Russia’s landmark deal to supply China with natural gas via pipeline over 30 years will have profound impacts globally and create a new price benchmark that may pressure other producers, as consumers choose from a variety of supply sources, according to analysts. OAO Gazprom on Wednesday clinched a contract with China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) to sell an estimated $400 billion worth of gas over 30 years beginning in 2018 (see Daily GPI, May 21). By the end of this decade, Russia could be supplying almost 10% of China’s gas supplies. The deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year via pipeline is priced at around US$10.00/Mcf, versus a current price of $14.00-15.00 for Asia Pacific imports, close to what most European utilities have agreed to pay over the past two years under discounted long-term contracts. “We, Russia and Gazprom, have discovered the Asian gas market for ourselves,” said Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller on Thursday at a forum. The transaction “will influence the whole gas market,” pressuring LNG projects in North America, Australia and Africa. Several analysts agreed that the partnership is a landmark for the global gas market. The compact “sets a new benchmark for what China is willing to pay for natural gas over longer-term contracts,” said Fitch Ratings. Asia liquefied natural gas (LNG) spot prices today are about $13.70/MMBtu, versus U.S. prices of about $4.50 (Henry Hub). “The deal changes the level playing field,” Societe Generale analyst Thierry Bros wrote. “China has now secured some new gas at a competitive price,” which means LNG shipped after the pipeline is completed “would need to be competitive.” China “now has a powerful stick with which to beat down LNG prices…They can tell their LNG suppliers ‘either you bring your price below Russian piped costs, or we will install a second line from Russia and cut you out.’” Russia “has thrown down the gauntlet to LNG producers courting Chinese buyers,” said London-based Timera Energy Director David Stokes. “Russian pipeline exports, which look to be competitively priced versus LNG, are set to have a material impact in eroding Chinese LNG demand. There is likely to be an important knock-on impact on the global LNG supply and demand balance, given the central role China plays in growth projections.” Expanding Gazprom’s Reach For Gazprom, the deal also gives it a brand-new market that’s roughly the size of Europe, said Wood Mackenzie Ltd.’s Stephen O’Rourke. Russia now supplies about one-third of Europe’s gas supplies, but more important, about 80% of Gazprom’s revenues are from Europe. “With European gas demand growth uncertain and the Ukraine crisis leading to calls for Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian gas, Gazprom now needs a ‘new Europe’ — enter China,” said O’Rourke. Gazprom could increase export volumes to China without affecting its ability to deliver to existing European customers, by developing untapped reserves in eastern Russia, said Fitch Managing Director Alex Griffiths, who heads natural resources and commodities. “Some have portrayed the deal as Russia turning away from Europe, in light of the ongoing situation in Ukraine. While it certainly begins to give Gazprom options in where to export, the company’s challenge historically has been to find ways to monetize its 23 trillion cubic meters of reserves at acceptable prices — and the best scenario for the company is an increase in production. “The deal is therefore positive for Gazprom’s medium- to long-term prospects, especially if it opens the door for a further deal to sell gas from its developed western fields to China in due course…” The price Russia fetched may be comparable to that of Gazprom contracts with Western Europe customers, but it’s “far above the prices at which gas can be sold in Russia,” said Griffiths. “A key difference is that gas to be sent to China will come from largely undeveloped fields, implying a significant upfront investment, which President Putin announced as US$55 billion. The 38 bcm announced is equal to about a quarter of Gazprom’s annual deliveries to Europe.” Russia also has announced it may abolish the mineral extraction tax for gas fields that deliver gas to China, potentially adding even more to Gazprom’s bottom line, he said. Russia likely is looking well beyond China for customers. Rumors are circulating that a transaction similar to the one with China is being negotiated with India. Russia is building new facilities and expanding other LNG export plants on its Pacific coast, near Sakhalin Island, where ExxonMobil Corp. and others are partnering. ExxonMobil struck an alliance with Russia’s OAO Rosneft in 2011 (see Daily GPI, Aug. 31, 2011). The pipeline to China would position Gazprom with leading Asia Pacific gas buyers, putting it at an advantage geographically over exports from North America and elsewhere. China Gas Demand Expected to Quadruple by 2035 However, the Asia Pacific region will need a lot of gas to keep up with demand. The International Energy Agency has predicted that China’s gas demand will quadruple by 2035. Russia exports will be a “drop in the bucket” as far as Asia Pacific’s thirst for gas, said Ziff Energy’s Ed Kallio, who directs gas consulting. “It doesn’t even come close. This doesn’t even scratch the surface.” And China hasn’t placed all of its bets on Russia, with large investments in gas schemes around the world, including British Columbia (BC), where a dozen-plus LNG export terminals are on the table. It’s also a big investor in Australia export projects. As well, China is planning to build at least 15 gas import terminals, which would make it the biggest gas importer after Japan. BC Premier Christy Clark said she didn’t think the Russia agreement would satisfy China’s thirst, nor its need to diversify supply. “I don’t think there’s a country in the world that today wants to depend on Russia as their sole supplier of natural gas,” said Clark. “Providing the assurance that we are not going to play politics with energy — I think that’s worth a lot to our potential partners out there, I think, especially China…We’ve certainly seen the way that Russia likes to do business these days, and we certainly know that the Chinese want a dependability of supply. We can supply that.” Calgary-based Talisman Energy Inc. CEO Hal Kvisle isn’t overly concerned about the deal pressuring Canada LNG. The former chief of TransCanada Corp. discussed the tie-up during a conference call during Talisman’s annual investor day. The quantity of gas directed to China isn’t enough “to swamp the market…It certainly doesn’t shut the door on LNG exports from Canada.” Woodside Petroleum Ltd. CEO Peter Coleman, whose company is Australia’s biggest gas exporter by volume, agreed that China would need a lot of gas from a lot of sources. Australia export facilities, including those backed by Chevron Corp., Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and ConocoPhillips, have faced huge cost overruns and labor shortages, but the backers haven’t signaled a slowdown. “China’s growth is coming off such a small base at the moment…It’s got a lot of headroom in it,” Coleman said. Wood Mackenzie’s Gavin Thompson, who heads Asia gas research, said the “comparisons with the development of Gazprom’s export business into Europe are clear, with almost identical population sizes between Northeast China and Western Europe. Gazprom’s exports to Western Europe first reached 38 bcm by the mid-1980s and have since increased to over 150 bcm into the whole of Europe. “We anticipate overall gas demand from China over the next two decades will grow more rapidly than that witnessed in Europe from the mid-1980s.” He said eight provinces in Northeast China would receive the East Siberian gas; the area has a population of around 360 million, roughly equal to that in Western Europe. The region also experiences “extremely cold winters and suffers from a shortage of indigenous supply options.” By 2025, Wood Mackenzie estimates that total gas demand from the eight provinces alone will reach 125 bcm; the Power of Siberia gas pipeline system would meet “over a quarter of regional gas demand by this time.” Without that eastern Russian supply, the region was facing increased reliance on imported LNG, Thompson said. Qatar, the world’s largest LNG producer, already is negotiating with CNPC and state-owned PetroChina Co. to supply 7 million metric tons/year (mmty); China now has long-term contracts for around 5 mmty. Major gas fields offshore Mozambique and Tanzania also hold promise. Too Much Gas? With gas reserves increasingly growing worldwide as unconventional drilling techniques improve, will there be enough buyers? “There will be more gas than needed, so those who get to the market first and cheapest will win,” said Sasol Petroleum International’s Ebbie Haan, managing director. There’s also the political strength that China and Russia gain through the gas alliance. “From the perspective of international relations,” said Thompson, “this deal also signals a deepening of energy ties between Russia and China. They now cooperate across a range of different commodities and have established a broad base for further increases in trade in oil, gas, LNG, coal and electricity.” The crisis in Ukraine, which has strained Russia relations with Europe and the United States gave “new urgency to the Russian desire to branch out to new markets,” said Credit Suisse analysts. “The implied price comes out at just under $10.00/MMBtu, but more importantly, provides China with something of a lever to cap ‘expensive’ LNG.”
Sunday, May 25, 2014
Saturday, January 29, 2011
Oyster - the world's largest working hydro-electric wave energy device
The world’s largest working hydro-electric wave energy device has been officially launched in Scotland. Known as Oyster, the device, stationed at the European Marine Energy Center (EMEC) Billia Croo site near Stromness, was installed this year and is, at present, the world’s only hydro-electric wave energy device which is producing power.
Oyster produces power by pumping high pressure water to its onshore hydro-electric turbine which feeds into the national grid to power homes in nearby Orkney and beyond.
The device is wave energy company Aquamarine Power’s first demonstration-scale wave energy device. The company believes that a farm of 20 Oysters would provide enough energy to power 9,000 three bedroom family homes.
Oyster is designed to capture the energy found in near-shore waves in water depths between 10-16m (33-54ft). There are minimal moving parts and all electrical components are onshore, making it robust enough to withstand the rigors of Scotland’s harsh seas.
Speaking at the launch, Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond MP, MSP, who was given the honor of switching on Oyster, said: “I’m delighted to see first-hand the full-scale Oyster now installed and operating offshore. This is a key milestone for Aquamarine Power and for Scotland’s marine renewables sector.
“Scotland's potential renewables capacity is estimated to be around 60GW. Our waters hold around ten percent of Europe’s wave power potential and as much as a quarter of its tidal power potential. The EMEC provides world-leading test facilities for Aquamarine and other companies to develop the technology needed to harness this huge untapped potential.
“I am delighted to confirm further R&D funding of almost £1m (US$1.66 million approx.) to Aquamarine Power for the development of Oyster 2, which could be installed within two years.”
Minister Salmond added that the Scottish Government was working to ensure it capitalized on its rich natural resources that would help it meets its ambitious climate change targets and would create more high-skilled green jobs. The marine energy industry could provide as many as 12,500 jobs, contributing £2.5 billion (US$4.1 billion) to the UK economy by 2020. Marine energy such as that produced by Oyster has the potential to meet up to 20 per cent of the UK's energy demands.
Chief Executive Officer of Aquamarine Power, Martin McAdam, said: “This is a fantastic day for the wave energy industry and for Aquamarine Power. We have proved what we always believed – that wave energy can produce sustainable zero-emission electricity to power our homes. The UK has one of the best wave resources in the world. Now it also has the best technology.
He said that with the additional funding, Aquamarine Power would press ahead with the development of next-generation commercial-scale Oyster.
“This is exactly the kind of support the industry needs. With continued support of this nature we can help decarbonise our electricity supply and build a major, world-beating industry here in the UK.”
Managing Director of EMEC, Neil Kermode, said EMEC was delighted to see Oyster up and running.
“I look forward to Oyster being joined by many more machines in the coming years,” he said.
Its performance will now be monitored and the results from the testing will provide a basis for the design of the next-generation commercial-scale Oyster.
Watch a short video of Oyster in situ here or see an outline of how it works below:
Breakthrough promises $1.50 per gallon synthetic gasoline with no carbon emissions
UK-based Cella Energy has developed a synthetic fuel that could lead to US$1.50 per gallon gasoline. Apart from promising a future transportation fuel with a stable price regardless of oil prices, the fuel is hydrogen based and produces no carbon emissions when burned. The technology is based on complex hydrides, and has been developed over a four year top secret program at the prestigious Rutherford Appleton Laboratory near Oxford. Early indications are that the fuel can be used in existing internal combustion engined vehicles without engine modification.
According to Stephen Voller CEO at Cella Energy, the technology was developed using advanced materials science, taking high energy materials and encapsulating them using a nanostructuring technique called coaxial electrospraying.
