http://old.thejakartapost.com/detailfeatures.asp?fileid=20081031.W01&irec=0
Moch. N. Kurniawan, The Jakarta Post, Berkeley, California
When applying for his masters degree at the University of California (UC) Berkeley this year, Min Zin, a 35-year-old Burmese dissident, encountered a big problem.
He had never finished high school.
Min Zin was kicked out of high school in Burma (now Myanmar) in 1988 for his political involvement against the military junta.
After this, Min Zin had gone into hiding to avoid arrest until 1997 before fleeing overseas where he worked as a journalist for years, voicing democracy for the Burmese people.
"So when I applied for a masters degree in Southeast Asian studies at UC Berkeley, I had no high school of undergraduate diplomas, and that caused headaches for the faculty," he said.
However, UC Berkeley showed its grace. Endorsed by five professors at the university, Min Zin was eventually accepted as a graduate student despite some concerns over the issue of favoritism.
"This might not have happen at other universities or in other countries. I was so grateful with UC's decision," Min Zin said in the courtyard of the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism.
The opportunity to study at UC Berkeley means a lot to Min Zin. It means he could gain access to tons of books and other material on his and other Southeast Asia countries, and regularly discuss it with experts on the region.
"I am always interested in Southeast Asian studies, particularly on Indonesia because it has a lot of similarities to Burma," Min said explained.
"As a neighbor, Indonesia is doing a good job managing the transition from an authoritarian rule to democracy. Indonesia is fighting hard against its deep-rooted corruption, and is dealing well with multi-ethnic and religious radicalism issues -- all of which could be studied by my home country."
It is not without good reason Min Zin suggested Indonesia was a good example of an authoritarian-turned-democratic country, since millions of Burmese people have been fed with news that "democracy will only lead to separatism and the collapse of a country, just like in the Balkans".
"Indonesia is really a good case study for us to examine, not the Balkans," he said, admitting that reading books about Indonesia had always thrilled him.
Min Zin's reflections on his country showed that his mind and heart remained their, despite the fact he is now living far away in the U.S..
"If I could return home today, I would go. I belong to Burma. My family is there. I want to dedicate myself to establish good journalism and education, because I realize that education is the key to developing Burma."
Min believes that journalism -- through radio, print and television -- could be a vital tool for the informal dissemination of educational material to the Burmese people, since the formal education system there is very limited.
"Even if there was a political change tomorrow, our formal education wouldn't be available for everyone in the country within 10 or 15 years. People will remain reliant on informal education. That's why the media people are very important," he said.
Min Zin may be far from home, but he is holding on to a message Burmese democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi sent him in early 2003, urging him to continue with his education and emphasizing that it would be a valuable investment for Burma.
The message was not given by chance, as Min Zin has known Suu Kyi since 1988 when he arranged for Burmese student unions to join peaceful democratic protests against the military junta. He witnessed the latter responding brutally with bullets, killing some 10,000 civilians.
Suu Kyi was put under house arrest later in 1989, as the military junta launched raids against democratic activists. Min Zin managed to escape, but his father, who passed away a few years ago, was imprisoned.
Ever since, Min Zin has moved from one place to another in Burma, hiding from the military searches, and after Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995, he has communicated with her regularly to exchange ideas.
In December 1996, Min Zin was one of the key organizers of massive student demonstrations, demanding better education and democratic reforms.
Instead of fulfilling the call, the military junta cracked down on the protests, arresting Min Zin's student activist colleagues, however they still could not find him.
As the military continued to hunt for him, Min Zin decided to leave the country, sneaking out to neighboring Thailand by trekking through the jungle for five days, in 1997.
In Thailand, he began his career as a journalist in Radio Free Asia (RFA Burmese Service) and the Irrawaddy English magazine.
Then Min Zin got an opportunity to be a visiting scholar at the Graduate School of Journalism, UC Berkeley, in 2001. He went back to the U.S. again in 2004, this time to work full-time at RFA, whose headquarters are located in Washington D.C.. Min once appeared in an MTV documentary celebrating the life of Nelson Mandela that allowed him to talk with the prominent world figure.
Since leaving RFA in late 2007, Min Zin is now working as a freelance journalist, contributing articles to the Thai-based Bangkok Post newspaper, Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review and The Irrawaddy online and magazine.
Min still maintains his status as a Carnegie teaching fellow at the Graduate School of Journalism, UC Berkeley, and is currently studying in the University's Southeast Asian studies program.
Those are the long and dynamic journeys Min Zin has made, his best assets to help rebuild Burma.
Min Zin believes that the only way to solve Burma's protracted crisis is that the military open a political dialog with the democratic opposition parties and ethnic groups.
Min says the military-drafted constitution and follow-up elections in 2010 would not bring about the much-needed state-building process, a process in which all parties rally together and make their voices heard.
Instead of state-building, the country is now crumbling with repression, poverty and a humanitarian crisis, he said.
Min said the UN-led international community -- especially countries like Indonesia -- should not give up their attempts to enforce an inclusive political resolution in Burma by 2010.
"Of course, I am not optimistic," he said.
"But if the international community lets the generals in Burma continue their unilateral 'road map', the country will experience a crash landing."
Friday, October 31, 2008
Min Zin: Burmese activist crosses boundaries
BURMA: China's Thirst for Oil Ignores Environment, Rights
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44534
BANGKOK, Oct 31 (IPS) - The largest island off Burma’s west coast is emerging as another frontier for China’s expanding plans to extract the rich oil and gas reserves of military-ruled Burma.
Initial explorations by a consortium, led by China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), has left a deep scar on Ramree Island, which is twice the size of Singapore and home to about 400,000 people. ‘’They have destroyed rice fields and plantations when conducting the seismic surveys and mining the island in search of oil,’’ says Jockai Khaing, director of Arakan Oil Watch (AOW), an environmental group made up of Burmese living in exile.
‘’The local communities have been directly and indirectly affected,’’ he Said during an IPS interview. ‘’Hundreds of people have been forced to relocate as a result of the drilling conducted near their communities. The locals hate the Chinese; their world has become crazy after the Chinese arrived.’’
CNOOC has been pushing ahead with its work since early 2005, with no attempt to consult the local residents and showing little regard to such notions as corporate social responsibility, adds Jockai. The Chinese company, which is listed on the New York and the Hong Kong stock exchanges, has ‘’not conducted the required environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments that are recognised internationally as a must before exploration work begins.’’
To dispose the waste from its drilling sites, ‘’CNOOC workers dug shallow canals designed to carry the (toxic) ‘drilling mud,’ or wastewater containing oil, away from the drilling sites and into Chaing Wa Creek, which curves past several local farms before flowing into the Bay of Bengal,’’ states a report by AOW, released in mid-October. ‘’This arbitrary disposal can make soil in surrounding areas unsuitable for plant growth by reducing the availability of nutrients or by increasing toxic contents in the soil.’’
Concerns about the cost of letting China tighten its grip on the natural resources in Burma (or Myanmar) has also been expressed by other groups, like EarthRights International (EI), a U.S.-based group championing human rights. There are 69 Chinese companies involved in 90 ‘’completed, current and planned projects’’ in the oil, gas and hydropower sectors in Burma, EI revealed in groundbreaking report released in late September.
That number marks an over 200 percent increase in the number of Chinese energy developers thought to have had existed a year before. ‘’Given what we know about development projects in Burma and the current situation, we’re concerned about this marked increase in the number of the projects,’’ the rights lobby stated in the report, ‘China in Burma: The Increasing Involvement of Chinese Multinational Corporations in Burma’s Hydropower, Oil and Natural Gas, and Mining Sectors.
‘’China is using Burma’s military dictatorship to its advantage as it goes in search of oil and gas. There are no rules and regulations for Chinese companies to follow in Burma,’’ Ka Hsaw Wa, executive director of EI, said in an IPS interview. ‘’This will hurt the future of Burma.’’
Such criticisms come at a time when China has begun to show signs that the environment cost of its projects abroad cannot be ignored. ‘’The country lacked comprehensive environmental protection policies in its overseas projects, although investment had been expanding,’’ states a report released in mid-September by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP), according to the ‘China Daily’ newspaper.
‘’China’s overseas investment and aid mainly focuses on exploring oil and other resources, processing and manufacturing, and construction in African and Southeast Asian countries,’’ the English-language daily added. ‘’Without proper management, such projects are likely to cause environmental problems, the (CAEP) report said.’’
Burma, in fact, will prove to be an ideal testing ground, given that China emerged as the military-ruled country’s biggest investor in the country’s power sector. The money flowing in from such foreign direct investments and the sale of gas has helped to prop up a junta notorious for suppressing its people through many forms of abuse.
In 2006, the junta earned an estimated 2.16 billion U.S. dollars from sales of natural gas to Thailand, which accounts for close to half of Burma’s export earnings and is the single largest source of foreign earnings. In 2008, Burma is expected to earn 3.5 billion US dollars from export of gas, according to one estimate.
But little of these benefits trickled down to the country’s beleaguered people. Consequently, Burma ranks as one of the world’s least developed countries. And having an abundance of natural resources has not improved the power supply in the country for the people either. Regular blackouts are frequent in Rangoon, the former capital, and elsewhere.
The junta has profited in other ways, too, from China’s energy interest in Burma. ‘’Beijing has come to the junta’s rescue and protects it from criticism at international forums like the U.N. Security Council,’’ says Win Min, a Burmese national security expert teaching at a university in northern Thailand. ‘’A strong relationship of mutual benefit has developed since 1988.’’
In exchange for letting Chinese companies exploit its natural resources, the Burmese dictatorship has got military hardware from Beijing. They range from fighter jets and armoured carriers to small weapons, Win Min told IPS. ‘’The junta will open the country to China because the military regime needs Beijing more than the other way around.’’
(END/2008)
US Group Says Burma Detained Opposition Activists' Lawyer
http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-10-29-voa58.cfm
By VOA News
29 October 2008
A U.S.-based human rights group says Burmese authorities have arrested a lawyer who is defending members of Burma's opposition party.
The U.S. Campaign for Burma says police detained Nyi Nyi Htwe in Rangoon Wednesday and are holding him in the Hlaing Thar Yar police station.
The group says Nyi Nyi Htwe and another lawyer Saw Kyaw Kyaw Min are defending 11 youth members of the National League for Democracy who were arrested in September for inciting public unrest.
Authorities detained the activists for peacefully marching to Rangoon's Shwedagon Pagoda on June 19, 2007 - the birthday of detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
The U.S. Campaign for Burma says the activists were not given a fair trial. It says when the lawyers submitted complaints about the process, the judge allowed the prosecutor to sue the lawyers and three defendants.
Burma is ruled by a military government that suppresses any opposition to its rule.
Last year, a string of small, peaceful protests against the rising cost of fuel turned into a rare massive anti-government movement calling for democratic reforms.
The military crushed the demonstrations with force.
Burmese regime plans major offensive against KNU-DVB
http://english.dvb.no/news.php?id=1906
Oct 30, 2008 (DVB)傍he State Peace and Development Council is said to be planning an all-out offensive against the Karen National Union, according to a source close to the military.
The source said that a leaked confidential report from infantry headquarters outlined the need to collect information on KNU positions, resources and capabilities and to monitor the movements of the Thai army along the border.
Heavy weapon stations in the area have been reinforced and provided with extra shells, the source said.
KNU information officer major Saw Hla Ngwe said the offensive was part of the regime痴 usual strategy.
的t is not a one-year plan to completely wipe us out, this is their strategic plan that they try to implement every year,・he said.
典his is nothing out of the ordinary; they have been doing it for a long time.・p>
Major Saw Hla Ngwe said there had only been low-level clashes so far, but added that the KNU is preparing for a larger scale attack.
展e are preparing for guerrilla warfare but we won稚 know what will happen until we start firing at each other,・he said.
的t is like this every year, so we are already prepared.・p>
Thailand-based military analyst Htay Aung said the SPDC was seeking to weaken the KNU to prevent them from providing support to ceasefire groups.
