ANALYSIS
Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity
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By SIMON ROUGHNEEN Thursday, September 3, 2009
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Recent fighting in northern Shan state, between the junta’s army and the ethnic Kokang militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, has fuelled speculation that the regime intends to coerce Burma’s 17 ceasefire groups into accepting a plan to incorporate them into the state security apparatus as border guards.
The ceasefire groups are ethnic militias—most notably the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army—that have fought on and off, in various guises, against central rule since Burma became independent in 1948. They are part of Burma’s remarkably diverse ethnic, religious and cultural demography—40 percent of the country’s population is comprised of non-Burman minorities. In total, the state recognizes 135 different ethnicities.
However, the Burmese regime’s army has fought brutal campaigns against these groups, with long-documented human rights abuses, including mass displacement, forced labor and conscription, as well as countless cases of rape and murder targeting civilians. Some analysts believe that the level of abuses ranks alongside or even exceeds that of Darfur in western Sudan.
In some cases, the junta has successfully co-opted proxy or splinter movements from ethnic insurgent groups as part of its ongoing strategy of “divide and rule” to weaken ethnically based opposition. But far from bringing peace to the country, this approach has served only to perpetuate ethnic tensions.
Indeed, some observers believe that the regime has little interest in resolving a problem that has long been its raison d’etre. “Burma’s ethnic diversity has been one of the main justifications for continued military rule,” said Win Min, an analyst of Burmese affairs based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, adding that the army has long seen civilian government as too weak to prevent potential secession by ethnic minorities.
Going back to the 1947 constitution, the military has always believed that civilian solutions to the problems posed by Burma’s ethnic divisions, such as local autonomy or federalism, with the option of secession in some cases, threaten national unity and foment instability.
The army goes by the maxim that diversity equals disunity, something seen in military-civilian political vehicles such as the National Unity Party, the junta-backed party that ran against the National League for Democracy in the 1990 elections, and the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass organization established in 1993 that is expected to be transformed into a pro-junta political party in time for elections in 2010.
The regime’s efforts to undermine ethnically based expressions of identity in Burma are also evident in the 2008 constitution, which circumscribes ethnic autonomy and is a digression away from the establishment of anything resembling a federal union—a demand of many ethnic groups.
“The constitution/election process is driving this policy to marginalize the ethnic groups,” said Sean Turnell, an economist at Australia’s Macquarie University whose research focuses on Burma. “This may come back to haunt the junta, as it has with previous governments,” he added.
If the junta proceeds with its military build-up in Shan State, close to the well-armed UWSA, it may be revisited by the ghosts of insurgencies past very soon. The prospect of renewed ethnic civil war in Burma’s borderlands has caused concern in neighboring countries, particularly China, which remains a key ally of the regime.
The Burmese generals issued an apology to Beijing after being reprimanded over the fighting in Kokang, which saw an estimated 30,000 refugees from this ethnically Chinese region cross into China’s Yunnan Province. The junta risks undermining its relationship with Beijing, as instability is perceived to be contrary to China’s interests.
As K. Yhome, an analyst at the Observer Research Foundation in India, put it: “Political stability in Myanmar [Burma] is a major concern for Beijing, particularly in the border regions.”
China’s port and pipeline plan linking the Burmese coast with Yunnan is due to get underway this month, and Beijing doubtless does not want the timeframe jeopardized by the junta’s domestic concerns. The pipeline will extend 1,200 km and allow Beijing to bypass the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea when bringing oil imports from Africa and the Middle East into China.
Given that China has “run interference for the junta at the UN Security Council”—in the words of Walter Lohman, an Asia expert at the Heritage Foundation—sending refugees streaming into China seems a bitter payback. Only three weeks ago, Beijing told critics that the August 11 decision to return Aung San Suu Kyi to house arrest was an internal Burmese matter.
Ironically, the junta’s offensive along the Sino-Burmese border may have been intended to send the same message—that the regime manages its internal affairs autonomously—to Beijing. It could also be a hint that there are other options available, should the junta want to diversify its networks of foreign partners.
