Saturday, July 5, 2008
Sinking: China’s Soft Diplomacy on Burma
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: In the past year, the Chinese government has made a number of assertions about its relationship and role in Burma, many of which are misleading or inaccurate. 8-8-08 for Burma provides the following two-part analysis of Beijing’s recent statements.
8/8/08 for BurmaFirst time here?ContactNewsletter News The Issue The Campaign Take Action Contact Sinking: China’s Soft Diplomacy on Burma
2 July, 2008
Contact: Cristina Moon (cmoon@8808forburma.org, 347.756.4088)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: In the past year, the Chinese government has made a number of assertions about its relationship and role in Burma, many of which are misleading or inaccurate. 8-8-08 for Burma provides the following two-part analysis of Beijing’s recent statements.
The first part of the analysis addresses points publicly made by the Chinese government. The second addresses China’s response to the humanitarian disaster wrought on Burma’s southern delta region by Cyclone Nargis on May 2nd, 2008.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past three years, China has come under increasing attention for its ties to the military regime in Burma led by Senior General Than Shwe. On September 18, 2007 Burma advocates held protests in 10 countries, spanning four continents, targeting Chinese embassies and consulates and expressing solidarity with pro-democracy protests that had engulfed Burma in the previous month. On that same day, leaders of the 88 Students Generation pro-democracy movement inside Burma released a public letter to Chinese leaders. Both protesters and the 88 Students Generation condemned China’s ongoing support for the Than Shwe regime, and implored Chinese leaders to do more to encourage democratic reform in Burma. As Buddhist monks and nuns took leadership of the protests in Burma shortly thereafter, Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams published an article in the Wall Street Journal calling on the international community “to pressure China’s leaders to use their considerable influence in Burma”.
China’s role in Burma was again brought into the spotlight when General Than Shwe blocked shipments of aid and international aid workers from reaching the 2.4 million people affected by Cyclone Nargis. These actions prompted foreign governments and human rights organizations to pursue numerous avenues of pressure and appeals, including calling on China to use its influence in Burma to remove restrictions on humanitarian access.
China has responded to this attention by making statements in international and Chinese media outlets, and at the United Nations Security Council where it is a veto-wielding member, defending its approach to Burma and denouncing the positions of its critics. China has advocated for a soft approach of “consultations” with the Burmese military junta, citing supposedly positive steps General Than Shwe and his junta have taken towards democratic reform.
A careful assessment of China’s characterization of its own actions vis-à-vis Burma fails to withstand reasonable scrutiny, revealing that China’s actions have actually hampered efforts for peace and democratic opening in Burma.
CHINA’S CLAIMS
China has defended its role in Burma in the past year by putting forward five main arguments, each of which fails to hold water.
CHINESE CLAIM 1:
There is no “special relationship” between China and Burma.
ANALYSIS:
Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya has referred on numerous occasions to the facts that China is an immediate neighbor to Burma and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to explain why China wishes as much, if not “more than any other country in the world, to see political stability, economic development and national unity” in Burma .
China is one of Burma’s largest trading partners and foreign investors – mostly in extractive industries such as natural gas, mining, and logging – and is expected to sign a US$1 billion contract in 2008 to construct a pipeline carrying oil and natural gas through Burma and into western China . China has invested extensively in Burmese infrastructure like roads and ports on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – a strategic move to streamline China’s energy acquisition since over 90% of China’s oil is currently delivered by ocean-going tanker .
China has also been the regime’s most important defender in the United Nations, blocking and weakening measures that would compel the generals to end their widespread violence and abuse of Burma’ 55 million citizens. Moreover, while many other countries have placed arms embargoes on Burma, China has sold US$2-3 billion in weapons and military equipment to Burma .
REALITY:
In addition to being an immediate neighbor of Burma with significant geo-political interests, China also has an unparalleled economic relationship with Burma. The result is unrivaled influence upon Senior General Than Shwe and the Burmese junta. The actions of China, more than any other country, have facilitated abuse, repression, and potential crimes against humanity in Burma.
