ပထမဆုံး ဒီပဲြ အေႀကာင္းနဲနဲေျပာခ်င္ပါတယ္။ ဆိုမွာက ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္၊ အယ္လ္ဆိုင္းဇီ(ကခ်င္တိုင္းရင္းသူေလး)၊ နဲ ့
ဆုန္သင္းပါရ္ (ခ်င္းတိုင္းရင္းသူေလး)၊ စီစဥ္သူေတြကဂ်ပန္က စတာရာတီးဝိုင္းအဖဲြ ့သားေတြ ျမန္မာဂ်ပန္ မိသားစုမ်ား
အသိုင္းအဝိုင္းဆိုတဲ့ အစုအဖဲြ ့ေလးနဲ ့ဂ်ပန္ကျမန္မာနိုင္ငံသားတခ်ိဳ ့ျဖစ္တယ္လို ့သိရပါတယ္။
ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္က မုန္တိုင္းသင့္ ဖ်ာပုံျမိဳ ့ မဂၤလာေသာင္တန္းရြာက ကေလးမ်ားအတြက္တဲ့၊
က်ြန္ေတာ္ကရိုးရိုးေလးစဥ္းစားလိုက္တယ္။ ဂ်ပန္ေရာက္ျမန္မာမိသားစုေတြက ျမန္မာျပည္ကနာဂစ္ေဘးသင့္ ကေလးေတြ
ကို အကူအညီေပးဖို ့ရန္ပုံေငြရွာတယ္၊ အဆိုေတာ္ေတြကလာျပီးကူညီသီဆိုတယ္။ရိုးရိုးေလးပါ။
ရိုးရိုးေလးထဲမွာရႈတ္လာတာကေတာ့ အသံေတြႀကားေနရတယ္ဘာသံေတြလဲ(ကိုေက်ာ္ဟိန္းသီခ်င္းစာသားေလးေနာ္)
(၁)ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြြဋ္ဟာေတဇ(ကိုေတဇ) နဲ ့သူငယ္ခ်င္းျဖစ္ေႀကာင္း
(၂)ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ဟာ ကိုေတဇနဲ ့ေပါင္းျပီးစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ေနေႀကာင္း
(၃)ကိုေတဇ ဂ်ပန္ကိုေရာက္ေနေႀကာင္း
ဒီ ေႀကာင္းသုံးေႀကာင္းေႀကာင့္ဆႏၵျပႀကမယ္ဆိုျပီး တခ်ိဳ ့နိုင္ငံေရးလုပ္ေနသူေတြကေဆာ္ႀသေနတာေတြႀကားေနရပါတယ္။
ဒီအသံကိုစႀကားရတာက က်ြန္ေတာ့္မိတ္ေဆြ တိုက်ိဳစတား စားေသာက္ဆိုင္ပိုင္ရွင္ ကိုေအာင္ျမင့္က လာျပီးအားေပးပါဦးလို ့
ဖုန္းဆက္လို ့ဒီပဲြအေႀကာင္းသိရတာပါ။က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့သမဂၢအစည္းအေဝးနဲ ့ရက္ေရာ အခ်ိန္ေရာတိုက္ေနလို ့အားေပးခ်င္ေပမဲ့
မလာနိုင္တဲ့အေႀကာင္းျပန္ေျပာလိုက္ပါတယ္။ဂ်ပန္ကနိုင္ငံေရးလုပ္ေနသူေတြအားလုံးထမင္းစားဖို ့ နိုင္ငံေရးလုပ္ဖို ့ေငြရေအာင္
သီးသန္ ့အလုပ္ေတြလုပ္ႀကရတာဆိုေတာ့ ကိုေအာင္ျမင့္ဖုန္းဆက္ခ်ိန္မွာ က်ြန္ေတာ္ကအလုပ္ထဲမွာေလ ဒီပဲြအေႀကာင္းအလုပ္ထဲ
ကသူငယ္ခ်င္းလုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္ေတြေျပာႀကေတာ့ ေစာေစာက ေႀကာင္းသုံးေႀကာင္းကိုႀကားရေတာ့တာပါဘဲ။အလုပ္
ထဲမွာလဲနိုင္ငံေရးအေႀကာင္းအျမဲေျပာေနႀကတာဆို ေတာ့က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ရဲ့အျမင္ေတြဖလွယ္ႀကျပီးက်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ကေတာ့ဆႏၵမျပ
သင့္ဘူးလို ့အားလုံးသေဘာတူညီခဲ့ႀကတယ္ေလ။
ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ဟာ တီတီစီေက်ာင္းထြက္က်ြန္ေတာ့္အကိုနဲ ့ေက်ာင္းေနဖက္ဆိုေတာ့ ကိုေတဇဟာလည္းတီတီစီ
ထြက္မ်ားျဖစ္ေနမလားဘဲ က်ြန္ေတာ့္အကိုအသက္က ၄၆ ဆိုေတာ့ ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္လဲဒီေလာက္ပဲရိွဦးမယ္ထင္ပါတယ္။
က်ြန္ေတာ္လဲတီတီစီထြက္ပါဘဲ။တီတီစီ ေက်ာင္းကေက်ာင္းသားေတြကို အႀကမ္းအားျဖင့္သုံးမ်ိဳးခဲြလို ့ရပါတယ္။အာဏာပိုင္
အဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြက အေကာင္ႀကီးေတြရဲ့သားသမီးေတြ၊ ပညာေရးဌာနနဲ ့အရပ္ဖက္ဌာနေတြကလူႀကီးသားသမီးေတြ၊
နဲ ့ ေငြေႀကးခ်မ္းသာတဲ ့လုပ္ငန္းရွင္ႀကီးေတြရဲ့ သားသမီးေတြ ဒီလိုကေလးေတြဘဲမ်ားပါတယ္။ က်ြန္ေတာ္ကေတာ့
ေရွ့ေနသားပါ။ဒီေက်ာင္းထြက္ျဖစ္တဲ့ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္မွာကိုေတဇဆိုတဲ့ငယ္သူငယ္ခ်င္းတေယာက္ရိွမယ္ဆိုရင္ထူးဆန္း
တယ္လို ့မဆိုနိုင္ပါဘူး။က်ြန္ေတာ့္မွာလည္းအဲ့ဒီတုံးကသူငယ္ခ်င္းေတြထဲမွာဒီအက္ေအကို ရိုးနံပါတ္ ၁၊ ၂၊ ၃၊ နဲ ့ဝင္သြားတဲ့
သူငယ္ခ်င္း ၃ေယာက္ရိွခဲ့ပါတယ္ ၁ က ပညာေရးဝန္ႀကီးဌာနကညြန္ႀကားမွူးရဲ့သား၊ ၂ က မဆလ စြမ္းအင္ဝန္ႀကီး
ဦစိန္ထြန္းရဲ့သား ၃ က တနသာၤရီတိုင္းေရတပ္တိုင္းမႈူးရဲ့သားပါ။ ေနာက္ထပ္ထပ္ေရးရင္အမ်ားႀကီးေပါ့။
ဒီသူငယ္ခ်င္းေတြနဲ ့ေနာင္တခ်ိန္ျပန္ေတြ ့ႀကရင္ ဘယ္လိုပုံစံမ်ိဳးနဲ ့ေတြ ့ျဖစ္ႀကမလဲမသိဘူး။ က်ြန္ေတာ့္အခုအခ်ဳပ္အေနနဲ ့
ေျပာခ်င္တာငယ္ငယ္တုံးကသူငယ္ခ်င္းေတြျဖစ္ခဲ့တာအျပစ္မဟုတ္ပါဘူး ႀကီးလာေတာ့ကိုယ္သန္တဲ့လိုင္း ကိုယ္လိုက္ႀကတာဘဲ။
ေစာေစာက ကိုေတဇဆိုျပီး ကိုတပ္ေခၚတာက ကိုယ့္ထက္အသက္ႀကီးတဲ့လူဆိုျပီးယဥ္ေက်းမႈအရသုံးတာပါ သူ ့ကိုက်ြန္ေတာ္
မသိပါဘူး။ စစ္တပ္အာေဘာ္ဗမာသတင္းစာေတြမွာ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ျမကို ဗိုလ္ျမေခၚလိုက္ ငျမေခၚလိုက္ ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ျမေခၚလိုက္ ဖထီး
ေခၚလိုက္ လိုရင္တမ်ိဳး မလိုရင္တမ်ိဳးေခၚေလ့ရိွတာကို လူတိုင္းသိမယ္ထင္ပါတယ္။ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ဒီမိုကေရစီသမားေတြ က
အမွန္ဘက္ကရပ္တည္မယ္ဆိုတဲ့စိတ္ဓါတ္နဲ ့လႈပ္ရွားေနႀကတာပါ။ သူတို ့လို လိုတမ်ိဳးမလိုတမ်ိဳးက်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့လုပ္ရင္ က်ြန္
ေတာ္တို ့လဲ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့တိုက္ေနတဲ့ စစ္အာဏာရွင္ေတြနဲ ့တတန္းတစားထဲျဖစ္သြားမွာပါ ဒါကို အျမဲသတိရိွဖို ့လိုပါတယ္။
ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ကကိုေတဇနဲ ့စီးပြားေရးေပါင္းျပီးလုပ္ေနတယ္ဆိုေတာ့ ျမန္မာျပည္တြင္းကစီးေရးလုပ္ငန္းလုပ္ေနသူေတြ
ဟာ နအဖ နဲ ့ကင္းလို ့မရဘူးဆိုတာလူတိုင္းသိႀကပါတယ္။ ဒါဆိုရင္ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ဟာ နအဖနဲ ့ေပါင္းျပီးကိုယ္က်ိဳးရွာေနသလား
ဆိုတဲ့ေမးခြန္းနဲ ့ သူစီးပြားရွာလို ့ရတဲ့ အက်ိဳးအျမတ္ေတြကိုဘာလုပ္ေနသလဲဆိုတဲ့ေမးခြန္းေမးျပီး သူ ့ဘယ္သူလဲ ဘာလဲဆိုတာကို
ဆုံးျဖတ္ႀကရမွာေပါ့။ ဂ်ပန္က သတင္းစုံသိတဲ့မိတ္ေဆြေတြဆီတယ္လီဖုန္းနဲ ့ေရာ လူေတြ ့ျပီးေတာ့ေရာေမးႀကည့္တယ္ ခုနကေမးခြန္း
နွစ္ခုကိုေလ ဘယ္သူမွ ဘာမွမသိႀကဘူး။ တခုေတာ့အစထြက္လာတယ္ နယ္စပ္ကလွမ္းေျပာတာတဲ့ မင္းတို ့ေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ကို
ဆႏၵမျပဘူးလားဆိုျပီး၊နယ္စပ္ကလူေတြကေတာ့အကုန္သိတယ္လို ့ေျပာပါတယ္။ ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ကိစၥက အခုနယ္စပ္မွာလမ္း
ဆုံးေနတယ္။နယ္စပ္ကကိစၥကို ေအာက္မွေနာက္ထပ္နဲနဲထပ္ေရးပါဦးမယ္ အခုကိစၥနဲ ့တိုက္ရိုက္မဆိုင္လို ့ပါ။
ျပည္တြင္းစီးပြားေရးသမားေတြထဲမွာတဖက္မွာ နအဖနဲ ့ေပါင္းျပီးစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ေနျပီး တဖက္မွာ တိတ္တိတ္ပုံး အတိုက္
အခံပါတီေတြ အထူးသျဖင့္ ျပည္တြင္းအန္အယ္ဒီပါတီကို ဘက္ေပါင္းစုံကေထာက္ပ့ံေနတဲ့သူေတြတပုံတပင္ႀကီးရိွပါတယ္။
တာေတြကိုျပည္တြင္းမွာထဲထဲဝင္ဝင္လုပ္ျပီးမွျပည္ပေရာက္လာတဲ့လူတိုင္းသိပါတယ္။ ဒီေထာက္ပံ့ေရးလမ္းေႀကာင္းမရိွခဲ့ရင္
ျပည္တြင္းအန္အယ္ဒီေရာဘယ္အတိုက္အခံမွ မရပ္တည္နိုင္ပါဘူး။
ဒီေနရာမွာကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ကို အတိုက္အခံေတြကိုတိတ္တိတ္ပုံးေထာက္ခံေနသူလို ့ေျပာေနတာမဟုတ္ပါဘူး ျပည္တြင္းအေႀကာင္း
တေစ့တေစာင္းေျပာတာပါ အခုလို မရွင္းရင္ ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္အျပန္မွာေလဆိပ္ေရာက္တာနဲ ့ဆဲြစိခံေနရဦးမယ္။ဂ်ပန္လိုစစ္အာဏာ
ရွင္စနစ္ကိုတက္တက္ႀကြႀကြဆန္ ့က်င္ေနတဲ့နိုင္ငံကိုလာျပီးသီခ်င္းဆိုေပးေနတဲ့အဆိုေတာ္ေတြကို က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ကေက်းဇူးေတာင္
တင္ရဦးမွာပါ။က်ြန္ေတာ္ေျပာခ်င္တာက ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ ဟာ ကိုေတဇနဲ ့ေပါင္းျပီးစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ေနတယ္ဆိုတာေတာင္ နယ္စပ္
ကေျပာတာပါလို ့ေျပာေနတာေလ၊ ဒါဆိုရင္ဂ်ပန္ကလူေတြ ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္နဲ ့ ကိုေတဇနဲ ့ဘယ္လိုပတ္သက္သလဲဆိုတာကို
ကိုယ္တိုင္ဘာမွမသိဘူးလို ့ေကာက္ခ်က္ဆဲြရေတာ့မွာပါ။သိတဲ့သူေတြရိွရင္ ေျပာႀကပါ အေထာက္အထားခိုင္ခိုင္လုံလုံနဲ ့ေပါ့ေနာ္။
ဒီေနရာမွာ ျဖတ္ေျပာခ်င္တာတခုရိွပါတယ္ က်ြန္ေတာ္ဒီ peaceful burma blog လုပ္ျဖစ္သြားတဲ့အေႀကာင္းေလးပါ။ က်ြန္ေတာ္က
fwubc ျမန္မာနိုင္ငံသားအလုပ္သမားသမဂၢအဖဲြ ့ခ်ဳပ္ဂ်ပန္နိုင္ငံံရဲ့အလုပ္အမႈေဆာင္တစ္ဦးပါ။ဂ်ပန္မွာ နအဖ ဖဲြ ့စည္းပုံကို
ကန္ ့ကြက္ဖို ့campaign ေတြလုပ္ႀကေတာ့ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့သမဂၢကိုဘက္ေပါင္းစုံကပန္ ့ပိုးေနတဲ့ JAM လို ့အတိုေကာက္ေခၚတဲ့
ဂ်ပန္စက္ရုံနဲ ့သံမဏိလုပ္ငန္းအလုပ္သမားမ်ားသမဂၢ က ဂ်ပန္အရာရိွေတြနဲ ့ေဆြးေႏြးတဲ့အခါမွာ နအဖ ဖဲြ ့စည္းပုံကို
က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့နဲ ့အတူဝိုင္းဝန္းကန္ ့ကြက္ႀကဖို ့ ေဆာ္ေအာ္တဲ့အခါမွာ အဲ့ဒီအရာရိွေတြထဲက တေယာက္ကဘာေျပာလဲဆိုေတာ့
ဒီဖဲြ ့စည္းပုံ မေကာင္းေႀကာင္းအခ်က္အလက္နဲ ့ေျပာျပ ပါ ေဒတာေပးပါ ဒီဖဲြ ့စည္းပုံကဘာေတြမေကာင္းတာလဲဆိုတာကိုသိမွ
တို ့တေတြက အတူပူးေပါင္းျပီးကန္ ့ကြက္နိုင္မွာေပါ့ ဘာမွမသိဘဲနဲ ့ဘယ္လိုလုပ္ျပီးကန္ ့ကြက္မွာလဲ လို ေျပာခဲ့လို ့ရွင္းျပခဲ့
ရပါတယ္။အဲ့ဒီအခ်ိန္ကစျပီးဒီဘေလာက္ကိုစလုပ္ျဖစ္သြားတာပါ။ဂ်ပန္က ဂ်ပန္လူမ်ိဳးေတြႀကားထဲမွာျမန္မာျပည္အေႀကာင္း
အျဖစ္မွန္ေတြသိရေအာင္ အင္ေဖာ္ေမးရွင္းေပးရေအာင္လုပ္ခဲ့တာပါ။
ဘေလာက္အေႀကာင္းေျပာရတာက ကိုယ္ေျပာခ်င္တာကို ကိုယ္ကိုယ္တိုင္ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာသိျပီးတျခားသူေတြကိုလဲအေထာက္
အထားနဲ ့တင္ျပဖို ့လို တယ္ဆိုတာကိုဆိုလိုခ်င္တာပါ။ သူမ်ားေျပာသံႀကားနဲ ့ကိုယ္ကိုယ္တိုင္ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာမသိဘဲနဲ ့ရမ္းမစြတ္
စဲြသင့္ဘူးလို ့ေျပာခ်င္တာပါ။ သိတယ္ရိွတယ္ဆို ရင္ ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာတင္ျပေစခ်င္ပါတယ္။
ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္အေႀကာင္းေသေသခ်ာခ်ာမသိဘဲနဲ ့ ကိုေတဇနဲ ့စီးပြားေရးအတူလုပ္ေနတယ္