The regime certainly has reason to believe that Beijing is not its only friend. While China’s tally of oil blocks in Burma is 16, India has seven and Thailand five. Meanwhile, India, South Korea and half of Burma’s fellow members in the Association of Southeast Nations are investing in the country’s vast natural resources and competing with China for trade links with the generals.
According to Turnell, the regime may even be paying China back for entering into a series of gas contracts with Bangladesh over offshore fields in disputed seas between Burma and Bangladesh.
However, it remains to be seen how far the junta could push this attempt to needle China, or to diversify its foreign trade and investment relations. “Myanmar needs to remain focused on Chinese concerns,” said Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of international studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.
If the regime seeks to pick a fight with the UWSA or any of the other larger ethnic militias, it could be stirring a hornet’s nest. This type of political instability could threaten Chinese investments in Burma, and Beijing’s growing economy cannot afford that.
Just as it does not want an unstable Burma, Beijing is almost certainly on the alert for any rapprochement between the US and the junta. It is not clear whether the Kokang offensive is linked to the recent visit by Senator Jim Webb to Burma, but the growing military presence in Shan State has taken place while international attention has been focused on Webb’s visit, and the Suu Kyi trial circus that preceded it.
“In the long term, if the US improves its ties with Myanmar, it will have strategic implications for Beijing, which wants to reach the Indian Ocean through Myanmar and the oil and gas pipeline projects that it plans through Myanmar,” said K. Yhome.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
Friday, September 4, 2009
Junta Continues its Campaign against Burmese Diversity
Kokang Conflict Highlights Tatmadaw Xenophobia
Kokang Conflict Highlights Tatmadaw Xenophobia
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By WAI MOE Thursday, September 3, 2009
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The Tatmadaw of Burma, one of the most nationalistic armies in the world, demonstrated its xenophobia during the past two weeks following its capture of Kokang-Chinese territory.
According to reports from the region on the northeastern frontier of Burma, following the seizure of Laogai, the Kokang capital, on August 24, government soldiers questioned civilians about whether they were Burma-born Chinese or immigrants from China.
“After answering, Chinese from mainland China were beaten by soldiers,” said a source in Laogai.
Refugees who fled to China told reporters that shops, stores and other properties owned by Chinese had been looted in various towns in the Kokang region where an estimate 90 percent of businesses are owned by Chinese businessmen.
Anti-Chinese elements among government soldiers are not new. In 1967, an anti-Chinese riot in Rangoon and other cities led to dozens of deaths. Observers said late dictator Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party used the Chinese as a scapegoat to deflect public anger at the government over a rice shortage in the country.
Anti-Chinese sentiment among Burmese has increased after the Chinese and Burmese governments signed border trading agreements in 1988, and the military junta signed ceasefire agreements with ethnic militias on the Sino-Burmese border in 1989.
After the opening of border trade and the ceasefire agreements, Chinese business interests and immigrants moved into Burma in large numbers, observers said. From the northern Shan State capital of Lashio to Madalay, the second largest city, to Rangoon, Chinese migrants and businesses along with the ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the Kokang and Wa, have taken on a higher profile among Burmese.
“They say they are Wa or Kokang, but we know they are actually Chinese,” said a businessman in Mandalay, citing his experience.
During two decades, Chinese have taken over businesses owned by Burmese in northern Shan State and Mandalay. Signs on many department stores, restaurants and shops in Mandalay and Lashio are printed in the Chinese language.
Intentionally or unintentionally, the special favors granted ethnic groups by Gen Khin Nyunt, the former Burma spy chief, produced a backlash against Kokang-Chinese and other ceasefire groups among the Tatmadaw’s soldiers.
From 1989 to 2004— before Khin Nyunt’s downfall—the Kokang and Wa were allowed to take their weapons to Rangoon and Mandalay. Kokang and Wa soldiers were untouchable under Khin Nyunt’s instructions even though they committed crimes.
