War Is Not Answer: Wa Leader
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By WAI MOE Monday, September 7, 2009
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Speaking in an interview on China’s Phoenix TV broadcast on Monday, Bao You-Xiang, the leader of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), said, “We absolutely do not want fighting to break out in Wa State [Wa Special Region]. Only peaceful negotiations can defuse the tension.
“The Wa State hopes to become a democratic self-ruled autonomous region within a Burmese federal republic. Only peaceful means can solve the problem, not the use of force,” he said.
United Wa State Army leader Bao You-Xiang appears on China's Phoenix TV.
Phoenix TV pictures clearly showed pictures of Gen Aung San, the founder of the Burmese army, and Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the leader of the Burmese junta on the wall of the Wa leader’s office.
Tension has risen dramatically on the Sino-Burmese border after the UWSA, the Kachin Independence Army, the Kokang armed group known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDDA) and the Mongla-based National Democratic Alliance Army(NDAA) refused to transform their militias into border guard forces as ordered by the Burmese junta in April.
The armed ethnic groups rejected the plan saying it ignores ethnic minority rights. By transforming their troops into border guard forces, the armed ethnic ceasefire groups would effectively put their troops under control of the Burmese army. The junta has set October as the deadline to begin training and forming the border guard force.
Lt-Gen Ye Myint, the head of Military Affairs Security [Burmese military intelligence] and the secretary of the Transformation Committee for the Border Guard Force repeatedly said in a letter to the UWSA that the Tatmadaw [Burmese armed forces] would not attack Wa troops.
With an estimated 25,000 soldiers, the UWSA is the biggest ethnic ceasefire group in military-ruled Burma. It signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese junta in 1989 after the MNDDA agreed to a ceasefire with the Burmese army.
The US Congressional Research Service describes the UWSA as “the largest of the organized criminal groups in the region,” due to its involvement in the drug trade.
The status of the Burmese military junta’s ceasefire agreements with 17 ethnic armed groups has been uncertain after Burmese government troops seized the Kokang capital, Laogai, on August 24.
After the fall of Laogai, there were skirmishes between government forces and MNDDA troops. At least 30 people, including Chinese citizens, were killed and more than 30,000 people fled to China.
The Kokang’s resistance to the junta’s troops ended abruptly after more than 1,500 Kokang fighters crossed the Sino-Burmese border and surrendered their arms to Chinese officials on August 29.
After the collapse of the MNDAA, observers have been openly wondering who the next target for the Burmese army will be. Many say the UWSA is the Burma army’s main target among the ceasefire groups because it is the leading group resisting junta plans to neutralize the armed militias.
Observers on the ongoing ethnic conflict in Shan State said Beijing would play an important role in maintaining stability along the Sino-Burmese border through negotiations with both sides as the Sino-Burmese overland oil and gas pipelines are scheduled to start this month.
The Chinese government is a close ally of the Burmese regime and is influential with the ethnic armed groups along the border.
During a meeting with Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye in June, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made it clear that the Chinese favor pushing forward the democratic process in Burma to achieve national reconciliation, safeguard national stability and promote economic development.
“What the Chinese do is paramount,” said Aung Kyaw Zaw, a former Communist fighter who is monitoring the situation from the Chinese border town of Ruili.
“However, the junta’s No1 Snr-Gen Than Shwe, No 2 Maung Aye and Secretary 1 Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo have paranoia over Beijing’s relationship with the ethnic groups along the Sino-Burmese border,” he said. “They fought against communist troops backed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. These troops became the militias of the UWSA, MNDAA and NDAA.”
On Sunday, a report about Burmese politics in a popular Chinese language news website, news.qq.com, said: “The Burmese people have been promised an improvement in their lives after the elections [in 2010]. However, analysts believe that if the new government fails to meet peoples’ needs, then this could lead to popular discontent.”
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
War Is Not Answer: Wa Leader
Prelude to a Civil War?
CONTRIBUTOR
Prelude to a Civil War?
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By HARN YAWNGHWE Monday, September 7, 2009
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Many were surprised by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attack against the Kokang forces.
Some had been so preoccupied with the trial of Aung San Suu Kyi that they were not even aware of the impending crisis. Others could not understand why the Burmese military would turn against their allies who have had a cease-fire agreement for more than 20 years.