ဆိုျပီးနယ္စပ္ကလွမ္းေျပာတာတခုထဲနဲ ့ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ကို နအဖလူလို ့က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့သတ္မွတ္လို ့မရပါဘူး။အခုလို တကူးတက
ေရးေနရတာ က ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ ဘက္ကေရွ ့ေနလိုက္ဖို ့အတြက္မဟုတ္ပါဘူး ၊ ေနာက္ထပ္ေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ေပါင္းေျမာက္ျမားစြာကို
အလားတူစဲြခ်က္ေတြထုတ္ျပီး နအဖ ဘက္ တကယ္ေရာက္သြားေအာင္ တြန္းပို ့မိတာမ်ိဳး ျဖစ္လာနိုင္စရာအလားအလာေတြ ရိွ
ေနတယ္ဆို တာကိုစဥ္းစားမိ လို ့ပါ။
အေပၚကအခ်က္နွစ္ခ်က္နဲ ့ဘဲ ကိုေတဇဂ်ပန္ကိုတကယ္ေရာက္ေနတယ္ဆိုရင္ေတာင္မွ ဒါဟာ သိပ္အေရးမပါေတာ့ဘူးလို ့
ထင္ပါတယ္။ဒါေပမဲ့ ကိုေတဇအေႀကာင္းမဟုတ္ပဲနဲ ့ကိုေတဇလို သနားစရာ ျမန္မာျပည္တြင္းကစီးပြားေရးလုပ္ငန္းရွင္ႀကီးတေယာက္
အေႀကာင္းကိုက်ြန္ေတာ့္သူငယ္ခ်င္းက ေျပာျပတာကို ျပန္ျပီးနဲနဲေလာက္ေဖာက္သယ္ခ်ခ်င္ပါတယ္။သူငယ္ခ်င္းေျပာျပတာက
သူသိတဲ့လုပ္ငန္းရွင္ႀကီးတဦးဟာပထမ သူ ့ဘာသာကိုယ္ပိုင္လုပ္ငန္းတခုလုပ္ျပီးေအာင္ျမင္တဲ့လုပ္ငန္းရွင္တစ္ဦးျဖစ္လာပါတယ္တဲ့
သူ ့ရဲ့ႀကိဳးစားမႈကိုသတိထားမိတဲ့ နအဖနဲ ့ခ်ိတ္ဆက္ထားတဲ့ေငြရွင္ႀကီးေတြကသူကို ေတာ္ေကာက္ျပီးသူ ့နာမယ္ခံခိုင္းျပီး
စီးပြားေရးအမ်ိဳးမ်ိဳးလုပ္ခိုင္းျပီးေကာင္းေကာင္းလဲပန္ ့ပိုးေပးတယ္ ဆိုပါတယ္။ အခုဆိုရင္က်ိက်ိတက္ေအာင္ခ်မ္းသာေပမဲ ့
အနဖ စက္ဝိုင္းထဲကထြက္လို ့မရေတာ့ပါဘူးတဲ့ သူတို ့အေႀကာင္းေတြေဖာ္မွာစိုး လို ့ ေငြထုတ္ပိုက္ျပီးတိုင္းျပည္အျပင္ဖက္ထြက္
ေျပးမွာစိုးလို ့မိသားစုတစုလုံးနိုင္ငံျခားကိုထြက္ခြင့္မေပးပါဘူးတဲ့ ယုတ္စြအစဆုံးတရုတ္ျပည္ထဲကုန္းလမ္းကသြားတာေတာင္
ေယာက္က်ားသြားရင္ မိန္းမနဲ ့ကေလးေတြကိုရန္ကုန္မွာခ်န္ထားခဲ့ရတယ္လို ့ဆိုပါတယ္ ။ ေငြပုံေပၚထိုင္ေနျပီးအျမဲတန္းသူတို ့ရဲ့
မ်က္ႏွာေတြဟာတခုခုကိုစိုးရိမ္တဲ့မ်က္နွွာေတြအျမဲပဲထြက္ေနတယ္လို ့ဆိုပါတယ္။ ကိုေတဇေရာအခု ဒီလို မ်ိဳးျဖစ္ေနျပီလား
ဘယ္ေတာ့ျဖစ္လာမွာလဲဆို တာကို အပူရုပ္ဟန္လုပ္ေနေနရတာလား ခင္ဗ်ားတို ့စဥ္းစားႀကည့္ႀကေပါ့ဗ်ာ။လူနာမယ္ေတြကို
ထည့္မေရးတာကိုနားလည္ႀကမယ္လို ့ထင္ပါတယ္။
နယ္စပ္ကသတင္းတပုဒ္
အေပၚမွာနယ္စပ္အေႀကာင္းေရးမယ္လို ့က်ြန္ေတာ္ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္။ အဲ့ဒါက က်ြန္ေတာ့္တို ့ဂ်ပန္ကေန ထူးထူးခ်ြန္ခ်ြန္
မဲေဆာက္မွာသြားျပီးနယ္စပ္ကကေလးေတြကို ကြန္ပ်ဴတာ၊ အဂၤလိပ္စာနဲ ့တျခားဘာသာရပ္ေတြကိုေက်ာင္းဖြင့္ျပီးသြားသင္ေပး
ေနတဲ့အဖဲြ ့တခုရိွပါတယ္ အဖဲြ ့နာမယ္က Human Resource Developement Programme(HRDP) လို ့ေခၚပါတယ္။
အဲ့ဒီအဖဲြ ့ရဲ့ မဲေဆာက္ေက်ာင္းတာဝန္ခံဒါရိုက္တာ ရဲ့နာမယ္က ကိုစည္သူလို ့ေခၚပါတယ္။ ကိုစည္သူကို က်ြန္ေတာ္စသိခဲ့တာက
အခုမိုးေသာက္ႀကယ္စာႀကည့္တိုက္အမႈေဆာင္ နဲ ့ဖန္မီးအိမ္ေဖာင္ေဒးရွင္းဂ်ပန္ရဲ့အတြင္းေရးမႉးျဖစ္တဲ့ကိုေမာင္ေမာင္ေအးအိမ္မွာပါ။
၂၀၀၂-၂၀၀၃ ခုနွစ္ေလာက္ကပါ။စည္သူဆိုရင္ ဂ်ပန္ကဝါရင့္ဗမာနိုင္ငံေရးသမားတိုင္းသိပါတယ္။ အဲ့ဒီကိုေမာင္ေမာင္ေအးအိမ္မွာဘဲ
က်ြန္ေတာ့္တို ့ရဲ့မိတ္ေဆြ လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္ ကိုမ်ိဳးသနု္ ့နဲ ့ေတြခဲ့တာပါ ။ အဲ့ဒီအိမ္မွာဘဲ 8888 Documentation net work ဆိုတဲ့
ဝက္ဆိုက္ကိုစခဲ့ႀကတာပါ ကိုမ်ိဳးသန္ ့ကေခါင္းေဆာင္က်ြန္ေတာ္နဲ ့ ကိုစည္သူက ဝိုင္းကူေပး အႀကံဥာဏ္ေပးခဲ့ႀကတာပါ။မွတ္မွတ္ရရ
ေျပာရရင္ အဲ့ဒီဝက္ဆိုက္ေပၚက ေဒါမာန္ဟုန္ ပီဒီအက္္ဖ္ ဖိုင္ဟာကိုစည္သူကိုယ္တိုင္ စကင္ဖတ္ျပီးတင္ခဲ့တာပါ
ကိုစည္သူ ဟာက်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ဂ်ပန္က အန္အယ္ဒီအယ္ေလဂ်ပန္ရဲ့အဖဲြ ့
ဝင္ေဟာင္းတေယာက္ပါ ဂ်ပန္ကတျခားအင္အားႀကီးနိုင္ငံေရးအဖဲြ ့အစည္းတခုျဖစ္တဲ့ ဘီဒီေအ အဖဲြ့ ကိုစျပီးဖဲြ ့တဲ့အခ်ိန္မွာ
ကိုေမာင္ေမာင္ေအးေရာ ကိုစည္သူေရာ ကိုမ်ိဳးသန္ ့ ပါ founding member ေတြပါ ။ founding member ၁၂ ေယာက္ပါ။
၂၀၀၃ ဒီပဲယင္းအေရးအခင္းအျပီးမွာဒီအဖဲြ ့ကိုစဖဲြ ့ခဲ့တယ္လို ့ထင္ပါတယ္။အဲ့ဒီတုံးကက်ြန္ေတာ္ကဖဲြ ့ဖဲြ ့ျခင္းစဝင္တဲ့အဖဲြဝင္ျဖစ္ခဲ့
ပါတယ္ founding member ေတြအတြက္ နံပါတ္စဥ္ကိုအရင္ေပးတဲ့အတြက္ က်ြန္ေတာ့္ရဲ့အဖဲြဝင္နံပါတ္က ၁၃ ျဖစ္သြားပါတယ္။
ေနာက္ပိုင္း fwubc အဖဲြ ့ ဥကၠဌ ဦးတင္ဝင္းက က်ြန္ေတာ့္ကို ကိုေမာင္ေမာင္ေအးကေနတဆင့္ fwubc အဖဲြ ့ကိုလာေရာက္ေလ့
လာေစလိုေႀကာင္း စိတ္ဝင္စားပါက ဝိုင္းဝန္းအကူအညီေပးပါလို ့ေျပာလို ့ဦးတင္ဝင္းကိုလဲ နဂိုကထဲကေလးစားျပီးသားျဖစ္လို ့သြား
ေလ့လာျပီး ကိုယ္ကိုယ္တိုင္လဲဂ်ပန္စကားအထိုက္အေလ်ာက္တတ္ျပီးအလုပ္သမားသမဂၢမွာအမႈတိုင္တဲ့လူနဲ ့ဂ်ပန္ဘာသာျပန္တဲ့လူ
အင္အားမမ်ွျဖစ္ေနတာရယ္ အဖဲြ ့အေနနဲ ့လဲ ဂ်ပန္ေရာက္ျမန္မာအလုပ္သမားေတြရဲ့ အလုပ္သမားေရးရာျပႆနာေတြကို JAM အဖဲြ ့
အကူအညီနဲ ့တကယ္ကို ထဲထဲဝင္ဝင္ကိုင္တြယ္ေျဖရွင္းေပးေနတာကိုေတြ ့လိုက္ရလို ့ fwubc အဖဲြ ့ထဲကိုေျခစုံပစ္ျပီးဝင္ခဲ့တာအခုအထိ
ပါဘဲ။ ေနာက္ပိုင္း ဘီဒီေအ အဖဲြ ့ဟာအဖဲြ ့ဝင္အင္အားေတာင့္တင္းလာျပီးေနာက္ ကိုမ်ိဳးသန္ ့ ကိုစည္သူ ကိုေမာင္ေမာင္ေအးတို ့လဲ
ေနာက္ပိုင္းမွာကိုယ္ပိုင္ သီးျခားအစီအစဥ္နဲ ့လူခဲြလုပ္ႀကဖို ့အသီးသီးထြက္လာခဲ့ႀကတာခုဆိုရင္ မိုးေသာက္ႀကယ္၊ HRDP ၊
8888 BURMA DOCUMENTATION NET WORK ၊ ဆိုျပီးဒီမိုကေရစီအေရးလုပ္ေနတဲ့ေတာင့္တင္းခိုင္မာတဲ့အဖဲြ ့ေတြေပၚထြက္လာ
တာပါဘံဲ။ဒါက ကိုစည္သူဘယ္သူလဲ ကိုစည္သူနဲ ့က်ြန္ေတာ္ဘယ္လိုပတ္သက္သလဲဆိုတာသိေအာင္ေရးရတာပါ ။
ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြ ့နယ္စပ္မွာေက်ာင္းသြားဖြင့္ျပီး ျပီးခဲ့တဲ့ေလးငါးေျခာက္လေလာက္မွာနယ္စပ္ကေနစည္သူဆိုတာနအဖလူ
ဆိုျပီးစြတ္စဲြသံေတြဆူဆူညံညံနဲ ့နက္ေပၚမွာတက္လာပါတယ္။ ေဒါက္တာလြန္းေဆြဘေလာက္ကစီေဘာက္မွာအဆိုးဆုံးလို ့ ႀကားမိ
ပါတယ္။က်ြန္ေတာ္ကကိုစည္သူအေႀကာင္းေကာင္းေကာင္းသိေနေတာ့ သိပ္ျပီးဂရုမစိုက္ပါဘူး ကိုယ့္လူက နအဖ လူမဟုတ္ဘူးဆိုတာ
ကို သိေနတာကိုး ၊ ဒါေပမဲ့စီေဘာက္ကိုအဆင့္ေက်ာ္လာျပီး အာဟာရစာေပအင္အားစု အာဟာရစာေစာင္ရဲ့ဦးေဆာင္အယ္ဒီတာလဲျဖစ္
က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ fwubc ရဲ့ ဒုတိယဥကၠလည္းျဖစ္တဲ့ကိုသက္လင္းကိုဖုန္းဆက္ျပီးတိုင္ေတာတာေတြ လုပ္လာပါတယ္ကိုစည္သူ
ဘယ္သူလဲဆိုတာကိုေမးတာမဟုတ္ပါဘူး။
နယ္စပ္ကလူေတြအေနနဲ ့လဲ ဒီအဖဲြ ့ဟာဂ်ပန္ကအဖဲြ ့ဆိုတာကိုသိရင္ မသင္ကာဘူးဆိုရင္ ဂ်ပန္ကလူေတြကိုေမး
ျပီးမွ ဆုံးျဖတ္သင့္တယ္လို ့ထင္ပါတယ္။ အခုေတာ့ ကိုသက္လင္းကိုလွမ္းျပီးေမးတာမဟုတ္ဘဲ တိုင္တာျဖစ္ေနတာကို ဝမ္းနဲ
စြာနဲ ့ဘဲ ႀကားခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ ကိုစည္သူနဲ ့ပတ္သက္ျပီးက်ြန္ေတာ္ဝင္ေျဖရွင္းေပးခဲ့တာ ၃ႀကိမ္္ ရိွပါတယ္။ပထမ တႀကိမ္တုံးက
ေအဘီ က ကိုသံခဲလာတုံးက စည္သူ ဆိုတာဘယ္သူလဲဆို ျပီးကိုသက္လင္းကိုေမးလို ့ ကိုသက္လင္းက လူကိုခင္ေပမဲ့
ဘာေတြလုပ္ေနသလဲဆိုတာမသိလို ့ က်ြန္ေတာ့္ကို ေမးလာလို ့ရွင္းျပခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ ေနာက္ထပ္ကိုသံခဲဆီက ဘာမွ ထပ္ေျပာ
လာတာမႀကားရပါဘူး။ အခုတခါ ကိုသက္လင္းဆီကို တိုင္တန္းလာသူဟာနယ္စပ္မွာရဲရဲေတာက္ပုဂၢိဳလ္တစ္ဦးလို ့လူတိုင္းက
ေလးစားေနတဲ့သူတစ္ဦးျဖစ္လို ့ က်ြန္ေတာ္ ဒီအတိုင္းမေနနိုင္ေတာ့ပါဘူး နယ္စပ္မွာ လက္နက္ကိုင္အဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြ မ်ားလို ့
တကယ္လို ့ပါးစပ္နဲ ့မေျဖရွင္းႀကဘဲနဲ ့လက္နက္နဲ ့ေျဖရွင္းမယ္ဆို ရင္ ကိုစည္သူလို လူတေယာက္ေရတိမ္နစ္နိုင္ပါတယ္။
ဒါနဲ ့ ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြကအဓိကေခါင္းေဆာင္တေယာက္ဟာက်ြန္ေတာ့္ရဲ့လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္လဲျဖစ္လို ့သူ ့ကိုေမးရပါတယ္
ေဒါက္တာလြန္းေဆြစီေဘာက္ထဲမွာ ေရးေနတာေတြကို က်ြန္ေတာ္ဂရုမစိုက္ေပမဲ့ အခုကိုသက္လင္းဆီကို ဖုန္းဆက္လာတဲ့သူ
ဟာ နယ္စပ္မွာလူေတြေလးစားတဲ့လူျဖစ္ေနလို ့ ဘာေတြျဖစ္ေနတာလဲ တခုခုေတာ့လဲြေနျပီလို ့ ေျပာဆိုေမးျမန္းခဲ့တဲ့အခါ မလို
အပ္ဖဲ နယ္စပ္ကနိုင္ငံေရးအင္အားစုေတြက အထင္လဲြမယ္ဆိုရင္လဲြေလာက္တယ္ဆိုတဲ့အခ်က္ေတြကိုေတြ ့ခဲ့ရပါတယ္။
က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့နိုင္ငံေရးသမားေတြေရွ့ေလာႀကီးတဲ့ကိစၥကေလးေတြပါ ပညာရိွသတိျဖစ္ခဲဆိုသလို ဒါမ်ိဳးအလားတူ
ထပ္မျဖစ္ရေအာင္ သင္ခန္းစာယူသင့္တယ္လို ့ထင္ပါတယ္။
-ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြ ့နယ္စပ္ကိုသြားျပီးေက်ာင္းသြားဖြင့္တဲ့အခါ မဲေဆာက္ကအေျခတက်ရိွေနတဲ့အဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြကို
ဖိတ္ျပီးဒီေက်ာင္းရဲ့ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ နဲ ့ဘယ္သူေတြကဘယ္လို ပန္ ့ပိုးေနသလဲဆိုတာကို မရွင္းျပခဲ့ပါဘူး။
-ဒီေက်ာင္းဖြင့္ျပီးတဲ့ေနာက္မွာမဲေဆာက္ကတခ်ိဳ ့NGO အကူအညီနဲ ့ဖြင့္ထားတဲ့ေက်ာင္းတခ်ိဳ ့ကို NGO ကအကူအညီေပးတာေတြ
ျဖတ္ေတာက္ခဲ့တယ္လို ့သိရပါတယ္။ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြ ့ဟာ ဘယ္ NGO ဆီကမွ အကူအညီ မယူဘဲလုပ္ခဲ့တာဆိုေတာ့နယ္စပ္က
အဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြအေနနဲ ့ စဥ္းစားစရာျဖစ္လာတာက ဒီေကာင္ေတြဘယ္ကေငြနဲ ့ ဒီေလာက္ႀကီးတဲ့ေက်ာင္းကိုလာဖြင့္တာလဲ
ဘာျဖစ္လို ့ဗီဇာရတာလဲ ဆိုတဲ့လဲေပါင္းမ်ားစြာနဲ ့သံသရဝင္စရာျဖစ္ခဲ့ေတာ့တာပါပဲ ဒီႀကားထဲမွာေငြေရးေႀကးေရးအႀကပ္အတည္း
အမ်ိဳးမ်ိဳးႀကားထဲကေန ရုံးကန္ေနရတာဆိုေတာ့ ဝင္ေငြနဲနဲရလဲမနဲဘူးဆိုျပီးေတာ့ refugee အေနနဲ ့ အေမရိကားကိုသြားမဲ့
မဲေဆာက္က ျမန္မာနိုင္ငံေရးလႈပ္ရွားသူတစ္ဦးေထာင္ထားတဲ့မိတၱဴကူးလုပ္ငန္းကိုဝယ္ယူလိုက္တဲ့အခါမွာ သံသရေတြ ပိုျပီးႀကီးကုန္ႀကေတာ့တာပါပဲ။
(သူတို ့ရဲ့ေက်ာင္းကို မဲေဆာက္မွာရုံးခဲြဖြင့္ထားျပီး အေမရိကားမွာအေျခဆိုက္တဲ့ ျမန္မာဒီမိုကေရစီအေရးဦးေဆာင္အဖဲြ ့အစည္း