溺any ethnic groups have signed as ceasefire, while other major armed resistance groups like the KNU, the Karenni National Progressive Party and the Shan State Army-South have not yet reached a settlement,・Htay Aung said.
典he SPDC plans to disarm these ceasefire groups, so some of them are planning to revolt against this disarmament,・he said.
典he SPDC thinks these ceasefire groups are being influenced by the KNU, KNPP and SSA-South to take up arms again,・he explained.
典hat痴 why they will launch some offensives against these three major groups before they disarm the other groups.・p>
Htay Aung said a new offensive could lead to human rights abuses and an increased number of displaced people.
的f heavy fighting breaks out, the people will suffer,・the military analyst said.
釘ased on past evidence, whenever heavy fighting has broken out, the first thing they do is to burn down villages and carry our extra-judicial killings,・he said.
展hen their offensives start, people have to flee or go into hiding, and usually they flee onto Thai soil.・p>
Reporting by Naw Say Phaw
Aso unveils ¥27 trillion stimulus package
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nb20081031a1.html
By TAKAHIRO FUKADA
Staff writer
Prime Minister Taro Aso unveiled a fresh stimulus package Thursday that includes about ¥2 trillion in benefits payments to households, expressway toll cuts and record tax breaks on home loans.
The first such package under Aso is an effort to cope with the ongoing economic turmoil, to revitalize regional economies and to protect citizens from the full effects of the financial crisis. The overall size of the package is expected to be worth ¥26.9 trillion. It entails about ¥5 trillion in fresh government spending, and calls for directing ¥1 trillion in road-related tax revenues to municipal governments.
In an unusual move, Aso also set out a timeline for hiking the consumption tax, saying he wants it raised "in three years' time."
"The economy is experiencing a violent storm seen only once every 100 years," Aso told reporters, referring to the global financial crisis. "Steering is unprecedentedly difficult. The government will (apply) full power."
While some experts cheer the new measures, others are skeptical. Some critics also say ruling the Liberal Democratic Party, and its coalition partner, New Komeito, are trying to woo voters with cash benefits in the runup to a general election.
The latest measures follow an ¥11.7 trillion stimulus package unveiled in August, before the full scale of the global credit crisis had become apparent.
Although Japanese banks have escaped comparatively unscathed from the crisis, profits of many companies are declining due to the soaring yen and slowing overseas demand.
The Bank of Japan is widely expected to cut its already superlow interest rates as early as Friday.
Under the newly announced package, the government plans to distribute cash to households. An average household with four people will receive about ¥60,000, Aso said.
The government dropped an earlier tax-cut plan in favor of benefits payments after realizing the cuts were unlikely to benefit low-income residents who do not pay taxes.
Similar measures were adopted in 1999, when the government spent around ¥700 billion to distribute coupons to households with children and pensioners. Municipal governments gave out coupons worth ¥20,000 to each recipient.
Expressway tolls will be slashed to ¥1,000 — and around ¥1,500 on regional roads — on Saturdays, Sundays and national holidays.
On weekdays, regional expressway tolls will be cut by around 30 percent.
Also included in the new package are the largest-ever tax breaks for mortgage holders. Premium payments for the national unemployment insurance program will also be lowered and tax breaks offered on securities.
The package also includes measures for energizing small and midsize companies. The government will help finance corporations by providing ¥30 trillion through expanded emergency state guarantees and loans.
However, some economists doubt the measures will be effective.
"The economic stimulus effects (of the package) are extremely limited," said Hiromichi Shirakawa, chief economist at Credit Suisse, calling the new package too little, too late.
Shirakawa predicted the nation's employment situation will deteriorate toward the middle of next year as export-oriented companies struggle due to the economic downturn in the U.S., Europe and Asia.
Under those circumstances, consumers are likely to tighten their purse strings. People will balk at taking out mortgages and the benefits payments will go into savings rather than be spent, Shirakawa said.
Sounding a more positive note, Mamoru Yamazaki, senior international strategist at RBS Securities Japan Ltd., said the package will help shore up the economy.
Yamazaki noted that the Japanese economy is largely dependent on overseas demand, which is declining due to the global financial turmoil.
In the middle to long term, it is imperative that the economy be driven largely by domestic demand, and economic structural reforms will be necessary, he said.
Fw: [burmainfo] 今週のビルマのニュース（0833号）
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ビルマ市民フォーラム メールマガジン 2008/10/31
People's Forum on Burma
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ビルマ情報ネットワークの「今週のビルマのニュース」をお送りします。
「今週のビルマのニュース」バックナンバー
http://www.burmainfo.org/weekly.html
きょうのビルマのニュース（平日毎日更新）もご利用ください。
http://d.hatena.ne.jp/burmainfo/
ビルマ情報ネットワーク （www.burmainfo.org）
秋元由紀
========================================
今週のビルマのニュース Eメール版
2008年10月31日号【0833号】
========================================
【今週の主なニュース】
ASEM議長声明ほか
・北京で開かれていたアジア欧州会議（ASEM）
首脳会議が25日に終了した。議長声明はビルマ問題
にも触れ、ビルマ軍政に対しすべての関係者を政治
プロセスに関与させ、政党の活動に対する制約を
解除し政治囚を解放することなどを求めた。
・ビルマ軍政のニャンウィン外相が27日、北朝鮮を訪問し、
朴宜春外相と平壌で会談した。会談では両国間の
協力関係の強化などが話し合われた。両国は昨年
4月に国交を回復した。ビルマ外相の訪朝は25年
ぶり（28日付APほか）。
【その他】
民主化活動家の弁護士にも禁固刑、ほか
・目撃者の話によれば、軍政は民主化運動指導者アウンサン
スーチー氏の自宅周辺に設置されていたバリケードを撤去した。
理由などは不明。スーチー氏は自宅軟禁されている（26日付BBCほか）。
・アウンサンスーチー氏の代理人弁護士が、氏の自宅軟禁措置
への異議申し立て手続きについて相談するため氏と面会したい
と軍政に要請した。スーチー氏は自宅軟禁措置の合法性を問う
申し立てを行ったばかり（24日付AFP）。
・インセイン刑務所に収容されている国民民主連盟（NLD）
党員の、代理人弁護士2人に6か月の禁固刑が言い渡された。
「司法手続きを妨害した」との理由だった（30日付ミジマほか）。
・ミンコーナイン氏など、国内で活動する民主化団体「88世
代学生グループ」の中心メンバー9人に6か月の禁固刑判決
が言い渡された。裁判所の命令に従わなかったことが理由
とされた。9人は昨年8月に燃料費値上げに抗議するデモ
行進をしたこと等を理由に拘束されており、複数の罪で
告訴されている（29日付ミジマ）。
・米国は27日、ビルマ産宝石の輸入禁止措置の施行を開始した。
同措置は7月末に成立しており、3か月間の猶予期間が定めら
れていた（28日付AFP）。
【ビルマへの政府開発援助（ODA）約束状況など】
新たな発表はなし
【イベントなど】
・宇田有三写真展「アウンサンスーチーとビルマ」
（岐阜県 瑞浪芸術館、10月25日～11月24日）
・東京女子大学祭での展示「FACES Burma 2007 and 2008
感じてください、ビルマの『現在（いま）』を」（ビルマに関する
写真展・映画上映・書籍販売）（東京女子大学善福寺
キャンパス 6号館6215教室、11月1・2日、10時～17時）
・新拓生展「黙殺の視線 - Shan state of Burma -」
（ビルマ・シャン州の写真展）
（新宿ニコンサロン、11月4日～10日、10時～19時。但し最終日は16時まで）
・第24回世界仏教徒会議日本大会
シンポジウムにビルマ僧侶アシン・ナヤカ師出席
（浅草ビューホテル、11月15日12時～）
・アジアと日本のつながりを考える国際セミナー
「100人の村 あなたもここに生きています」
ヒューライツ大阪ほか主催
秋元由紀がパネリストとして参加
（大阪市阿倍野区民ホール・小ホール、12月5日14時～）
・ビルマ市民フォーラム例会
（文京シビックセンター4階シルバーホール、12月6日18時半～）
★ジェーン・バーキン最新アルバム『冬の子供たち』が
11月26日に発売予定。アウンサンスーチー氏に捧げる
楽曲「アウンサンスーチー」を収録。
☆インターネット放送局「アワープラネットTV」がビルマ
でのダム開発問題を取り上げた。
ビルマ情報ネットワークの秋元由紀が解説（映像、16分）。
http://www.ourplanet-tv.org/video/contact/2008/20081008_10.html
★特定非営利活動法人メコン・ウォッチの
季刊誌「フォーラムMekong」、最新号はビルマ特集。
－ビルマ～サイクロン後の人々、軍政－
http://www.mekongwatch.org/resource/forum/FM_vol9_2_01.html
【もっと詳しい情報は】
きょうのビルマのニュース（平日毎日更新）
http://d.hatena.ne.jp/burmainfo/
ビルマ情報ネットワーク
http://www.burmainfo.org/
【お問い合わせ】
ビルマ情報ネットワーク 秋元由紀
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今週のビルマのニュース Eメール版
2008年10月31日号【0833号】
作成： ビルマ情報ネットワーク
協力： ビルマ市民フォーラム
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配布元: BurmaInfo（ビルマ情報ネットワーク）
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連絡先: listmaster@burmainfo.org
バックナンバー: http://groups.yahoo.co.jp/group/burmainfo/
※BurmaInfoでは、ビルマ（ミャンマー）に関する最新ニュースやイベント情報、
参考資料を週に数本配信しています。
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Burma’s Junta Targets Women in Human Rights Violations:
http://thewip.net/contributors/2008/10/burmas_junta_targets_women_in.html
by Cheery Zahau
- Burma / India -
•Burma has become well known to the world, not with good reason but for its worsening human rights violations perpetrated by the military junta ruling the country. According to Amnesty International, the regime now has more than 1,300 political prisoners, 175 of whom are women according to the Burmese Women Union Report. Last summer, the women of Burma showed their courage by resisting the junta’s many injustices during the Saffron Revolution. The regime responded violently to the protesting unarmed women citizens, nuns and monks.
The Union of Burma was formed in 1947 with the signing of the Panglong Agreement which was intended to provide the signing parties (Kachin, Chin and Shan) with equal rights, equal participation in the creation of government and self-determination. But these hope were short-lived and faded away when General Ne Win, the first dictator of Burma’s junta, seized power in 1962. Since the institution of Burma’s dictatorship, the country has become the largest user of both child soldiers and forced labor in the world, and the second largest producer of opium. Burma is one of the 50 poorest countries in the world, ranking high in corruption and low on health (190 out of 191 countries) and education (94 out of 129 countries). Today, Burma’s 54 million people belong to eight major ethnic groups and practice different religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and animisms. They possess very few rights and are routinely punished for voicing dissent.
In August 2007, the military junta increased fuel prices unreasonably. When student activists demonstrated against the policy the regime responded by harassing the activists and their families. After a month, the fire of dissatisfaction amongst Burma’s people spread until monks, nuns and ordinary citizens demonstrated against the junta, demanding social, economic and political change. The junta responded with bullet fire causing several deaths. Twenty-seven women activists were imprisoned while hundreds more had to flee to country. About 2,000 people were arrested and detained. Relatives of the protesters were interrogated. In Burma, the more people want justice and freedom, the riskier their lives become.
This is especially true for Burmese women who are often targeted for supporting the political activities of their husbands, brothers or fathers. These women are taken repeatedly from their homes and interrogated. Sometimes they are arrested on the spot when their male relatives are away.
In my work, I have come across several women who have been targeted by the regime for their desire to implement political and social change within the country. I know that the women in Burma live with fear and worry for their daily existence because of the junta’s economic mismanagement. They worry about the ongoing increase of food prices as they struggle to feed their families. They fear that they won’t be able to send their children to school or seek healthcare for their family members. I admire them for the sacrifices they have made for the betterment of our society.