Yet others thought that the Burma Army would never dare to incur the wrath of China. After all, had the Chinese not, in June, requested Vice-Snr-Gen Maung Aye to maintain stability on the border? This development was especially surprising to those who were convinced that Burma is a client state of China.
This failure to anticipate events underscores the weakness of the Burmese democracy movement, in particular, and the international community, in general.
We have often failed to understand the strategy and plans of the ruling military government. We have looked at their actions through our own prisms and misinterpreted their intentions. We have tended to see SPDC pronouncements as propaganda and have not paid enough attention to what it is planning to do.
Nobody is happy with military rule in Burma so we dismiss the SPDC “road map” to democracy and its constitution. But how many of us have actually studied the constitution in detail, not to criticize it, but to see how the military actually plans to implement its “road map” policies and how we can use its plans to our advantage?
In 2004, the SPDC announced the “road map,” and last year it announced plans for an election in 2010. We were outraged when the referendum was held two weeks after Cyclone Nargis had devastated the delta and Rangoon. We would not have been surprised had we realized that Snr-Gen Than Shwe takes the “road map” seriously.
He will not allow anything to stand in its way. A series of recent events has also taken some of us unaware—he release of U Win Tin; the first ever post-1990 congress of the National League for Democracy (NLD); Aung San Suu Kyi’s trial, the unseasonable attack on the Karen National Union; the attack on Kokang and now possibly an attack on the Wa.
These seem to be the random acts of a paranoid and unpredictable leader—he image we like to portray of Snr-Gen Than Shwe. But in reality, all these events have a common goal: the success of the 2010 elections. They are the rational outworking of a well-calculated and orchestrated operation plan of the SPDC.
The proposal to the ethnic cease-fire groups to transform themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the control of the Burma army is also an attempt to clear the decks before the 2010 elections. It was meant to either provoke the cease-fire groups to reject the proposal and be destroyed or frighten them into submission and acceptance of the SPDC road map.
It is clear that the BGF proposal was a provocation. This is because during the past 20 years, nothing of this matter was ever discussed with the cease-fire groups. They were told they could keep their arms and could negotiate with the newly elected government on the political terms they wanted.
Suddenly, in April they were told they had until October 2009 to decide. Analyzing the ceasefires, it is clear that the SPDC never meant to negotiate. The plan was to stop hostile action, provide incentives to entice individual commanders to split from the main groups and slowly weaken the ethnic groups to the point where they could be easily eliminated.
The cease-fire groups cannot accept the BGF because it is actually a plan to destroy the groups by attrition. But if they refuse to accept the proposal, they will be destroyed now, before the elections. The Kokang (MNDAA), the Wa (UWSA) and the Mongla (NDAA) groups rejected the BGF proposal and also refused to accept the SPDC’s road map and constitution. They do not want any changes. Therefore, if nothing changes, the SPDC will move against the UWSA and the NDAA. Which group will be attacked first will depend on the tactical advantage.
What about China? Is the SPDC not beholden to China? The short answer is—no. Whatever we may think about the SPDC, the Burma Army is very proud of the fact that it is “patriotic.” The SPDC has never danced to the tune of a foreign power. It has, rather, made foreign powers big and small dance to its tune. Since the SPDC has been largely ostracized internationally, it has had to depend on China.
But it was never happy about it. When Burma was discussed at the UN Security Council and it had to depend even more on China, the SPDC began to cultivate Russia, so that it would not be at China’s mercy. But Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s problem was solved when John Yettaw decided to take a swim. He enabled the SPDC to ensure that Aung San Suu Kyi would have no role in the election, and he also enabled Than Shwe to raise the stakes and create a direct link with the Obama administration.
This in turn gave Than Shwe the card he needed to ignore China’s wishes and move against the Kokang and Wa.
If Snr-Gen Than Shwe’s calculations are correct, the SPDC will be able to wipe out the Wa and Mongla groups, and the 2010 elections can be held on a less contentious playing field according to schedule.
The unpredictable factor, of course, is how much resistance the Wa army will offer. And what the reaction of the other cease-fire groups will be. Some like the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) are in the process of negotiating with the SPDC over the BGF issue.
Other groups like the KNU and the Shan State Army (South) are watching closely to see how the battle develops. If Than Shwe’s calculations are wrong, Burma could face a period of serious instability and the 2010 elections will be jeopardized.
But on the other hand, the SPDC may have decided that the elections could actually lead to democratization, and it is trying to create a pretext to postpone the elections indefinitely.