When vehicles from Wa and Kokang groups passed army and police checkpoints, they were not searched.
In one incident in 1999, a member of the Wa army killed a businessman in downtown Rangoon after a business conflict. The police arrested the man but he was not charged, and later Wa officials took the man from police custody.
According to Mandalay residents, members of ceasefire groups such as the Wa and Kokang were known to use pistols in personal conflicts with local people in the early 2000s.
Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China, said that after ceasefire agreements were signed, the Wa and Kokang caused many problems in cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay, and many officers and soldiers in the regime’s army have developed a negative image of the two groups as a result.
The recent military conflict between the government and ethnic groups has divided public opinion in Rangoon and Mandalay, according to journalists.
“Some people here say it is the government bullying the Kokang-Chinese. But most people support the government,” said an editor of a Rangoon-based private journal.
Naypyitaw’s negotiator postpones meeting with KIO leaders
Naypyitaw’s negotiator postpones meeting with KIO leaders
Written by KNG
Thursday, 03 September 2009 21:40
Naypyitaw’s chief negotiator and Chief of Military Affairs Security (MAS) Lt-Gen Ye Myint today postponed a meeting with the leaders of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The meeting was meant to be held in the group's Laiza headquarters in northern Burma, said KIO sources.
The meeting was originally slated for September 5 but it was rescheduled for September 6 (Sunday). This was because on September 5 a meeting was scheduled between KIO leaders and invited regional Kachin community leaders, according to KIO officials in Laiza.
KIO officials added, the urgent meeting was initiated by Lt-Gen Ye Myint, the ruling junta's chief Naypyitaw negotiator to all ethnic ceasefire groups in the country but it was again postponed for several days by Lt-Gen Ye Myint himself. A fresh date for the meeting is yet to be announced.
Lt-Gen Ye Myint (center with green uniform) visited to KIO's HQ Laiza in last year.
If Lt-Gen Ye Myint meets KIO leaders, he will be the first senior military officer to meet them in the midst of escalating military tension between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the armed-wing of KIO and the Burmese Army, according to KIO sources.
Regarding the visit of Lt-Gen Ye Myint to Laiza, the KIO leaders do not expect a positive outcome. However, the KIO will welcome the junta's negotiator from Naypyitaw, said a KIO officer in Laiza.
Col. Thet Pung, a special messenger of Naypyitaw and Commander Maj-Gen Soe Win of Northern Regional Command (Ma-Pa-Kha) based in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, met KIO leaders in Laiza headquarters on August 29 over the clashes with Kokang ceasefire group in northeast Shan State.
KIO officers in Laiza said, the KIO was informed by Col. Thet Pung not to get involved in the Kokang conflict and that it was not the concern of the KIO. He also suggested to KIO leaders not to pay heed to Burmese media in exile.
The junta keeps pressurizing the KIO to convert its armed-wing the KIA to a battalion of the Border Guard Force (BGF) controlled by the Burmese Army ignoring the KIO's demands for changing KIA to a brigade level Kachin Regional Guard Force (KRGF) and direct participation of the KIO in the new Kachin State government formed after next year’s elections, said KIO officials.
The KIO had twice sent a group of civilian peace negotiators led by Rev. Dr. Lahtaw Saboi Jum, former general secretary of Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) and current director of Shalom Foundation (also called Nyein Foundation) to Naypyitaw to meet the junta supremo Snr-Gen Than Shwe to explain the KIO's demands but the peace group could not meet Snr-Gen Than Shwe, according to KIO officials.
At the moment, ethnic Kachin people inside and outside Burma are increasingly demanding that the KIO breaks the 15-year-old ceasefire agreement with the junta and resumes civil war, according to Kachin media in exile.