CHINESE CLAIM 2:
“Pressure would not serve any purpose” in dealing with Burma. Rather, progress “is undeniably being made, slowly and steadily,” as a result of “consultations” with the Than Shwe regime
ANALYSIS:
China’s opposition to using sanctions and pressure on the Than Shwe regime, its advocacy for soft measures (chiefly in the form of bilateral “consultations” and economic encouragement), and its insistence that the junta is making progress ignores a clear pattern of intransigence on the part of the Than Shwe regime. The disparate, even conflicting, responses of the international community have meant that ethnic cleansing continues unabated, as does widespread repression of democracy activists. Than Shwe’s regime also continues to flout international law related to forced labor, child soldiers, and the treatment of women.
Following crackdowns on monk-led protests in Burma in late 2007, China increased the strength of its rhetoric vis-à-vis Burma and the Than Shwe regime, participating in a UN Security Council Presidential Statement that “deplored” the regime’s use of force against peaceful protesters. The regime’s response – taking the violence off the streets (and into prisons), inviting two previously-barred UN envoys into the country for stage-managed visits, and reinvigorating their “7-Step Roadmap to democracy” – was emblematic of how the regime deals with soft pressure; they do the bare minimum to create an illusion of progress, only to backslide once the pressure recedes.
Another way the regime responds to soft pressure is to ignore it altogether – for example when General Than Shwe refused to postpone its scheduled May 10 constitutional referendum or even to receive phone calls from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in the week following Cyclone Nargis.
REALITY: Than Shwe’s regime has demonstrated that it does not respond to soft measures, except with superficial developments meant to curb international pressure and continued repression, abuses, and atrocities.
CHINESE CLAIM 3:
“China firmly supports the Secretary General’s good offices” . “China supports ASEAN in playing a leading role in the Myanmar issue”.
ANALYSIS:
China has consistently undermined the good offices of the UN Secretary General, vetoing efforts to empower the UN Secretariat with a mandate from the UN Security Council and engaging in behind-the-scenes bilateral consultations with Burma’s military junta instead.
China first vetoed putting Burma on the UN Security Council agenda in 2006, and then vetoed a US-sponsored resolution on Burma on January 11, 2007. Shortly after casting its no-vote, Chinese state-owned enterprise PetroChina received extraction rights for 6.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas off Burma’s western coast from the Than Shwe regime – despite having been outbid by India .
In May 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed their concern for the lack of tangible progress towards democratic reform in Burma and called for the release of Nobel Peace laureate and General Secretary of the election-winning National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi. China refused to support these calls for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, on the grounds that her detention is Burma’s “internal affair” .
REALITY: China has consistently undermined the ability of the United Nations and multilateral organizations like ASEAN to effectively address Burma’s human rights crisis, instead pursuing its own interests.
CHINESE CLAIM 4:
“China has made its due efforts to promote stability in Myanmar and encourage the Myanmar government to continue its engagement with the international community” .
ANALYSIS:
China has taken some positive steps on Burma, such as hosting talks between the Than Shwe regime and then-US Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of State in June 2007 and more recently stating a desire for democratic reforms and more openness in Burma. However, since 2006 when Burma was placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council – a move China opposed – China has been a relentless supporter of Burma’s military regime, continuing its economic and military support, and thwarting attempts by the United Nations to address the junta’s abuses and atrocities.
At the same time, China has increased trade with Burma, continued to sell military equipment to the regime, signed large deals for natural gas extraction, given soft loans to the generals, vetoed a non-punitive UN Security Council resolution on Burma, and weakened two UN Security Council Presidential Statements on the situation in Burma.
REALITY: For at least the past two and a half years, essentially all of China’s actions supported the military regime in Burma, enabling its atrocities and repression.
CHINESE CLAIM 5:
Linking China’s Burma policy and the Olympics would be “inappropriate and unpopular” .
ANALYSIS:
China’s goals as Olympic host to highlight its “peaceful rise” and be seen as a responsible stakeholder in the global community directly conflict with its ongoing support for Burma’s atrocity-committing regime. China’s relentless support for General Than Shwe and his junta tarnishes the ideals and legacy of the Olympic movement, and should urgently be called into question.