ႀကီးတစ္ခုကလည္း သူတို ့နာမယ္နဲ ့ဖြင့္ပါ ေငြေႀကးလိုအပ္တာေထာက္ပ့ံပါမယ္လို ့ကမ္းလွမ္းလာေႀကာင္းလဲသိခဲ့ရပါတယ္။
ဒါေပမဲ့ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြ ့ဝင္ေတြ အစည္းအေဝးဂ်ပန္မွာထိုင္ျပီးနယ္စပ္မွာေက်ာင္းေတြအမ်ားႀကီးလိုအပ္ေနတာေႀကာင့္
ကိုယ့္ဘာသာကိုယ္ေက်ာင္းဖြင့္ပါ မိမိတို ့ကဝိုင္းဝန္းကူညီပါမယ္လို ့စကားျပန္ႀကားခဲ့ေႀကာင္းသိခဲ့ရပါတယ္။)
အဲ့ဒါေတြကိုေမးျမန္းျပီးကိုသက္လင္းကို ျပန္ရွင္းျပခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ဒါေပမဲ့ အသံေတြတိတ္မသြားခဲ့တဲ့အျပင္ ဂ်ပန္က
ကိုစည္သူနဲ ့အရင္က လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္ေတြ ကေတာင္စည္သူနာေတာ့မယ္ဆိုတဲ့အသံေတြ သံသရ စိတ္ေတြပြားကုန္ႀကလို ့
လိုက္ျပီးရွင္းျပေတာ့ ဂ်ပန္မွာေတာ့ အသံတိတ္သြားေပမဲ့နယ္စပ္မွာေတာ့ ဆူညံေနဆဲပါပဲ။
-ဂ်ပန္ကကိုစည္သူတို ့ရဲ့အဖဲြ ့မွာလည္းဘာျဖစ္လာသလဲဆိုေတာ့ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့က ရိုးရိုးသားသား နဲ ့ နယ္စပ္ကကေလးေတြ
အတြက္တတ္နိုင္သေလာက္သြားလုပ္ေနတာ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ကို မယုံဘူးဆို ရင္ ဒီေက်ာင္းကိုပိတ္လိုက္ရုံပဲရိွတယ္လို ့ေဒါသနဲ ့တုံ ့
ျပန္လာႀကလို ့၊ က်ြန္ေတာ္က က်ြန္ေတာ့္လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္တစ္ဦးလည္းျဖစ္ နိုင္ငံေရးေဆြးေႏြးေဖာ္တစ္ဦးလဲျဖစ္တဲ့ ကိုစည္သူ
တို ့အဖဲြ ့ကလူကို နားခ်ခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ ဘယ္လိုနားခ်ခဲ့ရသလဲဆိုေတာ့ ခင္ဗ်ားတို ့ဒီေက်ာင္းကို ပိတ္လိုက္ရင္ ခင္ဗ်ားတို ့ရံႈးျပီ
ကိုယ့္နိုင္ငံအတြက္ရိုးရိုးသားသားနဲ ့ကိုယ္လုပ္နိုင္တာကိုလုပ္ေနတာ ကိုယ့္ရည္မွန္းခ်က္ေတြမဖ်က္ပါနဲ ့၊ပိတ္လိုက္ရင္ကေလးေတြဘဲနစ္နာ
မယ္ သည္းညီးခံျပီးဆက္လုပ္ပါလို ့တိုက္တြန္းခဲ့ျပီးအႀကံေပးခဲ့ရပါတယ္။ျပီးေတာ့နယ္စပ္မွာရဟန္းခံပဲြလုပ္တဲ့အခါ
ဧရာဝတီဝက္ဆိုက္နဲ ့ပူးတဲြတာဝန္ယူခဲ့တာရယ္၊ ျပီးေတာ့ ေကအင္ယူ က ကေလးတခ်ိဳ ့ေက်ာင္းအိပ္ေက်ာင္းစားလာေနသြားတာ
ေတြကို ႀကည့္္ရင္ ခင္ဗ်ားတို ့ကို ဧရာဝတီနဲ ့ ေကအင္ယူက ယုံႀကည္မႈရိွတယ္ဆိုတာကိုျပတာ ဒါေႀကာင့္ဆက္လုပ္ပါ ကိုစည္သူ
ကိုေတာ့ သြားတာလာတာဆင္ခ်င္ပါေစလို ့ေဝဖန္သတိေပးခဲ့ရပါတယ္။
ဒါေပမဲ့ကယ္တင္ရွင္ေပၚလာပါတယ္။သူကေတာ့ ေဒါက္တာနိုင္ေအာင္ရဲ့ ဇနီး ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာပါ(ေလးစားမႈအေနနဲ ့ေဒၚတပ္
လိုက္တာပါ၊တကယ္ေတာ့အသက္ျခင္းကမတိမ္းမရိမ္းပါ) ျပီးခဲ့တဲ့ ၂ လေလာက္ကလို ့ထင္ပါတယ္ ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာဂ်ပန္ကိုေရာက္လာျပီးဂ်ပန္ကနိုင္ငံေရးအဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြနဲ ့ေဆြးေႏြးပဲြ ေတြ လုပ္ပါတယ္။
တိုက္ဆိုင္သြားတာကဂ်ပန္မွာ ျမန္မာ့အေရးေဆာင္ရြက္ေနတဲ့
ဂ်ပန္လူမ်ိဳးအမ်ားစုေခါင္းေဆာင္ပါဝင္ျပီးျမန္မာေခါင္းေဆာင္ေတြလဲပါတဲ့ PFB -PEOPLE FORUM OF BURMA အဖဲြ ့ဆိုတာရိွပါတယ္
အဲ့ဒီ PFB အဖဲြ ့မွာ က်ြန္ေတာ္ကလဲအဖဲြ ့ဝင္တစ္ဦးပါ။က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့fwubc အဖဲြ ့ဥကၠဌ ဦးတင္ဝင္းက ဦးေဆာင္ေကာ္မတီဝင္တစ္
ဦးပါ။ဂ်ပန္မွာ နိုင္ငံေရးအဖဲြ ့အစည္းေတြရဲ့ အစည္းအေဝးေတြကို တနဂၤေႏြေန ့မွာလုပ္ႀကပါတယ္။ ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာနဲ ့ဂ်ပန္ကျမန္မာ့
နိုင္ငံေရးပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မႈေကာ္မတီ JAC နဲ ့ ေတြ ့ဆုံပဲြလုပ္တဲ့ေန ့မွာ PFB ရဲ့ နွစ္ပတ္လည္ညီလာခံကိုက်င္းပခဲ့ျပီးအဲ့ဒီ
ညီလာခံကို ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကိုဖိတ္ႀကားခဲ့ပါတယ္ ။အဲ့ဒီပဲြ မွာ ဦးေဆာင္ေကာ္မတီဝင္အျဖစ္ ဘီဒီေအအဖဲြ ့ဥကၠဌ ဦးသန္းေဆြ ကို
တိုးခ်ဲ ့ေရြးခ်ယ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။ဦးသန္းေဆြက ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာရဲ့ရဲရဲေတာက္ေဆြးေႏြးခ်က္ေတြကို နားေထာင္ျပီးအမ်ိဳးသမီးေတြထဲမွာ
အမ်ိဳးသားေတြနဲ ့ရင္ေပါင္တန္းျပီးထက္ထက္ျမက္ျမက္လုပ္ေနတာ ေတြ ့ရတာအလြန္ဝမ္းသာစရာ ဂုဏ္ယူစရာဘဲလို ့မွတ္ခ်က္
ခ်ခဲ့ပါတယ္။က်ြန္ေတာ္ကသူ ့မွတ္ခ်က္ကို စကားတခြန္းျဖည့္ေပးခဲ့ပါတယ္ အကိုေရေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာ(အဲ့ဒီတုံးကမခင္ဥမၼာလို ့ေျပာခဲ့တာပါ)
ေျပာေနတာေတြက ေဟာဒီပါးစပ္ႀကီးနဲ ့ေျပာေနတာမဟုတ္ဘူး နွလုံးသားထဲက လာတဲ့အသံေတြဒါ္ေႀကာင့္သူလိုငါလို ပါးစပ္ႀကီးနဲ ့
ေျပာေနတဲ့လူေတြနဲ ့ဘယ္တူပါ ့မလဲလို ့ျဖည့္ေပးခဲ့ပါတယ္။
အစည္းအေဝးတုံးက ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကစင္ေပၚက က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ကစင္ေအာက္က ပဲြျပီးေတာ့လဲ သူ ့နားမွာ လူေတြဝိုင္းဝိုင္းလည္ေနလို ့
အနားေတာင္ကပ္လို ့မရပါဘူး။ ပဲြလဲျပီးေရာေနာက္တပဲြဆက္ဖို ့လာေခၚသူေတြေနာက္ကိုလိုက္သြားရပါတယ္။ မသြားခင္ေလးမွာ
PFB ရဲ့့နွစ္ပတ္လည္အက်ဥ္းခ်ုံဳးပါတီကေလးတခုလုပ္မွာျဖစ္လို ့ တက္နိုင္ရင္တက္ေပးပါလို ့ PFB ကေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကိုဖိတ္ခဲ့ပါတယ္။
သူနဲ ့စကားေျပာခြင့္ႀကံဳခ်င္ေတာ့က်ြန္ေတာ့္ကို fwubc အဖဲြ ့ဥကၠဌ ဦးတင္ဝင္းကေရာ ဘီဒီေအ အဖဲြ ့ဥကၠဌ ဦးသန္းေဆြကပါဒီပါတီကိုလိုက္ဖို ့ေခၚလို ့က်ြန္ေတာ္လိုက္သြားခဲ့ပါတယ္။
အဲ့ဒီမွာက်ြန္ေတာ္နဲ ့ ဘီဒီေအဥကၠဌဦးသန္းေဆြ တို ့အုပ္စုကဓါတ္ေလွကားေစာင့္ေနရလို ့ေနာက္က်သြားလို ့လြတ္တဲ့ေနရာ
ဝင္ထိုင္တဲ့အခါက်ြန္ေတာ္ရယ္ ဦးသန္းေဆြရယ္ဟာ PFB ဥကၠဌ နာဂအိဆင္းေဆးနဲ ့ ဆရာဦးေရႊဘ -တာနာေဘးစံ တို ့ႀကားထဲ
ေရာက္သြားပါတယ္။ပါတီပဲြျပီးခါနီးမွာ ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာေရာက္လာပါတယ္။ေနရာလြတ္ကက်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ေရွ ့(ဝါတာနာေဘးဆင္းေဆး
ရွင္ကန္းဆင္မမီမွာစိုးလို ့ေစာေစာထျပန္သြားလို ့ေနရာလြတ္သြားတာပါ)တဲ့တဲ့ျဖစ္ေနေတာ့ က်ြန္ေတာ္လဲေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကို
က်ြန္ေတာ့္နာမယ္ေျပာ အဖဲြ ့ကို မိတ္ဆက္ျပီးကိုစည္သူတို ့ကိစၥကို ရွင္းျပလိုက္ပါတယ္။
(၁) ကိုစည္သူတို ့အဖဲြ ရဲ့ ေက်ာင္းဖြင့္တဲ့ကုန္က်စရိတ္ကို ဂ်ပန္မွာရိွတဲ့အဖဲြ ့ဝင္ေတြရဲ့လစာေငြထဲက စုေပါင္းထည့္ဝင္ျခင္းျဖစ္
ေႀကာင္း ဘယ္အဖဲြ ့အစည္းဆီကမွ ေထာက္ပ့ံေႀကးယုူေနတာမဟုတ္ေႀကာင္း။
(၂)ကိုစည္သူဟာ က်ြန္ေတာ္တို ့ရဲ့လုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္ ျဖစ္ေႀကာင္း သူ ဟာ နအဖလူလို ့သံသရျဖစ္ေနႀကတာမဟုတ္ေႀကာင္း
က်ြန္ေတာ့္အေနျဖင့္တာဝန္ယူေႀကာင္းေျပာႀကားခဲ့ပါတယ္။
ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကကိုသက္လင္းကို လွမ္းဖုန္းဆက္ျပီးတိုင္တဲ့ပုဂၢိဳလ္ရဲ့နာမယ္ကို က်ြန္ေတာ္ကေျပာလိုက္တဲ့အခါ သူဟာက်ြန္မတို ့ရဲ့
အမာခံလုပ္ေဖာ္ကိုင္ဖက္တစ္ဦးျဖစ္လို ့မဲေဆာက္ကိုျပန္ရင္ ေသေသခ်ာခ်ာရွင္းျပေပးပါမယ္လို ့ကတိေပးျပီး က်ြန္ေတာ့္ရဲ့
မဲရိွ -Name Card ေတာင္းလို ့ေပးလိုက္ပါတယ္။ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာျပန္သြားျပီးဘယ္လိုေျဖရွင္းေပးလိုက္လဲေတာ့မသိပါဘူး အခုေတာ့
အသံေတြတိတ္သြားပါျပီ၊ ေဒၚခင္ဥမၼာကို အထူးေက်းဇူးတင္ေႀကာင္းေျပာႀကားလိုပါတယ္။
အဲ့ဒီတုံးကက်ြန္ေတာ့္မ်က္ေစာင္းထိုးမွာထိုင္ေနတဲ့ ဆရာဦးေရႊဘက က်ြန္ေတာ္ကကိုစည္သူ ့အေႀကာင္းရွင္းျပအျပီးမွာ
လက္ညိုးနဲ ့ လက္မဝိုင္းျပျပီး(ဂ်ပန္လူမ်ိဳးတို ့ရဲ့ good ဆိုတဲ့ အမွတ္အသားပါ) ျပံဳးျပံဳးရႊင္ရႊင္နဲ ့အားေပးခဲ့တာကိုလဲမွတ္တမ္း
တင္လိုက္ပါရေစ။
သူကလဲကိုစည္သူ ့အေႀကာင္းေကာင္းေကာင္းသိတဲ့လူတေယာက္ေလ။
နိဂံုးအေနနဲ ့အခုေရးျပီးသမ်ွကို ျခံဳျပီးေျပာရရင္ ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ ပဲြကို သြားျပီးဆႏၵျပ ဖို ့ျပင္ဆင္ေနတဲ့ ရဲေဘာ္မ်ားဒီေဆာင္း
ပါးကို ဖတ္ျပီး ျပသင့္ မျပသင့္ စဥ္းစားဆင္ခ်င္တုံတရားေရွ့ထားျပီး ဆုံးျဖတ္ႀကပါလို ့ေျပာႀကားရင္းနိဂုံးခ်ဳပ္ပါတယ္။
ေလးစားစြာျဖင့္-
ဘုန္းလိႈင္-FWUBC
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
ကိုေဇာ္ဝင္းထြဋ္ေဖ်ာ္ေျဖမဲ့ဂ်ပန္ကနာဂစ္ရံပုံေငြပဲြ နွင့္ ဆႏၵျပလိုသူရဲေဘာ္မ်ား
ONLINE COMMENTARY:Why India shifts its policy on Burma
http://www.kaowao.org/Why%20India%20shifts%20its%20policy%20on%20Burma.php
By Nehginpao Kipgen
November 3 , 2008
The international community keeps eyeing the political turmoil in military-ruled Burma. Understandably, neighbors better understand. Let us analyze why India seemingly has a lukewarm interest in the Burmese democratic movement?
It was the 1988 uprising which brought India significantly into the Burmese politics. This was the time when Burmese people contemplated bringing down the military regime.
The failed uprising forced hundreds of refugees across the international border into India. From 1988 to 1992, India's policy vacillated between support for democracy movement and diplomatic isolation.
The P.V. Narasimha Rao's (1991-1996) "Look East" policy basically changed India's foreign policy toward Burma. The dramatic policy shift, however, happened during Atal Bihari Vajpayee's (1998-2004) administration.
There were two major factors responsible for India's policy shift: (i) to counterweight the strategic influence of the People's Republic of China; and (ii) to deal with insurgency problems in the Northeast India. Economic interest also contributed to it.