I cannot do much to help them, but I can show my solidarity by helping them tell their stories to the world. The following story is just one among many, but shows how the women in Burma face incredible abuses and injustice. I met with Mrs. Tluang Ngam, 46, in Malaysia and recorded her story.
•
I arrived in Kualampur, Malaysia on February 13, 2008 from the Chin State of Burma. I was sentenced to prison for six and half years in Burma. I am one of the few political prisoners who was released after the Saffron Revolution, the popular monks uprising in Burma in September 2007.
• Malaysian immigration regularly arrests and detains Burmese refugees. Photograph by Cheery Zahau. •Here in Malaysia I met with my children and husband after waiting for almost seven years to see them. My four children have left Burma while I was in prison. But the place we met and stayed together as a family was not safe, because I was arrested by the Malaysian thug group called the RELA and was handed over to the Malay immigration department where they detained us for several days without a proper trail.
I thought I had been arrested unjustly only one time, but here it was repeated again. It is very common in Malaysia that the RELA arrest Burmese refugees and migrant workers. About 150 women from Burma have been arrested and sold to the commissioners at the Thai-Malay border who then demand Malay RN1800-2000 (US$503-559). Almost everyone is frightened by the RELA or Malay authorities for their ill-treatment of refugees and migrant workers.
I was arrested by Burmese military authorities on a “Suspect Case” because of some guests who stayed with us for three days in 2001 at our village in Chin Stat. It is common culturally to host travelers who cross the villages from time to time.
I was beaten on the back by the army officer and slapped across my face because I could not answer all their questions since I didn’t know what they wanted from me. I didn’t have time to say goodbye to my children. That was the most bitter experience of my life.
I was put in Malamaid Jail in Kalaymyo, Sagaing Division. I was sentenced to seven years and taken to court about five times. The judge asked me the same questions every time I was taken to the court. There was no lawyer provided for me.
[Inside the jail] I worked as a cleaner of the women's dormitory, which was very dirty. Almost every hour I had to work. Verbal abuse was very common by the women police. I hardly had a visitor [so] the roommates and authorities looked down on me. The food was so horrible, a small portion of rice, some kind of peas and bad quality salt. Some officers were very abusive and treated us like animals, but some were not so bad. The authorities kept changing every six months.
• Burmese refugees live in precarious conditions in Malaysia. Photograph by Cheery Zahau. •During my sentence, I kept worrying about my children as the youngest was only 11 when I was arrested. I also heard that my husband could not go back to our village for fear of interrogation and arrest. Every night, I wondered where my children would be - Were they cold, hot, hungry or happy? I cried so much because I missed my children.
I constantly lived with worry and fear. The only way I could comfort myself was by praying. As a consequence, I developed a heart condition and other mental health problems. Sometimes [even now], I don't want to speak to anyone, including family members. Sometimes I complain about life negatively even though I know it will create problems within my family. My children have grown up without their mother, which keeps their relationship distant with me [to this day].
I decided to tell you my story to let the world know that we, the women in Burma, face extreme violations of our basic rights under these unjust rulers. I want the world to know that we need a change in Burma in order to save thousands of innocent lives. For me, every night, I pray for my friends who remain in jail without a free and fair trail and their families who are traumatized, too.
I wish that one day they will enjoy freedom, justice and peace of mind. - Mrs. Tluang Ngam, 46
•
Burma’s military regime has used different tactics to oppress and persecute its own people, resulting in the flight of more than 450,000 Burmese refugees into neighboring Bangladesh, India and Thailand. About 600,000 of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been uprooted while approximately 140,000 refugees live in the recognized camps in Thailand. The routine attacks against Karen State civilians, the massive forced relocations in Shan State, the constant forced labor of the already poor villagers in Chin State, the economic assimilation of Kachin State with Chinese business people, and the more than 50 projects in other parts of Burma that favor the junta over the people, have caused severe suffering all across the country.
While ignoring the political, economic and social crises endured by its own citizens, the Burmese military junta makes an enormous and constant income from selling natural gas, hydropower, timber, minerals and gems. It uses none of the profits for the betterment of the people.
As a women's human rights activist, I come across Burmese women who are routinely victimized by the army troops. They clearly know they suffer because of the country’s bad governance. They protest despite the danger it poses their families because they know what needs to be done. Whenever I see them, I become more determined to work harder to create effective interventions, policy, laws and ultimately government that will protect and promote women's basic human rights. It is now up to the international community, the UN Security Council in particular, to add their voices to the chorus of protest against Burma’s regime. If the UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security is not used to protect lives in Burma, will it merely remain on paper forever?
About the Author
Cheery Zahau is a Chin activist working to restore democracy and human rights in her country. She left Burma when she was 17 and settled in India, where she works extensively on women's capacity building within her local Chin communities. She also campaigns to protect women’s rights in Burma. She has spoken at the United Nations and with representatives from governments around the world including India, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Germany and the United States about the systematic sexual violence committed by Burmese Army soldiers against Chin women.
Tags:Burma Human Rights Malaysia Saffron Revolution Women
Dalai Lama in Japan after health scare
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081031/wl_afp/japantibetchinadiplomacyreligiondalai_081031061535
Fri Oct 31, 2:15 am ET AFP – Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama (left), surrounded by security police, is greeted by wellwishers … NARITA, Japan (AFP) – Tibet's exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama on Friday started a week-long visit to Japan for talks on spirituality, his first trip overseas since a health scare.
The 73-year-old Nobel Peace laureate began his tour days after saying he saw no hope in current dialogue with Beijing, despite a new round of talks due to begin soon between his envoys and Chinese officials.
The Dalai Lama smiled and waved as he was welcomed at Narita airport near Tokyo by dozens of Tibetan expatriates, Japanese well-wishers and fellow Buddhist monks.
"I'm very happy to be once more in this country and to have the opportunity to meet all my friends," he said.
Some 50 plain-clothes police officers kept watch and escorted the Dalai Lama into a waiting car as Tibetans chanted "Free Tibet."
During his stay, the Dalai Lama is scheduled to give speeches arranged by a Japanese Buddhist group and Tibetan supporters. He will also visit children and monks.
He is due to travel to the southwestern city of Fukuoka to deliver an address on compassion and happiness and to speak in Tokyo about the nature of the mind, organisers said.
In October the Dalai Lama spent nearly a week in a New Delhi hospital after tests revealed he had gallstones.
Ahead of his illness, the revered monk had pursued a hectic international schedule as he campaigned for improved human rights in Tibet while China hosted the Olympic Games.
The Dalai Lama, who has lived in India since fleeing Tibet in 1959, is a frequent visitor to Japan where he enjoys an active following.
However, unlike many Western nations, Japan -- which has an uncomfortable relationship with China -- has almost always refused high-level official contacts with the Dalai Lama and no officials are scheduled to meet him on the current trip.
China accuses the Dalai Lama of trying to split Tibet from Beijing through his travels overseas.
The Dalai Lama's position has been one of seeking meaningful autonomy for Tibet within China. However, last weekend he said he had all but given hope of reaching a mutually acceptable solution.
China, after dumplings row, sniffs at Japan sauces
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20081031/wl_nm/us_china_japan_food_3
Fri Oct 31, 2:36 am ETBEIJING (Reuters) – China, accused in Japan of producing tainted frozen beans and dodgy dumplings, now says it has found toxic chemicals used in paint in Japanese mustard and soy sauce.
China has been swept by a series of food- and product-safety scandals in recent months involving goods as diverse as toys, tyres, toothpaste, pet food, fish and baby cribs and is fighting a scare over melamine found in milk and other products.
China said this month it had no evidence that frozen beans pulled from the shelves in Japan were tainted with pesticide. Earlier this year, several Japanese were made ill by Chinese-made dumplings that also contained pesticide, but a joint investigation failed to reveal how the contamination occurred.
Tests conducted by quarantine officials found Japan-produced soy sauce and mustard sauce had been contaminated by toluene and acetic ester, Xinhua news agency said on Friday.
"This would risk people's health," Xinhua said, citing experts on the chemicals which are used in paint and paint thinners.
"They will lead to headaches and vomiting if people eat food tainted with them," Xinhua said.
The sauces were produced by three Japanese factories, Xinhua said without revealing the names of the producers. The watchdog ordered Chinese companies to test similar products and take them off the shelves, the report said.
No related sicknesses had been reported in China, but the two chemicals had caused some sickness in Japan, it added.
Warming diplomacy between China and Japan over the last two years has done little to smooth rough edges. Chinese memories of Japan's invasion and brutal occupation of parts of the country from 1931 to 1945 run deep.
Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso had his first meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last weekend at an Asia-Europe summit, adding to a string of high-level visits since nationalist Junichiro Koizumi stepped down as Japanese prime minister in 2006.
A months-long scandal over melamine appearing in Chinese milk products and eggs has caused thousands of children to fall ill in China and killed at least four.
(Reporting by Beijing newsroom; Editing by Nick Macfie)
Attackers kill at least 61 in northeast India
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gnanZCCGoFB6Prcks7AbutGRI-iAD944V7GG0
By WASBIR HUSSAIN – 20 hours ago
GAUHATI, India (AP) — Bombs planted in cars and rickshaws ripped through crowded markets in a coordinated attack Thursday in India's volatile northeast, killing at least 61 people and wounding more than 300.
The scale and planning behind the 13 blasts surprised authorities, who struggled to determine who was behind the attacks — among the worst in a region plagued by separatism, ethnic violence and Islamic militants.
The largest explosion took place near the office of Assam state's top government official, leaving bodies and charred, mangled cars and motorcycles strewn across the road.
Bystanders dragged the wounded and dead to cars that took them to hospitals. Police officers covered charred bodies with white sheets in the street.
Later, dozens of people angry over the blasts took to the streets of the state capital, Gauhati, stoning vehicles and torching at least two fire engines. Police imposed a curfew on the city and closed roads leading in and out of the area.
Sixty-one people were killed in the blasts, including at least 31 who died in five explosions in the state capital, said Subhash Das, a senior official in the state's Home Ministry. At least 19 people were killed in the Kokrajhar district and 11 others in the town of Barpeta, he said.
Some 300 people were wounded by the bombs that went off within minutes of each other just before noon, he said.
Officials blamed the largest separatist group, the United Liberation Front of Asom, for the blasts. "The needle of suspicion is on ULFA," said Assam government spokesman Himanta Biswa Sharma.
However, the group has never carried out an attack of this size and complexity, which closely resembles bombings that have rocked other Indian cities this year. Those attacks were blamed on Islamic militants.
"Going by the nature, planning and magnitude of the blasts we need to find out if ULFA has been assisted by other terror groups ... at home or abroad," said Das.
Anjan Borehaur, a spokesman for the United Liberation Front of Asom, denied his group had any role in the attacks.
India's northeast — an isolated region wedged between Bangladesh, Bhutan, China and Myanmar with only a thin corridor connecting it to the rest of India — is beset by dozens of conflicts. More than 10,000 people have died in separatist violence over the past decade in the region.
In July, at least 49 people were killed in violence between members of the Bodo tribe and recent migrants to the area, most of whom are Muslims.
The region is also home to dozens of separatist groups who accuse the government of exploiting the area's natural resources while doing little for the indigenous people — most of whom are ethnically closer to Burma and China than to the rest of India.
U.S. Ambassador David Mulford condemned the latest attack.
"I send condolences to the people of India. Americans share their sorrow and outrage at these horrific attacks on innocent people," he said.
TV footage showed firefighters spraying streams of water at charred, twisted cars and motorcycles at the site of the largest blast outside the secretariat, housing the offices of the state's chief minister.
"I was shopping near the secretariat when I heard three to four loud explosions. Windowpanes in the shops shattered and we fell to the ground as the building started shaking," said H.K. Dutt, who was hit by shrapnel.
"I stood up and saw fire and smoke billowing out, then I looked down and saw blood on my shirt," he said.
Regional effort on climate change sought
http://www.bangkokpost.com/311008_Business/31Oct2008_biz35.php
NAREERAT WIRIYAPONG
Thailand should work more closely with its neighbours and other Asian countries to address the challenges of climate change more comprehensively, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said yesterday.