However, Beijing’s leaders have an opportunity to demonstrate global leadership in resolving Burma’s current crisis – one that includes the world’s longest currently-running armed conflict, the world’s largest number of child soldiers, and potential crimes against humanity. By taking a leading role in resolving Burma’s crisis, the leadership in Beijing could not only mitigate the global controversy around its hosting the Olympics, but directly do justice to the fundamental principles upon which the Olympic movement was built.
REALITY: China’s goals as Olympic host are in direct conflict with Beijing’s Burma policy, promoting repression and atrocities instead of the fundamental principles of the Olympics – human dignity, peace, and brotherhood.
CHINA’S REACTIONS TO CYCLONE NARGIS
Despite compelling evidence of a major humanitarian disaster in Burma following Cyclone Nargis, China’s ongoing defense of Burma’s military regime has hindered global efforts to accurately assess and respond to the catastrophe in the Irrawaddy delta region, potentially costing tens of thousands of lives.
ISSUE 1: CHINESE RELIEF AID TO BURMA POST-CYCLONE NARGIS
China’s humanitarian aid to Burma after Cyclone Nargis served to further Beijing’s vast economic relationship with the Than Shwe regime rather than provide timely assistance to cyclone survivors.
In the first days following Cyclone Nargis, Beijing’s leaders committed $1 million to relief in Burma. They later increased their commitment by a further $4.3 million for post-disaster reconstruction as well as relief. Incredibly, $500,000 of the initial commitment went in cash to the junta, without a public accounting as to how those funds have contributed to the relief of 2.5 million displaced by the cyclone . Moreover, China’s contribution to cyclone aid is trivial when considered in the context of its huge economic relationship with Burma – China’s total commitment is less than 3% of one interest-free loan made to the Than Shwe regime in 2006, a time when the regime was increasing attacks in eastern Burma that have displaced 1.5 million people.
ISSUE 2: CHINA ASKS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NOT TO ‘POLITICIZE’ AID
China’s appeals to the international community not to ‘politicize’ cyclone relief to Burma are misplaced and call into question China’s strong and ongoing support for the Than Shwe regime’s “7-Step Roadmap to Democracy.”
While the Than Shwe regime refused to allow foreign aid and aid workers into Burma after the May 2 cyclone, and then diverted national resources from cyclone relief to a previously-scheduled constitutional referendum only one week later, China called on the international community – not Burma’s generals – not to “politicize” aid to Burma .
By discouraging international pressure on the junta to allow unfettered aid and access into Burma and yet again pursuing bilateral consultations instead, China undermined the efforts of the international community to find a comprehensive solution to Burma’s post-cyclone humanitarian crisis. At the writing of this paper, aid continued to only trickle in and the small measures taken by the Than Shwe regime – such as allowing in a 50-person Chinese medical team – are having only a trifling impact on a major humanitarian disaster. In contrast to its timely and appropriate reaction to its own May 12 earthquake, China facilitated the denial of life-saving aid to the 2.4 million people affected by Cyclone Nargis in Burma.
URGENT ACTION NEEDED ON BURMA
Following last fall’s uprisings and Cyclone Nargis, the situation in Burma is dire and in need of radical change. Significant pressure urgently needs to be exerted on the Than Shwe regime from the international community as well as from inside the country. Because of its unrivaled influence with the Than Shwe regime, China should drastically increase the strength of its public statements on Burma and call for genuine dialog between the Than Shwe regime, ethnic representatives, and the democracy movement led by Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. China should also join the international community in taking concrete steps to cut the Than Shwe regime off from the flow of arms.
If China fails to use its leverage with the Than Shwe regime to facilitate genuine democratic reforms and the creation of a political environment conducive to humanitarian relief before the Olympics, it will be regarded as culpable for the deaths of countless thousands of innocent civilians. China will be seen as a country that chose to pursue its own interests in Burma at devastating human cost – characteristics unbefitting an Olympic host.