Of the two, countering China's regional influence remains to be the number one concern for India. Having experienced a bitter war with China in 1962, India feels insecure and threatened when China's influence is broadened.
China-Burma bilateral trade hit US$2.057 billion in 2007, up 40.9 percent compared with 2006. China's exports to Burma took US$1.686 billion, up 39.6 percent, while its import from Burma stood US$371 million, up 46.9 percent. China enjoyed a trade surplus of US$1.315 billion.
Similarly, India's exports to Burma in 2007-2008 amounted to about US$185 million, while its imports from Burma were valued at around US$810 million. In addition to the Tamu-Kalay-Kalewa highway upgrade, India has made investments in projects such as energy and gas exploration. Most recent India's assistance was the US$200 million project in IT program.
All these moves and counter-moves are the direct result of scrambling for power by the two Asian powers. India, at least for now, sees engaging with the military regime an effective means to narrowing the influence of China.
Another important factor for India's foreign policy shift was due to the rise of insurgency problems in the restive Northeast India. About 20,000 insurgents from different groups of Northeast India have bases in Burma, mostly in the Northwestern part Sagaing Division.
Talks for coordination between India and Burma security forces in counter-insurgency operations have taken momentum in recent years. During his visit to New Delhi in 2004, Senior General Than Shwe assured the Indian government that he would not allow his country to be used by anti-India elements.
Sometimes, bilateral talks and agreements have not really been put into practice.
Although the Burmese military, in a number of occasions, has asked the Indian government to silence its Burmese dissidents, New Delhi so far seems to pay a wishy-washy response. Similarly, Nay Pyi Taw appears to be not fully engaged in dismantling the bases of Indian insurgents operating from Burma.
India apparently is not totally ignoring her support for the Burmese democratic movement. One evidence is the presence of more than fifty thousand Burmese refugees (no official figure available) taking refuge in India, including some leading dissidents.
India rather acts in tandem with her national interest and security in the face of China's influence in the region. By engaging with the military regime, India feels better served. To many, this looks as if India has adopted a double-standard policy toward Burma.
In the event of Burma becoming a democratic country, India is expected to be one of the first to throw her support. Till then, India will continue to compete with China, while the Western world is likely to continue with traditional sanctions.
Nehginpao Kipgen is the General Secretary of US-based Kuki International Forum (www.kukiforum.com) and a researcher on the rise of political conflicts in modern Burma (1947-2004). The article first appeared in the China Post. The views expressed here are solely the opinion of the author. (Kaowao Editor)
The Strategy of the Military Regime and the Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma (Htun Aung Gyaw)
Dear Friends,
This is the paper that i submitted in the EU-Burma day meeting in Brussels on October 29, 2008. Any positive and negative comments are welcome.
Htun Aung Gyaw
607-339-6054
The Strategy of the Military Regime and the Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma
(Htun Aung Gyaw)
Part I
The Strategy of the Military Regime
The strategy is simple and cruel. The regime will never start dialogue or negotiate with the opposition political party, the National League for Democracy. The regime’s main strategy is military dominant rule. Whatever it takes, the generals will hold on to power by using any means. They do not care about the development of the country or sacrifice of human lives to achieve their goal. The regime will barge ahead with its own plan to grab political power by using a one-sided, non-free and unfair election in 2010 by following steps started in 1992.
1. Time buying
2. Imposing restrictions and closing down regional offices of the opposition parties, including NLD, SNLD and democratic forces
3. Embracing the ideology of master and slave
4. Promoting a military dominated education model and degrading civilian education
5. Conducting psychological warfare on opposition politicians and political prisoners
6. Drawing up a one-sided constitution to take political power by 2010 through a fake election
Time Buying
The Burmese generals promised the UN that they would begin dialogue with the opposition political party, the NLD, after the 1990 election but it never occurred. The dictatorship's reasoning for ignoring the 1990 election was that Burma required a new constitution. The constitution was drummed up by the regime’s handpicked people. The winning party, the NLD, did not have a chance to participate freely.
NLD walked out from the National Convention and never participated in creating the constitution. Also, the Shan National League for Democracy which won the majority of seats in the Shan States also walked out from the convention. Lacking the representatives in the convention made the constitution meaningless. Even so, the regime plowed forward with its lackeys bending to the brutal boot of their desires and direction. The constitution taking 15 years to complete, from 1992 to 2007, is evidence of time buying strategy. The result of the new constitution is military-dominant rule.
At the same time the regime was slyly using the UN for its tool to buy time successfully. Former UN special envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, warmly welcomed by the regime, was praised as a fellow Southeast Asian by them. And each time, before Razali visited Burma, the regime released 10 to 20 political prisoners and fooled him into believing that there would be a positive change after his visit. But no change or dialogue has ever occurred. Releasing political prisoners has shown itself to be a Machiavellian strategy for tricking international communities and buying continued time.
In reality, many more citizens were captured again and again after the regime released some political prisoners. Sometimes people did not know if the freed prisoners were real political prisoners or criminals who were not associated with politics. Razali Ismail praised the regime, imagining that there would be a real dialogue after discussions with the generals. After more than three years of negotiation without a positive result, Razali finally urged the regime to make good on their promises. At that juncture the regime refused him passage into Burma again.
In 2007, the cyclone Nargis slammed into Burma on May 3rd, killing more than one hundred thirty thousand people in the delta region, leaving two millions homeless. It is a historical fact that the regime refused international aid and callously let men, women, and children die in agony. French and American ships were ready to come to Burma’s shores to assist people who were in urgent need, but the regime turned down their humane offer. The French Foreign Minister openly denounced this cruel act of the regime and talked about R2P, Responsible to Protect Act to save cyclone victims. Pressure from international communities and people inside Burma mounted against the regime.
The UN indirectly rescued the regime. Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General, called Burma’s top General, Than Shwe, and received no answer. Finally, Ban went to Burma and met Than Shwe. Than Shwe greeted him and assured him that the UN and NGOs could enter Burma and help the cyclone victims. The US and French aircraft carriers however were not allowed entrance into Burma’s waters.