From early this week, Kachin civilians in Lweje (Loie in Kachin), Laja Yang village in the controlled areas of the junta and the two KIO controlled areas of Laiza and Mai Ja Yang have sent their important family belongings to Chinese territories by crossing the border in fear of hostilities between the KIO and the junta, said civilians in those areas.
http://www.kachinne ws.com/index. php/news/ 1075-naypyitaws- negotiator- postpones- meeting-with- kio-leaders. html
Burmese junta issues a warning to China
EDITORIAL
Burmese junta issues a warning to China
The Nation - Published on September 4, 2009
The recent attack on a ethinc Chinese rebel force raises tensions in the Golden Triangle
When it comes to the Burmese sector of the Golden Triangle, it is difficult to say who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. This is partly because they are all equally bad. As long as anybody can recall, the triangle has never been for the faint of heart. Wa headhunters, communist insurgents, opium warlords, heroin traffickers, Chinese crime syndicates and the Burmese military government - one of the most condemned regimes in the world - all play for keeps.
And so when fighting broke out last week between the Burmese junta and one of the ceasefire groups, namely the Kokang outfit - who two decades ago gave themselves the fancy but misleading name of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) - unwanted attention was placed on China, a quiet stakeholder in this rugged region. China, of course, prefers to stay out of the spotlight when it comes to such matters.
It was not so much because tens of thousands of Kokang Chinese and others fled into China; it was because China's influence in this highly contested region is being weakened. This is not to mention the possibility of further exposing the hush-hush relations between the communist giant and the ethnic armies who were once, and to some extent continue to be, their proxies. During the height of the communist insurgency, the Communist Party of China funded and armed many of the insurgent groups in Burma. Red Guards crossed the border to preach Marxism and succeeded in getting groups like the Wa to give up headhunting in exchange for Kalashnikovs and military fatigues. Burmese and Shan leftists also joined forces to be part of a movement that promised to bring equality and justice to a land where the ideas of law and order and the Western notion of the nation-state are still very much alien concepts.
For various reasons, the movement didn't last. And in 1989 the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) splintered along ethnic lines. Factions like the Wa transformed, quickly becoming a new force for the Burmese government to reckon with. Why not? They had enough weapons from the Chinese to last for another decade or so.
Among the remnants of the CPB were the Kokang, the Yunnanese Chinese whose territory fell on the Burmese side when the official Sino-Burma political border was drawn. To neutralise the remnants of the CPB, Rangoon had to move quickly. The then-security chief, Lt-General Khin Nyunt, was dispatched to the Wa capital of Panghsang to sign a ceasefire deal with the newly established United Wa State Army (UWSA).
Similar agreements were signed with other groups, including the Shan State Army-North and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), a Mong La-based outfit that even had Thai ladyboys performing for Chinese day-trippers to the border casinos.
Part of the 1989 ceasefire deal was that these newly created ethnic armies were permitted to administer their so-called Special Regions and were free to carry out any business activities of their choice. Besides casinos there were clandestine heroin factories.
Just a decade ago, methamphetamines came into the picture. The market for these drugs is no longer just streets in Europe and the United States but also Bangkok and other cities in Southeast Asia. China is not immune to the drug problem, however. In terms of damage, one can argue that the Chinese in Yunnan were the most affected when one takes into consideration the number of heroin addicts and HIV-infected drug users, largely due to the use of unclean needles.
But unlike leaders in Southeast Asia, Chinese leaders don't demonise these drug armies that operate freely on the Burmese side of the border. This is partly because of historical ties. Thai and foreign security analysts think the Chinese are using these ethnic armies as pawns for a later day, and a possible entry point into Burma. Why just court the Burmese junta when you can court them all?
Beside the cost of having to look after the Kokang and other refugees fleeing from the Burmese assault, China is also concerned that an unwanted spotlight will be focused on cross-border activities that they would rather keep off everyone's radar screen. These activities include the laundering of drug money in businesses and real estate in China by the leaders of these ethnic armies, many of whom rank high on the US's wanted list, mainly for heroin trafficking.
The shooting in Kokang's Special Region 1 has now stopped and the 1,000-strong MNDAA force appears to be a thing of the past. The 20,000-strong UWSA could very well be next on the Burmese junta's hit list.