Harn Yawnghwe is executive director of the Brussels-based Euro-Burma Office.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Danger of border skirmishes escalating
Danger of border skirmishes escalating
Editorial Desk
The Nation (Thailand)
Publication Date: 08-09-2009
It has always been said that China is Burma's closest ally. Given the fact that the junta doesn't have many friends, one like China will always stand out. But the not-so-honorific label of "closest ally" should be understood in its proper context. For the Burmese, Chinese friendship doesn't mean the world.
Nonetheless, such a friend could very well come in handy, especially when the international community and the United Nations are constantly looking to clobber the generals with sanctions and criticism.
For the Burmese regime, survival is everything. Where it positions its troops and weapons, and the type of legislation and reconciliation process that it proposes, reinforce the very idea that it is here to stay whether the world likes it or not.
For as long as anybody can remember, China has been a factor whenever a Burma policy and strategy is drafted by the international community. Over a decade ago, when Rangoon's membership of Asean was on the table, members of the regional grouping whispered among themselves about the Chinese factor. Keeping the Burmese out of the regional loop would push the junta further into the arms of the Chinese, they said.
But for the Burmese, Asean membership was not seen as a privilege but a right - simply because the country happens to be in the same geographical region. There was no "thank you" to Asean for letting the country become a member.
A handful of Thai diplomats thought a free ride for Burma in Asean would deny the regional grouping the only card it had to play against the junta. Their concerns were largely ignored by most of the other Asean members, who really didn't give a hoot about the atrocities committed by the junta, or the political baggage that comes with Burma's membership. And when Asean came under an unwanted spotlight or was at loggerheads with the international community, such as the European Union, over Burma's participation, all the Burmese generals could do was shrug their shoulders. They just couldn't care less.
And so when the Burmese unleashed their troops against one of the minority cease-fire groups within the country, namely the Kokang, forcing tens of thousands people - including Yunnanese Chinese who have more or less seized northern Burma over the last few years - to flee for China, Beijing was jolted.
Thai military officials with direct experience of the Chinese often called them "masters of two-track diplomacy". They pointed to China's relations with the bloody Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, up until that regime's dying days, and its historical ties with the ethnic armies that operate independently along Burma's northern border.
Attacking the Kokang and turning their guns towards the 20,000-strong United Wa State Army (UWSA) afterwards was a rude awakening for the Chinese. If anything, the junta was telling its so-called "closest ally" that it is charting its own course. One could say that the Chinese finally got a taste of their own medicine.
For decades, Burma has given China access to its ample natural resources, and the Indian Ocean, in exchange for political support. Moreover, Chinese companies are set to start construction on a US$2.5 billion oil-and-natural- gas pipeline project that will run from the Indian Ocean to Yunnan's capital of Kunming. But if one thinks that Burma is a Chinese lackey, think again.
It is clear that the two-decade-old ceasefire with the ethnic armies no longer serves Burmese purposes. From the generals' perspective, a normal country shouldn't have small armies operating independently on its soil, especially if those armies are proxies of a powerful neighbour.
Beijing expressed its concern back in June, and the ruling Burmese State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) said that it did not want to see disturbances along the Sino-Burmese border. But in the end, for the junta, domestic matters overtook any diplomatic concerns.
For too long Beijing turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed inside Burma, telling the world to stay out of Burma's domestic matters. Self-serving interest has always been China's political attitude towards Burma.
It's different now, however, as China is directly affected by this so-called domestic matter.
If Beijing thinks it has a big headache with the 30,000 refugees fleeing the Burmese attack against the Kokang, then wait until the junta turns its guns on the UWSA. It could very well have a ripple effect, turning Burma's entire northern border into a full-blown war zone if other cease-fire groups like the Chin, Kachin and Shan join the fight to keep their patches of real estate given to them two decades ago.
http://www.asianews net.net/news. php?id=7678&sec=3
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
The Politics of Building a Gas Pipeline
By J J KIM Tuesday, September 8, 2009
While the Western world continues to debate whether economic sanctions can make change in Burma, the sale of gas to China from the offshore Shwe gas fields in Arakan State threatens to raise the junta’s revenue from foreign investment to new heights and strengthen business ties throughout Asia.
Furthermore, the parallel gas and oil pipelines, which are reportedly starting construction this month from Arakan State to Yunnan Province, China, via Magwe Division, Mandalay Division and Shan State, have been criticised by human rights groups as a major contributing factor to the recent conflict in northern Shan State.