“We have developed new micro-beads that can be used in an existing gasoline or petrol vehicle to replace oil-based fuels,” said Voller. “Early indications are that the micro-beads can be used in existing vehicles without engine modification.”
“The materials are hydrogen-based, and so when used produce no carbon emissions at the point of use, in a similar way to electric vehicles”, said Voller.
The technology has been developed over a four-year top secret programme at the prestigious Rutherford Appleton Laboratory near Oxford, UK.
The development team is led by Professor Stephen Bennington in collaboration with scientists from University College London and Oxford University.
Professor Bennington, Chief Scientific Officer at Cella Energy said, “our technology is based on materials called complex hydrides that contain hydrogen. When encapsulated using our unique patented process, they are safer to handle than regular gasoline.”
Thursday, July 29, 2010
What an energy-hogging China may mean for the U.S. and global politics
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/28/what_an_energy_hogging_china_may_mean_for_the_us_and_global_politics
JULY 28, 2010
What an energy-hogging China may mean for the U.S. and global politics
Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Wednesday, July 28, 2010 - 10:22 AM Share
By Matthew Acocella
Best Defense deputy bureau chief, East Asian energy bureau
The International Energy Agency announced last week that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world's largest consumer of energy, citing data showing that "China consumed the equivalent of 2.25 billion tons of oil last year, slightly above U.S. consumption of 2.17 billion tons. The measure includes all types of energy: oil, nuclear energy, coal, natural gas and renewable energy sources." Chinese officials moved quickly to dispute this assertion and questioned the IEA's calculations.
This pushback is predictable, according to Fereidun Fesharaki, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center and Senior Associate at CSIS. At a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies last week on "China and India's Energy Policy Directions," Ferashaki explained that China is loathe to take on the title of World's #1 energy user because it prefers the U.S. to be in the global hot seat. One fact particularly struck me: according to Dr. Fesharaki, China purposely waits until a lull occurs in the price of oil before it buys up large amounts for its strategic petroleum reserves, in order to avoid being accused of spiking the price of crude.
China's energy use is projected to continue skyrocketing over the next decade. It is currently the world's top emitter of global warming gases, but simultaneously investing the most of any nation into developing green technology. Whether this investment will yield any substantial emissions reductions over the next decade is up for debate. Critics note that China's efforts at carbon-capture and sequestration, a process that strips out harmful elements in released gases to be stored underground, is very expensive and requires a large usage of coal to fuel the process. With China's economy still developing, even substantial investments in clean technology may fail to bend the curve of its pollution.
Of course, China's energy needs have other geopolitical effects. When it comes to China's relationship with Iran in the wake of recent US sanctions and forthcoming EU ones... well, there's not much top surprising there. China will continue to do business with Iran, even with delays and setbacks caused by sanctions. "Despite political pressures, Chinese contractors could invest more than $10 billion dollars in the Iranian oil and gas sectors in the next few years," stated Ferekashi. Chinese corporations are also heavily invested in other of Iran's domestic industries. Iran is fortunate in that 60% of its energy use is domestically produced, continued Ferekashi, which perhaps will allows it to withstand sanctions longer. With China so heavily invested in Iran, will Sino-Iranian ties make Iran sanction-proof?
In sum, there is plenty here for Western nations to grapple with. China's insatiable thirst for oil and other energy sources will make shedding any pretense of modesty necessary as it becomes an increasingly aggressive player in the Middle East, Africa, and South America. Furthermore, its willingness to partner with rogue states even in the face of international pressure has the potential to undercut efforts to impose sanctions on bad actors. If a superpower like China has no qualms entering into agreements with the likes of Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the U.S. will need in the coming years to develop policies and incentives to counter these marriages of convenience.
Marc van der Chijs/flickr
EXPLORE:CHINA, ENERGY, IRAN, OIL SHARE THIS ARTICLE: Facebook|Twitter|Reddit
Monday, October 26, 2009
Fw: ビルマを荒廃させる「シュエ・ガス・オイル・プロジェクト」阻止を！世界一斉アクションへの参加のお願い
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ビルマ市民フォーラム メールマガジン 2009/10/26
People's Forum on Burma
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
在日ビルマ人の団体、アラカン民主連盟（亡命・日本）からのお知らせを転送
させていただきます。
（重複の際は何卒ご容赦ください。）
ＰＦＢ事務局 宮澤
http://www1.jca.apc.org/pfb/
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GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION
"No Blood for Gas"
On October 28,2009 Join Activists from Around the World
Stop the Shwe Gas and Oil Pipeline Project in Burma
ビルマを荒廃させる「シュエ・ガス・オイル・プロジェクト」を阻止する
世界一斉アクションへの参加をお願い致します。
きたる10月28日、ミャンマー軍事政権と中国政府が手を組んで
進めている「シュエ・ガス・オイル・プロジェクト」を阻止する、
世界一斉アクションを実施致します。このプロジェクトによる
ビルマ国内への深刻な影響への皆様のご理解と、我々と共に、
中国政府へプロジェクト中止を呼びかけるアクションへの参加を
お願い致します。
「シュエ・ガス・オイル・プロジェクト」は、エネルギー不足に頭を
抱える中国政府が主導して、ビルマ南部のヤカイン州沖合の
天然ガス田から、ビルマ国内を横切って、中国まで、天然ガスと
石油を届けようとするプロジェクトです。天然ガスと石油の輸送
パイプラインの建設によって、ビルマ国内への与える影響は、
深刻かつ甚大なものが予想されております。
我々ALD（アラカン民主連盟）は、中国政府等にプロジェクトの
中止を要請するべく、世界一斉に、各国にある中国大使館前で、
抗議アクションを実施致します。
このビルマの置かれている深刻な現実に目を向けて頂けますよう、
皆様のご理解とご協力をお願い致します。
★日本における抗議活動
日時：2009年10月28日 （水）14:00～16:00
場所：中国大使館前（中華人民共和国駐日本国大使館前）
東京都港区元麻布3-4-33
（地下鉄日比谷線六本木駅・広尾駅から徒歩15分）
目的：「シュエ・ガス・オイル・プロジェクト」への
世界一斉抗議アクション
主催：アラカン民主連盟（亡命・日本）
問合先：090-2525-1966、090-1779-6028、090-6310-4461、
090-4296-3490、080-3310-4233、090-4268-4367
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Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
By J J KIM Tuesday, September 8, 2009
While the Western world continues to debate whether economic sanctions can make change in Burma, the sale of gas to China from the offshore Shwe gas fields in Arakan State threatens to raise the junta’s revenue from foreign investment to new heights and strengthen business ties throughout Asia.
Furthermore, the parallel gas and oil pipelines, which are reportedly starting construction this month from Arakan State to Yunnan Province, China, via Magwe Division, Mandalay Division and Shan State, have been criticised by human rights groups as a major contributing factor to the recent conflict in northern Shan State.
According to a report titled “Corridor of Power” released by the Shwe Gas Movement (SGM), the pipeline will make the junta at least US $29 billion over the next 30 years. Much of this is expected to be spent on military expansion, despite the current famine in Arakan State and poverty across the country.
Source: Shwe Gas Movement
Moreover, the report claims, construction of the pipelines, which are being built primarily by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), is likely to lead to human rights abuse across the country and a “re-ignition of fighting between the regime and ceasefire armies stationed along the pipeline.”
According to Khur Hseng from Shan Sapawa, who has been researching the impact of the pipeline in Shan State since 2007, these fears were confirmed during the armed confrontation between the military government and the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in late August. The fighting took place just 50 km from the proposed pipeline route, killing 200 people and leading to a mass exodus of up to 30,000 civilians to China.
“The main objective of the SPDC is to clear all opposing forces from the area for development projects, including the Shwe Gas pipeline,” said Khur Hseng. “They are trying to clear the people who will be against the plans and control the area so the true information about the project can’t get out. China needs this as well because they limit their media too.”
According to Wong Aung, the international coordinator of SGM, despite reports from the Chinese media about the project’s commencement, in fact the risk of local opposition and conflict is too great for the project to make much progress this year.
“It is impossible to start now; maybe just some foundations in Arakan State or Magwe. Before they start they will have to clear out all political, ethnic and conflict issues on the border. They will have to deploy propagation in so many places along the pipeline first, to ensure security.”
The sale of gas and oil is currently the junta’s biggest earner, bringing in almost US $3.5 billion annually. According to the report, from 2013 onwards the Shwe Gas Project, which is headed by the South Korean company Daewoo International, will bring in close to another US $1 billion.
This has raised concerns among pro-democracy campaigners and analysts, who say the deal will entrench military rule in the country by financing the regime and strengthening their political clout in the region.
Wong Aung said “It will harm the democratic process if the regime continues to receive the revenue from this sector… . The regime is receiving that money and creating conflicts in the ethnic areas. Basically, institutional investors and companies who are supporting the regime's projects are damaging the stability of the region.”
According to Larry Jagan, a long-term observer of Sino-Burmese relations, “One of China's main concerns is natural resources, so any major project is important to them from an economic point of view.”
This is of particular significance with the pipeline agreement as it offers China an alternative trade route for oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East too. Until now, such imports have had to pass through the US-Navy controlled Malacca Strait taking seven days longer than they would through Burma.
“One thing that is apparent [from the recent conflict in northern Shan State] is that Burma holds the cards. The opposition thinks that China could influence Burma if they want to, but these projects give Burma the upper hand”
“Although economically important to China, Burma is also strategically crucial to China as it is its staunchest ally in Southeast Asia [and] opposed to US interests in the region.”
“There is no doubt that Chinese investment and Burma’s trade with the rest of Asia reduces the impact of Western sanctions,” Larry said.
Experience from past gas and oil developments in Burma have led SGM to believe that the pipelines will cause “forced labour, forced relocation, land confiscation and a host of abuses by soldiers deployed in the area.” According to SGM's report, there are currently an estimated 13,200 soldiers stationed along the pipeline route, mostly in areas that haven’t seen significant armed conflict for decades.
According to Naing Win of Kyauk Phyu Township in Arakan State, where the pipeline will begin, “Most people depend on fishing for survival, but they are prohibited by the navy to fish within 10km of the gas fields. The Navy often steal their fish and gas and oil and [harass] them outrageously.” Because of this, local people find it difficult to survive and provide an education for their children.
Another major concern is the threat of forced relocation of civilian families to make way for the pipeline and other related infrastructure. Stretching around 1,000 km in Burma, the pipeline will cut through many densely populated areas. According to Khur Hseng, “Thousands of people will be forced to leave their homes in Shan State alone.” Recent projects in the region, such as the Tasang Dam, have forced hundreds of thousand of men, women and children into the jungle and to other countries to start a new life.
As the report highlights, while the regime’s profits from the export of electricity and fossil fuels become increasingly lucrative, civilian energy needs are persistently neglected. The national per capita energy consumption currently amounts to less than 5 percent of that in Thailand or China. Arakan State, the source of the gas, is not connected to the national grid and over 90 percent of the population still use candles for light and firewood for cooking.
While the junta continues to make war in ethnic regions and display no regard for civilian needs, many campaigners feel that change can only come when all foreign companies and financial institutions halt investment in such projects. Despite sanctions and Western rhetoric, both CNPC and Petrochina, who will distribute the gas in China, have received significant financial backing from the West in recent years, from banks such as Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs.
According to Wong Aung “The USA and EU need to re-impose stronger sanctions and consider a practical way to get a positive outcome because the regime has so many channels to oppose the sanctions compared with 10 years ago. While locally registered companies continue to gain financial backing from the USA and EU, sanctions are becoming just a notion for these governments.”