Regional co-operation in several areas could help reduce the increasing risks of climate change, in addition to individual problems country by country, said Jean Pierre Verbiest, country director of the ADB's Thailand Resident Mission.
Asian countries should agree regionally on issues such as deforestation and slash-and-burn farming to avoid risks that banning such activities in one country would lead to more severe problems in a neighbouring one, noted Mr Verbiest.
''Climate change has now become a major global concern,'' he said. ''The ADB is strategically positioned to work with developing countries of Asia and the Pacific region to co-ordinate efforts in promoting sustainable development and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation.''
An example of regional co-operation is the power grid that Thailand has promoted for many years, allowing the kingdom to buy energy from neighbouring Laos, Burma and Cambodia to optimise production, he said.
The ADB is one of the few international institutions that support Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in the region in terms of technical and financial assistance.
CDM is a concept that allows developing countries such as Thailand to sell carbon credits to industrialised nations that must make emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto accord.
Carbon credits are an instrument used in emission trading schemes globally.
Mr Verbiest said the ADB had set up the $150-million Asia Pacific Carbon Fund to provide bridge financing for CDM projects in the region.
Currently, the bank has three ongoing CDM projects valued at a total of $10 million managed under the fund, with many others in the pipeline.
The ADB will co-host a conference on climate change on Nov 13 to discuss the impact of global warming on livelihoods, ecological systems and the economic well-being of the people affected.
The local consultancy Team Group and the Stock Exchange of Thailand are co-sponsoring the conference, which aims to attract both government and business leaders to explore ways to mobilise resources for CDM facilities.
Six Months on from Myanmar Cyclone Nargis, Save the Children Helps 100,000 Children Get back into School
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/SaveChAlli/26589039992d83e98c1f2106e002b94d.htm
31 Oct 2008 10:18:09 GMT
Source: International Save the Children Alliance
Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are the author's alone.
Yet new report highlights that education still is not viewed as a critical part of every humanitarian response
Yangon, Myanmar (1 November 2008) Today, six months after the devastating Myanmar cyclone, Save the Children has shown that quality education can and should be provided in the aftermath of an emergency.
The cyclone destroyed 50-60 percent of schools, yet over the past six months Save the Children has improved the quality of education for more than 100,000 children, including the construction of over 350 temporary schools.
“It’s hard to overstate how important getting children back to school is,” said Andrew Kirkwood, Save the Children’s country director in Myanmar. “The best way to deal with emotional distress is to normalise the lives of children, get them back into a routine, and enable them to pick up what they were doing before the cyclone.”
Save the Children’s experience in many emergencies demonstrates that education in emergencies can be provided and is of value, not only to children but also to whole communities. As Save the Children’s new report, Delivering Education for children in Emergencies highlights, while every emergency is unique, a number of interventions are common across contexts and can be tailored to specific cases.
“There’s a huge demand for this, from communities and children. There were about 400,000 children who were not able to go to school because of the cyclone. Now, we’ve managed to get 100,000 of those kids back into school through, for example, the rebuilding of temporary schools, using relatively inexpensive materials,” said Kirkwood.
Save the Children has shown time and again that education can and should be provided, even in the immediate aftermath of an emergency. In December 2007, Save the Children reacted quickly to Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh, which affected over 260,000 students. Within a month almost all students were able to return to school. Save the Children was able to help over 37,000 children continue their education despite very difficult circumstances.
Yet, education is still not part of every humanitarian response and, as a result, children affected by conflict or natural disasters miss out on weeks, months or even years of schooling.
Save the Children’s new report Delivering Education for Children in Emergencies: A Key Building Block for the Future sets out why education is a critical part of humanitarian response and demonstrates that it is possible to provide quality education even in the midst of conflict.
Even though education saves lives, in both the short and the long term, quality education in emergencies is still viewed as secondary when compared to the provision of food, water, medical assistance and shelter. Less than 2 percent of humanitarian emergency aid went to education in 2007.
Moreover, when governments do fund education as part of their emergency response, they tend to do so as a series of short-term projects rather than as part of a longer-term continuum from emergency to development.
On average, 750,000 children have their education disrupted or miss out entirely on education owing to humanitarian disasters each year. In addition, there are 72 million children out of school worldwide and more than half of them — 37 million— live in countries affected by conflict.
Read Save the Children's Delivering Education In Emergencies
China's footprint in Myanmar expands
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/JK01Cb02.html
China Business
Nov 1, 2008
By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI - Once under the radar in mostly remote areas, China's growing investments in resource-rich Myanmar have become more openly apparent as Beijing parlays its close diplomatic ties to the country's ruling military junta into lucrative contracts and concessions. China's commercial advance comes while the United States and Europe impose strict trade and investment sanctions against the military regime.
Recent investigative reports, including from environmental groups EarthRights International and Arakan Oil Watch, detail the involvement of some 69 Chinese multinational corporations in at least 90 hydropower, mining and oil and gas projects across the country. The growing commitments are a testament to China's pragmatic approach to commercial diplomacy and underscore its
interest in maintaining Myanmar's political status quo.
China's Myanmar investments focus mainly on energy and natural resources, which are required in ever-larger quantities to fuel its fast-expanding industrialization and urbanization. Chinese projects range from hydropower dams to the highly ambitious and controversial Shwe Gas pipeline that is projected to cross the length of Myanmar to transport fuel to China's landlocked southern Yunnan province.
That particular project is designed to open access for China to the Indian Ocean for some fuel shipments and circumvent the congested Strait of Malacca, through which over 70% of its current oil and gas imports travel. Beijing has expressed strategic concerns that in a conflict the United States could block the strait and starve the Chinese economy of fuel imports.
India and Thailand also aggressively jockey for access to the resources of neighbor Myanmar, in contrast to US and Europe, which subject the country to strict trade and investment sanctions in protest against its rulers' abysmal rights record. Those curbs were recently augmented by so-called "smart sanctions" aimed at hitting the private resources of senior junta members and their top business associates.
The growing scale of China's commitments have the potential to provide huge profits for the regime, funds which historically have been employed to buy weaponry that is used to suppress the democratic and ethnic opposition. Some economic analysts estimate the regime has in recent years earned US$3.5 billion in natural gas sales alone.
China's investment in Myanmar's oil and gas reserves is on the rise. EarthRights International identified 21 Chinese-funded onshore and offshore oil and natural gas projects, including the Shwe Gas project in Arakan state and newer blocks in Sagaing division. China is also reportedly interested in using Kyaukpyu Island off Arakan state as a transshipment point for Middle Eastern oil and gas imports, which will then be piped up through Myanmar to China's Yunnan province.
A $1 billion contract has been signed between the Myanmar government and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, or Sinopec, to build a first oil pipeline. A parallel gas pipeline is expected to follow. A memorandum of understanding has also been signed between China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) for an assessment on the construction of a crude oil terminal.
Chinese partners are also involved in the gigantic 7,100-megawatt Tasang Dam on the Salween river in Shan state, while other dams on the N'Mai Hka, Mali Hka and Irrawaddy rivers in Kachin state are being built to provide electricity to Yunnan. According to EarthRights Internation, the Kachin state dams are expected to have a combined capacity of 13,360 megawatts.
Sidestepping sanctions
Chinese companies have also long taken part in small-scale mining operations in Myanmar, often in quest of gold and jade. According to EarthRights International, China is now involved in at least six major mining operations in the country, including China Nonferrous Metal Mining Company's recent $600 million investment in the Taguang Taung nickel deposit.
While the US recently imposed sanctions on the import of precious stones from Myanmar, Chinese merchants have helped to fill the trade gap. A government-sponsored gem fair in Yangon in October netted the regime an estimated $175 million. Chinese traders, who were mostly interested in Myanmar jade, represented the largest contingent at the event, with 2,200 out of the 2,648 attendees.
China's commercial embrace of Myanmar is underwritten by a long-standing policy of non-interference between the two neighboring countries. First signed in 1954 and known formally as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the policy nominally separates business from politics. It has allowed China to invest heavily in Myanmar's underdeveloped resources while resisting US, European and United Nations calls to leverage its influence to push for political change.
Political change in Myanmar could erode Beijing's present privileged position there. Certainly China has used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block criticism and sanctions against Myanmar.
In the past year, Chinese statements on Myanmar have taken a slightly critical edge, indicating to some either that Chinese patience with Myanmar's generals is waning, or a concern that stability be maintained to protect Beijing's economic and strategic interests. After the junta's violent crackdown on demonstrators last year resulted in widespread international condemnation, Chinese diplomat Tang Jiaxuan was reported to have told Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win in September 2007, "China wholeheartedly hopes that Myanmar will push forward a democracy process that is appropriate for the country." That veiled criticism went further the following month, when China joined with Russia and India in a call for the Myanmar's ruling generals to meet with the opposition.
A UN Security Council resolution in October last year condemning the Myanmar government for its use of violence against protestors and demanding the release of political prisoners was supported by the Chinese government. Yet China is clearly most concerned about a possible international intervention or sudden regime change in Myanmar that nullifies its commercial concessions and privileges.
Earlier this year, Beijing expressed strong opposition to the idea that US, France and Great Britain should use military means to force Myanmar's generals to accept foreign aid after the Cyclone Nargis disaster displaced as many as two million people in the country. At the height of the standoff, the US and France had warships near the coastal region worst hit by the storm, while Western diplomats pushed to invoke a UN "right to protect" provision to help the stranded victims.
China has instead advocated Myanmar change from within, in line with the ruling junta's stated plans to move towards a managed form of electoral democracy by 2010. At the same time, the democratic opposition has made few attempts to convince China that should they take power, Chinese strategic interests and investments would be preserved and guaranteed.
At least outwardly, there appears at present to be no contact between the opposition and the Chinese government. China's ability to provide low-cost machinery, technical know-how and long-term, low-interest loans would presumably make it an attractive strategic partner regardless of who holds power in Myanmar.
But from Beijing's point of view, its growing and more visible commercial interests are for now better served by the devil it knows.
Brian McCartan is a Chiang Mai-based freelance journalist.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Injustice in Burma: Time to bring Burmese Military Government to International Criminal Court
http://www.demotix.com/en/2008/09/25/injustice-burma-time-bring-burmese-military-government-international-criminal-court
Arresting political dissidents will not solve Burma’s long standing political crisis
One year after "2007 Saffron Revolution" led by Buddhist monks, who were at the forefront of the demonstrations against military dictatorship in Burma, leaders of the bare-foot monks and democracy activists are behind bars facing injustice. Recently, Nilar Thein, who is one of the steering leader of 2007 Saffron revolution got arrested and interrogated.
Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) expressed very serious worry over her arrest and demands the Burmese military regime to avoid ill-treatment and torture. Nilar Thein joined the Burma democracy movement as a high school student in 1988 as a member of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions which is outlaw in Burma and spent eight years in jail from 1996 to 2003 for her political activity.
“We are very concerned over her (Nilar Thein) arrest and seriously worrying that she will face torture, brutal and inhumane treatment. We demand military government to refrain from practices of torturing political dissidents and urged to release them unconditionally”, said Myo Thein, Director of Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) in United Kingdom.
Brutalities facing prisoners of conscience in Burma are only the tip of Ice-Berge. There are a lot more to be revealed when military government is brought into International Criminal Court.
U Sandar Waya (a) U Nyan Win, Buddhist monk, whose only crime is praying for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, listening to foreign independent media like BBC/Burmese, RFA/Burmese, participating in the Saffron Revolution and the notes of “if the military violently crack down peaceful demonstrations- avoid confrontation and settle the situation peacefully”. He was arrested on 4th October 2007 when military raided his monastery in North Oakalapa, Rangoon without warrant or civilian witness.