According to a report titled “Corridor of Power” released by the Shwe Gas Movement (SGM), the pipeline will make the junta at least US $29 billion over the next 30 years. Much of this is expected to be spent on military expansion, despite the current famine in Arakan State and poverty across the country.
Source: Shwe Gas Movement
Moreover, the report claims, construction of the pipelines, which are being built primarily by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), is likely to lead to human rights abuse across the country and a “re-ignition of fighting between the regime and ceasefire armies stationed along the pipeline.”
According to Khur Hseng from Shan Sapawa, who has been researching the impact of the pipeline in Shan State since 2007, these fears were confirmed during the armed confrontation between the military government and the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in late August. The fighting took place just 50 km from the proposed pipeline route, killing 200 people and leading to a mass exodus of up to 30,000 civilians to China.
“The main objective of the SPDC is to clear all opposing forces from the area for development projects, including the Shwe Gas pipeline,” said Khur Hseng. “They are trying to clear the people who will be against the plans and control the area so the true information about the project can’t get out. China needs this as well because they limit their media too.”
According to Wong Aung, the international coordinator of SGM, despite reports from the Chinese media about the project’s commencement, in fact the risk of local opposition and conflict is too great for the project to make much progress this year.
“It is impossible to start now; maybe just some foundations in Arakan State or Magwe. Before they start they will have to clear out all political, ethnic and conflict issues on the border. They will have to deploy propagation in so many places along the pipeline first, to ensure security.”
The sale of gas and oil is currently the junta’s biggest earner, bringing in almost US $3.5 billion annually. According to the report, from 2013 onwards the Shwe Gas Project, which is headed by the South Korean company Daewoo International, will bring in close to another US $1 billion.
This has raised concerns among pro-democracy campaigners and analysts, who say the deal will entrench military rule in the country by financing the regime and strengthening their political clout in the region.
Wong Aung said “It will harm the democratic process if the regime continues to receive the revenue from this sector… . The regime is receiving that money and creating conflicts in the ethnic areas. Basically, institutional investors and companies who are supporting the regime's projects are damaging the stability of the region.”
According to Larry Jagan, a long-term observer of Sino-Burmese relations, “One of China's main concerns is natural resources, so any major project is important to them from an economic point of view.”
This is of particular significance with the pipeline agreement as it offers China an alternative trade route for oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East too. Until now, such imports have had to pass through the US-Navy controlled Malacca Strait taking seven days longer than they would through Burma.
“One thing that is apparent [from the recent conflict in northern Shan State] is that Burma holds the cards. The opposition thinks that China could influence Burma if they want to, but these projects give Burma the upper hand”
“Although economically important to China, Burma is also strategically crucial to China as it is its staunchest ally in Southeast Asia [and] opposed to US interests in the region.”
“There is no doubt that Chinese investment and Burma’s trade with the rest of Asia reduces the impact of Western sanctions,” Larry said.
Experience from past gas and oil developments in Burma have led SGM to believe that the pipelines will cause “forced labour, forced relocation, land confiscation and a host of abuses by soldiers deployed in the area.” According to SGM's report, there are currently an estimated 13,200 soldiers stationed along the pipeline route, mostly in areas that haven’t seen significant armed conflict for decades.
According to Naing Win of Kyauk Phyu Township in Arakan State, where the pipeline will begin, “Most people depend on fishing for survival, but they are prohibited by the navy to fish within 10km of the gas fields. The Navy often steal their fish and gas and oil and [harass] them outrageously.” Because of this, local people find it difficult to survive and provide an education for their children.
Another major concern is the threat of forced relocation of civilian families to make way for the pipeline and other related infrastructure. Stretching around 1,000 km in Burma, the pipeline will cut through many densely populated areas. According to Khur Hseng, “Thousands of people will be forced to leave their homes in Shan State alone.” Recent projects in the region, such as the Tasang Dam, have forced hundreds of thousand of men, women and children into the jungle and to other countries to start a new life.
As the report highlights, while the regime’s profits from the export of electricity and fossil fuels become increasingly lucrative, civilian energy needs are persistently neglected. The national per capita energy consumption currently amounts to less than 5 percent of that in Thailand or China. Arakan State, the source of the gas, is not connected to the national grid and over 90 percent of the population still use candles for light and firewood for cooking.