“I would like to raise this issue among foreign governments, companies and the various institutional investors involved in this project: they should support the democratic process for Burma,” he said.
JJ Kim is a freelance writer based in Thailand.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy. org
http://www.irrawadd y.org/article. php?art_id= 16740
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Israel launches world’s first hybrid solar power station
Photo takenon 24 June,2009 showsthe solarreceiver ofthe world’sfirst hybrid
solar thermalgas turbinepower stationat KibbutzSamar insouthernIsrael.
XINHUA
KIBBUTZ SAMAR, 25 June — AORA,
A leading Israeli solar energy technology company,launched Wednesday world’s first hybrid
solar thermal power station at KibbutzSamar in southern Israel.
This marked the first time that concentratingsolar power (CSP) stations can provide
environmentally-friendly power 24hours a day, according to AORA’s CEO,
Haim Fried. AORA’s “Power Flower” station, named due to its unique yellow tulip design, consists of a field of 30 tracking mirrors (heliostats) situated on half an acre of land.
Each of the station’s 30 heliostats tracks the sun and reflects its rays towards the top
of a 30 meter-high tower housing a special solar receiver along with a 100 kilowatt gas
turbine. The patented receiver uses the solar energy to heat air to a temperature of 1,000
degrees Celsius and directs this energy into the turbine, which converts the thermal energy
into electric power that will be fed directly into the national grid.
Xinhua
Monday, May 18, 2009
Burma building 13 hydropower plants - Xinhua
http://uaelp.pennnet.com/news/display_news_story.cfm?Section=WireNews&Category=HOME&NewsID=178088
May 18, 2009 (BBC Monitoring via COMTEX) -- [Xinhua "Roundup" by Feng Yingqiu: "Myanmar Works To Meet Growing Demand of Electricity"]
Yangon [Rangoon], May 18 (Xinhua) - Myanmar [Burma] has been working to meet its domestic demand of electricity, building up a total of 13 hydropower plants covering the power grids of the whole nation since 1988 when the present government took office.
Installed generating capacity of these established power plants now accounts for only 3 per cent of that of the whole country, said the editorial of Monday's official newspaper New Light of Myanmar.
On completion of other 35 ongoing hydropower projects, the editorial predicts that Myanmar will be able to fulfil domestic electricity demand in the future.
The newly-inaugurated hydropower plant, Shweli-1, on last Saturday represented one of the country's latest achievement in the aspects and the production of the plant is seen as being able to satisfy the nation's power demand to an extent.
Claimed as the biggest power plant of its kind so far, the Shweli-1, located near at Mantat Village, 27.2 km southwest of Namkham, northern part of Shan state, possesses an installed generating capacity of 600 megawatts (mw) which can produce 4.022 billion kilowatt-hour (kwh) yearly.
Shweli-1 also stands one of the three large-scale hydropower projects being implemented along the Shweli River.
Originating in China's southwestern Yunnan Province, the Shweli River winds its way around Muse and Namkham and then flows into Myanmar's Ayeyawaddy River.
The completed project reflects not only friendship between Myanmar and China but also mutual cooperation between the two countries, the editorial appraised.
In the very near future, another power plant, Yeywa, which is bigger than Shweli-1, is expected to emerge.
Up to now, all the hydropower stations across the country can generate more than 1,400 mw of electricity and the 35 ongoing projects could in the future add 32,900 mw or 79 per cent to its installed capacity.
These projects lie along the rivers of Ayeyawaddy, Chindwin, Sittoung and Thanlwin which are blessed with lots of water resources. Along the Ayeyawaddy basin are Yeywa, Shweli, Zawgyi and Mone creek projects, the editorial disclosed.
Meanwhile, experts estimated that with the country's total available water resources, up to 43,400 mw of the capacity could be produced.
Although Myanmar does not have enough electricity at present, it will in not-too-distant future, be able to fulfil its domestic demand, the editorial anticipated. With change in people's living condition and with the growing number of industries, the consumption of electricity across Myanmar has significantly increased year after year, calling for more efforts in the sector for national development and people are urged on their part to help develop the national economy by improving their business.
Source: Xinhua news agency, Beijing, in English 0412 gmt 18 May 09
Friday, May 15, 2009
Teamsters Call for Transparency at Chevron in Shareholder Proposal
http://sev.prnewswire.com/oil-energy/20090512/DC1548212052009-1.html
Proposal Focuses on Chevron's Role in Burma and Resulting Risks to Shareholder Value
WASHINGTON, May 12 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Representatives from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Simon Billenness, Co-Chair of the U.S. Campaign for Burma, gave presentations via teleconference today on the Country Selection Criteria shareholder proposal at Chevron Corporation, which goes to a vote at the company's May 27, 2009 annual meeting of shareholders.
The presentations focused on Chevron's role in Burma and the resulting risks to shareholder value, and the need for Chevron to be transparent about the standards used by the company in its assessment of high-risk countries for potential or continued investment.
Chevron, in partnership with Total of France, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, holds equity in the largest investment project in Burma: the Yadana gas-field and pipeline, which is reportedly the single largest source of income for the Burmese military regime.
Chevron's investment in Burma exposes the company to staggering legal, financial, political, and reputation risks and raises serious questions about Chevron's current policies and processes for evaluating and managing in-country operational risks.
The Teamsters General Fund is the lead filer of the Country Selection Criteria proposal, which asks Chevron to disclose the criteria under which it starts and ends investments in high risk countries like Burma. If adopted, the proposal would provide shareholders with the information they need to evaluate Chevron's procedures and policies in this area and make informed choices regarding Chevron's governance.
Described by the New York Times as "a super-specialist" in human rights and shareholder advocacy, Simon Billenness has over 15 years of experience helping institutional investors address key issues concerning human and labor rights, the environment, and country risk. He is a pioneer in shareholder engagement with companies operating in countries racked by conflict and under repressive regimes. His country and regional expertise includes Latin America, Burma (Myanmar), Nigeria, Sudan/Darfur, and China.
Simon Billenness developed his professional expertise as a Senior Analyst for Trillium Asset Management, Senior Policy Advisor for Corporate Engagement at Oxfam America, and Special Advisor with the Office of Investment at the AFL-CIO.
Billenness is a member of the Board of Directors of Amnesty International USA, where he serves as liaison to the Investment Committee and the Business and Human Rights Program. He also serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Campaign for Burma and the Unitarian Universalist Association Committee on Socially Responsible Investment.
Sunday, April 5, 2009
Daewoo Int'l extends Myanmar field exploration
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssIndustryMaterialsUtilitiesNews/idUSSEO3885220090403
SEOUL, April 3 (Reuters) -
South Korea's Daewoo International Corp said on Friday it had extended exploration rights to Myanmar's AD-7 oil and gas field despite other members of the project dropping out after the original exploration period ended in February.
Daewoo International (047050.KS) will have a 100 percent stake in the field under the new deal, from its previous 60 percent stake.
India's ONGC Videsh Limited had owned a 20 percent stake in the field, while another Indian firm, Gail (GAIL.BO), and state-run Korea Gas Corp (KOGAS) (036460.KS) each had 10 percent, it said.
(Reporting by Angela Moon; Editing by Jonathan Hopfner)
BURMA: China’s Thirst for Oil Ignores Environment, Rights
http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/04/03/burma-chinas-thirst-for-oil-ignores-environment-rights/
2009 April 3
tags: Human Rights, Junta, Burma, Gas, Thugs and Thieves, oilby peacerunningBURMA: China’s Thirst for Oil Ignores Environment, Rights
By Marwaan Macan-Markar
BANGKOK, Oct 31 (IPS) - The largest island off Burma’s west coast is emerging as another frontier for China’s expanding plans to extract the rich oil and gas reserves of military-ruled Burma.
Initial explorations by a consortium, led by China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), has left a deep scar on Ramree Island, which is twice the size of Singapore and home to about 400,000 people. ‘’They have destroyed rice fields and plantations when conducting the seismic surveys and mining the island in search of oil,’’ says Jockai Khaing, director of Arakan Oil Watch (AOW), an environmental group made up of Burmese living in exile.
‘’The local communities have been directly and indirectly affected,’’ he Said during an IPS interview. ‘’Hundreds of people have been forced to relocate as a result of the drilling conducted near their communities. The locals hate the Chinese; their world has become crazy after the Chinese arrived.’’
CNOOC has been pushing ahead with its work since early 2005, with no attempt to consult the local residents and showing little regard to such notions as corporate social responsibility, adds Jockai. The Chinese company, which is listed on the New York and the Hong Kong stock exchanges, has ‘’not conducted the required environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments that are recognised internationally as a must before exploration work begins.’’
To dispose the waste from its drilling sites, ‘’CNOOC workers dug shallow canals designed to carry the (toxic) ‘drilling mud,’ or wastewater containing oil, away from the drilling sites and into Chaing Wa Creek, which curves past several local farms before flowing into the Bay of Bengal,’’ states a report by AOW, released in mid-October. ‘’This arbitrary disposal can make soil in surrounding areas unsuitable for plant growth by reducing the availability of nutrients or by increasing toxic contents in the soil.’’
Concerns about the cost of letting China tighten its grip on the natural resources in Burma (or Myanmar) has also been expressed by other groups, like EarthRights International (EI), a U.S.-based group championing human rights. There are 69 Chinese companies involved in 90 ‘’completed, current and planned projects’’ in the oil, gas and hydropower sectors in Burma, EI revealed in groundbreaking report released in late September.
That number marks an over 200 percent increase in the number of Chinese energy developers thought to have had existed a year before. ‘’Given what we know about development projects in Burma and the current situation, we’re concerned about this marked increase in the number of the projects,’’ the rights lobby stated in the report, ‘China in Burma: The Increasing Involvement of Chinese Multinational Corporations in Burma’s Hydropower, Oil and Natural Gas, and Mining Sectors.
‘’China is using Burma’s military dictatorship to its advantage as it goes in search of oil and gas. There are no rules and regulations for Chinese companies to follow in Burma,’’ Ka Hsaw Wa, executive director of EI, said in an IPS interview. ‘’This will hurt the future of Burma.’’
Such criticisms come at a time when China has begun to show signs that the environment cost of its projects abroad cannot be ignored. ‘’The country lacked comprehensive environmental protection policies in its overseas projects, although investment had been expanding,’’ states a report released in mid-September by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP), according to the ‘China Daily’ newspaper.
‘’China’s overseas investment and aid mainly focuses on exploring oil and other resources, processing and manufacturing, and construction in African and Southeast Asian countries,’’ the English-language daily added. ‘’Without proper management, such projects are likely to cause environmental problems, the (CAEP) report said.’’
Burma, in fact, will prove to be an ideal testing ground, given that China emerged as the military-ruled country’s biggest investor in the country’s power sector. The money flowing in from such foreign direct investments and the sale of gas has helped to prop up a junta notorious for suppressing its people through many forms of abuse.
In 2006, the junta earned an estimated 2.16 billion U.S. dollars from sales of natural gas to Thailand, which accounts for close to half of Burma’s export earnings and is the single largest source of foreign earnings. In 2008, Burma is expected to earn 3.5 billion US dollars from export of gas, according to one estimate.
But little of these benefits trickled down to the country’s beleaguered people. Consequently, Burma ranks as one of the world’s least developed countries. And having an abundance of natural resources has not improved the power supply in the country for the people either. Regular blackouts are frequent in Rangoon, the former capital, and elsewhere.
The junta has profited in other ways, too, from China’s energy interest in Burma. ‘’Beijing has come to the junta’s rescue and protects it from criticism at international forums like the U.N. Security Council,’’ says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert teaching at a university in northern Thailand. ‘’A strong relationship of mutual benefit has developed since 1988.’’