Taking on the Kokang was a stern warning to the UWSA by the Burmese. It was also a stern warning to the Chinese, and a blow to the long-standing illusion that Beijing has the Burmese junta in the palm of its hand.
September 4, 2009 04:00 pm (Thai local time)
http://www.nationmu ltimedia. com/2009/ 09/04/opinion/ opinion_30111426 .php
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【コーカン地区の戦闘が終結 難民の帰国も始まる】
・ビルマ北東部コーカン地区で8月末に起きたビルマ国軍と
コーカン軍との戦闘は一応終結した。死者数は軍政発表に
よれば双方で34人。中国側に数万人の難民が逃れていたが、
帰国も始まった（2日AFPほか）。軍政は国営紙にほぼ連日
「コーカン地区には平和が戻り、行政機能も回復した」とする
記事を出し、同地区の安定を強調している。
・国軍兵士が同地区に住む中国人住民に暴力をふるい、
店の商品等を略奪したという報告もある（3日イラワディほか）。
中国は以前から国境地帯での紛争発生を望まないことを軍政側
に伝えており（4日NYタイムズ）、戦闘開始後の8月28日には
「国境地帯の安定維持を期待する」と珍しく軍政を非難した。
【軍政、次はワ州連合軍を狙う？ 住民が避難】
・コーカン軍の司令官が、同盟しているワ州連合軍（UWSA）の
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は同地域へ増派し、司令官の身柄引き渡しをUWSAに求めたが、
UWSAは回答していない。国軍とUWSAとの戦闘を恐れて住民
数百人が中国やシャン州の他地域に逃げている
（2日DVB、3日シャン・ヘラルドほか）。
【背景】軍政は来年予定の総選挙を前に、停戦協定を結んだ
武装組織に対しそれぞれの軍部を国境警備隊に再編し、
国軍の指揮下に入れるよう要求しているが、UWSAを含む
ほとんどの組織は拒否している。
【アウンサンスーチー氏が控訴 自宅の改修も検討】
・民主化運動指導者アウンサンスーチー氏の弁護団は3日、
氏が宣告された有罪判決を不服としてヤンゴン地裁で控訴
手続きを行い、4日に受理された。弁護団は「裁判は失効した
はずの法律に基づいて行われ、有罪判決は違法」などと主張
している。控訴審は18日からの予定（3日DVB・BBC、4日AP）。
【背景】アウンサンスーチー氏は5月に国家防御法の下で起訴され、
8月に禁固3年の有罪判決を宣告された。現在は減刑措置を
受けて自宅軟禁中。裁判は、軍政が来年予定の総選挙を前に、
国民の支持を集める氏の拘束を続けるために仕掛けたとの見方が大勢。
・アウンサンスーチー氏は、警備強化のため自宅の部分的な
改修工事を検討中で、弁護士を通じて建築家に相談している
（1日DVB）。
【「無国籍」シャン少年、日本への渡航を許可される】
・タイ政府は3日、紙飛行機の滞空時間を競う大会のタイ予選で
優勝したシャン民族の少年（12）に、本大会が開かれる日本へ
の渡航許可を特別に出した。少年の両親は移民労働者として
タイで働くビルマ出身のシャン民族。少年はタイでは「無国籍」
扱いでパスポートの発給を受けられないため、タイ政府は当初、
渡航を認めていなかった（4日毎日新聞）。
【ビルマへの政府開発援助（ODA）約束状況など】
新たな発表はなし
【イベント情報】
・在日ビルマ人共同行動実行委員会ほか
ビルマ軍政に対しアウンサンスーチーさんと全ての政治囚の
釈放と民主化勢力との対話を要請するアピール行動
（在日ビルマ大使館前、31～4日15～16時）
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13点展示、写真など販売あり。
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（クレオ大阪東 研修室2F、9月20日18時～）
報告内容：訪問地、各難民キャンプの現状、
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Thursday, September 3, 2009
Burma: denial of fundamental rights
Burma: denial of fundamental rights
Wednesday, 2 September 2009, 2:55 pm
Press Release: Asian Human Rights Commission
BURMA: Institutionalized denial of fundamental rights and the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar
1. The case decided against democracy party leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and co-accused this August 2009 brought to global attention the institutionalizing of fundamental human rights abuse through what the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) has characterized as Myanmar’s “injustice system”. Although global outrage was expressed at the politically contrived manner in which the proceedings reached their inevitable conclusion, the trial was in many respects typical of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of others in recent years, many of which the ALRC has studied and documented in detail. These features included the following:
a. Inapplicability of charges: Leaving aside questions over whether or not the house arrest of the accused in this case was legal at all, the charges against the defendants were inapplicable as the order against Aung San Suu Kyi did not include anything to prohibit her from communicating with someone already in her house. Many other cases heard against opponents of the government in Myanmar also rest on inapplicable and baseless charges. The police, who may receive interrogation files from military personnel and be ordered to frame charges without ever having had contact with an accused, often appear at a loss to identify an offence. For instance, in the case of Aung Aung Oo and three others (Bahan Township Court, Felony No. 442/09, under trial, Judge U Khin Maung Htay presiding), the accused were charged with an arms offence but during the preliminary trial process the charge was instead changed to intent to cause public fear or alarm: an offence used when the police can fin d no other. In the case o