The Beijing Games are set to open approximately one year after Burma’s Saffron Revolution, and exactly twenty years after a months-long democracy movement in Burma that culminated in nation-wide protests on August 8, 1988. China should take immediate action to help bring Burma’s crisis to an end before this important day.
August 8, 2008 can be a day to celebrate human achievement and perseverance - in China, in Burma, everywhere. But only if China takes action now.
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Posted Tuesday, July 1st, 2008.
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The Burmese Cyclone, Nonviolent Action, and the Responsibility to Empower,権限を与えるビルマのサイクロン、非暴力的な行為および責任
Pushing the relief truck out of the mud, photo: Beyond Rangoon Project, May 17, 2008
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The Burmese Cyclone, Nonviolent Action, and the Responsibility to Empower
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Authors: Patrick Meier [3]
Patrick Meier is a Ph.D. student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts and a Doctoral Research Fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. His fellowship involves studying the role of communication technologies in responding to humanitarian crises. Meier blogs at www.irevolution.wordpress.com [4].
Full Article:
Repressive regimes continue to play the sovereignty card regardless of international condemnation, and the military regime in Burma is no exception. Prior to the cyclone disaster, the regime maintained an effective information blockade on the country, limiting access and communication while forcefully cracking down on the pro-democracy resistance movement.
著者: パトリックMeier [3] パトリックMeierはハーバード人道主義者の率先に房および博士の研究員におよび外交Fletcherの法学大学院にPh.D学生である。 彼の団体は人道主義の危機に対してコミュニケーション技術の役割を調査することを含む。 www.irevolution.wordpress.com [4]のMeierのブログ。 完全な記事: 抑圧的政権は国際的な非難にもかかわらず主権カードをし続けビルマの軍の政体は例外ではない。 サイクロンの災害前に、政体は力強く民主化の抵抗運動を厳しく取り締まっている間国の有効な情報封鎖を維持し、アクセスおよびコミュニケーションを限る
サイクロンの災害に続く人道的援助を妨げる軍の政体の決定は驚きとして実際に来るべきではない。 国際地域社会は保護する責任を嘲笑する政体に振り回されはっきり残る。 保護する責任(か人間性に対して集団虐殺を、戦争犯罪か、民族浄化、または罪を断言する国連国連安保理決議1674年によって裏書きされるR2P、防ぐか、または停止するすべての責任)気高い主義である: 主権はstate'に依存している; 市民を保護するsの能力。 Burma' sの軍の政体は絶対に興味、かなり反対をその際に示さなかった -- "の場合には; natural" 災害。 Bernard Kouchnerフランス人の外相はR2Pの原則が領土主権にビルマの軍の会議の権利を却下することを正当化することを支持した。 