Ban eased the tension between the international communities and the regime, but his visit only favored the regime's manipulation of the situation to make it their own game. After Ban’s visit, the US and France ships left without a chance to help victims in urgent need. International donors had to wait for three weeks or more to get into Burma. Even the UN agencies could not enter Burma easily. Most of the foreign aid workers were trapped in Rangoon and were not allowed to travel to the cyclone-hit areas; some were in Bangkok waiting for the green light.
One shocking incident was that the visa section of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok was on fire and many passports of reporters and NGOs were burned in the fire. These people were trying to get a visa from the Burmese embassy. It was not an accident; it was a dirty trick to stop the influx of foreign media and aid workers. The result was one regime manipulated Ban Ki-Moon and withdrawal of international pressure to stop blocking aid to the cyclone victims. Even though two million people became homeless and more than one hundred thousand died, the UN involvement gave the generals a way out.
Madeleine K. Albright (United States Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001) wrote an article in New York Times Op-Ed published in June 11, 2008, under the title “The End of Intervention,” referring to Burma. She wrote, “At the heart of the debate is the question of what the international system is. Is it just a collection of legal nuts and bolts cobbled together by governments to protect governments? Or is it a living framework of rules intended to make the world a more humane place? We know how the government of Myanmar would answer that question, but what we need to listen to is the voice – and cry – of the Burmese people.”
Ban Ki-Moon would not listen to the Burmese people’s cries. Instead he listened to Than Shwe’s sugar-coated words. What happened? Today cyclone victims are still suffering from lack of food, shelter and medicine. Because of Ki-Moon's involvement, the Burmese Regime managed to buy time and defuse the international intervention intended to help cyclone victims.
Ban announced that he had reached an agreement with General Than Shwe and hoped that all the donations and NGOs will enter without difficulty going into Burma. His announcement released Than Shwe from being caught exposed in a corner. With help from Ban Ki-Moon, Than Shwe managed to buy time and avoid foreign involvement whose intention was to save cyclone victims. In reality, week after week a few NGOs managed to make it to the remote areas with limited help. And now the whole world is forgetting the victims in Burma. Unfortunately, Than Shwe is safe from being removed from leadership.
Time buying strategy benefited the regime in several ways. It bought them enough time to prepare, re-organize, draw new ideas, and implement new strategy. It weakened the opposition and created confusion among opposition political parties from within which created mistrust within the NLD leadership itself. It imposed restrictions and closed down regional offices of the opposition parties. It promoted a sham national convention, while the generals loudly claimed that they would begin a dialogue with opposition political parties, especially the NLD. But they never started a single dialogue. Instead they issued an order to close down NLD regional offices by force. Landlords who rented the offices to NLD received threats and pressure from the regime-sponsored organization, Union of Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Many offices were closed down; the only offices left were in the capital, Rangoon.
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and SNLD leader Khun Htun Oo have been detained. At the same time, the regime mouthpiece-newspapers brainwashed the people and foreign media, including the United Nations, that Aung San Suu Kyi is very stubborn and that because of her ill intentions it is hard to start any dialogue. Not more than five people are able to meet each other. If people gather around a NLD office, they are captured and sent to the court for destabilizing the public order. For this phony charge they can be sentenced to three to six years in prison. The regime is using this method to separate the public and NLD party. Regional offices being closed down and the public not being allowed to associate with NLD members made the party weaker and weaker after an 18 year period from 1990 to 2008.
Embracing the Ideology of Master and Slave
The weakening of NLD party strengthened the ideology of master and slave, further promoting the military-dominant education model and degrading civilian education.
The regime is paranoid and afraid of the civilian educated class, especially university students who are the most critical threat to the regime.
When the first military coup was initiated by General Ne Win, the university students challenged the army officers and joked that three of them combined would not exceed a sixth grade education because most of them joined the army with little or no education. The students teased that they were promoted due to their prolonged service in the army and their loyalty to General Ne Win.
In the heat of the 1988 nationwide demonstrations, a new coup was led by General Saw Maung on September 18, 1988, to save his superior, General Ne Win and his cabinet ministers. But Saw Maung was forced to abandon his position after the military regime lost the election in May 1990. The new leader, General Than Shwe, wisely strengthened his power under the watch of Ne Win’s clique, including the powerful General Khin Nyunt who was also a chief of the most feared military intelligence. Than Shwe persuaded Khin Nyunt to persecute Ne Win’s grandsons’ notorious gang called Scorpion and sentenced his three grandsons and their father to death. After he successfully freed himself from Ne Win’s influence, Than Shwe made his last move to detain General Khin Nyunt and became the new dictator.
Under Than Shwe’s rule, he closed down Undergraduate Studies in Rangoon Arts and Science University as well as closing down professional institutions such as Rangoon Arts and Science University (RASU), Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT), Medical college 1 (MCI) and MCII. Many instruments and tools which were donated by USA and Russia were taken out from the institutions and sent to the Military Medical Academy, Defense Service Technological Academy, and to a high tech computer school in the military town called Pyin Oo Lwin known as May Myo where the Defense Service Academy is located. Most of the students in military schools are sons and daughters from the military clique. The best teachers were recruited or forced to transfer to the military schools.
On the other hand, civilian universities were forced to shrink into regional colleges without sufficient instruments, chairs, desks, text books and skilled teachers. The regime created Regional Degree Colleges, Institutes, and University of Distance Educations, a total of 44 altogether. Moreover, the colleges were built in remote areas far away from towns and cities to prevent student protest in cities. After 1988, uprising universities were shut down for four years. When they opened again, professors only had a chance to teach two to three months a year for another six years, without sufficient teaching and study time. Every student who took the tests were passed and graduated without qualification. The regime’s strategy is that it does not want to see many students pile up in the colleges.
In contrast, the military schools were open year round with sufficient facilities and skilled teachers. The results are stunning. People now go to doctors who graduated from military medical schools because the doctors have skill; people do not want treatment from doctors who graduated from civilian medical colleges. In a similar fashion, engineers from a military engineering college can get a job easily but engineers from civilian colleges are not trusted and find it difficult to get a job. The reason was they do not have skills in the field and no connection with the ruling class.
Every year military schools produce approximately 1,200 graduates; on the other hand, the civilian college graduates are at least 10 to 20,000 people without qualifications. The narrow minded, xenophobic attitude of the generals is degrading the Burmese education system and harming the country’s development in the long run.
Than Shwe issued the order that the major ranking officers need to hold a master’s degree educational level and the officers' wives hold an undergraduate degree in order to get a promotion. Such an incentive proves that Than Shwe is promoting a dominant military class in Burma to rule the country.
In 1990, before the May election, Than Shwe was the second in command of the armed forces; he visited the military families and gave a shocking speech. He said, “I will not tell you which party to vote for. You can vote whatever way you want to, but think deeply before you vote. Do you want to live like a master or live like a slave? Think about that and then vote.” This kind of speech indicates that he sees Burmese people as his slaves and the army generals as the masters. The speech is the revelation of the dictator’s mind.
Psychological Warfare on Politicians and Political Prisoners.
The regime threatens opposition politicians by using many dirty methods. It tries to seize their properties. It fires them from government offices if they are employed by government firms. It employs thugs to attack them on the way to work or while walking down the street. It visits them at home at night and checks the list of the household members by using its sponsored organization USDA. Police and Fire Fighters line up household members, including kids under ten years old at midnight while they are sleeping. If they find a guest in the home, the household leader and the guest will pay a fine or be given both a fine and jail term for not informing the quartermaster on time.
Prominent politicians’ homes have been closely watched and everyone who visits them are questioned in front of the house. Why are they visiting the house? For what reason? What did the politician tell them? Are they politically supporting the person? How is he/she related to this politician? A lot of people are afraid of being captured and so the ultimately the politician becomes isolated.
Under the close watch of the UN and human rights organizations, the regime changed its oppressive methods regarding opposition by creating two pro-regime organizations. The main sponsored organization, the Union of Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and its new branch, the Swan Arr Shin group (Vigorous being).
People vs. People Strategy
State Peace and Development Council uses excessive measures to suppress the people’s movement in 1988, ‘89, ‘90, ‘96 and beyond by using armed forces. Now they are using their own thugs to squash activists and political parties. The USDA and Swan Arr Shin duties are to harass activists, sometimes beating them to death. They also try to squash anti-government demonstrations, disguising themselves as normal people and capturing activists.
Aung San Suu Kyi's trip to upper Burma was ambushed while traveling with supporters and members on May 30, 2003 by USDA and Swan Arr Shin groups backed by police forces and army units. It was known as the “Depeyin Massacre.” More than a hundred of her supporters were beaten and stabbed to death. Aung San Suu Kyi luckily escaped from being assassinated. No one was persecuted for this massacre. The attackers roam free but since then Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest
When the regime mouthpiece newspapers say that, “Concerned citizens cannot tolerate the people making disturbance and those people should be captured,” the words pretend the regime is not involved in taking action against the activists. Supposedly the people are taking such action on their own. The idea is that a peace loving people could not tolerate those who create disturbance (Protest and demonstration against the government are used as disturbance in regime’s terminology) within the country. The regime lets the activists demonstrate if they want to but the peace loving people will not allow such protests.
On the other hand, the regime gave a green light to USDA rallies and demonstrations in many towns and cities denouncing NLD party and western sanctions. Thousands of government employees were summoned to join the pro regime demonstrations by force. No one was captured but instead got paid. In contrast, NLD supporters were captured if they gather more than five people for a public safety act.
Political Prisoners
There are more than two thousands political prisoners languishing in Burma’s prisons across the country. The Regime never recognized them as political prisoners. They said all are criminals because they broke the law. Political prisoners face a tremendous challenge in prison. Torture is rampant and real criminals are encouraged to bully and hurt political prisoners. Solitary confinement, both legs chained with middle iron bar, lack of nutritious food and medical treatment, lack of water supply for daily bathing and washing clothes, no toilet and sanitation has become a norm in Burma’s prisons. Using unclean needles in prison hospitals create the spread of HIV disease.
The worst thing is trying to break the mentality of the person by using cruel methods. Some political prisoners are very tough and never beg or break down. People who can resist physical torture have to face mental torture. One infamous example of such torture involves a renowned journalist and one of the leading members of NLD party, U Win Tin, who had been in prison from 1998-2008.
The regime promised U Win Tin his release if he would sign the deal for not participating in politics. He turned it down several times. He is a man who will hold his last breath and never give up what he believes in. Several times he was informed that he had been released and told him to pack up all his belongings in the cell where he lived. After he finished packing up his stuff, he changed from his prison clothes to civilian clothes and waited for the warden. A warden opened the cell and escorted him to the prison gate, but when he reached the gate the head warden told him that his jail term had been extended and sent him back to the cell.
The regime gave U Win Tin the hope of becoming a free man again, only so they could destroy it. This kind of method is used to shatter the soul of politicians who believe in freedom and democracy. Some people manage to resist torture while being a prisoner, but when they were tested by this cruel method they broke down in tears and some went insane. The regime used this method several times on U Win Tin, but he is a person with wily intelligence and he overcame the test.
On September 23, 2008, U Win Tin was informed by the wardens to pack his belongings and change his clothes because he would be free that day. U Win Tin knew the drill very well and did not want to be fooled again. He refused to change his prison clothes and refused to sign the acceptance of his freedom because of bitter past experiences. As a part of a plan to cause tension and a split in the NLD, U Win Tin was freed that day in his prison clothes.
However, U Win Htein, another prominent political prisoner and NLD CEC member, was informed by the warden, the same day of U Win Tin's release that he would also be freed from Kalay Prison, north of Mandalay. His family members were also informed to meet him in Mandalay. But his release was short lived. He was sent back to prison the next day. All these inhuman tricks are practiced in Burma's prisons today as mental torture.
Drawing Up a One Sided Constitution to Take Political Power by 2010 through a Fake Election
The regime forced the people to approve the sham constitution created by handpicked individuals, without delay under extreme conditions when cyclone Nargis hit. It was more important for them to have approval of their dominant military favored constitution, over saving thousands of lives.
History repeats itself, just like in the old days when General Ne Win drew up a constitution which favored a one party system and the only political party existing was his party, the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP). It was approved by ninety nine percent of the people under threat and close watch. Then, under the constitution, General Ne Win was elected as the first President.
Under Than Shwe, the new constitution allows the military chief of staff to appoint twenty five percent of the military representatives in the parliament directly. Also, he has the right to take over political power if necessary which means he has the right to stage a coup under constitutional rights. The regime said that they will give the Burmese “Discipline Democracy,” which sounds similar to Indonesia’s model under General Suharto rule.
Suharto used “Guided Democracy” and he was elected six times in Indonesia. His cronies and generals enjoyed wealth and power. The Burmese generals are copying the Indonesian model to exploit Burma’s rich natural resources and enslave its own people. The 2010 election is their goal to change the military rule to a civilian rule like Ne Win’s. If Than Shwe is not running for President, one of his disciples will do so under the guidance of Than Shwe’s clique.
One major shift from the Ne Win's regime is the economy. Under Ne Win’s reign it was a centralized economy. Big and small scale industries, factories, malls, and shops were nationalized. Than Shwe will allow a crony economic system under free trade where nothing is truly free or fair.
Part II
The Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma
The future prospect for democratic change is very blurry. It mainly depends on three forces: the military regime, democratic oppositions and international support. First it depends on NLD and SPDC; how honestly and willingly do they want to work together and find a command ground to overcome the dead end? The attitude of the regime is obviously very negative for democratic change; the generals are planning for a centralized political system under the military’s dominant rule. The option for dialogue is far gone from the generals’ side. On the other hand, the biggest opposition political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has been facing challenges from its youth wing to change to a more active strategy. The youth want a more central role in confronting the regime. In addition, the exile opposition groups are facing the same dilemma involving active change, while exile leaders have held their positions for nearly two decades without any progress. The third player is foreign pressure. Without any foreign pressure on the military junta no single improvement will occur in Burma.
National League for Democracy
NLD Chairman, U Aung Shwe, has been criticized for not following democratic principles and refuses to listen to the grassroots and its youth wing. Recently, selecting new youth leaders by NLD CEC sparked the resignation of more than one hundred youth members and has shocked the NLD leadership, which indicates the frustration among the youths for not achieving the goal of democracy. It seems without Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD has no movement to achieve its goal.
The regime time-buying strategy has suppressed the mobility of the NLD party and created frustration among the party leaders and grassroots activists. Passive response to the military regime made active youth leaders rebellious. Some found their own way to fight against the regime and were kicked out from the party as punishment or ended in a prison cell. The current leaders only know how to request a dialogue without follow up actions and leverage power. The generals will not wake up and look at it from their comfortable beds if there is no leverage power.