b. Violations of basic criminal procedure: Judges from two districts heard the case against Aung San Suu Kyi and her co-accused. This is a fundamental breach of criminal procedure, which requires that a judge of a jurisdiction hear a case against an accused in the jurisdiction where the alleged offence occurred. There is no provision of law for mixing judges of different jurisdictions. The case also was heard in a closed court which only select persons were allowed to attend: again, there is no basis in law for trying someone in this manner; however, the trying of opponents to the present government in this way is the norm, not the exception. The ALRC is not aware of any such case in recent years that has been conducted in an open courtroom. In fact, in the case of Aung San Suu Kyi and her co-accused there was more openness than in many such cases. Very often family members and also lawyers are denied access to courtrooms. For instance, in the case of human rights defender U Myint Aye and two co-accu
c. Problems with witnesses: The court in the case of Aung San Suu Kyi initially allowed only one defence witness and thereafter on request to a higher court, a second witness. By contrast, the prosecution presented some 17 witnesses, of whom 11 were police and the others were immigration and council officials. Defendants in trials of this sort in Myanmar are routinely unable to present witnesses. It is also common to find that the only witnesses for the prosecution are police and other officials; and ordinary civilian witnesses, where present, are not genuinely independent but appear for the police as professional witnesses. For instance, in the case against U Tin Min Htut and another, who were accused of writing a letter to the United Nations Secretary General in which they criticized the government and the manner in which the international community has treated the situation in Myanmar (Yangon West District Court, Felony Nos. 138 & 140/09, decided 13 February 2009, Judg e U Tin Htut presiding),
2. Together these points speak to the first of two fundamental problems with the judicial system in Myanmar with which the international community must come to terms if it is going to say or do anything useful about the human rights situation there, rather than simply decry the unfair trials of a few prominent individuals. The judiciary is in its present form an appendage of executive authority. Unless its structurally and functionally subordinate position is addressed, it will continue to act as an instrument for the violation of rights rather than their defence. Under these circumstances, calls for the courts to decide cases fairly and in accordance with international standards are completely meaningless. In such cases, the courts in Myanmar are not even capable of complying with domestic standards, and nor should they be expected to be, because they are performing an executive function, not a judicial one: i.e. their role is to imprison government opponents rather than uphold the law.