最初は、Gareth Evansは国際危機グループのディレクター強く、Kouchnerのアプローチが可能性としては新興社会の気力à気力R2Pに現在ある一般的な一致の下を掘るポスト災害の環境に介入するために先例を作成することを論争する意義を唱え。 他の多くの人道主義者はまた非承認された介在の従事に彼らの反対を表明した。 彼らは(間違って)そのような介在が武力の行使を要求することを仮定した。 結果か。 国際地域社会けれども再度曲がること抑圧的政権の願いに; 保管生命へのひどく不十分な国内の人道主義の応答; そしてますます高い死者数。 可能性としては抵抗力がある政府によってより少なく決まる人道主義の介在への代替的アプローチが考慮されるのは潮時である -- 人々集中させた作戦および非暴力的な行為のようなアプローチ。 すなわち、一般市民の保護および非合意上の人道主義の介在のためにどんな非暴力的な選択があるか。 政府を無視して供給の一般市民: ベルリン空輸およびBiafranは戦う 歴史への回転はある洞察力を提供する。 ベルリンの空輸は、例えば、避けるには多くの方法絶対絶命の努力第三世界戦争になるかもしれないものがに記号論理学の虚勢および業積のために有名で認められない十分想像的のとしてそして降下をではない。 第二次世界大戦が同盟国とソビエト連邦間の増加する張力の下で起こった後同盟職業の下のドイツの部分。 地理的に4国の司法権(フランス、イギリス、米国およびソビエト社会主義共和国連邦)の下に残るドイツ(東ドイツ)のソビエト管理されたセクションで隔離されるベルリン。 1948でこれらの張力はベルリン市からの同盟国を強制するようにすべての土地(道および柵)および都市への水アクセスの妨害によって努めたスターリンとして山場を越えた。 1948の6月から1949年の9月によって -- 大統領からのトルーマン順序の下 -- 食糧、燃料および緊急の医学材料は空気によって西ベルリンに飛んだ。 非常に粗い天候にもかかわらず、米国空軍は、イギリスサポートと、270,000の飛行の西ベルリンに商品の以上2百万トンを飛ばすことをどうにかして。 許可されて、ベルリンの空輸は核brinkspersonshipの条件の下の軍隊によって遂行されたが、大都市が意外にも非暴力的な平均によって供給できることを空輸自体は示した。 従来とは違う介在のもう一つの例は60年代後期のBiafraの軍封鎖に応じてあった。 疑わし行なわれたナイジェリアの国政選挙の後で脱退するように試みられるIbgoの民族グループのメンバーが主として居住するナイジェリアのBiafraの南東地域の政治リーダーシップ。 Biafraは1967年に独立を宣言した。 ナイジェリアの政府は軍封鎖と分離論者およびオイル豊富な領域を再撮影するために答えた。 従ってNigeria'の大災害を始めた; sの内戦。 欧米政府は展開の残虐行為についてのよりオイルへのアクセスについて単に待機したり、もっとかかわった。 ベルリンの空輸とは違って、Biafraの介在は信頼基づかせていた組織のグループ導かれた。 ほぼ2年間AfricaFiles.org [5]のヒューMcCullum著作の記事に従って、不認可の空輸の" 生きた小さい、分離した西アフリカの状態を保ち飢餓がwar."の武器として使用されるように断る; これは多分非状態俳優が取った最も大胆なおよび運動家のリーダーシップの役割の1つだった。 Joint Churchの援助(JCA)と呼ばれた努力は"を提供する5,000の代表団(一晩50までの飛行)に飛んだ; 人道的援助の60,000トンおよび救われた何百万のlives." 各飛行は1つ以上の国際法に違反した。 操縦者はBiafranの封鎖の実施に熱心なナイジェリア力の銃そして爆弾によって提起された極度な危険にもかかわらずひるまなく残った。 代表団の1999に従って記述は飛行中にジャーナル雑誌を出版した: " 毎晩彼らの操縦者はUliの離着陸場の土地に与えられる整理のための新しいパスワードを… すぐに20機の航空機が、暗闇で、木から掛かった方向標識を…一周すると多数は最終のための薄暗い石油ランプの滑走路限界燈だけアプローチの数秒を認められた。 触れられたタイヤがライトextinguished."だった瞬間; Biafranの労働者はちょうど各飛行の荷を下すために20分かかった; 商品は2,000以上の供給の中心のネットワークにそれから方法を作った。 JCAは25人の操縦者および乗組員を失った。 " JCAの最もよい努力にもかかわらず、" McCullumの"を言う; それはdeath."に飢えている約2,000,000 Biafrans推定される; 西からの重要な政治的圧力なし、Nigeria' sの中央政府は勝った。 非暴力的な人道主義の介在のための技術 空中投下はもう一つの選択、物質供給に限られる必要はない。 訓練された人員は落下傘で降り、指名場所で医療サービスが材料に加えて提供されることを保障するために再度取ることができる。 高解像の衛星画像は既にのために利用できる非承認されるの調整を非常に促進するビルマの、非暴力的な介在。 サイクロンの後の幾日、貨物機は食糧と荷を積み、ビルマの死者数が増加する間、医薬品はまだバンコクの国際空港のタールマカダム舗装で基づかせていて残った。 複数の非営利組織間の会話は人道主義の応答のための国連操縦された空気車、またはUAVsの潜在的な使用について、起こっている。 SnowGooseは、例えば、貨物配達のために設計されているUAVである。 空気車は500ポンド以上運ぶことができ、200マイルの範囲を備えている。 