Zaw Zaw Aung was involved in peaceful demonstrations in Saffron revolution. Being a NLD member, Zaw Zaw Aung is surveillance by police constantly and charged him under section 124(A). He was arrested by Swan Arr Sinn and USDA members, junta sponsor militias, beaten and transferred to the police. When police lieutenant Than Htay Aung, the government prosecutor, is challenged by the accused counsel whether he is aware of the freedom of expression and freedom of organisations are fundamental human rights according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which Burma is the signatory country, and he replied “No”-indicates that how Burma is lack of human rights and freedom.
U Peter and Daw Nu Nu Swe have been sentenced to six years in prison accusing them of disturbing police on duty when they came to their house to arrest their son, Sithu Maung, who actively participated in Saffron revolution. The couple was arrested on 29th September last year after they delayed answering the door to the men who did not wear uniform and claimed themselves police asking them to open the door at night around 2 am with no warrant, appeared to be drunken and had not been accompanied by local officials. U Peter and Daw Nu Nu Swe were too scared to open the door as they did not know them and as if they were robbed. Their only crime is delaying in answering door to unknown men who claimed to be police.
Sithu Maung, Thein Swe (a) Min Soe, Myo Thant (a) John Nawtar, Ye Min Oo (a) Kalarlay, Ye Myat Hein (a) Ko Ye, Kyi Phyu, and Zin Lin Aung (a) Rakhine are behind bars. Their only crimes are protesting peacefully in Saffron revolution, expressing truth of fuel prices hike and economic hardship facing the Burmese people.
“Who will save helpless 50 millions Burmese people suffering under brutal military government for nearly half the century? Burma has been forgotten crisis for very long time and even in last year 2007 Saffron revolution, the world witnessed that military regime killed innocent unarmed peaceful demonstrators and no concrete actions have been yet taken by United Nations and international community”, said Khin Maung Win, Director of Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) in United States.
Arresting political dissidents will not solve Burma’s long standing political crisis. International community and Burmese democratic forces have been calling for military junta to release all political prisoners and perform the meaningful time-bound dialogue to find out the solution for current Burma political crisis. Increasing arrest to political dissidents are very alarming that military government have no desire or will to solve the political crisis through non-violent ways and indicating that they will use the force whatever the cost it may be. Burmese military government is openly defying United Nations and international community by increasingly arresting activists. This is time to ask the question that what United Nations will do.
The military maintains an extensive network of Military Intelligence (MI), informers, police, militias such as Swan-Arr-Shin and Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members, prepared to imprison anyone suspected of holding or expressing anti-government opinions in Burma. Laws have been established that criminalize freedom of thought, expression, association, assembly and movement, thus legitimizing these arbitrary arrests and continued to arbitrarily detain people across Burma for associating with opposition groups.
The military maintained complete control over the legal system and denies basic rights to due process of law, a fair and public trial in political cases.
“We are defending the human-rights and democracy with non-violent way and we have been paying the price very dearly. I would like to stress here that Burma is not only Burmese people crisis but also international crisis as everyone is bond in humanity. If we cannot eliminate military dictatorship in Burma today, there will be another dictator emerge tomorrow from another corner of the world. It could spread like the virus and the world will be at risk of prevailing injustice and aggressors. We have to stop it sensibly and it is our duty to do the RIGHT thing”, said Kyaw Lin Oo, Director of Burma Democratic Concern (BDC) in Thailand. For more information contact,
Myo Thein
00 44 787 788 2386
[United Kingdom]
Khin Maung Win
00 194196126 22
[United States]
Kyaw Lin Oo
00 664107 9352
[Thailand]
BURMA: New Constitution - Radical Change or Fig Leaf?
http://globalnewsblog.com/wp/2008/10/14/burma-new-constitution-radical-change-or-fig-leaf/
October 14th, 2008 • Related • Filed Under
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Filed Under: Analysis • Asia • Politics
Global Geopolitics Net Sites / IPS
Tuesday, October 14, 2008
All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2008.
Analysis by John Feffer
WASHINGTON, Oct 14 (IPS) - After more than 15 years in the drafting, Burma unveiled its new constitution in February. The 194-page document has generated a widely disparate response.
In May, just days after Tropical Cyclone Nargis hit Burma and killed tens of thousands Burmese, the military government reported that 92 percent of the population supported the new constitution in a referendum vote.
The opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), however, has categorically rejected the new document. And outside observers generally treat the constitution — as well as the referendum results — with scepticism.
From the current Burmese government’s point of view, the constitution provides for a stable transition to democratic rule. Elections are scheduled for 2010, after which the new constitution would go into effect. The military has reserved 25 percent of the seats in both houses of parliament, but the remaining seats will be open to qualified candidates.
Some measure of autonomy is accorded to the states.
The third in Burma’s history — after an initial 1947 post-colonial document inspired by British common law and a socialist-era document drafted by the military junta in 1974 — the new constitution provides at least the trappings of the rule of law. For instance, the constitution mandates the creation of a constitutional court, which will administer and interpret the law as well as preside over disputes between different branches of government.
According to Dominic Nardi, a Georgetown University law student and speaker at an Oct. 8 seminar in Washington, DC sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the court has a third critical function as an ”elite insurance mechanism”.
”If the political situation changes dramatically, if the opposition takes over one or both houses of legislation, a constitutional court ensures that minorities will have some protection under the law,” says Nardi. ‘’In transition from less liberal to more liberal forms of government, we see authoritarian leaders establish courts so that they have protection from prosecution after the transition.”
The constitution also rules out demonetisation. In 1987, the government introduced a new currency and wiped out the savings of millions of Burmese. The constitutional prohibition against demonetisation is therefore a positive lesson learned, says David Steinberg, professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University.
At the same time, Steinberg notes that the constitution contains a get-out-of-jail-free card for the leadership: ”No one can be tried for any crimes committed by the government in the past.”
The military has protected its position in other ways. In an emergency, the president can hand power over to the military commander-in-chief for a year. Moreover, changing the constitution requires the consent of three-quarters of lawmakers. So it is quite difficult to change the army’s leading role, the process of choosing the president or even the process of amendment itself.
Nardi points out, however, that the U.S. constitution is also a notoriously difficult document to amend, so that U.S. leaders have gotten around the amendment process by focusing on judicial appointments and constitutional interpretation.
”Many people think the amendment procedure is a horrible provision. I don’t think it will matter as much as many people in the opposition believe,” Nardi argues. Other provisions in the new constitution ”allow the speaker and the president to appoint judges to a constitutional tribunal. If you can’t amend the constitution, you could appoint judges more favorable to you and influence judicial interpretation.”
Brian Joseph of the National Endowment for Democracy believes the constitution does nothing to advance democratic rights.
”The constitution drafting effort and the draft constitution offer us virtually nothing to hold on to,” he says. ”It may have some provisions that allow for protections or legislative action.”
But the essential characteristic is that the military can dismiss the government without cause,” Joseph added. ”Whoever is governing, once they overstep their bounds, will be dismissed. So the government will constantly be looking over its shoulder.”
Joseph does not believe that there will be any true power-sharing under the new constitutional order or any creation of space for the opposition. ”They might hold elections in 2010,” he observes. ”The important thing is not the technical details of the constitution but whether people can organize, whether there’s freedom of speech and mobilisation. If parties can’t organize, this is all just an empty exercise.”
Joseph pointed out that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi cannot run for president because she was once married to a foreigner, which disqualifies her according to a provision of the constitution.
Steinberg acknowledges that the military has no intention of undermining its own power and that the constitution will be a continuation of military rule by other means. At one time, in the 1950s and 1960s, social scientists looked to the military in developing countries as forward-looking and relatively immune from corruption. Today, however, perceptions of the military junta have changed.
”Maybe there will be some people within the military trying to change the operation of power under the constitution,” he concludes. ”But right now it is an unlikely possibility.”
Rise of the military in Burma
http://aliran.com/index.php?view=article&catid=49%3A2007-8&id=379%3Arise-of-the-military-in-burma&option=com_content&Itemid=10
Saturday, 08 December 2007 07:07
Burma is one country with zero democracy. In the light of the bloody crackdown against peaceful protesters there, John Smith Thang recounts the rise of the brutal military regime and how it morphed into a brutal dictatorship.
After World Wars I and II, the Burmese people realised that state security from sudden invasion by the then imperialist powers such as the Japanese and Germans was not guaranteed. At that time, the role of the military was to fight the invading enemy, to protect the people and the country. This did not mean that the military’s primary objective was to rule the state. Military rule should be the exception - only during emergency situations.
According to Alagappa, “the military’s primary role is deemed to be in [the] international arena”. The people’s voice should be supreme for nation building in this day and age. The military’s role in the international arena only arises when world war or other global conflicts occur. This is when the country is faced with an external threat. The state’s police force is seen as sufficient for handling crime and maintaining internal security.
Moreover, the state should be accountable for any militarised action it takes. It should be with the consent of the people or there should be provisions in the Constitution to authorise such action.
Here ‘civilian rule’ refers to the state, political society, and civil society, especially the political, administration, and juridicial institutions. In civilian rule, the military is not involved in ruling the country. This article looks at how the military developed in Burma and finally took over the country.
Achieving a shaky independence
In Asia, many modern day sovereign nations are ex-colonies of former colonial powers. Even after gaining independence, many of them had not achieved sufficient political maturity to build the state themselves. This resulted in the potential collapse of the state as weaknesses were found in several sectors. Occasionally the military interfered in the civilian rule and politics of the state. Under military rule, however, different levels of state building and ruling systems were developed in the newly independent nations in Asia.
Military domination in North Korea, Pakistan and Burma clearly shows how the political process, national goals and agenda have been determined by the military. The state is directly run by the military, although a different name such as council or committee may be used for the governing body. But the military are in full control of the State in those countries.
Formation of the Burmese army
The Union of Burma had a basic civil constitution in 1947 (reflecting the Penglong Agreement), as well as its agreement with the different ethnic nationalities for the first time as a step towards nation building. This was of common interest to all the people and an acceptable basic principle for the formation of a nation. The Penglong Agreement also paved the way to achieving Burmese independence from the British. It was a historic event as the different ethnic nationalities united to defend Burma from the threat of a colonising invasion. It was founded on state civil-military relations from the founding moment: independence from colonial rule in 1948.
In Burma the armed forces were originally organised as a federation of ethnically constituted regiments established during the colonial period such as the Chin and Kachin regiments. It also saw the involvement of different ethnic nationalities fighting for independence from colonisation. Apart from this, ethnic regiments significantly contributed to defending the federal union of Burma during the civil war in the early years.
But the sincere comradeship of the multi-ethnic regiments was destroyed after Independence was achieved. The reason is that, immediately after Independence, the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was formed by only the prominent Burman nationalist politicians who had participated in Japan’s invasion of Burma in 1942.
Subsequently, within a few months of Independence in 1948 it was reorganised by force “with Burman (refers to ‘proper Burma’ as well as known ‘lower Burma’ mainly from the central part of the country, not Chin, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, Mon or Arakan ethnic group) officers and men dominating all units, regardless of their ethnic names” (Silverstein 1990). The ethnic regiments were excluded and placed in different units and so were fragmented.
Hence, it was a total assault on the federal army, national freedom and independence, unity and loyalty of the ethnic groups. The federal army was abolished. The army comprises Burman extremists who have betrayed the ethnic nationalities.
Moreover, the new army started claiming a hold on the nation touting itself its guide. This was not at all fair as the new army only served the interests of Burman extremist leaders. This was the beginning of how the Burmese army became the federal broker and national ethnic unity broker in contravention of the 1947 constitution. It is clearly a military insult to the nation after the secret arrest and disappearance of the Federal Union’s constitutionally appointed former president and Chairman of the chamber of nationalities S. Shwe Thaik in 1962. (An ethnic Shan, he became the president of the Union of Burma on 4 January 1948 at its independence. He served as the head of state of Burma between 1948 and 1952. After this term as president, he was the chairman of the chamber of nationalities until 1962. In the military coup of March 1962 he was arrested by military head General Ne Win and died in prison in November 1962.) Similarly, the father of Independence, General Aung San, was assassinated in 1947 by Burman extremists.