3. The second point that the international community has so far failed to grasp concerning criminal injustice and its relevance to debate on human rights in Myanmar is that the patterns of bad behaviour developed through the types of cases given above have a flow-on effect into the system as a whole. In ordinary criminal cases the ALRC has observed the same sorts of incorrectly applied charges, consistently broken procedure, lack of evidence and forced confessions. These types of behaviour persist in ordinary cases in part because they are learned in the course of the sorts of politically directed cases described above. But in ordinary cases the concern is not with correct application of executive directions in lieu of law, but instead with obtaining the best price from the highest bidder. Among persons working in and familiar with the legal system in Myanmar it is known as a justice-trading system. However, some persons working for international agencies in Myanmar either misunders tand or pretend to misund
4. These features of institutionalized abuse, and the need for more effective study and critique rather than simple condemnation of specific acts of wrongdoing are of special relevance in the current period, when the government of Myanmar has indicated that it plans to hold an election, perhaps in 2010, after which the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar will come into effect. The response of many in the international community on learning of the re-confinement of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi this August was to condemn the expected election as a farce, for reason of her non-involvement. But the problems associated with the electoral process need to be studied in terms of the institutional contradictions to which her case points rather than in terms of its personalities. The deeply flawed 2008 Constitution further entrenches arrangements for abuses of the sorts outlined above, and any serious attempts from the international community to take up issues of concern to the people of Myanmar in the lead up to and after the anti
a. Un-separation of powers: The constitution in section 11(a) separates the branches of government only “to the extent possible”. This absurd clause effectively un-separates powers and makes a mockery out of claims to judicial independence. The constitution must guarantee full separation of the judiciary from other parts of state before the courts can be considered anything other than subordinates of the executive.
b. Army as constitutional defender: Section 20(f) assigns main responsibility to the Defence Services, rather than the judiciary, for defence of the constitution. This is despite the establishing under the charter of a constitutional tribunal. How the army is supposed to perform the task is not explained. This nonsense provision must be removed and responsibility for the constitution must be placed in the hands of the courts before the constitution can be described as a supreme law at all.
c. Rule of law as a function of the executive: Under Schedule One the rule of law and the police force are both placed under the Union Defence and Security Sector. In other words, both maintenance of law and policing are assigned to the armed forces. This is another blanket provision that ensures the continued militarization of the state and subordination of the judiciary to military interests.
d. Presidential power over judges: The power to appoint, promote and remove senior judges ultimately lies with an executive president who in turn, the constitution ensures, must be someone approved by the armed forces. The sections of the constitution pertaining to this power must be amended to remove this authority and instead an independent judicial services commission or equivalent must be established for this purpose.
e. Qualified rights: Apart from the arrangements in the constitution identified above that serve to negate statements of rights in the constitution, the formal statements themselves are consistently qualified and undermined. For instance, the right to be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours, which already exists under ordinary criminal procedure, is defeated through a lengthy opaque clause in section 376 exempting cases concerning national security, the rule of law, peace and tranquility and the interest of the public. Other sections are similarly imprecise and repeatedly allow only for qualified, not guaranteed rights “in accordance with the law”.
5. The above observations and recommendations are made with awareness that the Government of Myanmar will anyhow override provisions of the constitution in the same way that it has consistently overridden those of the ordinary law to the extent necessary to achieve its objectives, but are made on the basis that the constitution as a normative document should provide some bases for commitments to protect human rights, against which it is possible to measure a government’s actual record of respect, protection and fulfillment. The present document provides no such bases. The international community needs to use cases and issues arising in the present day, like that of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to probe, critique and explore the institutional features of abuse and how they will be reconfigured under the planned new arrangements for government after an election of some sort, rather than simply criticize the individual cases of prominent persons as if they are somehow isolated from the structure and functions o
About the ALRC: The Asian Legal Resource Centre is an independent regional non-governmental organisation holding general consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It is the sister organisation of the Asian Human Rights Commission. The Hong Kong-based group seeks to strengthen and encourage positive action on legal and human rights issues at the local and national levels throughout Asia. http://www.scoop. co.nz/stories/ WO0909/S00031. htm
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
New York Times: Myanmar forces overwhelm rebels – Thomas Fuller
New York Times: Myanmar forces overwhelm rebels – Thomas Fuller
Mon 31 Aug 2009
Filed under: On The Border
BANGKOK — The Myanmar military has overwhelmed rebels from an ethnic Chinese minority in the northern reaches of the country, the junta’s second victory over armed opponents in three months.