The announcement of an election in 2010 alerts the democratic forces inside and abroad. NLD leadership is under extreme pressure to find a strategy for how to fight back the 2010 election by using the 1990 election results. If they accept the election in 2010, the 1990 election has no value at all. If they do not accept the election they have to fight back but NLD leadership is hesitant of confronting the regime if their demands are not recognized by SPDC.
On the other hand, if they cannot stop the election in 2010, the regime will win the election by using all its dirty tricks. NLD needs to confront the regime with courage to call for nationwide demonstrations before the election. Time is running out and NLD needs to reshuffle the leadership and unleash the young bloods who are willing to sacrifice for freedom.
Exile Opposition groups
Exile opposition groups are facing the same fate as the NLD. They tolerate prolong leadership with no progress and no strategy. They are deteriorating from freedom fighters to NGO-style activists. They are unsuccessful in working as a united entity, therefore they form sub groups within the coalition that are going nowhere.
Prolong Leadership with No progress and No Strategy
National Coalition Government of Union of Burma (NCGUB) was formed on the Thai-Burma border after the 1990 election was ignored. After more than 17 years without any single progress and success, the NCGUB leadership has never changed. The Members of Parliament Union (MPU), comprised of elected MPs from the1990 election, is a powerhouse.
The coming MPU meeting has a chance to elect a new leadership. If they dare to elect a new leader who dares to take a risk and try to unite the opposition abroad, it will become a strong entity. NCGUB formation was based on elected MPs only. No one was allowed to become ministers in the government, only the elected MPs have license to take the higher post. This needs to change by allowing in capable new bloods, who have sufficient education and show strong leadership in the exile communities. Skilled technocrats, political science professors and economics experts need to be recruited in the new government. Also ethnic resistance leaders who have leadership skills and experience with trained ethnic armies need to be embraced.
Under strong leadership with capable members, NCGUB will shake the power of the military regime. In the past, NCGUB’s role was under the shadow of the NLD policy, never daring to find its own role as an independent powerhouse. NLD does not have the liberty to do it inside Burma because its movement has been suppressed and members have been harassed and arrested by military thugs over and over again.
NLD is walking on a thin line under the close watch from the regime. If they take any anti-government action, its members would be captured and put into prison, but NCGUB has total freedom to do whatever it feels like. NCGUB needs to know its role while dealing with the regime. Confrontation and playing hard ball is the role for NCGUB. NLD’s role is to call for dialogue and find a common ground. It is a separate ball game and they need to know in which ground they are living and what kind of strategy they need to play. NCGUB does not need to follow NLD strategy because they are living in a totally different playground with one similar goal; to establish a democratic government.
Degrading from Freedom Fighters to NGO Style Activists
Some activists abandoned the armed struggle and changed themselves into non-violent activists. They know most of the donors like to support only non-violent means. That is the main reason they became non-violent activists, to get grants and funding, not for the democratic change but for their survival. They really do not have any strong belief in any method. They become grant seeking NGOs who try to sniff out which issue is hot and popular in order to get funding whether they believe in the issue or not.
That kind of change within the revolutionary area destroyed the fighting spirits among the activists. People who get funding became popular leaders with followers who need money. As salary workers the attitude of the activists totally changed. They will take a stand if they get paid; if not, they will not do it even when it is necessary for the revolution.
Most of the funding goes to the salaries of the clerks and travel expenses; only 20% of the funds go into Burma. But there are some strong committed activists who still resist this kind of shift. They are finding their own way to survive by working at some shops and collecting money and supporting comrades inside and doing what they believe in. They are not selling out human items. They are real activists who believe in themselves, that they have to fight back with no compromise.
Surprisingly, they can compete with the NGOs activists even though they can collect only a small amount of money because their comrades believe in them and only want to work with them as un-corrupt persons with dignity. The reason is they can easily beat the NGOs group which has ten thousand dollars for a project by only using tow thousand dollars for the same project. The outcome will be just as effective or better because they use all of their money for the inside movement. The NGOs spend eight thousand dollars for its staff and spending. If the real activists get funding from donors, they will do more than five fold what the NGOs are doing right now.
The 88 Generation Students are the future leaders of Burma because their generation is aging and now they are over forty-year-old men and women with full commitment and guts. In November 2008, 88 generation leaders who live in exile formed a core group called Burma Freedom League (BFL) with potential leaders who ignited the 1988 nationwide uprising. They will lead the revolution in the near future because they have twenty years of experience against the military regime and strong connections inside underground groups and also with the new generation. If the donors see the reality and really want to change the status quo in Burma, they need to see deep inside the movement, who is who and who has enduring commitment, connections inside, and the potential to be effective.
International Support (Pressure)
International pressure is not unanimous. ASEAN countries, China and Russia are against this option. As a result, the sanctions against Burma are not very effective but they are hurting the regime slowly. Without international involvement, the regime change will be prolonged and Burmese people will continue to suffer.
In the current history of Burma, the regime change occurred when foreign troops invaded Burma. The Burmese king was removed from his throne when the British invaded Burma in 1886. Then the British colonial regime was removed when the Japanese invaded Burma in World War II in 1944. Then the Japanese were kicked out when the allies came back. All these three models have shown that regime change in Burma occurred when foreign troop invaded Burma.
In the modern era, such foreign invasion is not easy as in the past but it has occurred in some countries. For Burma this is not likely to happen because of geo-politics. The West and the US do not want to get into Burma because of China. China will not let the US tap on its door. Burmese have to rely on their own strength and courage. 88 Generation leaders Min Ko Naing, Min Zeya, Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe and the rest have proved their commitment and courage but still they need support from the US and European countries.
The US and EU need to double their funding for free Burma by selecting potential leaders and grassroots activism inside Burma and abroad. Funding together with advanced technology like mobile broadcasting stations, satellite phones, digital cameras, and computers are crucial for activists to organize and educate the people and promote awareness.
In addition, giving activists a chance at higher education and classes for forming networking and communication skills is key. Scholarships for subjects like International Law, Industrial and Labor Relations, International Relations, City and Regional Planning, Human Resources, Peace Studies, Asian Studies, European Studies, Political Science, Conflict Resolutions, Economics, and so forth will benefit the future development in Burma.
Conclusion
The future prospect for establishing a democratic system in Burma is uncertain. The military regime is planning to go forward for its election in 2010 without compromising with the opposition. The opposition is diverse and not able to form a united front. At the same time, NLD leadership is too old to lead and the exile leadership is too weak to lead and do not want to take risk and enjoy in status quo.
On the other hand, the military regime has one command, one leadership and one goal. If the opposition cannot stop the 2010 election, the regime will definitely win the election. NLD activists inside and abroad need to set up a strong underground network that covers the whole nation. The only strategy is to initiate a mass movement to oppose the 2010 election by educating the people to understand the outcome of the 2010 election which will produce dominant military rule for the next two decades if they do not dare to fight back.
The International actors, especially the United Nations need to pressure the regime to stop pushing one sided election based on a non-democratic constitution. If the UN and the West wrongfully support the 2010 election, it will not only harm the democratic forces in Burma but it will hurt democratic forces around the world who struggle for freedom as well. It will generate the wrong signal to other authoritarian states that it is acceptable to nullify free and fair elections and replace them with a one sided election.
The brightness of Burma's future depends on compromises by the military, unity of the opposition forces and strong support from the international actors for democratic transition.
Not such a hero after all
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/11/burma-aung-san-suu-kyi
The Guardian, 11 November 2008
By Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy
Aung San Suu Kyi, the pro-democracy activist and leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Burma, is the world's most famous political prisoner. She has spent the best part of the past 20 years under house arrest, detained by the military dictatorship she opposes. Her current imprisonment began in May 2003, when her convoy was attacked and 70 of her supporters killed by a militia of government-sponsored thugs known darkly as the Masters of Force. She has been confined to her Rangoon home ever since.
Suu Kyi was born into the family that drove Burma's independence movement: her father was General Aung San, who was murdered by his political rivals in July 1947, shortly after negotiating his country's independence from Britain. Suu Kyi was pushed into politics in 1988 after thousands of students protesters were gunned down on the streets of Rangoon - when she delivered her inaugural speech at Rangoon's Shwe Dagon Pagoda on August 26 that year, a crowd of 500,000 came to hear her. A nation held in a headlock by a junta since 1962 fell behind her gutsy message of hope, and she led the NLD to a landslide election victory in May 1990, winning 392 out of 485 seats.
Suu Kyi has always advocated non-violent resistance, but is internationally renowned for her recalcitrance rather than her compliance. When Burma's military junta annulled the 1990 vote, Suu Kyi reached out to the west, where her allure was underpinned by her beauty and a post-colonial fairytale upbringing - a childhood spent riding with Rajiv and Sanjay Gandhi; university years at St Hugh's, Oxford; a marriage on New Year's Day 1972 to a brilliant young academic to whom she had been introduced by Lord Gore-Booth.
Amnesty International made her a prisoner of conscience, while Vanity Fair dubbed her Burma's Saint Joan. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel peace prize and India's prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru award for international understanding was given the following year. There seemed no limits to her popularity abroad - Gordon Brown, in his book Courage: Eight Portraits, called her "a hero for our times", profiling Suu Kyi alongside Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King.
Footage of her fiery speeches, made from behind the famous blue gates of her family home on University Avenue, were broadcast across the globe. Portraits of her were seen all over the world, too - most famously one shot by photographer Nic Dunlop, which has Suu Kyi looking defiant, her arms folded, her head turned reluctantly towards the lens (the NLD leader having just snapped at one of Dunlop's friends who had dared argue the toss with her about Burmese history).
Compilations of Suu Kyi's writings became bestsellers. Her democracy campaign drew hundreds of thousands of supporters at home and the attention of millions abroad, transforming the issue into the most high-profile postwar protest, barring the anti-apartheid movement.
But despite her international image as a great leader, Suu Kyi has become mute since her arrest in 2003. Twenty years on from her great speech in Rangoon there is nothing but static emanating from her Rangoon home. On the implosion of Burma's economy that has transformed it into one of the 49 least developed countries in the world, she has not much to say. Uprisings brutally suppressed - like those led by monks in September 2007?
No comment. Tropical cyclone Nargis that last May swept away 170,000? Barely a word from Suu Kyi. A jerry-rigged referendum in May on a new constitution that would keep the military in power in perpetuam? No counter or strategy. Only a statement from the NLD that the vote had been "non-inclusive, non-transparent and undemocratic" and therefore a sham - which was self-evident to those who had survived May's cyclone Nargis only to be frog-marched to the polls at the point of a gun.
While western activists, such as the Burma Campaign UK, have never been more vocal - recently being backed by stars including Ricky Gervais - their focal point, Suu Kyi, has chosen to stay quiet behind the locked gates of her home, even though in previous years her house arrest has not prevented her from venting her anger in written and even filmed statements. She has been unable or unwilling to meet with the ruling Burmese junta or anyone else - refusing even to see UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari in August, during his fruitless six-day visit, the 40th such mission to date. Only the occasional photograph has emerged in recent years, revealing a woman who has, unsurprisingly, given the toll on her of imprisonment and isolation, dramatically aged.
Suu Kyi's uncharacteristic silence has worried Burma's pro-democracy activists, lighting up bulletin boards and chat rooms inside the country and wherever the Burmese diaspora has resettled.
"If Suu Kyi has a plan to end 20 years of political deadlock, only she knows it," an elder who first pushed her into politics told the Guardian. According to streams of increasingly agitated posts on the country's many bulletin boards, some supporters are even unsure if their leader remains actively engaged in the struggle at all. Suu Kyi's fight appears to have sublimated into a meditative battle, some say, underscored by her deeply felt spiritual views. "The generals heap pressure on her. She soaks it up," one Burmese activist remarked. Nowadays in Burma it is, the activists say, metta v the military, with Suu Kyi wielding only the Buddhist notion of loving kindness against the battle-hardened men in khaki.
So esoteric has the combat become that a noticeboard Suu Kyi has erected outside her house is - by her own choosing - now the only gauge of her inner-most ideas. This summer she posted a message on it which was so perplexing that it sparked an acrimonious debate among supporters and commentators.
Just inside the blue gates behind which Suu Kyi has been detained for 13 of the past 19 years, the message declares in bold red lettering: "All martyrs must finish their mission." Suu Kyi is renowned for her verbal precision. In the flesh she can be tart, a pedant even. So what did she mean? The question has been asked by supporters and opponents. The sign was put up to coincide with the country's Martyrs Day, a national holiday that commemorates the death of General Aung San.
In the vacuum that has replaced Suu Kyi's spoken words, the bizarre martyrdom message has been interpreted by some as a justification of her personal stance, and a vow that she will continue her struggle regardless of her own suffering - she lost her husband, Michael Aris, to cancer in 1999 and was not given the chance to say a final goodbye, and she is still separated from her two sons Kim and Alexander. However, for others, her reference to the need to finish the mission is seen as an astounding con-cession from a woman who has until now steadfastly refused to perceive herself as a martyr. Suu Kyi has, in the past, always described herself as an activist at the helm of an effective political movement.
In the land of bad news, speculation has mounted. A frank debate aired in campaign newspapers, online magazines and in political circles has thrown up some uncomfortable and incontrovertible facts about the state of the struggle for democracy and the effectiveness of Suu Kyi herself. Despite dedicating 20 years to ridding her country of its lumpen military, the generals' power has only increased, their role in any future elected government enshrined by the new constitution, which will lead to general elections in 2010 in which the only parties with the ability to canvas are those controlled by the same generals. On the other side, and having won the election in 1990, Suu Kyi has boycotted the constitution drafting process and the new elections, while advancing no alternative workable policies. Meanwhile, her NLD machine crashes around her - 1,000 of her supporters have been jailed this year alone, and no new leaders are emerging to fill their places in a party that is also short on policy.
The noticeboard that sprung up outside her home has been read by many as a downsizing of Suu Kyi's aspirations, and an acknowledgement that she now considers herself more a votive candle for democracy - a flame memorialising lost opportunities, and giving the Burmese people strength to survive whatever the military junta throws at them - rather than a political leader fighting to overthrow the regime once and for all. This apparent shift has provoked extraordinary candour both within Burma and among the millions of exiled Burmese who this summer commemorated the 20th anniversary of the student uprisings whose bloody suppression launched Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Suu Kyi is hallowed ground. And yet even some of her diehard supporters are now asking if the NLD and its leader have been guilty of political naivety and moral high-handedness, leaving the party and the democracy movement moribund. "What would happen if Suu Kyi died?" a magazine run by exiled Burmese dared to ask in August. "Her absence would probably be a death blow to the already weakened democracy struggle, because she has no obvious successor."
This is only one of the failings that some supporters now accuse her of. In late September, Aye Thar Aung, an ethnic Arakanese leader from western Burma and senior NLD coalition partner, broke cover. He had come to believe that the NLD had achieved no "tangible improvements in democratic reform" in 20 years. To go forward, even a centimetre, the party had to learn from the mistakes of its past, he argued. Now, for the first time, Suu Kyi's supporters are reviewing her leadership - and finding it wanting.