UAVsが軍の会議の休止によって残っている真空を満たすためにウォールストリート・ジャーナル(2008年5月23日)のレポートが行為にはねたビルマの非公式の人道主義の応答ネットワークを支えるのに使用できる。 応答ネットワークは僧侶、インターネット精通した運動家および民主化学生を含んでいる。 UAVsはますます現実的、飛び易い。 実際に、トリノ、イタリアからのグループは、より少しにより要するプロトタイプを$12,000開発し、指名ポイントに飛ぶのにグローバルな配置方法(GPS)を使用する。 なお、1つはUAVsを使用するためにビルマに入る必要はなかったりタイビルマのボーダーからむしろ平面を作動できる。 実際に、UAVsがビルマ内の軍隊の動きを監視し、非公式ネットワークの分配の食糧および医薬品のメンバーとラジオまたは携帯電話およびSMSによってローカル村とこの情報を伝えるのに使用できる。 さらに、UAVsは人権の違反および残虐行為の証拠を提供できる。 膨脹可能な衛星通信装置はまたある。 GATRComは、例えば、"である; あらゆる位置の超高速の広帯域衛星回線をおろすことができる膨脹可能な貝の中で押し込められるultralight、ultraportableアンテナ" Popsci.comに従って。 バックパックに容易の装置適合浜球のように小さいポンプによって膨脹させ。 短期使用のためにだけ、付加的なgeospatialイメージおよび通信チャネルを提供するのにGATRが使用することができる間、ビルマの救援スタッフが供給の配分を調整することができるように。 携帯電話およびラジオはまた非承認された人道主義の応答の調整の重要な役割を担うことができる。 サイクロンの前でさえも、ビルマの反対はこれらの技術を使用して努力を調整していた。 2008年2月のアジアの時に隠れる話すことのビルマの反対者に従って: " 電話およびラジオは今非常に重要である。 私は私が行くところはどこでもそれらを常に取る。 それらは私の隣に私が眠るときある。 ラジオは私と私達の動きのための社会的な武器になった。 それは軍の政体に対するメッセージが私達によって放送およびthem."に対して他いかに行うかである; グループはInSTEDD.org [6]、新しい非営利組織を、既に開発しているGoogle Earth、グローバルな配置方法および携帯電話を統合する技術を好む。 これは携帯電話およびGPSの単位が付いているビルマのだれでもテキストGoogle Earthパスワード保護されたインターフェイスにすぐにgeo置かれるリアルタイムの警報できたことを意味する。 1つのかちりと言う音を使うと、テキストメッセージはある特定の周囲内の携帯電話のユーザーのいくつもに自動的に進めることができ偽りなくネットワークコミュニケーションおよび実時間状況意識を可能にする。 データ機密保護を保障するためにこれらのテキストメッセージはまた使用することができる必要異なったSIMカードが軍隊がユーザーに電話をたどってないことを保障するのにと同時に暗号化し。 ビルマの現在の抵抗運動はそのような作戦の使用で特に精通している。 なお、運動家の通信網はDigiActiveの前線SMSを好み、MobileActiveは首尾よくデータ機密保護を保障する新しい作戦を識別しおよび/または開発し続ける。 ビルマの軍の会議の命令のような政体を許可することは受諾可能人道主義の介在の規則ではない。 毎日によって貨物機が基づかせていて残るために強制されたことたくさんの付加的な生命はloだった
The military regime's decision to block humanitarian aid following the cyclone disaster should really come as no surprise. The international community clearly remains at the mercy of regimes that scoff at the Responsibility to Protect.
The Responsibility to Protect (or R2P, as endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1674, affirming the responsibility of all to prevent or stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity) is a noble principle: sovereignty is contingent upon the state's ability to protect its citizens. Burma's military regime has shown absolutely no interest in doing so, but quite the opposite -- even in the case of a "natural" disaster. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has advocated that the principle of R2P justifies overruling the Burmese military junta's right to territorial sovereignty.
