tycoon Tay Za, a close associate to the country's leader Senior General Than Shwe and other senior officers.
Speculation as to the extent of the regime's cyber-warfare capabilities comes during a fast expansion of Internet access across the country. In addition to two new ISP providers, the generals are pushing local and foreign investment in its Yadanabon Cyber City project, located east of Mandalay.
Over one-fifth of the 4,500 hectare city is slated for computer hardware and software factories and is expected to have modern Internet services available through ADSL, CATV, Triple Play and Wi Max. In July, 12 local and foreign companies, including CBOSS of Russia, agreed to invest US$22 million in the development of the city.
Although ostensibly a civilian initiative, much of the technology to be developed, built and used there would have dual use capabilities, experts say.
Brian McCartan is a Chiang Mai-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Gorbachev to form new Russian party
By Conor Sweeney
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will join forces with Russian tycoon Alexander Lebedev to launch a new political party independent of the Kremlin, the billionaire businessman said on Tuesday.
Gorbachev, 77, won the 1990 Nobel peace prize for allowing the peaceful revolutions the previous year that brought democracy to Eastern Europe after decades of Soviet control.
Though hugely admired in the West, he is deeply unpopular at home for presiding over the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union that led to economic and political chaos. When he last ran for president, in 1996, he won just half a percent of the vote.
Gorbachev initiated plans for the new party, said Lebedev on his website http://alex-lebedev.livejournal.com/141495.html
"He gave our people freedom but we just can't learn how to use it," wrote Lebedev, who said the provisional name of the new party is the 'Independent Democratic Party'.
The party will press for legal and economic reform and promote the growth of independent media, said Lebedev, who does not plan to bankroll the party himself but said it should be financed only from "non-state sources."
He said the party favored "less state capitalism," the development of independent media, reform of the justice system and a stronger role for parliament, adding that it would take part in elections.
However, Mikhail Kuznetsov, the deputy chairman of Gorbachev's present political organization, the Union of Social Democrats, said winning seats was not the objective.
"Mikhail Sergeyevich (Gorbachev) is not striving to take seats in parliament, he is going to establish an independent democratic party and its task will be to let young people find fulfillment in new politics," Kuznetsov said.
Gorbachev declined to comment when contacted by Reuters.
He has in the past criticized many of the electoral practices of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's United Russia party, but has stopped short of attacking Putin himself.
Gorbachev also backed Russia's role in last month's war with Georgia, which was widely condemned in the West. Putin, who was president until this year, has been accused in the West and by Russian liberals of stifling free expression and the development of multi-party democracy.
"There will be no extremists," Lebedev said of the new party's membership, suggesting that economists and members of the failing right-wing SPS party would be welcome to join.
Lebedev's National Reserve Corp. controls over 30 percent of Russian flag carrier Aeroflot, in which the Russian state holds a majority. He and Gorbachev both have stakes in the independent newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, where murdered journalist and Kremlin critic Anna Politkovskaya worked.
(Additional reporting by Aydar Buribaev, editing by Mark Trevelyan)
Myanmar FM urges lifting 'counter-productive' sanctions
Mon Sep 29, 4:37 PM ET
UNITED NATIONS (AFP) - Myanmar's foreign minister Foreign Minister Nyan Win on Monday called for the lifting of what he called "unwarranted" and "counter-productive" Western sanctions against his country.
"These sanctions are unwarranted," he told the UN General Assembly, referring to "unilateral" sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States.
The sanctions were imposed on Myanmar's military regime for its refusal to release political prisoners, including democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, end repression of minority groups and start genuine national reconciliation.
"They are not only unfair but immoral. They are counter-productive and deprive the countries of their right to development," Nyan Win said.
He also pointed out that Myanmar has "abundant land and natural resources to be able to make a meaningful contribution to energy and food security of our country and beyond."
"In order for us to fulfill our potential we need unfettered access to markets. We need modern technology. We need investment," the Myanmar minister added. "The sooner the unjust sanctions are revoked and the barriers removed, the sooner will the country be in a position to become the rice bowl of the region and a reliable source of energy."