In exchange for letting Chinese companies exploit its natural resources, the Burmese dictatorship has got military hardware from Beijing. They range from fighter jets and armoured carriers to small weapons, Win Min told IPS. ‘’The junta will open the country to China because the military regime needs Beijing more than the other way around.’’
(END/2008)
Thursday, April 2, 2009
Myanmar gets China's help for hydropower project
http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/energy/100077635-1-myanmar-gets-china%2527s-help-hydropower.html
YANGON, March 30 - China is to help Myanmar build a big hydropower plant on the River Irawaddy in the north of the country, adding to a string of joint hydropower projects, and a huge gas pipeline to China is also planned, officials in Myanmar said.
The latest hydropower project, under a deal reached with a Chinese delegation last week, involves a plant in northern Kachin State, at the confluence of the Malikha and Maykha rivers on the upper reaches of the Irawaddy.
Located about 20 miles (32 km) north of Myitkyina, Kachin's state capital, and about 50 miles (80 km) from the Chinese border, officials say the plant will generate electricity to be used domestically and for export.
Sources in the region have said that feasibility studies for the project were carried out last year around the confluence, raising concern about the possible relocation of nearby villages and the ecological impact.
To cope with growing demand, Myanmar has pushed ahead with dozens of hydropower projects across the country, mostly with the assistance of China, one of the few allies of the army-ruled Southeast Asian country.
At present 15 major hydropower projects are still being implemented.
On completion of these projects, total installed electricity generation capacity will be 10,400 megawatts. According to official data, total capacity in the whole country has been 1,690 megawatts since fiscal 2005-2006 (April/March).
PIPELINE
China said last week it had signed a contract with Myanmar to build cross-border oil and gas pipelines. [ID:nPEK68191]
A senior Chinese energy official said one project involved a gas and oil pipeline running more than 2,000 km (1,240 miles) through Ruili and Kunming in Yunnan province to Chongqing municipality in southwestern China.
It would help China cut out a long detour through the congested Strait of Malacca and strengthen China's access to rich energy reserves in Myanmar itself.
Officials in Myanmar said the pipeline would start from its western deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu Township in Rakhine State.
A senior Energy Ministry official told Reuters last year the consortium that had developed two major offshore gas blocks off Rakhine had already agreed to sell gas from the block to China through a pipeline.
Construction of the pipeline is scheduled to start in the first half of 2009, they said.
Located in the A-1 block off Rakhine, the Shwe gas field has proven reserves of 4 to 6 trillion cubic feet (TCF).
Myanmar has at least 90 TCF of gas reserves and 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil reserves in 19 onshore and three major offshore fields.
According to official data, Myanmar exported gas worth $2.53 billion, mainly to neighbouring Thailand, in fiscal 2007/2008 (April/March), up from $2.03 billion in 2006-2007.
Myanmar's gas exports in the first nine months of the current fiscal year totalled $1.78 billion.
Bangladesh to Develop Nuclear Power
http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/03/31/bangladesh-to-develop-nuclear-power/
2009 March 31
tags: Human Rights, world focus on Burma, Junta, Burmaby peacerunningDhaka: Bangladesh is keen to set up a nuclear power plant in the next decade with a 1,000 MW capacity with potential help from Russia, in order fulfill the demand for power in the country.
According to official sources, the power plant will be set up at Rooppur, which was previously set up by the then East Pakistan government for the same purposes.
Bangladesh recently received three initial proposals to set up the nuclear power plant from three countries - China, Russia, and South Korea - but Russia is at the top of the list and is eager to move ahead with the project under a bilateral agreement.
A Russian technical expert team arrived on Sunday in Bangladesh on a three-day visit to discuss the proposed power plant project with Bangladesh authorities.
Prior to the team’s visit, the Russian ambassador met with Bangladesh’s state minister for science and ICT, Mr. Yeafesh Osman, to discuss issues related to the project.
However, Bangladesh may face big challenges in mobilizing funds for the project due to the current global financial crisis. The project is likely to cost US $1.2 to $1.5 billion and take up to ten years to complete.
The nuclear power plant project was initiated in Bangladesh during the previous BNP government and the caretaker government that followed expedited the process to obtain a clearance certificate from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
According to sources, the Bangladesh caretaker government received technical and financial support from the IAEA to develop a site suitable for the plant, with the IAEA providing $366,000 for the site in Rooppur.
Bangladesh has also requested the IAEA to provide technical support to create a trained and skilled workforce for the project, the government source said.
Narinjara news
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Toshiba Said to Buy Majority Stake in Nuclear Fuel Company
http://asianenergy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
By Megumi Yamanaka
March 30 (Bloomberg) -- Toshiba Corp., Japan’s largest supplier of reactors, plans to buy a controlling stake in a nuclear fuel supplier to help compete with global rivals for new atomic power plants, officials said.
Toshiba’s Westinghouse Electric Co. seeks to buy more than 50 percent ofNuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. from Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd. andFurukawa Electric Co., said two officials close to the negotiations who declined to be named before an announcement. Yuichiro Horiba, a spokesman at Osaka- based Sumitomo Electric confirmed the talks and said the companies have yet to reach a decision.
Better access to fuel may help Toshiba win orders as competition with France’sAreva SA and an alliance between Hitachi Ltd. and General Electric Co.intensifies. Nuclear power generation is set to increase as developing countries led by China and India build more reactors to meet demand and cut carbon emissions blamed for global warming.
“It’s more profitable to package reactors with the fuel,” Fujii Tomoyuki, an analyst at Okasan Securities Co., said by phone from Tokyo today. “Customers don’t want to take risks associated with the nuclear fuel business, and offering them together will help win orders.”
Toshiba spokeswoman Hiroko Mochida and Furukawa spokesman Toshinori Kimura declined to comment.
The two officials didn’t say how much Toshiba may pay for the proposed stake. The Yomiuri newspaper reported yesterday that Toshiba will buy all of Nuclear Fuel Industries at a cost of more than 20 billion yen ($205 million).
Hitachi Venture
Toshiba wants to buy a stake in Nuclear Fuel Industries partly because of concern that the company may be pushed out of another fuel venture with General Electric and Hitachi, one of the officials said.
Toshiba and Hitachi each own 24.5 percent of Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co. while General Electric holds 51 percent. General Electric and Hitachi merged their nuclear energy business in July 2007, a year after Toshiba bought Westinghouse.
Toshiba, which is forecasting its first net loss in seven years, is focusing on nuclear energy as the global recession cuts profit from semiconductors, its main business. The company aims to win orders to build 39 reactors by 2015, it said in the mid-term business plan unveiled in January.
Shares in the company have tumbled 42 percent in the last six months,outpacing the 27 percent decline in the benchmark Topix index. The stock fell 8 percent to close at 263 yen at in Tokyo.
Nuclear Fuel Industries was formed in 1972 and sells atomic fuel rods to companies including Tokyo Electric Power Co. and Kansai Electric Power Co., the country’s biggest utilities. The company operates one plant at Ibaraki, north of Tokyo, and another in Osaka.
The world needs 32 new nuclear power plants a year to meet a goal of halving emissions by 2050, International Energy Agency Executive Director Nobuo Tanaka said in June.
India plans to add 40,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity by 2020, while China has increased its goal to 75,000 megawatts from a previous target of 40,000 megawatts, the Shanghai Securities News said today.
To contact the reporter on this story: Megumi Yamanaka in Tokyo
China, Burma to build cross border gas pipeline
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/1906-china-burma-to-build-cross-border-gas-pipeline.html
by Mungpi
Friday, 27 March 2009 21:09
New Delhi (Mizzima) - China and Burma on Thursday signed four contracts, which included the construction of a cross border oil and gas pipeline, Burma’s state-run media said.
The New Light of Myanmar, Burma’s official newspaper on Friday reported that the Burmese Energy Minister Brig-Gen Lun Thi and Head of China’s National Energy Administration, Mr. Zhang Guobao signed a cooperation agreement on the Sino-Burma Oil and Gas pipeline.
The other contracts include a framework agreement on Development of Hydropower Resources in Burma by China, a Memorandum of Understanding on Buyer’s Credit for Construction Projects between the Export-Import Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance and Revenue of Burma. Both China and Burma also agreed on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the two countries.
The contracts were signed between Burmese and Chinese officials, who accompanied Li Changchung, member of the politburo of the central committee of Communist Party of China (CPC), during his visit to military-ruled Burma.
According to the Chinese central government website, the Sino-Burma cross border gas pipeline is designed to link a port city in Burma with Kunming, capital of southwest China's Yunnan Province.
According to a Reuters report, Yunnan is to start construction of the pipeline in the first half as part of its 72 billion Yuan (S$15.9 billion) worth of energy projects this year.
The pipeline, according to a Sino-Burmese analyst Aung Kyaw Zaw, is strategically important for China as it could cut down on the detour of oil cargoes through the congested Malacca Strait and also strengthen China's access to Burma’s rich energy reserves.
Burma in December awarded China the right to buy oil from its offshore block–A gas field in the Bay of Bengal for a period of 30 years.
Aung Kyaw Zaw said Li’s visit to Burma, which is part of a four-nation tour, could also be to push Burma to implement the agreement.
“China is worried that Burma is delaying work on the gas pipeline construction,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw.
Li, during his visit to Burma, met several officials including the junta supremo Snr. Gen Than Shwe, and exchanged views on developing good-neighbourly and friendly ties between China and Burma, according to the Burmese state-run paper.
Western nations particularly the United States and the European Union have imposed stringent economic sanctions on Burma, restricting its companies from investing in the country.
But China, which has raised its voice against western sanctions on Burma, has been investing in Burma and has signed several contracts for business deals.
China and Myanmar seal gas export deal
http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20090327-131496.html
Fri, Mar 27, 2009
Reuters
BEIJING - A Myanmar gas consortium led by South Korea's Daewoo International has signed an agreement to sell natural gas to China, China's Xinhua news agency said on Thursday.
China and Myanmar plan to build oil and gas pipelines through Myanmar and into China's southwestern Yunnan province, bypassing the long journey around the Malacca Strait for oil cargoes and solving the problem of getting the gas to market, Chinese media have reported.
Few western companies will invest in the former Burma because of its poor human rights record and continued detention of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, which has led to a broad range of U.S. and European sanctions.
China, typically wary of supporting or imposing sanctions and one of Myanmar's few diplomatic allies, has shown no qualms about investing in its neighbour, eager for its natural gas, oil, minerals and timber to feed a booming economy.
Daewoo said last year it had picked China as a preferred bidder for natural gas from a project in Myanmar, putting it at the front of a queue that also includes India and Thailand.
Top Chinese officials have said that Beijing will encourage its energy companies to make more forays abroad to ensure the country's energy security, an even more important strategy than exploration at home.