Since then, the armed forces have been almost permanently at war with the Karen, Shan and other ethnic minorities. The government has failed to incorporate these minorities into the national community. Ethnic rebel groups increase in numbers on the periphery of Burma.
At the height of conflict in 1949-50 the military was elevated to partnership in the government. It was called in again by the politicians to form a caretaker government and hold the country together in 1958 and subsequently took power; the constitution was allegedly terminated in the 1962 coup (Luckham).
This coup arose in connection with civilian rule due to alleged intrigue by the Burman extremist patriotic group. It led to a mis-driven economic budget utilisation, which failed to implement the policy reforms required that might have transformed the economy. The military coup in 1962 occurred with the cooperation of the Burman dominated army. To date, this army remains Burma’s national army, known as “Myanmar Thatmadaw”.
Nation's guardian or oppressor?
Now the role of the army is more than guardian of the nation; it is a full participant in government. The army has paved the way to dictatorship instead of maintaining and rebuilding the nation. Its failure to maintain parallel economies and political institutions – have reinforced the stagnation of the economy and the repressiveness of the military regime (Luckham).
The Burmese military government attempted to outflank the left by establishing its own Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); the new military order was an autarkic and non-aligned socialist state. The reason for becoming Socialist was to create a political ideological balance between the neighboring countries. Burma was treated as a strategic buffer between the democratic Indian and the communist Chinese regimes on its borders (Luckham).
For various reasons, the Burmese army took power not only to solve the crisis but also to form its own party, the BSPP. Army chief, General Ne Win, became Burma’s Socialist Party president. The prolonged and continuing domination by the military clearly seems to be aimed at perpetuating military rule through the creation of a single-party structure. Since then, Burma’s democracy has been totally confiscated and the country has never returned to civilian rule.
The Burmese Army started the repression of the students’ and workers’ demonstrations in the 1960s and 1970s; these were brutally crushed. It even resorted to torture, and the economy steadily deteriorated. By mid-1988, rice shortages and popular discontent reached crisis proportions. The police slaying of a student sparked demonstrations.
Coinciding with the fall of the communist strong hold of Soviet Russia, which was also Burma’s ally, General Ne Win, Burma’s socialist dictator, in fear of mass demonstrations, resigned as head of the government in July 1988. Sein Lwin, his own armyman, replaced him as the new president. But the strongman Sein Lwin was forced by public fury to quit on 12 Aug after only 18 days in power. There was a nation wide strike and thousands were killed by the army.
The main thing that the people demanded was a change in political structure. The people did not demand a mere change of BSPP leadership. But the military group didn’t want to end the BSPP, and kept on changing the leadership of the party making General Maung Maung the next leader. Later, by the continuous demand of the people, and failed repressive measures to crush it, the BSPP’s hold on power was finally ended.
Then, in September 1988, through reassertion of their power in the country, the army formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); senior general Saw Maung became chairman of SLORC. On 18 September 1988, the military took power again with the new name (SLORC) after killing a sufficient number of people. At the same time, the military made a verbal promise for “democracy” just to pacify the people.
However, the SLORC military government again abolished the second constitution of 1974; even though that 1974 constitution was not democratic, the new SLORC issued martial law decrees that forbade any public criticism of the military and prohibited public gatherings of more than five people. On the same date SLORC took power, the military regime announced that they would implement a multi-party democratic system in Burma.
It looked like the army had finally responded to calls for democracy by announcing a coup by SLORC. But this announcement turned out to be merely idealistic rhetoric, as people later realised, because SLORC did not transfer power to the elected party.
In June 1989, SLORC changed the name of the country to Myanmar; in 1992, senior general Saw Maung, who took control of the state by force in 1988, retired. Another general, Than Shwe, then became the chairperson of SLORC and has ruled till today. Than Shwe renamed the party the State Peace and Development Council in November 1997.
Recent massacre
The current Burmese public demonstration that began in September is not just an ethnic confrontation with the military government; but the majority of Burman people also participated in the demonstration. They realised it was not only about ethnic conflicts but also an issue for the whole nation, and that the military caused misunderstanding amongst ethnic communities of different religions. That is why a big internal revolution was raised recently in Burma mainly led by the monks.
The monks, particularly, feel a huge burden because of military misuse of Buddhism against other ethnic minority religions. On 24 September 2007 alone, over a million people took to the streets in 26 cities and towns, including all the ethnic states across Burma, marching for freedom and human rights (Asia Pacific People’s Partnership on Burma (APPPB) Maroon Revolution in Numbers).
However, as was characteristic of the military junta, despite claiming to be Buddhists and Burman nationalists, they brutally killed the monks in the recent September massacre. The army didn’t even respect the Buddhist ‘god’ by not taking off their shoes in the temple and pagoda, against their own Buddhist tradition, and went in to kill Buddhist monks.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), at least 4,000 people including more than 1,000 monks were arrested. At least two national United Nations staff have been arrested and detained. Around 300 people were killed including one Japanese journalist and possibly thousands of people as well. Not less than 1,000 people have disappeared in this Revolution. Possibly ten thousand people were arrested. Even before 21 August 2007, there were 1,158 political prisoners already in prisons. Three thousand students were shot in 1988 and numbers of people massacred in 2003 at Depayin.
Moreover the public feared further prolonging of military power in Burma as the newly drafted constitution stipulates “25 per cent directly reserve seats for military in parliament”. This is dangerous for all Burmese people. Public participation was very limited in drafting the constitution, and there were no fundamental rights of freedom of expression and the right to assembly. It can lead to wrong nation building that could have adverse implications for Burma’s future.
Burma has a serious ruling structure problem. The military government is a cruel illegal ruler , which is still trying to hold on to power.
This is how the Burmese military junta, which was supposed to be the nation’s guidance in early times, later turned into a dictatorship, killing its own people till today. Moreover, the Burmese military has a deep-rooted tradition of dictatorship; it cannot commit to genuinely building a democratic nation as long as power is in the hands of the army.
Democracy versus military rule
The possibility exists for the military to take temporary control when a civilian government strays from its ‘national ideal’ or obligation. In Burma’s case, if the military was the genuine guardian it should have solved the civilian conflict among the various ethnic nationalities. For example, there was a democracy dilemma in civilian rule in early 1950 to 1960: civilian rulers from the Burman extremists group tried to dominate the country by secret Buddishtisation and Burmanisation over other ethnic nationalities (Horton, Guy 2005). The Prime Minister U Nu himself was presumably involved in these efforts. (U Nu also attempted to legalize Buddhism as the state religion in 1961.) This is the consequence of extremist Burmanisation and a weak democracy.
It certainly violates the nation’s constitution as well as the fundamental Penglong Agreement, by discrimination and restriction of freedom. Society’s support of this fundamentalist and pro-domination trend is always a problem for nation building. It apparently led to the failure of civilian rule. In such an event, the intervention of the military is appropriate to prevent extremists taking power. But here the military also became the partner of extremist Burmans. We later realised they were linked with each other.
Slowly, we discovered that the military initially, immediately reorganised the army and later held a coup to form the Socialist party, with the purpose of monopolising military power and controlling the country. Looking back, the behaviour of the Burmese military was not about creating a resolution for democracy, but rather about having lasting political power and control of the country.
When conflicts between the Burman dominant group and other ethnic groups arise, within the system of civilian rule, the army should protect and be responsible for their reunification instead of aiding the ethnic-cleansing of the other ethnic groups. The army should play an impartial role.
According to Enloe (1981), a second society-based explanation of military politicisation and intervention is that the military intervenes to protect and advance the interests of a specific class or ethnic/religious group (Alagappa 48). But in the case of Burma the military is systematically maintaining power itself to control the civilian population. This is one of the reasons the BIA (military name of early time) allegedly removed from the federal army ethnic regiments like the Chin and Kachin Regiments. The military was also hand-in-hand with the Burman extremists helping to exploit and collapse other ethnic societies. This is another regrettable mistake in the Burmese Army’s history.
The military seemed to try to re-assume democracy in the 27 May 1990 election. But out of 485 parliamentary seats contested; the NLD won 392 (over 80%; 82%). Ethnic minority parties won 65 more seats. The army-front NUP won only 10 constituencies; it was clear that people did not approve of the army being in power. The result was not the one expected by the military.
However, the urgent question is whether the military will hand over power to a civilian government or whether the Burmese military junta will retain power forever. The military has tasted power for a long period; so until there is serious or any damaging opposition armed attack, their attitude is unlikely to change.
In our latest experience, a non-violent method is totally opposed to the Burma military. The military has cheated the public. This is a trap for the Burmese people as the military always blocks efforts to obtain civilian rule. The Burmese people have lost the opportunity of having a civilian administration and their liberty, for more than half a century.
In a democracy, a civilian government should control the army. But it appears that the Burmese army never wants to be under civilian control. Civilian supremacy is “government control of the military,” and the criterion for civilian control is “the extent to which military leadership groups, and through them the armed forces as a whole, respond to the direction of the civilian leaders of the government” (Alagappa).
Furthermore, in a democratic system, the concern is to ensure a professional and political military that acknowledges civilian authority and executes the orders of a democratically elected government.
Conclusion
After various studies of the military, it is not possible for a military that was always linked to dictatorship or quasi dictatorship to produce democracy. Therefore, the military should totally relinquish power and transfer it to a civilian government. Today, the Burman and other ethnic groups are mature enough to build the nation.
However, Burma is one of the countries in Asia dominated by a very hard-line military. The military has become the supreme power overriding civilian supremacy. Indeed, it clearly expresses its intention not to develop democracy. It is right to say that the present Burmese military government is an illegal government.
Since 1988, the caretaker military administration remains in place, rules by martial law, has imprisoned politicians, and refuses to hand over power to an elected government (Luckham 32). Furthermore, the newly drafted constitution has allegedly betrayed the public by giving weight to military power and again the holding of elections remains uncertain.
The reason for the existence of a military government in Burma is neither an emergency nor for a temporary term. They intend to prolong their rule permanently. So their action is not limited to a nationalistic ideal or security matter. Moreover, there is no threat of any external invasion in Burma. Rather, the Burmese military has become a threat to neighbouring countries through unnecessarily increasing its troop numbers to 400,000, with an additional, 200,000 auxiliary soldiers.
John Smith Thang is a Burmese MA human rights student.
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Thursday, October 30, 2008
The Geopolitics Of China
http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john_mauldins_outside_the_box/archive/2008/06/12/the-geopolitics-of-china.aspx
The Geopolitics Of China
John Mauldin's Outside the Box
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No matter where in the world I am, in South Africa, in Europe, in La Jolla, there's one question I get asked over and over, "What about China?" And small wonder. The increasing impact of China in the last generation is just staggering and seemingly accelerating every day. If you're in the market for oil, minerals, arable land, equities or debt, you're bidding against Chinese government-sponsored entities with a $1 trillion warchest. And the list of markets where China is a key player grows every day. Bottom line: whether you're filling up your gas tank or trading credit default swaps, China's decisions impact your pocket book.
The only thing that's crystal clear about China is the need to look long term, at the underlying forces that don't change day by day. Nobody does this better than my friend George Friedman and his team at Stratfor. Their geopolitical focus filters out the noise in the popular press and concentrates on the real drivers behind national policy. This is especially critical for a market like China, where traditional financial statement analysis is impossible and profit motives just don't apply.
On Monday, George and his team are releasing the second in their series of Geopolitical Monographs, called The Geopolitics of China. I've received an advance copy of the report below, and it is today's Special Edition of Outside the Box. Click this link to take advantage of a special pre-release offer on a Stratfor Membership that George is offering just to my readers. Did you know that China is functionally an island? Want to understand China's strategy behind their sovereign wealth funds? Policy in Tibet and Darfur? Join Stratfor now. You'll get a whole year of Stratfor's insights, plus you'll get The Geopolitics of China and their other Geopolitical Monographs included free. You really don't want to miss out on this opportunity.