While the junta continues to make war in ethnic regions and display no regard for civilian needs, many campaigners feel that change can only come when all foreign companies and financial institutions halt investment in such projects. Despite sanctions and Western rhetoric, both CNPC and Petrochina, who will distribute the gas in China, have received significant financial backing from the West in recent years, from banks such as Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs.
According to Wong Aung “The USA and EU need to re-impose stronger sanctions and consider a practical way to get a positive outcome because the regime has so many channels to oppose the sanctions compared with 10 years ago. While locally registered companies continue to gain financial backing from the USA and EU, sanctions are becoming just a notion for these governments.”
“I would like to raise this issue among foreign governments, companies and the various institutional investors involved in this project: they should support the democratic process for Burma,” he said.
JJ Kim is a freelance writer based in Thailand.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy. org
http://www.irrawadd y.org/article. php?art_id= 16740
China's troubles: A vast nation faces unrest in many directions
China's troubles: A vast nation faces unrest in many directions
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Strife between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang province, refugees pouring into China from Myanmar and heightening tensions with India are examples of problems that face China on its edges.
Sprawled across Asia from its borders with India, Pakistan and Afghanistan on the east to the sea on the west, and from Russia in the north to Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, to the south, China not only has difficult neighbors but also contains a complicated quilt of ethnicities.
By comparison, the United States -- with the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Canadian and Mexican borders, and regional and ethnic politics -- seem blessedly simple, even counting Texas and Alaska.
In Urumqi, in the Xinjiang region, Han Chinese, brought there by Beijing to water down the Muslim, independent- thinking Uighurs, claim that Uighurs are attacking them in the streets with hypodermic needles filled with HIV virus, and complain that the government isn't doing enough to protect them. Street disturbances have lasted for days.
The government of Myanmar, allegedly in advance of elections scheduled for next year, clamped down militarily on separatists in Kokang region, which borders China. The result was a flood of refugees into China, to the great displeasure of Beijing, which has to deal with them. China is otherwise the Myanmar government's best friend and greatest protector.
The third problem is a heating of tensions between China and the other Asian giant, India, in the Tawang region, part of long-standing wrangling between the two giants over their 2,521-mile border zone. Both sides have added to the danger of an outbreak of fighting by building up their military forces in the area.
Two points emerge from this prickly situation. The first is that it is difficult being China. The second is a hope that China and India, both of which will be at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, will take that opportunity to soothe relations.
First published on September 8, 2009 at 12:00 am
Read more: http://www.post- gazette.com/ pg/09251/ 996249-192. stm#ixzz0QW9d2UJ X
[info_ngo_hrn] 9/13「NGOまつりin上野2009」を丸幸ビルにて開催！
ヒューマンライツ・ナウ メールマガジン購読者のみなさま
今年もこの季節がやってまいりました。
9月13日、東上野の丸幸ビル（通称NGOビル）に事務所を構える10団体が集結し、
「NGOまつりin上野2009」を開催します！！
http://ngomatsuri2009.blog88.fc2.com/
今年のテーマは『アナタが気付けば セカイが動く～』
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16：00-17：00 在日ビルマ難民の方のお話
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・NGOに聞きたいこんなこと！(展示)
他にも各フロアーでいろんなイベントが目白押しです。
ぜひ、足をお運びください。
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日本における人身売買の防止に向けた取り組みについて
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下記の学習会を企画いたしました。
ぜひ、みなさまにも一緒に学んでいただけましたら幸いです。
【日時】 ２００９年９月12日（土） １５：３０～１８：００
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【講師】
森田明彦さん 「人身売買法の制定への課題」
橋本直子さん 「日本とアジア地域における人身売買の現状と防止に向けた取
り組み」
【資料代】 ５００円
【講師紹介】
□森田明彦（もりたあきひこ）さん
外務省、国際連合開発計画、財団法人日本ユニセフ協会広報室長等を経て、2006
年4月より東京工業大学特任教授。そのかたわら、国際的な子どもの権利NGOであ
るセーブザチルドレン・ジャパンのシニア・アドバイザー、フリーザチルドレン
・ジャパン理事等を務める。
□橋本直子（はしもとなおこ）さん
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所・准法務官などを経て、０７年８月より、国際移住機関（ＩＯＭ）駐日事務所にて
プログラム・マネージャー
として勤務。日本における人身取引被害者など脆弱な立場にある移民の保護・支
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