Beijing also offered incentives such as cheap loans and tax breaks to energy firms to fund their foreign exploration. --REUTERS
Thursday, March 26, 2009
The Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia:
http://japanfocus.org/-Milton-Osborne/2448
Rivers, Dams, Cargo Boats and the Environment
Milton Osborne
When the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) released its list of the world’s top ten rivers at risk in late March, attention in Australia naturally focused on the fact that the Murray-Darling River system was one of those listed.[1] Very little attention was given in the Australian media to the other nine rivers so identified, which included the two longest rivers in the Southeast Asian region, the Mekong and the Salween. Both these rivers rise in the Himalayas in Chinese territory before flowing into Southeast Asia, and play a vital role for the populations in their basin areas; for the 60-70 million in the Mekong’s basin of nearly 800,000 square kilometres, and for the 6-7 million in the Salween’s basin of 272,000 square kilometres. The WWF’s claims about the risks facing the rivers it lists as ‘in danger’ are bound to generate controversy, with proponents of hydroelectricity sourced from dams bound to express scepticism. Nevertheless, current and future developments associated with both the Mekong and the Salween are certainly worthy of examination. For there is irrefutable evidence of the problems that can be caused by the construction of large-scale dams on previously free-flowing rivers. Moreover, a review of current developments associated with the Salween and the Mekong rivers is desirable at a time when environmental issues are increasingly a concern internationally. Such issues have particular relevance in Southeast Asia, both within individual countries and in terms of relations between individual Southeast Asian countries and their great neighbour, China.
Map 1: Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)
Source: International Rivers Network http://www.irn.org/img/nu/nu_map_pol.gif
In two Lowy Institute Papers, River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia (2004), and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia (2006), I discussed the many and complex range of relationships evolving between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours.[2] These relationships are multifaceted, involving politics, in the broadest sense, trade and economics, particularly as these relate to energy, and increasingly, for the mainland states, present and future environmental issues. A striking feature of all these relationships is the rapid pace of developments, so that snapshots of events taken at a particular moment rapidly become out-of-date. In this paper, and against that fast-changing background, I concentrate on two prominent current issues, principally involving China, Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand, and the Mekong and the Salween, as trans-national rivers.
The first of these issues relates to the controversies associated with plans for the construction of dams on the Salween River, the last free-flowing river in Southeast Asia; the second to developments associated with the greatly increased navigation of the Mekong River now taking place between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand. In the case of the Mekong, it is important to recognise that the rapid changes that have taken place in connection with navigation of the river should be seen as part of the much greater prospective changes to the river as a whole. These include the continuing program of dam construction being undertaken in China and new proposals which are contemplated in studies undertaken by the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Additionally, developments associated with various tributaries of the Mekong are a cause for concern. (These latter issues associated with the Mekong, and which are separate from the navigation developments, are discussed briefly in the Appendix to this paper.)
Long neglected outside the circles of advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the environment has increasingly become an issue of political importance in Southeast Asia and, now, in China.[3] While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that environmental concerns can, by themselves, determine government policy, there is no doubt that they have an importance that plays a part in decision-making, as demonstrated in the accounts that follow. The salience of this observation is given weight by the emphasis placed on environmental issues by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March 2007, when he said, ‘We must make conserving energy, decreasing energy consumption, protecting the environment and using land intensively the breakthrough point and main fulcrum for changing the pattern of economic growth.’[4] And in Thailand, a country which receives detailed attention in this paper, the environmental movement has played an increasingly active and politically important role for well over a decade, particularly in constraining the government from developing further dams to produce hydroelectric power within Thai territory.[5]
The Salween
Like the Mekong, the Salween River rises in Eastern Tibet at a height above 4,000 metres, where for several hundred kilometres it runs parallel to both the Mekong and the Yangtze, forming part of what is known as the ‘Three Parallel Rivers’ region. After passing through Yunnan, where it is known as the Nu Jiang, or ‘Angry River’, a reflection on the speed of its flow, it enters and flows through Burma. For a distance of some 120 kilometres during its passage through Burma it forms the national boundary between Burma and Thailand. It then resumes its course through Burma alone, finally emptying into the Gulf of Martaban at Moulmein. (For the purposes of this paper, I refer to the river under discussion as the ‘Salween’, when discussing its entire length and that section which flows through Burma and beside Thailand. I use the name ‘Nu’, or ‘Nu Jiang’ when discussing the river and its course in China. The river is also known as the ‘Thanlwin’ within Burma, a usage restricted to that country, but sometimes appearing in news reports generated in Burma but carried elsewhere.)
Although the second longest river flowing through Southeast Asia, the Salween at an approximate total length of 2,800 kilometres – this length is disputed, with some estimates giving its length as 3,200 kilometres – is much shorter than the Mekong (4,900 kilometres). The topography of the regions through which the Salween flows is sharply different from much of what exists along the Mekong’s course, particularly after the latter leaves China when it flows through a largely flat, immediately surrounding landscape. Until it reaches its delta in Burma, the Salween flows almost entirely through sharply rising gorges on either side of its banks. In Tibet and western Yunnan some of these gorges rise to a height of 3,000 metres above the river. Even in the region where the Salween flows between Burma and Thailand, where the height of the surrounding gorges is much reduced, the topography is such that it still provides an ideal physical setting for dam construction. (See Photograph 1 of the Salween taken at Ban Sam Laep, on the left [Thai] bank, where the river forms the boundary between Thailand and Burma.)
Photograph 1: Salween at Ban Sam Laep
Of great importance to any discussion of the Salween’s future as a prospective site for a series of dams is the rich biodiversity existing along its entire course. In addition there is a remarkably diverse set of minority ethnic population groups in the regions through which it flows, both in China and Burma. Indeed, the presence of ethnic minorities along the Salween in Burma has been the touchstone for the vigorous opposition to the plans for the construction of dams on the river from a varied range of advocacy NGOs, most particularly in Thailand. Both in Burma and in China there is concern among human rights advocates that dam building will lead to the displacement of populations. And this prospect, as discussed later, is seen by critics of the Burmese regime as yet another example of that government’s efforts to impose control over dissident minorities.
Map 2: Potential dam sites of the Salween River
Among advocacy NGOs concerned with environmental issues there has been considerable focus on the Three Parallel Rivers region already mentioned. This area was inscribed on the list of World Heritage sites in 2003 for its identity as the ‘epicentre of Chinese biodiversity’ which is ‘also one of the richest temperate regions of the world in terms of biodiversity’.[6] On the basis of a map published by the International Rivers Network, the designated Heritage area does not include the Nu itself, but rather is located close to the river’s right, or western bank, as well as taking in areas further east, close to the Mekong and the Yangtze. (See Map 1 entitled ‘Proposed dams along the Nu (Salween)’, showing the course of the Nu and the sites of proposed dams in China.)
In both Burma and Thailand, areas bordering the Salween are rich in reserves of teak. And as is the case with the Mekong, the Salween is a major source of fish -- many of which are migratory -- for the populations living by or close to it, particularly in the rich agricultural region of its delta.[7]
What is planned, and why?
The possibility of constructing dams on the Salween River to generate hydroelectric power has been under discussion for some time, certainly for well over a decade. The plans under discussion fall into two categories: those for dams to be constructed in China, and those to be constructed either within Burma or on that section of the Thai-Burma border formed by the river. For the moment, and as detailed below, substantial uncertainty remains as to just how many of the dams will actually be built. What is more clear are the reasons why there are plans to build them, and why these plans have excited opposition. In the case of the dams projected for the Nu in China, the available evidence suggests that these have been conceived in the planners’ minds essentially for the provision of power to industry within Yunnan province.[8]
While Yunnan province, with its high concentration of minority peoples, was neglected by the Chinese central government for many years, it is now seen as an important region in Beijing’s ‘Develop the West’ strategy. And in this regard, it is now targeted for industrial development, particularly around the provincial capital, Kunming. Developing dams on the Nu for hydropower accords with the reasons behind the construction of the dams that have already been built or are under construction on the Mekong. (The dam currently under construction at Jinghong, in southeastern Yunnan, will be an exception to this general rule since it is designated to supply power to Thailand when completed.)
Among the dams planned for Burma, or on the Thai-Burma border, two are to be located in the Shan State. One will be at Tasang — which may consist of two linked reservoirs — while another, so far simply designated as the ‘Upper Thanlwin hydropower project,’ will be constructed further north on the river. Its exact location has not been given in news reports. Both are projected to be connected to the Mekong Power Grid, a project promoted as one of the programs developed within the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) forum, with the backing of the ADB. Under this program, power generated by dams in Burma, China and Laos will supply electricity to Thailand and Vietnam. The dams planned for construction on the Thai-Burma border, at Wei Gyi and Dagwin, and possibly Hutgyi (also transliterated as Hut Gyi and Hatgyi), are projected to supply power to an even larger grid, the ASEAN Power Grid, a plan embraced by ASEAN with the goal of supplying electric power from a grid serving all ten member countries by 2011.[9]
China
Details of China’s current plans for dams on the Nu Jiang are not readily accessible, and the status of these plans is made more uncertain because of the lack of public information about the extent to which they are under reconsideration. The fact that there is this lack of information and uncertainty about Chinese plans is not surprising and conforms to a similar state of affairs in the early stages of the planning for dams on the Mekong. In the case of the Chinese dams on that river, very little was known about them outside of China until more than a decade after construction began on the first dam in the 1980s. This state of affairs reflects a Chinese view that it has no obligation to make public statements about developments within its own territory until a time of its own choosing. The account that follows is therefore open to qualification if and when new information becomes available.
It appears that a detailed proposal to build 13 dams on the upper section of the Nu was first put forward in 1999, by the State Development and Reform Commission. This were then elaborated in August 2003, when officials in Yunnan put forward plans which were subsequently approved by the central government.[10] The absence of information about the dams outside China was made strikingly clear when former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin admitted in December 2003, at a time when there was much public discussion about China’s plans for 13 dams on the Nu, that he had no knowledge of China’s intentions.[11] With the announcement of the plans it became clear that several of the dams would be located close to the Three Parallel Rivers heritage region, and their construction was set to involve the relocation of some 50,000 people.
To the considerable surprise of outside observers, the announcement that dams would be built on the Nu brought an unprecedented series of protests from within China itself, including from the Chinese Academy of the Sciences, two prominent Chinese NGOs, the China Environmental Culture Association and Green Watershed, as well as some prominent individuals. And an even greater surprise followed, given China’s poor record on showing concern for environmental issues, when the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, announced at the beginning of April 2004 that the plans to build 13 dams would not proceed and that the project was to be reconsidered.[12] Nevertheless, and without any further official statements having been made, a range of reports suggested that plans remained for four dams to be built on the Nu. In the absence of official statements it is necessary to rely on press reports in an effort to identify which dams were still likely to be built. And it may be that five, rather than four dams, will still be built.
So, despite the unavailability of firm information about China’s plans, it would certainly be wrong to assume that they have been completely shelved. There is evidence that officials in Yunnan were not reconciled to the announcement by Premier Wen, at least in the period shortly after he made it. According to an Associated Press report from 9 April 2004, the director of the Nu River Power Bureau in Yunnan, Li Yunfei, stated that he had not heard of any changes to the plans to construct dams. While this may only suggest that decisions taken in Beijing sometimes reach outlying provinces very slowly, there are other indications that preliminary preparations, at least, continue along the course of the river.
A detailed report of a journey along the course of the Nu in China in 2006 makes clear that preparations of various kinds, apparently linked to future dam construction, continue to be made. Published in the online journal, The Irrawaddy, of 28 February 2007, Rudy Thomas gives an account of visiting 12 of the 13 sites originally designated as dam sites.[13] Despite his reference to having visited 12 sites, Thomas in his article only refers specifically to activities at five sites as he travelled upstream from just above the Burmese border with China: these sites were at Yan San Shu, Saige, Abilou (this toponym is clearly a misprint for Yabilou), Maji and Songta. At none of these sites was actual dam construction taking place, in the sense that dam walls were being erected. Rather, what Thomas describes appears to be work preliminary to construction, such as core sampling, road construction and tunnelling.