When Suu Kyi was reluctantly pushed forward as a figurehead for the newly formed NLD, she took her cue from the Dalai Lama, immediately pledging to pursue a "democratic dialogue" with the regime as opposed to engaging in armed struggle. But was she up to it? Most of the generals had spent their youth as anti-colonialists fighting the British and afterwards warring in grinding insurgencies - what hope did Suu Kyi have, an inexperienced politician who had been educated in India and Britain and even spoke Burmese with a British accent?
After her resounding 1990 electoral victory, the generals regrouped. The military placed her under house arrest and tore her party to pieces, while unfurling a sophisticated, long-range political programme whose breadth is only being appreciated today. They launched a National Convention to draw up a new constitution for Burma, to legalise the illegitimate military's role in any future government. They also established the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass civilian organisation that inveigled its way into all levels of society, to be wielded as a political cheerleader in future elections. "Their goal was to get around the will of the people," a Burmese economist in Rangoon told us. "To get elected despite the people."
To buy time, Senior General Than Shwe, the head of the ruling State Peace and Development Council, occasionally reached out to Suu Kyi, staging meetings at a government guesthouse. Photographs show her curtseying, while the general's face registers no discernible emotion at all. They had something in common. Both were authoritarian and proud.
Nyo Ohn Myint, who today is foreign affairs spokesman for the exiled wing of the NLD, recently described to Irrawaddy, an online magazine run by exiled Burmese, how the party was so pleased with itself for winning in 1990 that it became "ambitious beyond reality". Suu Kyi, according to party members, began taking decisions unilaterally that were aimed at confronting and isolating the military, even though as an organisation that was decades old and far more coherent than the NLD it would need to be worked with. She announced that the NLD would not participate in the generals' National Convention - a self-serving vehicle for the junta, but also the only forum to debate with the armed forces.
She also demanded that Burma be transformed into a pariah state - that the country be brought to its knees by sanctions imposed by her allies in Europe and the US. Nyo Ohn Myint reflected: "The approach was extreme. It was just a bull fight." The party squandered its opportunities. He added: "At that time, most of us had just three or four months in politics. But we became policy makers in the NLD."
Suu Kyi's tactics did not work. In the west, sanctions felt good. But trade between Europe and Burma was less than 5% of the country's GDP, while US sanctions were ultimately hollow, constructed in order that Unocal, the US oil giant, could continue to operate in Burma, increasing its stake to $1.2bn. For every western company that bailed out, there was an Asian equivalent that came in. A report by the International Crisis Group also warned: "Sanctions confirmed the suspicions of strongly nationalistic leaders that the west aims to dominate and exploit [Burma] and strengthens their resolve to resist."
According to the Rangoon economist, "Suu Kyi pressed on, creating further disquiet in the NLD by calling for NGOs in Burma to quit [because they were] prolonging the life of a junta." It was a controversial position in a country now rife with malaria and HIV, where only 50p per person was spent on health. But according to a former NLD leader in Rangoon: "Those who spoke out, she drummed out."
Having boycotted the military's route march to democracy, what new policies did the NLD generate, some in the NLD inner circle began to ask? In 1998, Suu Kyi went against the advice of her party by unveiling her own Committee Representing the People's Parliament, which would cancel all laws passed by the junta. One of those who protested to Suu Kyi recalls: "It was a symbolic gesture that led to the jailing of 110 NLD MPS and the closing down of 43 NLD offices. The NLD imploded. We should have found a way to intervene in the debate. We allowed the military that was unpopular to become a government that could succeed, while the NLD, a party that was popular, got lost."
Aung Naing Oo, a leader in the 1988 student uprisings and for seven years the foreign affairs spokesman for the anti-junta All Burma Students Democratic Front, told Irrawaddy: "I think our politicians are naive and no more than activists. They don't know how to take power and they have no strategic policies." He went further: "Never in our history did we have such an excellent combination of influential political figures, such as [Suu Kyi]. But sadly, those leaders ... followed their own path, ignoring unity." A former senior NLD MP in Rangoon told the Guardian: "The old guard just clung on, incapable of training new activists, deaf to ideas, too strung up on bureaucracy and centralisation. While Suu Kyi remained inspirational, she was ineffective as a leader and the party, under attack from the outside, was neutered from within."
In 2005, the now unassailable generals turned their backs on the people (and Suu Kyi) altogether, retreating to Naypyidaw, the new highly-fortified capital 320km north of Rangoon. It, too, was a symbolic act. The Rangoon-based economist said: "If the democracy movement was leaderless, the Burmese regime was now a government unique in that it was unburdened by having to care for its people."
It was while the Burmese people came together when cyclone Nargis struck, driving aid to victims and pulling fallen trees from the capital's roads in the absence of any governmental help, that Suu Kyi's noticeboard leapt into life. One of those prompted to talk out by the bizarre martyrdom message was Tun Myint Aung, a student leader from 1988. He concluded: "No one can deny that we are on the side of truth and the people. But what we also have to consider seriously is whether our sacrifices alone will actually bring victory." Being a martyr was simply not good enough.
It was a point underscored by Burma's longest-serving political prisoner, Win Tin, a 79-year-old former journalist and advisor to Suu Kyi, who was released by the junta on September 23 this year. Reappointed secretary to the NLD's central executive committee, he immediately entered the fray. The fight for democracy "hadn't ended yet", he announced. However, "the NLD alone can't work it out". Instead of waiting the junta out, and turning its back, the party and its leader would have to begin engaging with its enemies as well as its friends. With any one, in fact, with whom it could form a dialogue. But when it comes to leaders, some in the party are asking whether it is it time to move on from Aung San Suu Kyi.
Source: The Guardian
Photo: AP
Watching the war on drugs-THAI -BURMA
http://www.bangkokpost.com/111108_News/11Nov2008_news16.php
EDITORIAL
Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat has ordered a new crackdown on drug peddlers, and Justice Minister Somsak Kiatsuranond kicked it off officially at a Chiang Mai ceremony. This has raised concerns, particularly on the civil rights front. Such concern is understandable and proper. But the good news is that this campaign, for all its flash and gimmickry, has been properly planned.
Any active anti-drug trafficking campaign these days is certain to be overshadowed by the infamous order to police by ex-premier Thaksin Shinawatra to eliminate drug peddlers and hang the consequences. That shameful 90-day police violence not only took innocent lives, it also put every subsequent attempt to crack down on big-time drug dealers and their street-corner sellers on the wrong foot. In the more than five years since that three months of a real "war on drugs," traffickers have made bold new inroads, while authorities often felt inhibited from pursuing them.
Timidity is not a useful reaction in dealing with Thai and Thailand-based drug traffickers. They are ruthless men, seriously addicted to the drug trade for its huge profits and, in many cases, its power. In the past 20 years, which is to say one generation, Thailand has made huge progress in the fight against big-time drug trafficking. Many forget that the notorious Khun Sa once lived in northern Thailand with impunity, virtual emperor of an opium fiefdom.
The 2003 campaign under Thaksin was an abomination. An independent committee reported credibly that the so-called anti-drug crackdown resulted in 2,819 deaths. Only 1,370 were found to be related to the actual crackdown. The committee said 878 people were killed even though they had no connection with drugs, and another 571 were murdered for causes still unknown. Such an operation must never again be countenanced.
Today, there are three major areas which any anti-drug operation must target to be successful. The first is the Burma-based production facilities of the United Wa State Army. The UWSA is responsible for most of the amphetamines and heroin that are sold or smuggled through Thailand. Anti-drug agents must also find the street-level drug peddlers and, through them, the "Mr Big" traffickers who ultimately control the trade and aim to corrupt Thai youth through drugs and the nation through corruption and money.
Finally, there is the demand for drugs. It is encouraging to see that the Office of the Narcotics Control Board has targetted both drug users and the most vulnerable parts of society. Drug users can and should be encouraged to stop harming themselves and their families, as well as the country. Potential users can be properly educated in the danger, corruption and moral indignity, so that they never start.
The concerns of many human rights activists are germane. But it would be wrong to delay or cancel anti-drug campaigns at any level because one of them went off the tracks. Mr Somchai seems sincere about this programme. He appointed Interior Minister Kowit Wattana to head a suppression and control centre, with Somsak Kiatsuranond as deputy.
This is encouraging. The next step is to make the government fully and intimately accountable at each stage of the anti-drug campaign. Human rights groups, the media and all members of the public should be involved. It is important that authorities pursue drug traffickers, both at the national level and at the street level. Such campaigns will be more successful and long-lasting if the government obeys the law at every stage.
The End of the Road for Personal Data Protection in the EU
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/11/end-of-road-for-personal-data.php
JURIST Guest Columnist Virginia Keyder, currently teaching European Union law at Bogazici University and Sabanci University in Istanbul, Turkey, says that while the European Commission, aided most recently by the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice, has taken steps to encourage and even mandate increased state data retention for more efficient crime-fighting in the EU, the trend threatens to limit fundamental individual rights in the name of an ever-widening definition of "state security"...
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The European media has recently been awash with horror stories of government excess in the area of electronic surveillance and retention (and loss) of personal data. On November 5, Robert Verkaik of UK newspaper The Independent discussed the public outrage that greeted the government announcement of “plans to create a database holding information about every phone call, email and internet visit made in the UK”. And yet, the European Commission, aided most recently by the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), has set its sights on not only assisting such excesses, but mandating them.
For readers unfamiliar with the structure of the European Community, the European Union and the relationship between the two, this may be hard going. I ask you to bear with me because involved in this ostensible struggle for increased legislative competence is a concerted effort to limit fundamental individual rights in the name of ‘state security’ in an ever-widening sense.
On October 14, 2008 ECJ Advocate General Bot upheld the competence of the EC Council (the body that votes on legislation in the European Community) to enact Directive 2006/24EC (On the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications network and amending Directive 2002/8) based solely on the single market competence afforded by the EC Treaty.
AG Bot rejected a claim by Ireland that such legislation should have been enacted under EU’s ‘third pillar’, i.e. Judicial and Police Cooperation, and found instead that single market competence under Article 95 of the European Community Treaty (TEC) was sufficient.
Article 95 TEC gives the EC the power to “adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.”
The purpose of Directive 2006/24 is set out in its Article 1(1):
This Directive aims to harmonise Member States’ provisions concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks with respect to the retention of certain data which are generated or processed by them, in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law.
Article 5 of the Directive sets out the data to be retained. The categories are as follows (the details are set out under each category):
data necessary to trace and identify the source of communication;
data necessary to identify the destination of the communication
data necessary to identify date, time and duration of the communication;
data necessary to identify the type of communication;
data necessary to identify users communication equipment or what purports to be their equipment; and
data necessary to identify location of mobile communication equipment.
Article 8 provides that “Member States shall ensure that the data specified in Article 5 are retained in accordance with this Directive in such a way that the data retained and other necessary information relating to such data can be transmitted upon request to the competent authorities without undue delay.”
To the untrained eye, it would be hard to imagine a more straightforward attempt to legislate for the purpose of collecting and retaining data for the purpose of police cooperation among member states, an activity that falls squarely within third pillar competence.
The difference in legal competence underpinning European legislation, i.e. whether the EC does it or the EU does it, is important. At the risk of oversimplification, the difference between EU (third pillar) and EC (first pillar) competence stems from the creation of the European Union as a ‘parallel institution’ by the member states of the European Community in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Through the EU, EC member states could agree to measures and common positions in areas for which they desired to retain more national sovereignty than they could through the EC. The ‘third pillar’ of the EU (Judicial and Police Cooperation, or ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ between 1992 and 1999) sets out those areas where member states, acknowledging the need for common action, were nevertheless reluctant to give over full sovereignty, as they had in 1957. For example, the member states agreed to surrender considerable sovereignty to the EC for the establishment of free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, but not for judicial and police cooperation, for which they created the ‘third pillar’. (For those curious but uninformed readers, the missing second pillar is Common Foreign and Security Policy).
An act under the third pillar cannot affect the ‘acquis communautaire’ i.e. that body of Community law binding all member states, which includes treaties, secondary legislation and ECJ case law. Third pillar actions cannot amend EC directives and retains ‘intergovernmental’ status, roughly comparable to a standard agreement under international law between totally sovereign states. It not subject to important structural principles of Community law such as supremacy (of EC law) and direct effect (on individuals). It is also significant that EU legislation (i.e. acts under the third pillar) requires unanimity making it more difficult to conclude, while TEC Article 95-based legislation may be passed by a qualified majority of votes in Council.
The reasoning behind the AG’s opinion favoring EC single-market legislative competence is puzzling. The opinion twists and turns through exemptions and retained national competences of earlier EC directives on the subject of data protection that Directive 2006/24 is designed to amend, and then, after acknowledging the stated crime-fighting purpose of the legislation, the AG supports his decision to view Directive 2006/24 as single market legislation as follows (paragraph 85):
In the absence of harmonisation, a provider of electronic communications services would be faced with costs related to the retention of data which differ according to the Member State in which he wishes to provide those services. Such differences may constitute obstacles to the free movement of electronic communications services between the Member States and may therefore create obstacles to the establishment and functioning of the internal market in electronic communications. They may, in particular, slow down the cross-border development of new electronic communications services which are regularly introduced in the information society. They may also give rise to distortions in competition between undertakings operating on the electronic communications market.
Totally absent from the opinion is any mention of the importance with which the protection of personal data has been viewed by member states over the past three decades and within the legal structure of the European Community since 1995. This positivist approach to what constitutes a pivotal area of fundamental rights is in sharp contrast to the privileged position Europe has given to a growing body of human rights law over the past half century.
The Background of Personal Data Protection
Personal data protection in Europe is an important offshoot of the fundamental right of privacy as set out in the Council of Europe European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Art. 8), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 17) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (Art. 8). It has deep roots in post-WWII constitutions and legislation of EU member states, particularly Germany and France - two countries that have contributed heavily to the structure and substance of EC/EU law. As a human right, it is important to remember that privacy, along with other human rights, is a right that protects individuals from the State. The concept of ‘privacy’, as an instinct that drives us to walk off into a corner to talk on our cell phones or close the curtains when we are having sex has diluted the idea of privacy as a human right and made most of us associate it with our neighbors rather than the state. To understand the threat of having personal data lose the protection of the law requires that privacy be repositioned as a fundamental human right against actions by the state.
Concern for personal data protection was initially the result of a long-standing belief in Germany, where such protection began, that the facility with which pre-war abuses of human rights and personal dignity were carried out, was at least partly attributable to the excessive accumulation of personal data by the Nazi regime (made possible a purpose-built census designed for the regime by IBM in 1933). In the 1990s, the rapid growth of the internet, with its potential for instantaneous and universal dissemination of data, advanced telecommunications, and the new genetic and biometric technologies accentuated the need to protect the fundamental right of privacy in general, and the right to the protection of personal data in particular.