Look at the map below that shows how China is functionally an island. Fascinating. It's just one of the maps George uses to illustrate what makes China, China. I hope you find this report intriguing, and do take George up on his offer for a free copy of the entire series included with your Stratfor Membership.
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
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THE GEOPOLITICS OF CHINA: A Great Power Enclosed
Contemporary China is an island. Although it is not surrounded by water (which borders only its eastern flank), China is bordered by terrain that is difficult to traverse in virtually any direction. There are some areas that can be traversed, but to understand China we must begin by visualizing the mountains, jungles and wastelands that enclose it. This outer shell both contains and protects China.
Internally, China must be divided into two parts: The Chinese heartland and the non-Chinese buffer regions surrounding it. There is a line in China called the 15-inch isohyet. On the east side of this line more than 15 inches of rain fall each year. On the west side annual rainfall is less than that. The bulk of the Chinese population lives east and south of this line. This is Han China, the Chinese heartland. It is where the vast majority of Chinese live and the home of the ethnic Han, what the world regards as the Chinese. It is important to understand that over a billion people live in an area about half the size of the United States.
The Chinese heartland is divided into two parts, northern and southern, which in turn is represented by two main dialects, Mandarin in the north and Cantonese in the south. These dialects share a writing system but are almost mutually incomprehensible when spoken. The Chinese heartland is defined by two major rivers -- the Yellow River in the north and the Yangtze in the South, along with a third lesser river in the south, the Pearl. The heartland is China's agricultural region. However -- and this is the single most important fact about China -- it has about one-third the arable land per person as the rest of the world. This pressure has defined modern Chinese history -- both in terms of living with it and trying to move beyond it.
A ring of non-Han regions surround this heartland -- Tibet, Xinjiang province (home of the Muslim Uighurs), Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. These are the buffer regions that historically have been under Chinese rule when China was strong and have broken away when China was weak. Today, there is a great deal of Han settlement in these regions, a cause of friction, but today Han China is strong.
These are also the regions where the historical threat to China originated. Han China is a region full of rivers and rain. It is therefore a land of farmers and merchants. The surrounding areas are the land of nomads and horsemen. In the 13th century, the Mongols under Ghenghis Khan invaded and occupied parts of Han China until the 15th century, when the Han reasserted their authority. Following this period, Chinese strategy remained constant: the slow and systematic assertion of control over these outer regions in order to protect the Han from incursions by nomadic cavalry. This imperative drove Chinese foreign policy. In spite of the imbalance of population, or perhaps because of it, China saw itself as extremely vulnerable to military forces moving from the north and west. Defending a massed population of farmers against these forces was difficult. The easiest solution, the one the Chinese chose, was to reverse the order and impose themselves on their potential conquerors.
There was another reason. Aside from providing buffers, these possessions provided defensible borders. With borderlands under their control, China was strongly anchored. Let's consider the nature of China's border sequentially, starting in the east along the southern border with Vietnam and Myanmar. The border with Vietnam is the only border readily traversable by large armies or mass commerce. In fact, as recently as 1975, China and Vietnam fought a short border war, and there have been points in history when China has dominated Vietnam. However, the rest of the southern border where Yunnan province meets Laos and Myanmar is hilly jungle, difficult to traverse, with almost no major roads. Significant movement across this border is almost impossible. During World War II, the United States struggled to build the Burma Road to reach Yunnan and supply Chiang Kai-shek's forces. The effort was so difficult it became legendary. China is secure in this region.
Hkakabo Razi, almost 19,000 feet high, marks the border between China, Myanmar and India. At this point, China's southwestern frontier begins, anchored in the Himalayas. More precisely, it is where Tibet, controlled by China, borders India and the two Himalayan states, Nepal and Bhutan. This border runs in a long ark past Pakistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, ending at Pik Pobedy, a 25,000-foot mountain marking the border with China, Kirgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It is possible to pass through this border region with difficulty; historically, parts of it have been accessible as a merchant route. On the whole, however, the Himalayas are a barrier to substantial trade and certainly to military forces. India and China -- and China and much of Central Asia -- are sealed off from each other.
The one exception is the next section of the border, with Kazakhstan. This area is passable but has relatively little transport. As the transport expands, this will be the main route between China and the rest of Eurasia. It is the one land bridge from the Chinese island that can be used. The problem is distance. The border with Kazakhstan is almost a thousand miles from the first tier of Han Chinese provinces, and the route passes through sparsely populated Muslim territory, a region that has posed significant challenges to China. Importantly, the Silk Road from China ran through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan on its way west. It was the only way to go.
There is, finally, the long northern border first with Mongolia and then with Russia, running to the Pacific. This border is certainly passable. Indeed, the only successful invasion of China took place when Mongol horseman attacked from Mongolia, occupying a good deal of Han China. China's buffers -- Inner Mongolia and Manchuria -- have protected Han China from other attacks. The Chinese have not attacked northward for two reasons. First, there has historically not been much there worth taking. Second, north-south access is difficult. Russia has two rail lines running from the west to the Pacific -- the famous Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) and the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM), which connects those two cities and ties into the TSR. Aside from that, there is no east-west ground transportation linking Russia. There is also no north-south transportation. What appears accessible really is not.
The area in Russia that is most accessible from China is the region bordering the Pacific, the area from Russia's Vladivostok to Blagoveschensk. This region has reasonable transport, population and advantages for both sides. If there were ever a conflict between China and Russia, this is the area that would be at the center of it. It is also the area, as you move southward and away from the Pacific, that borders on the Korean Peninsula, the area of China's last major military conflict.
Then there is the Pacific coast, which has numerous harbors and has historically had substantial coastal trade. It is interesting to note that, apart from the attempt by the Mongols to invade Japan, and a single major maritime thrust by China into the Indian Ocean -- primarily for trade and abandoned fairly quickly -- China has never been a maritime power. Prior to the 19th century, it had not faced enemies capable of posing a naval threat and, as a result, it had little interest in spending large sums of money on building a navy.
China, when it controls Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, is an insulated state. Han China has only one point of potential friction, in the southeast with Vietnam. Other than that it is surrounded by non-Han buffer regions that it has politically integrated into China. There is a second friction point in eastern Manchuria, touching on Siberia and Korea. There is, finally, a single opening into the rest of Eurasia on the Xinjiang-Kazakh border.
China's most vulnerable point, since the arrival of Europeans in the western Pacific in the mid-19th century, has been its coast. Apart from European encroachments in which commercial interests were backed up by limited force, China suffered its most significant military encounter -- and long and miserable war -- after the Japanese invaded and occupied large parts of eastern China along with Manchuria in the 1930s. Despite the mismatch in military power and more than a dozen years of war, Japan still could not force the Chinese government to capitulate. The simple fact was that Han China, given its size and population density, could not be subdued. No matter how many victories the Japanese won, they could not decisively defeat the Chinese.
China is hard to invade; given its size and population, it is even harder to occupy. This also makes it hard for the Chinese to invade others -- not utterly impossible, but quite difficult. Containing a fifth of the world's population, China can wall itself off from the world, as it did prior to the United Kingdom's forced entry in the 19th century and as it did under Mao Zedong. All of this means China is a great power, but one that has to behave very differently than other great powers.
China's Geopolitical Imperatives
China has three overriding geopolitical imperatives:
Maintain internal unity in the Han Chinese regions.
Maintain control of the buffer regions.
Protect the coast from foreign encroachment.
Maintaining Internal Unity
China is more enclosed than any other great power. The size of its population coupled with its secure frontiers and relative abundance of resources, allows it to develop with minimal intercourse with the rest of the world, if it chooses. During the Maoist period, for example, China became an insular nation, driven primarily by internal interests and considerations, indifferent or hostile to the rest of the world. It was secure and, except for its involvement in the Korean War and its efforts to pacify restless buffer regions, was relatively peaceful. Internally, however, China underwent periodic, self-generated chaos.
The weakness of insularity for China is poverty. Given the ratio of arable land to population, a self-enclosed China is a poor China. Its population is so poor that economic development driven by domestic demand, no matter how limited it might be, is impossible. However, an isolated China is easier to manage by a central government. The great danger in China is a rupture within the Han Chinese nation. If that happens, if the central government weakens, the peripheral regions will spin off, and China will then be vulnerable to foreigners taking advantage of Chinese weakness.
For China to prosper, it has to engage in trade, exporting silk, silver and industrial products. Historically, land trade has not posed a problem for China. The Silk Road allowed foreign influences to come into China and the resulting wealth created a degree of instability. On the whole, however, it could be managed.
The dynamic of industrialism changed both the geography of Chinese trade and its consequences. In the mid-19th century, when Europe -- led by the British --compelled the Chinese government to give trading concessions to the British, it opened a new chapter in Chinese history. For the first time, the Pacific coast was the interface with the world, not Central Asia. This in turn, massively destabilized China.
As trade between China and the world intensified, the Chinese who were engaged in trading increased their wealth dramatically. Those in the coastal provinces of China, the region most deeply involved in trading, became relatively wealthy while the Chinese in the interior (not the buffer regions, which were always poor, but the non-coastal provinces of Han China) remained poor, subsistence farmers.
The central government was balanced between the divergent interests of coastal China and the interior. The coastal region, particularly its newly enriched leadership, had an interest in maintaining and intensifying relations with European powers and with the United States and Japan. The more intense the trade, the wealthier the coastal leadership and the greater the disparity between the regions. In due course, foreigners allied with Chinese coastal merchants and politicians became more powerful in the coastal regions than the central government. The worst geopolitical nightmare of China came true. China fragmented, breaking into regions, some increasingly under the control of foreigners, particularly foreign commercial interests. Beijing lost control over the country. It should be noted that this was the context in which Japan invaded China, which made Japan's failure to defeat China all the more extraordinary.
Mao's goal was three-fold, Marxism aside. First, he wanted to recentralize China -- re-establishing Beijing as China's capital and political center. Second, he wanted to end the massive inequality between the coastal region and the rest of China. Third, he wanted to expel the foreigners from China. In short, he wanted to recreate a united Han China.
Mao first attempted to trigger an uprising in the cities in 1927 but failed because the coalition of Chinese interests and foreign powers was impossible to break. Instead he took the long march to the interior of China, where he raised a massive peasant army that was both nationalist and egalitarian and, in 1948, returned to the coastal region and expelled the foreigners. Mao re-enclosed China, recentralized it, and accepted the inevitable result. China became equal but extraordinarily poor.
China's primary geopolitical issue is this: For it to develop it must engage in international trade. If it does that, it must use its coastal cities as an interface with the world. When that happens, the coastal cities and the surrounding region become increasingly wealthy. The influence of foreigners over this region increases and the interests of foreigners and the coastal Chinese converge and begin competing with the interests of the central government. China is constantly challenged by the problem of how to avoid this outcome while engaging in international trade.
Controlling the Buffer Regions
Prior to Mao's rise, with the central government weakened and Han China engaged simultaneously in war with Japan, civil war and regionalism, the center was not holding. While Manchuria was under Chinese control, Outer Mongolia was under Soviet control and extending its influence (Soviet power more than Marxist ideology) into Inner Mongolia, and Tibet and Xinjiang were drifting away.
At the same time that Mao was fighting the civil war, he was also laying the groundwork for taking control of the buffer regions. Interestingly, his first moves were designed to block Soviet interests in these regions. Mao moved to consolidate Chinese communist control over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, effectively leveraging the Soviets out. Xinjiang had been under the control of a regional war lord, Yang Zengxin. Shortly after the end of the civil war, Mao moved to force him out and take over Xinjiang. Finally, in 1950 Mao moved against Tibet, which he secured in 1951.
The rapid-fire consolidation of the buffer regions gave Mao what all Chinese emperors sought, a China secure from invasion. Controlling Tibet meant that India could not move across the Himalayas and establish a secure base of operations on the Tibetan Plateau. There could be skirmishes in the Himalayas, but no one could push a multi-divisional force across those mountains and keep it supplied. So long as Tibet was in Chinese hands, the Indians could live on the other side of the moon. Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria buffered China from the Soviet Union. Mao was more of a geopolitician than an ideologue. He did not trust the Soviets. With the buffer states in hand, they would not invade China. The distances, the poor transportation and the lack of resources meant that any Soviet invasion would run into massive logistical problems well before it reached Han China's populated regions, and become bogged down -- just as the Japanese had.