In his article Thomas provides information on the planned size of two of the dams, those at Maji and Songta, that is consistent with the details provided by the International Rivers Network, by far the most active of all international advocacy NGOs in relation to river issues (see Table 1). At Maji, located ‘north of the riverside town of Fugong’, the planned dam will have a 300 metre high wall and will displace 20,000 people. While at Songta, ‘just north of the border that separates the Nu River Prefecture and the Tibetan Autonomous Region’, the planned dam’s wall will be 307 metres high, with a reservoir stretching back 80 kilometres. If these details are correct, the two proposed dams are very large, with dam walls roughly the same height as the Xioawan dam currently under construction on the Mekong. The dam at Xioawan is frequently spoken of as set to be the second largest dam in China after the Three Gorges dam on the Yangtze. Another very recent reference to the Chinese dams on the Nu, in Asia Sentinel, states that Chinese construction crews ‘began the first efforts to dam the river this week’, that is, in the last week of February 2007.[14] Without further information, it remains unclear whether this report adds to the information provided by Thomas, or whether the reference is essentially to continuing preliminary construction works.
In contrast to the sizeable body of literature that exists discussing, and frequently condemning, the Chinese dams built on the Mekong for their predicted long-term detrimental environmental effects on the countries downstream of China, there has so far been little material published that analyses what dams built on the Nu will mean for the countries downstream of China: Burma and Thailand. The suggestion in the Asia Sentinel article cited above that the Chinese dams ‘are expected to raise government hackles in Rangoon’, is not borne out by other similar information or judgments. Given Burma’s extremely close relations with China, on which it is dependent in so many ways, it seems unlikely that the Burmese government would express a critical view of Chinese intentions, even if it did, indeed, hold concerns about the dams. At the same time, while NGOs which take an active role in relation to the proposed dams for Burma and Thailand make passing reference to possible developments in China, they have not developed arguments dealing with the possible effects of the Chinese dams in the downstream regions in the same manner as has been done in relation to the Mekong, and the effects on the countries downstream of China. Nevertheless, and when, as seems most likely, at least four dams will be built on the Nu, it is reasonable to expect that there will be more vocal and developed criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly in Thailand. This criticism is likely to be directed both at the possibility that Chinese dams will affect fish stocks in the river and at the human rights issues involved in population displacement.
There is little basis on which to assess China’s likely reaction to the protests that have been lodged in relation to the dangers to the heritage status of the proposed dams to be built in the Three Parallel Rivers region. As already noted, these protests have come from within China as well as from external bodies. The concerns expressed by the World Conservation Union were probably the most important of those coming from organisations outside China and which were considered at the twenty-ninth meeting of the World Heritage Committee meeting in Durban, in 2005. At that meeting the World Heritage Committee agreed to send ‘a reactive monitoring mission’ to evaluate the ‘progress made on the conservation of the property’, and to ‘assess the impact of planned dams on the outstanding universal values of the site, its integrity and downstream communities’.[15]
Before the monitoring mission made its visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, China submitted a statement to the World Heritage Committee, in January 2006, which stated that there were no plans for dams in the eight areas that make up the World Heritage site. The statement noted, however, that plans had been developed for hydropower stations (dams) adjacent to the site. Of these hydropower stations, to a total of 17, three were being considered for the Nu, with the others under study for the Jinsha (the upper reaches of the Yangtze) and the Lancang (Mekong) Rivers.[16]
Following their visit to the Three Parallel Rivers region, the two-person monitoring team, composed of a representative each from UNESCO and the World Conservation Union, reported that the Chinese authorities with whom they consulted indicated an intention to reduce the area of the heritage area that had been inscribed on the World Heritage List in 2003 by approximately 20%, and more particularly that:
While the Mission noted the repeated commitment of accompanying officials to applying stringent Chinese laws and policies towards protection of the World Heritage Site, the evidence of intrusions from mining, tourism and proposed changes to inscribed boundaries and the lagging release of hydrodevelopment plans, continues to raise concerns about the future integrity of the inscribed property. The existing mining operations within some of the inscribed properties also suggest the possibility of listing the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger.[17]
At the Thirtieth Session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, in July 2006, and in the light of the monitoring mission’s report, the committee noted that although Chinese officials had given assurances that any future dams would not affect the World Heritage Site, this could not be corroborated since the mission’s members were not given any Environmental Impact Assessments or maps relating to the proposed dams that China intends to build. In addition, ‘evidence from maps, the inspection of hydro-power development exploratory works, unclear boundaries and advice on proposed dams in the vicinity of the World Heritage property suggest that direct and indirect impacts of dam construction on the property may be considerable’. Concluding that China’s positive conservation measures ‘are regrettably overshadowed by grave concerns about the, as-yet unreleased, plans for hydro-development’, the Committee called on China to submit a report by 1 February 2007 giving details on its plans for dams within the Site area.[18]
To date, I have not been able to find evidence that China has submitted the report the UNESCO committee requested. A lengthy report in the China Youth Daily of 17 July 2006 suggested that there was disagreement between national and local authorities about the possibility of building dams in the Three Parallel Rivers region, and that no ‘national approval’ had been given for the construction of dams on the Nu.[19] If reports such as those already noted suggesting, at the very least, that preparatory work for dam construction is already taking place are correct, this could be taken to mean that concerns to develop hydropower have trumped conservation considerations. If so, there is the likelihood that China will endeavour to retain the Three Parallel Rivers region’s heritage classification by excising the areas closest to the Nu, and other rivers from it. Whether this will be acceptable to the UNESCO Committee is difficult to assess, as is the degree of Beijing’s concern not to alienate international feeling as the 2008 Olympics draw ever nearer. The China Youth Daily reporter chose to be optimistic in concluding his article cited above with the comment that:
In the end the World Heritage Convention (sic) did not use its ‘yellow card,’ giving everyone a chance to rest a little easier, though we hope that at the next convention we will hear some good news about the Three Parallel Rivers Region.
Yet to conclude in this Panglossian fashion that ‘all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds’ may neither be justified, nor a reliable index of central government thinking on environmental issues. The World Heritage Committee appears to act in an essentially apolitical fashion in placing sites on its endangered list, and there is no certainty that it will not be ready to act in the same way in relation to the Three Parallel Rivers region. At the same time, and just as Wen Jiabao’s decision in 2004 to halt plans for the construction of 13 dams on the Nu was a surprise to many observers, the emphasis placed by the Chinese premier on environmental questions in his recent address to the National People’s Congress on 5 March suggests that it cannot now be assumed that the central government will simply disregard the World Heritage Committee’s concerns.
Thailand
Until the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, Thailand was deeply involved in planning for the construction of five dams on the Salween -- three in Burma and two on the border between the two countries -- after the river flowed out of China. This involvement reflected Thailand’s growing energy needs and concerns on the part of its Electricity Generating Authority (EGAT) to avoid building dams in Thailand itself, where they had become a highly controversial issue. Discussions about these dams began in 1994 when Thailand signed a preliminary agreement to purchase electricity from dams on the Salween that would be built in Burma. (Prospective sites for dams on the Salween are shown in Map 2.)
It was not until December 2005 that EGAT and the Burmese Ministry of Electric Power signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the construction of a dam at Hutgyi, in Burma, as the first of five planned dams on the Salween, either in Burma or on the Thai-Burma border. Later, in September 2006, EGAT was reported as finally formalising plans for the five dams, and as having stated that previous plans were being discarded since they could have been regarded as Thai interference in Burma’s domestic affairs. Under the December 2005 agreements between Thailand and Burma, preliminary plans were drawn up for dams that would be constructed at Hutgyi, Tasang, and a further unnamed location in Shan State, in Burma, and at Weigyi and Dagwin, where the river runs between Burma and Thailand. With an estimated total cost of US$10 billion, the dams were projected to be able to produce 10-15,000 MW of power, with Thailand receiving up to 90% of the energy produced. The remaining 10% generated was to be provided free to Burma. As of August 2006 an agreement was in place for the first dam to be built at Hutgyi by the major Chinese construction firm, Sinohydro, partly with Chinese funding, with work set to begin in December 2007.[20]
The plans for the Salween dams, as they stood before the overthrow of the Thaksin government in September 2006, attracted vigorous criticism from advocacy NGOs, particularly those concerned with human rights, but also in relation to environmental issues. Prominent opposition political figures, such as former chairman of the Thai Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kraisak Choonhavan, were also active in condemning the planned dams.[21] The Tasang dam will, when constructed, be the largest dam in Southeast Asia, with a wall rising 228 metres and the capacity to generate 7,100 MW. During 2006 preliminary roadworks for access to the dam site at Tasang were carried out by a Thai real estate and construction firm, MDX. Now, in April 2007, reports have emerged stating that work has commenced on the dam proper. This news has coincided with the announcement of the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Burmese government and two Chinese firms for the construction of the Upper Thanlwin dam mentioned earlier in this paper, and which will have a generating capacity of 2,400 MW.[22]
Both the Tasang and Upper Thanlwin dam sites are in Burma’s Shan State, a region which has already experienced large-scale forced population relocation as part of the Burmese government’s concern to exercise control over dissident, and potentially dissident, minority populations. A variety of NGO reports estimate that up to 300,000 people have been forcibly relocated in Shan State over the past decade.[23]
Human rights issues, as these relate to ethnic minority dissidents, have also been raised in the case of the planned Hutgyi dam. The area in which the dam is to be built is home to members of the Karen minority, who have long opposed Burmese control, and there have been reliable reports of the Burmese government engaging in forced relocation of the population in the area as roads are built and villages are destroyed to make way for large-scale agriculture. One indication of the problems in the general Hutgyi area has been the increased flow of refugees across the border into Thailand. And as a sign of the militarisation of the area an EGAT employee engaged in survey work for the Hutgyi dam was killed by a landmine in May 2006.[24]
Following the military coup that ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin, the Energy Minister in the new interim Thai government, Piyasvasti Amranand, announced in October 2006 that he did not intend to go forward with the agreements reached between Thailand and Burma for the construction of five dams on the Salween. This announcement was greeted with surprise, but appears to accord with Piyasvasti’s reputation as an independent-thinking technocrat with well-established qualifications in the energy field. His independence was underlined by his decision to resign from his position as a deputy permanent secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office, in 2003, following policy disagreements that included energy issues, particularly as these related to Thaksin’s hopes to privatise EGAT. In making his announcement, Piyasvasti mapped out his own view of how Thailand should meet its future energy needs, placing greater emphasis that had previously been the case on purchasing energy from Laos and sourcing gas supplies from the Middle East and from Cambodia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Nevertheless, and despite Piyasvasti’s announced decision not to proceed with the agreements Thailand had previously reached with Burma in relation to the suite of dams on the Salween, it has become clear that his government is still committed to the Hutgyi dam on the Salween.[25] And as already noted, construction of a dam at Tasang with the involvement of a Thai construction company has apparently begun.
Beyond the fact that this commitment will continue to be contested by human rights groups, and recently formed the basis of a major protest by advocacy NGOs on 28 February, the policies being followed by the interim Thai government that has replaced the Thaksin regime are clearly less accommodating to Burma than those of its predecessor. This policy, characterised by Thaksin as ‘forward engagement’, looked to Thailand’s closer association with the Burmese regime in a range of economic activities, of which dams on the Mekong was one of the most important. Other areas in which ‘forward engagement’ was to define policies included the proposed involvement of Thailand in the exploitation of gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal and also in projected mining and logging ventures. Given the increasing readiness of some ASEAN members to criticise the State Peace and Development Committee (SPDC) regime in Burma, it will be of considerable interest to see whether this change in Thailand’s policies, with the decision to draw back in relation to the Salween dams as a key element, results in further pressure on Burma to make at least some gestures towards reform. There are few signs that this is likely.