Last July, US President George W. Bush renewed a ban on imports from Myanmar and also signed a new law that aims to keep Myanmar's gems from entering US markets via third-party countries.
In parallel, the US Treasury Department slapped financial sanctions on 10 companies owned or controlled by the Myanmar government or government officials, including companies involved in the gem trade.
The European Union also tightened its own sanctions against Myanmar in May, including an embargo on the import of timber, gems and metals from Myanmar.
The 27-nation bloc also extended the list of Myanmar leaders and their relatives subject to a travel ban and assets freeze.
Top Barclays exec murdered while helping homeless man
LONDON (AFP) - A top Barclays executive was beaten to death by a group of youths in Norwich as he tried to stop them attacking a homeless man, Norfolk police said on Tuesday.
Frank McGarahan, 45, was standing at a taxi rank in central Norwich in the early hours of Sunday morning when the incident occurred.
Detective superintendent Chris Hobley who is leading the murder inquiry, said McGarahan had seen a group of four youths assaulting a homeless Lithuanian man who was walking a dog with his girlfriend.
There was an "exchange of words" and moments later, the youths attacked McGarahan who was knocked unconscious, Hobley said.
His brother and a cousin, who were with him at the time, also got dragged into the brawl.
McGarahan was rushed to Norwich University Hospital with a head injury, then transferred to Addenbrooke's hospital in Cambridge, but he never regained consciousness and died later in the day.
The father-of-two who came from Much Hadham near Bishops Stortford in Hertfordshire, had spent a "quiet night" enjoying a meal with his family, police said.
McGarahan's cousin was also injured in the brawl, and a bouncer from a local nightclub who came to their aid also suffered a fractured jaw. The homeless man also received medical attention but his injuries were not said to be serious.
Hobley said the family were "very distressed" at the brutal murder of McGarahan, who was chief operating officer at Barclays Wealth which employs 7,700 staff in 20 countries.
Speaking to reporters outside the family home in Much Hadham, Tony McGarahan, one of the banker's brothers, said it was a "mindless malicious murder" and that the family would "never truly recover" from their loss.
"This tragedy, a vicious wicked murder, ruins the life and lives of so many people who must eventually pick up the pieces and carry on. And we will try to do that but without Frank in our family and in our lives," he said.
"We will never understand how or why anyone could murder such a decent, caring and loving man," he said.
"Frank has paid the ultimate price of life for being a good citizen."
Nobel laureates urge pressure on Sudan, Myanmar
By Claudia Parsons
Mon Sep 29, 7:21 PM ET
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - African Union leaders are more interested in protecting Sudan's president than its people and Southeast Asian leaders do the same when it comes to Myanmar, a group of women Nobel Prize winners said on Monday.
"All those clubs, the African Union, ASEAN, or the U.N. Human Rights Council club, recognize their job as protecting the state rather than protecting the human rights of people from states that violate them," said Jody Williams, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for campaigning against land mines.
She said ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, should put more pressure on Myanmar over human rights and democracy rather than buying timber and gems that give the military junta money to support itself.
She criticized the African Union for siding with Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir over a request by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to charge Bashir with genocide in Darfur. Bashir and AU leaders have said the move would damage prospects for peace in the region.
"We need to put intense pressure on these institutions that are supposed to be having a role in protecting people," Williams told a news conference at the United Nations, reporting on a fact-finding trip to south Sudan, Chad, the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Thai border with Myanmar.
The trip was organized by the Nobel Women's Initiative, which was founded in 2006 by six women Nobel Peace Prize winners, including Wangari Maathai, a Kenyan environmentalist who won the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize.
Williams said the reason for visiting refugees from both Myanmar and Sudan was to show the linkages between the two situations -- especially the role of China in buying oil and providing weapons that helped support the governments.
Actress Mia Farrow, a vocal campaigner on Darfur who was part of the delegation on the trip, said AU officials had been "quite agitated" when she and the others raised the subject of the ICC indictment on Bashir when they met in Addis Ababa.
She said women she met in refugee camps in Chad who had fled Darfur were unanimous in supporting the indictment requested by ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.
"Babies are being born, babies are being named Moreno Ocampo," she told the news conference.
(Editing by Cynthia Osterman)
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