Originally, Gareth Evans, Director of the International Crisis Group, strongly disagreed, arguing that Kouchner's approach would create a precedent to intervene in post-disaster environments, which would potentially undermine the general consensus that currently exists in the developing world vis-à-vis R2P. Many other humanitarians have also voiced their opposition to engaging in non-authorized intervention. They (mistakenly) assumed such intervention requires the use of force. The result? An international community yet again bowing down to the wishes of a repressive regime; a terribly inadequate in-country humanitarian response to save lives; and an increasingly high death toll. It is high time that alternative approaches to humanitarian intervention be considered that depend less on potentially resistant governments -- approaches such as people-centered tactics and nonviolent action. In other words, what nonviolent options exist for civilian protection and non-consensual humanitarian intervention?
Supplying Civilians In Defiance of Governments: the Berlin Airlift and Biafran War
Turning to history provides some insights. The Berlin Airlift, for example, is renowned for its logistic bravado and accomplishment but not appreciated enough as an imaginative and in many ways last-ditch effort to avoid a descent into what might have become a third world war. The division of Germany under Allied Occupation after World War II took place under increasing tensions between the Allies and the Soviet Union.
Berlin, geographically isolated in the Soviet-controlled section of Germany (East Germany), remained under four-country jurisdiction (France, Great Britain, US, and the USSR). In 1948 these tensions came to a head as Stalin sought to force the Allies from the city of Berlin by blocking all land (road and rail) and water access to the city. From June of 1948 through September of 1949 -- under orders from President Truman -- food, fuel, and emergency medical material were flown into West Berlin by air. In spite of some extremely harsh weather, the US Air Force, with some British support, managed to fly more than two million tons of goods into West Berlin in 270,000 flights. Granted, the Berlin airlift was carried out by the military under conditions of nuclear brinkspersonship, but the airlift itself demonstrated that even a large city could be supplied through surprisingly nonviolent means.
Another example of non-traditional intervention was in response to the military blockade of Biafra in the late 1960s. The political leadership of the southeastern Biafra region of Nigeria, inhabited largely by members of the Ibgo ethnic group, attempted to secede after a dubiously-conducted Nigerian national election. Biafra declared independence in 1967. The Nigerian government responded with a military blockade to retake the secessionist and oil-rich territory.
Thus began the catastrophe of Nigeria's civil war. Western governments simply stood by, more concerned about access to oil than about the unfolding atrocities. Unlike the Berlin Airlift, the intervention in Biafra was led by a group of faith-based organizations. According to an article by Hugh McCullum on AfricaFiles.org [5], for almost two years their unsanctioned airlifts "kept a small, breakaway West African state alive, refusing to allow starvation to be used as a weapon of war." This was perhaps one of the most audacious and activist leadership roles ever taken on by non-state actors.
The effort, called Joint Church Aid (JCA), flew over 5,000 missions (up to 50 flights per night) delivering some "60,000 tons of humanitarian aid and saved millions of lives." Each flight violated one or more international laws. The pilots remained undaunted despite the extreme danger posed by the guns and bombs of the Nigerian forces intent on enforcing the Biafran blockade. According to a 1999 account of the mission published in Flight Journal magazine:
"Each night their pilots would be given a new password for clearance to land at Uli airfield… As many as 20 aircraft at once, in total darkness, would circle a directional beacon hung from a tree… they were allowed only dim kerosene lantern runway lights for the final few seconds of their approach. The instant their tires touched, the lights were extinguished."
Biafran workers took just 20 minutes to unload each flight; the commodities then made their way to a network of more than 2,000 feeding centers. The JCA lost 25 pilots and crew. "Despite JCA's best efforts," says McCullum, "it is estimated some 2 million Biafrans starved to death." Without significant political pressure from the West, Nigeria's central government prevailed.
Technologies for Nonviolent Humanitarian Interventions
Airdrops are another option and need not be limited to material supplies. Trained personnel could be parachuted in and picked up again at designated sites to ensure that medical services are provided in addition to the material. High-resolution satellite imagery is already available for Burma, which would greatly facilitate the coordination of non-authorized, nonviolent intervention. Days after the cyclone, cargo planes loaded with food and medical supplies still remained grounded on the tarmac of Bangkok's international airport while the death toll in Burma increased.