Navigating the Mekong
When River at risk was published in 2004, clearance of obstacles to navigation in the Mekong River between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand had just been completed. This operation followed the signature, by China, Burma, Laos and Thailand, in April 2000, of the Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Mekong-Lancang River, which envisaged the eventual clearance of the river as far as the former Lao royal city of Luang Prabang. Despite the Environmental Impact Statement for the clearance program delivered in 2001 -- in which China had a major input -- being sharply criticised by outside observers, clearance began the following year. Financed entirely by China, and with the work largely undertaken by Chinese work crews, 23 separate rapids, reefs and other obstacles were removed from the river bed to make possible year-round navigation of the Mekong by vessels up to 150 Dead Weight Tons (DWT) as far as Chiang Saen.[26]
Although the original plan for this first stage of the clearance operation envisaged obstacles being removed from the river as far as the Thai river port at Chiang Khong (and its Lao neighbour located directly across the Mekong, Huay Xai), unresolved boundary issues have meant that a final, major set of obstacles just upstream from Chiang Khong remain ― the boundary issues involved appear to relate to concerns on the part of Thai authorities that the removal of these obstacles might affect the thalweg, which is the national boundary between Thailand and Laos, as well as affecting the territorial status of sandbanks that regularly appear in the river during periods of low water. For the moment, with these obstacles still in place, Chiang Kong effectively functions as a terminal for Lao river vessels, but it is not accessible to large Chinese vessels that berth at Chiang Saen.
It also seems likely that no action has been taken to clear this remaining obstacle since there is a recognition that Chiang Khong will relatively soon become an important link in the road system that is being developed to run from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province in China, to Bangkok. This highway will pass through Laos and will eventually cross the Mekong over a bridge at Chiang Khong. Approval for the construction of this bridge has already been given by the Thai government.[27] As for the rest of the river clearance plan that was the subject of the agreement concluded between China, Burma, Laos and Thailand in 2000, and which would have seen clearance extend into Laos as far as Luang Prabang, there are no current signs that any of the parties are pressing for this to take place.
In terms of the parts played by the four parties to the 2000 navigation agreement since the clearances were completed, the roles of China and Thailand have been much more important than those of Burma and Laos. Burma’s interest in the Mekong, despite the river’s forming a national boundary, is limited by the fact of sparse settlement in the region past which the river flows. For the Burmese authorities the Irrawaddy River is of greater importance as a navigable waterway, a fact that is important to the Chinese, also, who see it as a future link in a road/river transport system that would give it access from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal. As for Laos, as noted below its vessels appear unable to compete with Chinese cargo boats over the cleared section of the river.
In terms of the expansion of navigation on the Mekong since 2004, what has occurred is remarkable, even though there is a dearth of accurate and fully up-to-date statistics to quantify developments. In China there are now two fully functioning river ports capable of handling cargo vessels throughout the year. These are at Jinghong, the last major settlement in southern Yunnan, and Guan Lei, an almost entirely new town only recently carved out of the surrounding jungle. Major dockworks were still being built when I visited Guan Lei, in February 2003, to board a cargo boat for travel down the Mekong. These dockworks have now been completed. And in Thailand substantial developments at Chiang Saen have made that river port, and current terminal for vessels coming downriver from China, both an important trade link and a settlement in the process of demographic transformation.[28]
As recently as 2006, most Chinese vessels coming to Chiang Saen were still loading and unloading their cargo a little upstream of the town. They did this by mooring next to a section of the river’s bank that had been concreted for stability. There, with gangs of labourers employed to shift the cargo, it was carried over planks stretched between the boats and the shore. This very basic method of shifting cargo was apparently designed to circumvent paying port charges. This was despite the existence of port facilities constructed by the Thai authorities as long ago as 2004. These facilities are now in full use, as I witnessed them in January of this year. They consist of two covered pontoon docks equipped with conveyor belts and ramps suitable for truck traffic. At the time I observed the port in action, the pontoon docks were servicing eight vessels. Despite the presence of the conveyor belts linked to each dock, much of the cargo handling was still being carried out by labour gangs, with the bulk of the cargo being unloaded from China consisting of fresh fruit and vegetables.
Some heavier goods were being loaded on to trucks on the docks and trucks were also being used to bring Thai palm oil and sacks of soybean meal as backloading of the Chinese vessels for their return trip. A mobile crane was also in use for even heavier items than those picked up or delivered by truck. In the light of the current activity around this existing port, there are plans to build a further facility downstream from Chiang Saen, which will be capable of servicing vessels up to 500 DWT.[29] Although some of my informants spoke of work already being under way for this new port, with feasibility studies supposed to have been completed by 2006, I did not see any indication of this during my visit to Chiang Saen. (See Photograph 2 of Chinese vessels moored at the existing Chiang Saen facilities in January 2007.)
Photograph 2: Chinese vessels at Chiang Saen
As a reflection of the Chinese dominance in this river trade, when I was in Chiang Saen, there were no fewer than 24 Chinese vessels in port and strung out over a distance of some kilometres along the river. This was in contrast to the three Lao vessels I observed, and the total absence of Thai vessels. Anecdotal accounts from Thai informants to whom I spoke in both Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong suggest that the imbalance between Chinese and Thai vessels travelling on the river is of the order of 90% to 10%. In general, Thai vessels are smaller and less powerful than their Chinese counterparts; this fact was the cause for some controversy and resentment during the 2003-04 dry season, when the Mekong fell to unusually low levels. Although this fall was certainly connected to an unusually short wet season and subsequent drought, there is no doubt that the low levels also reflected the fact that the Chinese authorities were holding back water discharges from their dams on the Mekong, at Manwan and Daochaoshan. They did this so that they could then release water in sufficient quantity for Chinese vessels to travel to and from Chiang Saen. The less powerful Thai vessels were unable to make the same transits in the relatively short period the river’s water levels remained navigable.[30]
There are no reliable statistics for the number of Chinese vessels using the port on an annual basis, though it is certain that the figure of 3,000 vessels claimed for 2004 -- an increase from 1,000 the year before -- has most certainly been exceeded. As for the figures for the trade that passes through Chiang Saen, unofficial figures compiled by researchers for the Indochina Media Memorial Foundation, in Chiang Mai, for 2006, show a balance heavily in Thai favour, with imports from China totalling approximately US$36 million, while exports to China were approximately three times larger at US$115 million.[31] These figures take little account of the impact China’s imports are having in northern Thailand, a point emphasised by former senator Kraisak Choonhavan, in conversations I had with him in both 2005 and 2007. He draws attention to the fact that the bulk of Chinese goods shipped into northern Thailand is made up of fruit and vegetables. These are often landed at prices against which local farmers cannot compete. This is particularly the case with garlic and onions, though there have been periods when poor growing conditions in China reversed this situation.
In March 2006 a little-publicised agreement was signed by Burma, China, Laos and Thailand to permit the transport of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan. Under this agreement, the amount of refined oil to be shipped from Chiang Saen was set at 1,200 tons each month. Although a relatively small amount, the agreement immediately sparked environmental concerns, not least because the oil was to be shipped in barrels rather than in specially constructed vessels, so that a collision or grounding of vessels carrying oil would pose a major risk to the Mekong and its fish stocks. So far there has only been a report of one shipment having been made, of 300 tons -- with 150 tons of oil being loaded on each of two vessels. But Chinese officials have indicated that they have much bigger plans in mind and have spoken of future shipments of up to 70,000 tons per year. In speaking in these terms, a Chinese official linked the shipment of oil from Thailand to southern Yunnan with his country’s concern about the possibility of Middle Eastern oil shipments through the Straits of Malacca being blocked by the United States should there be conflict between China and Taiwan. Leaving aside the likelihood of such a development occurring, the suggestion that 70,000 tons shipped up the Mekong would represent a major answer to China’s energy security concerns appears to be a notable exercise in hyperbole. Today, even a moderately sized tanker carries that amount of oil. Possibly more to the point is the fact that Thailand subsidises the cost of oil so that shipments made by way of the Mekong will be landed in Yunnan at a lower price than would otherwise be the case for oil brought overland from Chinese coastal ports.[32]
Of considerable interest is the impact that the Mekong River trade is having on Chiang Saen town, and more generally within Chiang Rai province, within which the town is located. Until the early 1980s Chiang Saen, which I visited several times during that decade, was little more than an overgrown village beside the Mekong River. Once the site of a small, fourteenth century kingdom, whose walls remain to the present day, it and the river plains surrounding the town were the site of repeated clashes between Thai and Burmese armies in the eighteenth century, to the point where the settlement had almost disappeared by the nineteenth century. Although, by the late 1990s, Chiang Saen had grown in size and was used in a limited fashion as a terminal for trade between southern Yunnan and northern Thailand, its status was transformed by the navigation clearances completed in 2004. Most particularly, its growth in size has been accompanied by what, for want of a better word, may be described as its ‘Sinification’.
Chinese immigration into Thailand has, of course, a long history What is striking about developments at Chiang Saen, and in Chiang Rai province as a whole, is the rapidity with which a new Chinese element has become part of the demographic and commercial landscape. This change was well described by Joshua Kurlantzick, of the Carnegie Institute, in an article published in the Bangkok Post in October 2005, in which he wrote of the sudden burgeoning in the number of Chinese restaurants in Chiang Saen, signs in Chinese advertising cheap telephone calls to Yunnan and the apparently dominant presence of Chinese nationals in the town’s commerce.[33] The picture Kurlantzick offered appeared entirely justified in the course of my own visit in January 2007. But, more to the point, it is also the view of the range of Thai informants with whom I discussed the impact of Chinese in-migration, both legal and otherwise, into Chiang Saen and Chaing Rai province. These informants, who included a senior Thai politician, business figures in both Chiang Mai and Chiang Khong, and Thai NGO representatives, provided an anecdotal picture of unregulated Chinese immigration into Chiang Saen, with illegal immigrants marrying Thai women in order to regularise their status and become eligible to own land. In no case were my informants able to quantify the number of Chinese immigrants who had settled in the area around Chiang Saen, but there seems no basis for doubting the basic validity of their accounts.
One reason this is so is the quite clear indication that illegal and undocumented Chinese immigration into Burma, Laos and Thailand has been taking place for some time. It is now accepted that Lashio and Mandalay in Burma have Chinese populations exceeding 50% and 25% respectively. As recorded in The paramount power, illegal Chinese immigration into Laos is a real, if undocumented, fact, with the new arrivals ranging from poor rural peasants to minor businessmen. Chinese settlement in northern Thailand, in Chiang Rai province, is taking place at a time when there has been a major increase in Chinese commercial activity in the region, with the most active role being played by interests based in Yunnan. While the announcement of plans, such as those for an industrial estate in Chiang Saen, may not always proceed at the pace their promoters promise, the overall picture is one of Chinese corporations playing an increasingly active role in the region. According to Dai Jie, deputy director of Yunnan Provincial Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, a three-phase project consisting of a ‘commodities city, duty-free zone and a supplier’s centre,’ close to Chiang Saen town, is set to be completed in 2014.[34]
As already noted in relation to the shipments of oil up the Mekong from Chiang Saen to Yunnan, the environmental costs of the commercial activity now centred around Chiang Saen are a subject for concern among the active Thai advocacy NGOs that monitor developments linked to the Mekong River. More generally, these groups draw attention to the decline in fish catches along the course travelled by vessels between Chiang Saen and Yunnan, and particularly in relation to catches in the area immediately around the town. They also argue that as a result of changes in flow patterns along the river between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong river banks and sandbanks used for horticulture in dry seasons continue to be adversely affected. These variations in flow patterns are, the NGOs argue, the product both of the dams that have already been built in China and of the negative hydrological effects of the clearances that have been undertaken to facilitate navigation.[35]
Concluding Remarks
The developments discussed in this paper point to the manner in which environmental issues, and frequently those issues combined with concerns relating to human rights, are playing an increasingly important part in the politics of the Asian region. Concern for the environment is no longer a fringe issue, and there is no more striking illustration of this fact than the domestic opposition that was mounted within China to the proposed dams on the Nu, and which sparked the important but unexpected reaction by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to step in and put plans for the construction of 13 dams on hold. Attention has also been drawn in the paper to the important part played by Thai environmental activists in relation to their government’s policies, both towards the Salween and the Mekong.