China had geopolitical issues with Vietnam, Pakistan and Afghanistan, neighboring states with which it shared a border, but the real problem for China would come in Manchuria or, more precisely, Korea. The Soviets, more than the Chinese, had encouraged a North Korean invasion of South Korea. It is difficult to speculate on Joseph Stalin's thinking, but it worked out superbly for him. The United States intervened, defeated the North Korean Army and drove to the Yalu, the river border with China. The Chinese, seeing the well-armed and well-trained American force surge to its borders, decided that it had to block its advance and attacked south. What resulted was three years of brutal warfare in which the Chinese lost about a million men. From the Soviet point of view, fighting between China and the United States was the best thing imaginable. But from Stratfor's point of view, what it demonstrated was the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security.
Protecting the Coast
With the buffer regions under control, the coast is China's most vulnerable point, but its vulnerability is not to invasion. Given the Japanese example, no one has the interest or forces to try to invade mainland China, supply an army there and hope to win. Invasion is not a meaningful threat.
The coastal threat to China is economic, and most would not call it a threat. As we saw, the British intrusion into China culminated in the destabilization of the country, the virtual collapse of the central government and civil war. It was all caused by prosperity. Mao had solved the problem by sealing the coast of China off to any real development and liquidating the class that had collaborated with foreign business. For Mao, xenophobia was integral to natural policy. He saw foreign presence as undermining the stability of China. He preferred impoverished unity to chaos. He also understood that, given China's population and geography, it could defend itself against potential attackers without an advanced military-industrial complex.
His successor, Deng Xiaoping, was heir to a powerful state in control of China and the buffer regions. He also felt under tremendous pressure politically to improve living standards, and he undoubtedly understood that technological gaps would eventually threaten Chinese national security. He took a historic gamble. He knew that China's economy could not develop on its own. China's internal demand for goods was too weak because the Chinese were too poor.
Deng gambled that he could open China to foreign investment and reorient the Chinese economy away from agriculture and heavy industry and toward export-oriented industries. By doing so he would increase living standards, import technology and train China's workforce. He was betting that the effort this time would not destabilize China, create massive tensions between the prosperous coastal provinces and the interior, foster regionalism or put the coastal regions under foreign control. Deng believed he could avoid all that by maintaining a strong central government, based on a loyal army and communist party apparatus. His successors have struggled to maintain that loyalty to the state and not to foreign investors, who can make individuals wealthy. That is the bet that is currently being played out.
China's Geopolitics and its Current Position
From a political and military standpoint, China has achieved its strategic goals. The buffer regions are intact and China faces no threat in Eurasia. It sees a Western attempt to force China out of Tibet as an attempt to undermine Chinese national security. For China, however, Tibet is a minor irritant; China has no possible intention of leaving Tibet, the Tibetans cannot rise up and win, and no one is about to invade the region. Similarly, the Uighur Muslims represent an irritant in Xinjiang and not a direct threat. The Russians have no interest in or capability of invading China, and the Korean peninsula does not represent a direct threat to the Chinese, certainly not one they could not handle.
The greatest military threat to China comes from the United States Navy. The Chinese have become highly dependent on seaborne trade and the United States Navy is in a position to blockade China's ports if it wished. Should the United States do that, it would cripple China. Therefore, China's primary military interest is to make such a blockade impossible.
It would take several generations for China to build a surface navy able to compete with the United States Navy. Simply training naval aviators to conduct carrier-based operations effectively would take decades -- at least until these trainees became admirals and captains. And this does not take into account the time it would take to build an aircraft carrier and carrier-capable aircraft and master the intricacies of carrier operations.
For China, the primary mission is to raise the price of a blockade so high that the Americans would not attempt it. The means for that would be land- and submarine-based-anti-ship missiles. The strategic solution is for China to construct a missile force sufficiently dispersed that it cannot be suppressed by the United States and with sufficient range to engage the United States at substantial distance, as far as the central Pacific.
In order for this missile force to be effective, it would have to be able to identify and track potential targets. Therefore, if the Chinese are to pursue this strategy, they must also develop a space-based maritime reconnaissance system. These are the technologies that the Chinese are focusing on. Anti-ship missiles and space-based systems, including anti-satellite systems designed to blind the Americans, represent China's military counter to its only significant military threat.
China could also use those missiles to blockade Taiwan by interdicting ships going to and from the island. But the Chinese do not have the naval ability to land a sufficient amphibious force and sustain it in ground combat. Nor do they have the ability to establish air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. China might be able to harass Taiwan but it will not invade it. Missiles, satellites and submarines constitute China's naval strategy.
For China, the primary problem posed by Taiwan is naval. Taiwan is positioned in such a way that it can readily serve as an air and naval base that could isolate maritime movement between the South China Sea and the East China Sea, effectively leaving the northern Chinese coast and Shanghai isolated. When you consider the Ryukyu Islands that stretch from Taiwan to Japan and add them to this mix, a non-naval power could blockade the northern Chinese coast if it held Taiwan.
Taiwan would not be important to China unless it became actively hostile or allied with or occupied by a hostile power such as the United States. If that happened, its geographical position would pose an extremely serious problem for China. Taiwan is also an important symbolic issue to China and a way to rally nationalism. Although Taiwan presents no immediate threat, it does pose potential dangers that China cannot ignore.
There is one area in which China is being modestly expansionist -- Central Asia and particularly Kazakhstan. Traditionally a route for trading silk, Kazakhstan is now an area that can produce energy, badly needed by China's industry. The Chinese have been active in developing commercial relations with Kazakhstan and in developing roads into Kazakhstan. These roads are opening a trading route that allows oil to flow in one direction and industrial goods in another.
In doing this, the Chinese are challenging Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. The Russians have been prepared to tolerate increased Chinese economic activity in the region while being wary of China's turning into a political power. Kazakhstan has been European Russia's historical buffer state against Chinese expansion and it has been under Russian domination. This region must be watched carefully. If Russia begins to feel that China is becoming too assertive in this region, it could respond militarily to Chinese economic power.
Chinese-Russian relations have historically been complex. Before World War II, the Soviets attempt to manipulate Chinese politics. After World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and China were never as good as some thought, and sometimes these relations became directly hostile, as in 1968, when Russian and Chinese troops fought a battle along the Ussuri River. The Russians have historically feared a Chinese move into their Pacific maritime provinces. The Chinese have feared a Russian move into Manchuria and beyond.
Neither of these things happened because the logistical challenges involved were enormous and neither had an appetite for the risk of fighting the other. We would think that this caution will prevail under current circumstances. However, growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan is not a minor matter for the Russians, who may choose to contest China there. If they do, and it becomes a serious matter, the secondary pressure point for both sides would be in the Pacific region, complicated by proximity to Korea.
But these are only theoretical possibilities. The threat of an American blockade on China's coast, of using Taiwan to isolate northern China, of conflict over Kazakhstan -- all are possibilities that the Chinese must take into account as they plan for the worst. In fact, the United States does not have an interest in blockading China and the Chinese and Soviets are not going to escalate competition over Kazakhstan.
China does not have a military-based geopolitical problem. It is in its traditional strong position, physically secure as it holds its buffer regions. It has achieved it three strategic imperatives. What is most vulnerable at this point is its first imperative: the unity of Han China. That is not threatened militarily. Rather, the threat to that is economic.
Economic Dimensions of Chinese Geopolitics
The problem of China, rooted in geopolitics, is economic and it presents itself in two ways. The first is simple. China has an export-oriented economy. It is in a position of dependency. No matter how large its currency reserves or how advanced its technology or how cheap its labor force, China depends on the willingness and ability of other countries to import its goods -- as well as the ability to physically ship them. Any disruption of this flow has a direct effect on the Chinese economy.
The primary reason other countries buy Chinese goods is price. They are cheaper because of wage differentials. Should China lose that advantage to other nations or for other reasons, its ability to export would decline. Today, for example, as energy prices rise, the cost of production rises and the relative importance of the wage differential decreases. At a certain point, as China's trading partners see it, the value of Chinese imports relative to the political cost of closing down their factories will shift.
And all of this is outside of China's control. China cannot control the world price of oil. It can cut into its cash reserves to subsidize those prices for manufacturers but that would essentially be transferring money back to consuming nations. It can control rising wages by imposing price controls, but that would cause internal instability. The center of gravity of China is that it has become the industrial workshop of the world and, as such, it is totally dependent on the world to keep buying its goods rather than someone else's goods.
There are other issues for China, ranging from a dysfunctional financial system to farm land being taken out of production for factories. These are all significant and add to the story. But in geopolitics we look for the center of gravity, and for China the center of gravity is that the more effective it becomes at exporting, the more of a hostage it becomes to its customers. Some observers have warned that China might take its money out of American banks. Unlikely, but assume it did. What would China do without the United States as a customer?
China has placed itself in a position where it has to keep its customers happy. It struggles against this reality daily, but the fact is that the rest of the world is far less dependent on China's exports than China is dependent on the rest of the world.
Which brings us to the second, even more serious part of China's economic problem. The first geopolitical imperative of China is to ensure the unity of Han China. The third is to protect the coast. Deng's bet was that he could open the coast without disrupting the unity of Han China. As in the 19th century, the coastal region has become wealthy. The interior has remained extraordinarily poor. The coastal region is deeply enmeshed in the global economy. The interior is not. Beijing is once again balancing between the coast and the interior.
The interests of the coastal region and the interests of importers and investors are closely tied to each other. Beijing's interest is in maintaining internal stability. As pressures grow, it will seek to increase its control of the political and economic life of the coast. The interest of the interior is to have money transferred to it from the coast. The interest of the coast is to hold on to its money. Beijing will try to satisfy both, without letting China break apart and without resorting to Mao's draconian measures. But the worse the international economic situation becomes the less demand there will be for Chinese products and the less room there will be for China to maneuver.
The second part of the problem derives from the first. Assuming that the global economy does not decline now, it will at some point. When it does, and Chinese exports fall dramatically, Beijing will have to balance between an interior hungry for money and a coastal region that is hurting badly. It is important to remember that something like 900 million Chinese live in the interior while only about 400 million live in the coastal region. When it comes to balancing power, the interior is the physical threat to the regime while the coast destabilizes the distribution of wealth. The interior has mass on its side. The coast has the international trading system on its. Emperors have stumbled over less.
Conclusion
Geopolitics is based on geography and politics. Politics is built on two foundations: military and economic. The two interact and support each other but are ultimately distinct. For China, securing its buffer regions generally eliminates military problems. What problems are left for China are long-term issues concerning northeastern Manchuria and the balance of power in the Pacific.
China's geopolitical problem is economic. Its first geopolitical imperative, maintain the unity of Han China, and its third, protect the coast, are both more deeply affected by economic considerations than military ones. Its internal and external political problems flow from economics. The dramatic economic development of the last generation has been ruthlessly geographic. This development has benefited the coast and left the interior -- the vast majority of Chinese -- behind. It has also left China vulnerable to global economic forces that it cannot control and cannot accommodate. This is not new in Chinese history, but its usual resolution is in regionalism and the weakening of the central government. Deng's gamble is being played out by his successors. He dealt the hand. They have to play it.
The question on the table is whether the economic basis of China is a foundation or a balancing act. If the former, it can last a long time. If the latter, everyone falls down eventually. There appears to be little evidence that it is a foundation. It excludes most of the Chinese from the game, people who are making less than $100 a month. That is a balancing act and it threatens the first geopolitical imperative of China: protecting the unity of the Han Chinese.
Your working hard to understand China Analyst,
John Mauldin
Disclaimer
John Mauldin is president of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC, a registered investment advisor. All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions.
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Filed under: George Friedman, China, Stratfor, Geopolitics, Global Economy
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