Conversations among several non-profit organizations are taking place about the potential use of un-piloted aerial vehicles, or UAVs, for humanitarian response. SnowGoose, for example, is a UAV designed for cargo delivery. The aerial vehicle can carry more than 500 pounds and has a range of 200 miles. The UAVs could be used to support the informal humanitarian response network in Burma, which the Wall Street Journal (May 23, 2008) reports has sprung into action to fill the vacuum left by the inaction of the military junta.
The response network includes Buddhist monks, Internet-savvy activists, and pro-democracy students. UAVs are increasingly affordable and easy to fly. Indeed, a group from Torino, Italy, has developed a prototype that costs less than $12,000 and uses Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to fly to designated points. Furthermore, one would not need to enter Burma to use the UAVs, but rather could operate the planes from the Thai-Burmese border. Indeed, UAVs could be used to monitor the movement of military units within Burma and to communicate this information via radio to local villages or via mobile phones and SMS to members of the informal network distributing food and medical supplies. In addition, UAVs can provide evidence of human rights violations and atrocities.
Inflatable satellite communication devices also exist. GATR-Com, for example, is an "ultralight, ultraportable antenna tucked inside an inflatable shell that can pull down a superfast broadband satellite connection at any location," according to Popsci.com. The beach-ball-like device easily fits into a backpack and is inflated with a small pump. While only for short-term use, GATR can be used to provide additional geospatial imagery and communication channels for Burmese relief workers to coordinate the distribution of supplies.
Mobile phones and radios can also play an important role in coordinating non-authorized humanitarian response. Even before the cyclone, the Burmese opposition was coordinating their efforts using these technologies. According to a Burmese dissident in hiding speaking to the Asia Times in February 2008:
"The phone and the radio are very important now. I always take them wherever I go. They are next to me when I sleep. The radio has become a social weapon for me and for our movement. It is how the messages against the military regime are broadcast by us and others against them."
Groups like InSTEDD.org [6], a new nonprofit organization, are already developing technologies that integrate Google Earth, Global Positioning Systems, and mobile phones. This means that anyone in Burma with a mobile phone and GPS unit could text an alert in real time, which would immediately be geo-located on a password-protected Google Earth interface. With one click, the text message can be automatically forwarded to any number of mobile phone users within a given perimeter, allowing for truly networked communications and real-time situational awareness.
These text messages can also be encrypted as needed to ensure data security, and different SIM cards can be used to ensure that the military is unable to trace the phones to their users. The current resistance movement in Burma is particularly savvy in using such tactics. Furthermore, activist communications networks like DigiActive, Frontline SMS, and MobileActive continue to identify and/or develop new tactics that successfully ensure data security.
It is not acceptable to let regimes like Burma's military junta dictate the rules of humanitarian intervention. With each day that cargo planes were forced to remain grounded, thousands of additional lives were lost. When a coercive regime like Burma's fails to uphold its responsibility to protect, the obligation becomes squarely ours, which means that we, the humanitarian community, also failed in Burma. Diplomatic pressure, lobbying, and advocacy are certainly important and necessary actions. However, this top-down pressure needs to be complemented with nonviolent, tactical, proactive, and bottom-up response measures that draw on existing networks, local capacities, and available technologies.
Helping Burmese
Post-cyclone, global nonprofit organizations are struggling to help Burmese meet their needs.
The American Friends Service Committee (www.afsc.org [7]) is assisting the monastic school network, providing medical supplies, food, fuel, shelter materials, and water purification equipment. Donations are needed.
From Issue 386 - June 2008 [8]
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Source URL: http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/burmese-cyclone-nonviolent-action-and-responsibility-empower
Links:
[1] http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/forward/1019
[2] http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/print/1019
[3] http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/authors/patrick-meier
[4] http://www.irevolution.wordpress.com
[5] http://AfricaFiles.org
[6] http://InSTEDD.org
[7] http://www.afsc.org
[8] http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/issue-386-june-2008
[9] http://www.afsc.org/store
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