Although the broader issue of climate change has dominated global discussion of environmental issues, the politics of water, of its use and its availability are receiving ever-greater attention. And this is likely to be increasingly the case as the future use of rivers in China and Southeast Asia intersects with policies linked to energy and increased irrigation. The centrality of rivers and their exploitation to a broad range of political issues is strikingly illustrated in the two cases examined in this paper. In the case of the Salween, energy resources in China, Burma and Thailand, human rights in Burma and intra-ASEAN relations are all issues that stem from the contested future of a river. And for the Mekong, while attention has previously focused chiefly on China’s dam-building activities, the new navigation regime has raised environmental issues while playing a part in the increasing Chinese presence in northern Thailand. That UNESCO should now be involved in what is currently an unresolved issue over the heritage status of the Three Parallel Rivers region, through which the Nu, Mekong and Yangtze all flow, is a testimony to increasingly broad reach of environmental factors.
Neither the Salween nor the Mekong are close to the parlous state of China’s Yellow River, which is suffering from the combined effects of overuse, recurrent droughts, and the decrease of snow-melt as Himalayan glaciers contract in size. The river’s dire condition has prompted consideration within China of the possibility of a transfer of water from other rivers, including even one as far distant as the Yangtze, in an effort to return its flow to a healthy state. So while the Mekong and the Salween are currently in a notably healthy state by comparison with the Yellow River, and indeed, the lower reaches of the Yangtze, their futures are not automatically assured. The fact that both are vital to the well-being of the countries through which they flow make the matters examined in this paper issues of real consequence.
At another level, the issues examined in this paper reinforce the judgments made in The paramount power, as China’s involvement with the countries of Southeast Asia continues to grow. So, at the same time as China seeks to develop hydropower on the Nu within its own territory, it is closely involved through Chinese-based commercial companies in the developments taking place on the Salween beyond its borders. And, as is clear from the information provided on developments associated with navigation of the Mekong, China is both integral to the navigation process itself and becoming ever more deeply involved in the commercial life of Thailand’s Chiang Rai province, in which the river port of Chiang Saen is located. All of these developments reinforce a judgment that China continues to build on its previous successes in dealing with the countries of Southeast Asia — particularly those of the mainland region — to project further its influence on a peaceful basis and in cooperation with those states.
APPENDIX
A brief overview of current, and controversial, issues associated with the Mekong
The content of this paper has, in relation to the Mekong, been essentially concerned with navigation and associated developments. At a broader level, the release of two key documents during 2006 seems likely to spark further controversy in relation to the uses made of the river and the institutions that play a role in determining its future. These documents are: a Mekong River Commission (MRC) draft document, ‘Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No. 8, Flow-regime assessment,’ of February 2006, and a joint World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) working paper, ‘Future directions for water resource management in the Mekong basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy’, released in June 2006.
The first of these two documents has been released at a time when there is very active discussion about the future role of the MRC, in particular the extent to which it can play a role in which its trans-national responsibilities can supersede the interests of its four, individual national members.[36] And, most importantly, it bears on the question of the extent to which the MRC should play a role in promoting development (infrastructure such as dams and water diversion projects) as opposed to its role to date as, essentially, being a repository of knowledge about the Mekong River and its basin.[37] The particular salience of this latter issue is illustrated by the fact that the MRC document discusses in detail a range of predicted and costly effects that could occur in Cambodia -- where fish form the overwhelming source of the population’s protein intake -- in the event of three different ‘flow regimes’.[38]
The WB/ADB Working Paper, which, most usefully, should be read in conjunction with the MRC paper just discussed, states in its ‘Executive Summary’ that the ‘bottom line message of this Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy is that the analytical work on development scenarios has, for the first time, provided evidence that there remains considerable potential for development of Mekong water resources’. In the light of this conclusion, and conceived in terms of the river’s trans-national character, the paper urges a move away from ‘the more precautionary approach of the past decade that tended to avoid any risk associated development, at the expense of stifling investments’. While not disregarding risks, the paper argues that ‘balanced development’ should be ‘the driving principle for the management and development of the Mekong River Water resources in the coming years’.[39]
The issues involved in these two documents go the heart of the Mekong’s future and that of the people of the Mekong basin. As such they deserve extended analysis, which is beyond the compass of this brief note. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that should the assumptions in the two documents prove to be incorrect the cost in human terms could be high indeed. One of the reasons for this sombre conclusion is to be found in the problems that are already apparent in the case of infrastructure development on two rivers that are tributaries of the Mekong, the Se San and the Sre Pok, which rise in Vietnam but flow into the Mekong in Cambodia.
As discussed in River at risk, Vietnam’s decision to build dams on Mekong tributaries has resulted in substantial and damaging effects on Cambodian communities living downstream.[40] Despite the warm political relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, no solution has been found to the problems caused by the presence of these dams and the consequences of water releases from them.[41] With the prospect of a very substantial increase in the number of dam projects being undertaken in Vietnam and Laos, some of which are on Mekong tributaries that are trans-national in character, the need to put in place a future, equitable governance of the Mekong system as a whole — an issue central to the MRC and WB/ADB documents — is clearly of great importance. The manner in which this issue is resolved, or a failure to do so, will be of the greatest importance for the 70 million people who live in this great river’s basin.
This article was originally published at Lowy Institute for International Policy, Ausutralian National University, May 2007. Posted at Japan Focus, June 11, 2007.
Milton Osborne is an Australian historian, author, and consultant specializing in Southeast Asia.
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[1] World’s top 10 rivers at risk, Gland, Switzerland, WWF International, March 2007. The other rivers listed, in addition to the Murray-Darling, Mekong and Salween, were the Danube, La Plata, Rio Grande-Rio Bravo, Ganges, Indus, Nile and Yangtze.
[2] River at risk: the Mekong and the water politics of China and Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 02, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2004; and, The paramount power: China and the countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper 11, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2006.
[3] China’s long history of pursuing policies without notable concern for the physical environment is charted in Mark Elvin’s, The retreat of the elephants: an environmental history of China, New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2004. An important survey of contemporary environmental issues in China is Elizabeth C. Economy’s, The river runs black: the environmental challenge to China’s future, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2004.
[4] Jim Yardley, Chinese Premier focuses on pollution and the poor, New York Times, 5 March 2007.
[5] See Osborne, River at risk, pp 31-2, in relation to the Pak Mun dam and the subsequent policy shift by the Thai government.
[6] UNESCO World Heritage, Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas.
[7] Background information on the Salween is usefully provided in, The Salween under threat: damming the longest free river in Southeast Asia, published by Salween Watch, Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), and the Center for Social Development Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Chiang Mai, 2004. Although quite clearly an advocacy document, there is no reason to question the basic facts provided in it.
[8] Jim Yardley, Chinese project on the Nu-Salween River pits environmentalists against development plans, New York Times, 3 January 2005. See, also, Yunnan hydropower expansion: update on China’s power industry reforms & the Nu, Lancang & Jinsha dams, a paper prepared by Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research and Green Watershed, Kunming, People’s Republic of China, February 2004.
[9] For details of the ASEAN Power Grid, see here.
[10] Yardley, as cited in footnote 6.
[11] Bangkok Post, 18 December 2003.
[12] Osborne, River at risk, pp 12-13, and footnote 17.
[13] Please visit here.
[14] Nava Thakuria, India and Burma: such good friends, Asia Sentinel, 27 February 2007.
[15] Executive Summary, Report of a Joint Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Three Parallel Rivers of Yunnan Protected Areas, China, from 5 to 15 April 2006, pp 2-3.
[16] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, Asia-Pacific, 8-16 July 2006, pp 5-6.
[17] Ibid, footnote 15.
[18] UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, World Heritage Committee, Thirtieth Session, Vilnius, Lithuania, 8-16 July 2006, Asia Pacific, pp 7-8.
[19] Zhang Kejia, Three Parallel Rivers region focus on monitoring mission. China Youth Daily, 17 July 2006.
[20] These developments are summarised in Will Baxter, Dam the Salween, damn its people, Asia Times Online, 15 September 2006. See, also, Salween Watch Media Advisory, Press conference and submission of petition letter against the Salween Dams in Burma, 28 February 2007.
[21] Interview with Khun Kraisak Choonhavan, 9 January 2007, Bangkok.
[22] Myanmar signs deal with Chinese firms to build hydroelectric plant, International Herald Tribune, carrying an Associated Press report of 7 April 2007. The Chinese firms involved are, Farsighted Investment Group Company Limited and Gold Water Resources Company Limited.
[23] Shawn L. Nance, Unplugging Thailand, Myanmar energy deals, Asia Times Online, 14 November 2006.
[24] Will Baxter, Dam the Salween as cited in footnote 20.
[25] Will Baxter, Thailand and Myanmar at odds over Salween dams, Burma, Archives of global protest, 13 December 2006.
[26] This and the immediately succeeding paragraph draw directly on River at risk, pp 25-9.
[27] The Nation, (Thailand), 9 March 2004.
[28] I visited Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong, most recently, over the period 15-17 January 2007. I first visited this region in 1979 and have continued to visit it on an irregular basis since that time.
[29] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong, South China Morning Post, 19 February 2004.
[30] See, River at risk, pp 19-20.
[31] Vaudine England, Trade turns Mekong into river of plenty, International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2006.
[32] On the oil shipment, see, Marwaan Macan-Markar, Sparks fly as China moves oil up Mekong, Asia Times Online, 9 January 2007.
[33] Joshua Kurlantzick, China stepping into US vacuum, Bangkok Post, 31 October 2005.
[34] Jason Gagliardi, China paves the way for big money to flow down the Mekong.
[35] Montree Chantawong, The Mekong’s changing currency, Watershed: People’s Forum on Ecology, Vol. 11, No. 2, November 2005 – June 2006, pp 12-25.
[36] Philip Hirsch, Kurt Morch Jensen, with Ben Boer, Naomi Carrard, Stephen FitzGerald and Rosemary Lyster, Executive Summary, National interests and transboundary water governance in the Mekong, May 2006.
[37] For some very recent discussion of this issue, see, Richard P. Cronin, Destructive Mekong dams: critical need for transparency,’ RSIS Commentaries, a publication of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 26 March 2007.
[38] Mekong River Commission, Water Utilisation Program, Integrated Basin Flow Management Report No.8, Flow-regime assessment, Draft 1 February 2006, p 57.
[39] WB/ADB Joint Working Paper on ‘Future directions for water resources management in the Mekong River basin, Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy,’ June 2006.
[40] River at risk, pp 32-4.
[41] For recent discussion of the Vietnamese dams, see, Montree Chantawong, as cited in footnote 35, and, Sam Rith and Cat Barton, Vietnamese dams proposed for Cambodian river, Phnom Penh Post, 21 September-5 October 2006. (In addition to the discussion of Vietnamese dams, Montree Chantawong’s article also provides details on flow variations, and their effects, in the section of the Mekong between Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong).
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