In 1995, the European Community undertook to protect personal data by enacting Directive 95/46. This Directive harmonizes the protection and free movement of personal data between member states in the context of the single market. It sets common standards of data protection so as to prevent national law from prohibiting the free movement of data among member states. It includes the proviso that personal data should not be sent to any non-member state unless it is established that the recipient state provides a similar level of legal protection to personal data.
Two years later, Directive 95/46 was joined by Directive 97/77 (on data protection in the telecommunications sector) and by Regulation 2001/45 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies (as distinct from the member states) and on the free movement of such data was enacted. This Regulation established a monitoring body, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), and sanctions for offenders. Like the two directives, it applies not only to data movement within the EU but to personal data sent to non-member states. Article 9 requires that ‘personal data shall only be transferred to recipients, other than Community institutions and bodies, which are not subject to national law adopted pursuant to Directive 95/46, if an adequate level of protection is ensured in the country of the recipient...”.
Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46 states that “This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defense, State security (including economic well-being of the State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.”
What we see in this article is a line being drawn between EC competence, i.e. that which the EC can rely on to enact legislation in connection with harmonization for purposes of constructing a single market, and EU competence, in areas of public security, defense, etc., and member state criminal law competence. Titles V and VI of the TEU are the second and third pillars, respectively. The inclusion of economic well-being of the state is interesting but deserves further attention than the scope of this essay offers.
Under these two Directives, the collection of and access to personal data is limited in use and duration to legitimate purposes for reasonable periods of time. Holders of such data are prohibited from sending it outside the EU to any country which does not have similar data protection laws. Following the enactment and implementation of the Directives in the member states, strict limitations were therefore placed on data collection and retention as well as on transfer of personal data to non-member states.
Globalization, 9/11 and the Decline of Personal Data Protection
Europe does not live in a vacuum, however, and events subsequent to 1995 were soon to test the strength of personal data protection in the EC. The unfolding in the 1990s of ‘globalization’ with its expanding communications technology and its facilitation of transnational crime and then the events of September 11, 2001, introduced serious threats to many individual rights once believed to be central to the self-image of western countries, among them the protection of privacy. The US ‘war on terror’ and overriding claims of ‘national security’, especially in their international manifestations, combined with heightened interest in preventing and prosecuting criminal activity ranging from drug and human trafficking to economic crimes such as intellectual property offences. This exacerbated the fundamental tension between state (and economic) interests and individual privacy in Europe as well as in the US (as seen in the wiretapping escapades of the National Security Agency).
In November 2001 the US enacted legislation requiring all air carriers to provide the US customs authorities with access to extensive electronic data on all passengers entering or leaving the US (passenger name records, or PNR). Such data once obtained could effectively be retained and circulated for the lifetime of the data subjects. Initially, the EC Commission advised the US that transferring such data would conflict with EC and member state data protection laws, particularly since the US has no data protection laws, let alone laws on the level mandated by Directives 95/46 and 97/77. US pressure on Brussels, combined with the threat to fine all airlines $6000 per passenger entering the US without the requested data, led the EC Commission to issue a Decision to the effect that they were satisfied that the data protection required by Directive 95/46 existed in the US. This was designed to open the way to an agreement whereby data on all passengers entering the US would be provided by the airlines. No provision for extracting data on US passengers entering Europe was requested, and none was given.
Again, it is important to note that the US effectively has no data protection legislation (the first US state to enact such legislation was California, in 2003). Nor does it claim to have such protection. Quite the opposite: data is seen as a valuable commodity which is readily transferred, bought and sold in the ‘free market’. Individuals’ rights regarding the data held on them is effectively limited to finding out what data is held, and potentially correcting it where it is found to be in error. This right is limited to US citizens. The US made no claims that the data would not be distributed among relevant agencies, and stored by private companies under the all-pervasive ‘privatization’ policies of the current US government. Opposition to this arrangement was widespread among data protection activists in Europe, however, and no formal agreement was signed at that time.
By early March 2004, however, noting “The fight against terrorism, which justifies the proposed measures” to be “a key priority in the European Union” and seeking to alleviate the “uncertainty of air carriers and passengers and their financial interests” in the absence of a concrete agreement, the Commission issued a Decision to enter into an agreement under which airlines would be authorized to provide the personal data requested by the United States. The European Parliament almost immediately requested a new Decision that would guarantee passengers the fundamental right of protection of their personal data. Failing to obtain such a Decision, the Parliament along with the EDPS brought an action before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against the Council (the EC institution that votes on all legislation) to annul the Decision on the basis that the EC had no competence to enter such an agreement, that it breached the fundamental principles of the Directive on data protection, and that it violated fundamental rights of individuals as well as the EC principle of proportionality (a basic principle of EC law which restricts acts of the Community to what is necessary and proportional to the legitimate goal to be achieved in a democratic society).
To make a long story short, the ECJ set aside the decision on adequacy of US data protection on the basis that the goal of collecting the data, i.e. security and criminal law, fell outside the data protection Directive’s purview, as stated in the Directive itself and set out above. Thus, said the Court, the need to evaluate whether the comparable protection required in the directive exists in the US never arises. The Court also found that the EC Treaty did not in fact provide an adequate legal basis for the Commission to enter into an agreement with the US to transmit personal data. The ECJ therefore found no need to decide whether or not fundamental rights would be violated by the Agreement. The so-called Agreement was a dead letter.
The EU remained under pressure from the US, however, and proceeded to assure the US that it would comply with its requests. In its capacity as the “EU” (or, lack of capacity, since the EU, unlike the EC, has no legal personality to enter into an agreement, though this didn’t seem to bother anyone) it entered into an agreement to provide the data, such agreement to be given legislative effect by an EU Framework Decision assuring the compliance of all EU member states. The Agreement was signed on 23 July 2007. A week later, (according to EU doc. No. 12307/07, linked to Statewatch website) the US Dept. of Homeland Security requested that all negotiation documents related to the PNR Agreement be kept secret for ten years.
As the deadline for European compliance with US demands approached in 2007, and perhaps worrying the European population might be bothered by giving up so much (data and protection) and receiving so little (for throughout the negotiations it apparently never occurred to the EC or the EU to ask for reciprocal surrender of personal data of incoming passengers), the EU itself decided to institute its own PNR for passengers entering the EU. It began discussing plans to move beyond air traffic and impose such requirements not only on virtually all forms of travel into the EU, but even within the EU itself.
Although plans to extend the requirements to non-air travel have been put on hold, on November 11, 2007 the EU issued a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record for Law Enforcement Purposes (COM 2007 (0654) final). Preempting claims that this violated fundamental rights, the opening sentence of the proposal states that ‘Terrorism constitutes one of the greatest threats to… fundamental rights”. Noting that Directive 2004/82 already requires airlines to communicate Advance Passenger Information (API) to member states’ authorities, it bemoans the fact that this is “sufficient only for identifying known terrorists and criminals”. What it claims to need is a tool to carry out risk assessments of the persons, for obtaining intelligence and for making associations between known and unknown people.” (Rumsfeld lives.) The proposal provides for retention of the data for 15 years and the only restrictions placed on transfer to third countries is that “(a) the authorities of the third country shall only use the data for the purpose of preventing and fighting terrorist offences and organized crime and (b) such third countries shall not transfer the data to another third country without express consent of the Member State (Proposed Article 8). Thus every member state would collect data on all passengers, and such data could be shared with third countries subject only to these restrictions. This is a far cry from the recognition, a mere 15 years ago, that entities, including states, collecting too much data have tended to abuse the data at the expense of individuals and fundamental rights. It is a far cry from Directive 95/46, which allocates competence to collect data for the purpose of state security, etc. to the full sovereignty of the member states.
The 2006 Directive
Meanwhile, back in the EC legislative theatre and pursuant to abovementioned rise in concerns about ‘state security’ and the ‘war on terror’, the EC passed Directive 2002/58 limiting the scope of the protection of personal data afforded in the original 1995 Directive. Article 15 of this 2002 Directive limited the right to data protection by enabling member states to restrict such rights “when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defense, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system”. In essence, it allowed states to “adopt legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds laid down in this paragraph”. Notable here is the expansion of state powers from doing what is necessary to pursue terrorists to other unrelated acts including mere ‘criminal offences’ and unauthorized use of electronic communication systems.
There was little reaction to this 2002 Directive, however, and in 2006, Directive 2006/24 (the subject of the recent legislative competence decision by the AG) was enacted to amend the 2002 Directive by mandating data retention. Initially put forward by four countries to be adopted under EU third pillar competence (i.e. judicial and police cooperation, which as mentioned above requires unanimity and is not subject to the principles of EC law), it was seized upon by the Commission and passed as a Directive under the same competence as the earlier and now defunct agreement between the EC and the US, i.e. Article 95 for matters pertaining to single market.
It is this competence that was questioned by Ireland, and it is this competence that was accepted by the Advocate General in last week’s decision.
Limiting Privacy in the State, the Community, and the Union
Anyone who follows the issues of privacy in Europe cannot help but notice that the decline in protection afforded the individual from the prying eyes of the state has been precipitous in recent years. Only Germany for example, among the 27 member states of the EU, found the introduction of ‘body scanners ’ i.e. full exposure to border officials of passengers’ naked bodies, to be an affront to human dignity (a concept itself enshrined in the German constitution). For the others, as for the US where the practice began, ‘national security’ seemed to justify the gross invasion of privacy of this ‘strip search’ technology. In its defense, it should be noted that European Parliament (the least powerful of all EC institutions) voted in October 2008 in favor of a Resolution alerting the EC to the potential for violation of both fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality (a general principle of Community law, similar to ‘ultra vires’ in the Common law, which restricts the powers of the EC to what is necessary and proportional in a democratic state to achieve its legitimate aims) entailed in such technology.
This decline the right to privacy is particularly marked in the UK where a database containing information on all individuals within the UK (this is separate from the communications database discussed in the opening paragraph of this essay), ranging from DNA and biometrics to data contained in various government databases, was recently proposed. The EU is itself about to embark on similar, if less invasive, projects. These include the Internal Market Information System, or IMI through proposed EC Directive 2008/49 (where the Commission relies on a previous decision of its own as a basis for legislative competence, much to the concern of European Data Protection Supervisor), and the EU Framework Decision on European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS).
Government access to individuals’ private records and documents has taken a great leap forward on both sides of the Atlantic. While personal data has never been subject to protection in the US, the recent US judicial recognition of the legality of the practice of allowing US border officials to take and copy hard disks of air passengers received little or no official comment in Europe. European companies fearing exposure of trade secrets, employee or contact information or other confidential data simply advise employees traveling to the US to go with empty computers and download documents necessary for their business upon arrival. Even this may not protect personal data and information contained on private hard disks, however, if last week’s opinion by the Advocate General is upheld by the European Court of Justice and national measures like the UK ‘blackbox’ data base plans become law.
No Wonder Ireland Voted No
Last week’s opinion by Advocate General Bot to the effect that EC Directive 2006/24, forcing member states to require Internet Service Providers to collect and save personal data of their customers, was properly passed by the EC under its treaty competence for building a single market will, if followed by the ECJ, provide just one more indication of a reversal of individual privacy rights built up over the past fifty years.
The fact that measures to limit data protection rights are now being taken at the European level, and thus subject to neither national constitutional nor electoral challenges, is doubly worrying. Such measures are unchallengeable once treaty competence to enact them is established. Ironically, the Charter on Fundamental rights with its Article 8 protection of personal data is inoperative until the Lisbon Treaty comes into effect. Rejecting Ireland’s challenge to what seems on the face of it to be an obviously flawed legislative competence might not be the best way to gain support (from Ireland or any other member state given the opportunity to voice its opinion) for a Treaty that would place even more unbridled power in Brussels.
This recent Directive mandating data retention by internet service providers, combined with the extensive personal data on Europeans to be transferred to the US under the PNR and thereby set free to roam along the free market highways of North America do not paint a happy picture of personal data protection under European law.
It would seem clear, from a perspective of fundamental rights, particularly in light of the fact that such limitations on access to personal data arose directly out of one of the most horrific periods of state excesses in the history of Europe, that at a bare minimum legislation to reduce protection should only be undertaken unanimously (which is required at the EU level, unlike single market competence that AG has found sufficient, which requires only a qualified majority). While the question posed in this ECJ case was a narrow one, i.e. can legislation aimed at preventing crime by mandating the retention of personal data by private actors, be based on the competence to enact single market directives, the underlying question of whether Europe still supports fundamental rights to data protection and privacy is paramount.
In an era where EU member states, most notably but not exclusively, the UK, are taking measures that invade the privacy of individuals to a degree inconceivable even two decades ago (including a national closed-circuit TV system estimated to photograph each UK inhabitant at least 300 times a day, with the suggestion that microphones be added in the near future, and the abovementioned proposed national database under which data is acquired without suspicion of wrong-doing or even the knowledge of the subject), individuals across Europe would be justified in expecting that their unelected officials in Brussels would at least make a show of protecting their rights, if only by refraining from duplicating these measures. Even if the European Court of Justice wisely rejects the AG’s interpretation of EC competence to mandate data retention, and hold that only the EU has such power under the third pillar, subject to unanimity and on condition of the enactment of protection currently lacking in the EU legal structure, it would still be questionable state action from the perspective of fundamental rights developed over the past half century.
It is encouraging that the European Data Protection Supervisor has recently issued an opinion putting forth yet again his worries and suggesting the installation within the EU legal system a set of guarantees to compensate for the lack of a comprehensive legal framework on data protection in the field of cooperation between police and judicial authorities. But the forces, internal as well as external, in favor of reducing personal data protection are formidable.
“National security” and the “War on Terror” have taken the entire western legal order into dangerous territory in terms of reversing advances human rights law has made since its inception after WWII. Even in the United Kingdom, which all agree has the most pervasive system of privacy-invading technology on the planet, no reduction in criminal activity has been noted since these measures were instituted. Initially designed to weed out ‘terrorists’, this movement now feels justified to undertake full-scale surveillance over all individuals. And it is not just the chilling effect of ubiquitous state surveillance that is at issue in these developments. Corporate economic interests, including but not limited to intellectual property holders, have ‘caught the coattails’ of (and quite possibly been one of the forces behind, but that is for another essay) this onslaught on privacy. Once the state has full access to our personal data, communicated or stored in our hard disks or held by internet service providers, no one is safe and given what we have seen over the past few weeks in terms of states’ ability or will to guard the basic interests of their citizenry, there is no reason to believe that good faith will prevail.
Virginia Keyder teaches European Union law at Bogazici University and Sabanci University in Istanbul, Turkey.
November 10, 2008
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