The routing over the weekend of the forces of the small, Chinese-speaking Kokang ethnic group gives Myanmar’s governing generals momentum in their campaign to quell armed opposition before elections and the adoption of a new Constitution next year.
Several well-armed groups, notably the Wa and Kachin, still stand in the way of the junta’s goal of complete control over the country. But a recently announced agreement of solidarity among the rebel groups, which had the potential to slow the central government’s advance against the Kokang, may be fraying.
The Myanmar government’s strategy, analysts say, appears to be to challenge the groups one by one and to try to capitalize on the many factions within each group.
In June, the military defeated ethnic Karen insurgents along the border with Thailand, aided by a local militia of Karen Buddhists who led an attack on forces that were largely made up of Karen Christians.
To defeat the Kokang, the small ethnic group in the north, the junta allied itself with a defector and chased out troops loyal to the Kokang’s chairman, Peng Jiasheng.
A force of 2,000 Wa soldiers had initially come to the assistance of the Kokang, but they retreated Friday, according to Aung Kyaw Zaw, a former rebel based on the Chinese side of the border. This appeared to undercut a mutual-assistance agreement that the rebel groups reached several weeks ago.
Late on Sunday, Myanmar’s official media broke their silence on the fighting with a television broadcast announcing that clashes had ended and providing what appeared to be a preliminary death toll of 26 members of government security forces and 8 Kokang militiamen, The Associated Press reported. “The region has now regained peace,” the official announcement said.
Chinese state media said that two Chinese citizens had also been killed in the fighting.
News services reported from southern China that Kokang forces were continuing to flee across the border into China on Sunday on the heels of what United Nations and Chinese officials estimated were as many as 30,000 civilian refugees. Nearly half the estimated 1,500 members of the Kokang militia have crossed the border and handed their weapons to the Chinese authorities, according to Mr. Aung Kyaw Zaw.
The central government’s assaults on the Kokang, which began last week, have put other ethnic groups on alert, according to Brang Lai, a local official in the Kachin headquarters in Laiza, along the Chinese border.
“People are very concerned,” Mr. Brang Lai said in a telephone interview. On the Chinese side of Laiza, residents have put Chinese flags on their roofs in the hope that they will be able to avoid any additional fighting. Officers from the Myanmar military’s Northern Division were in Laiza over the weekend to call for calm, Mr. Brang Lai said.
Followers of Mr. Peng, the Kokang’s chairman, were spotted by reporters on the Chinese side of the border buying civilian clothes to replace their militia uniforms.
“There was no way we would win,” Ri Chenchuan, a Kokang rebel, said as he shopped for new clothes, The A.P. reported.
The Myanmar government has signed more than a dozen cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups over the past two decades, but the fighting with the Kokang raised questions about the military’s intentions.
Aung Din, executive director of the United States Campaign for Burma, an advocacy group that opposes the junta, said the generals apparently had adopted a more aggressive posture, partly influenced by the Sri Lankan government’s military victory over Tamil rebels in May.
Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, met with Myanmar’s generals in June in what was his first overseas trip after the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The visit might have inspired Myanmar’s senior general, Than Shwe, who has spent much of his military career battling ethnic groups, Mr. Aung Din said.
“It was an encouragement to the regime to do away with the insurgency once and for all,” Mr. Aung Din said. “Their thinking has changed.”
The motives and strategies of Myanmar’s leaders have long been difficult to divine. General Than Shwe is a very secretive man and the state-run media are highly selective in their reporting. The report on Sunday evening was the first time they had mentioned the campaign against the Kokang.
The fighting appears to have strained Myanmar’s relations with China, especially since the Kokang are ethnically Chinese. The Chinese Foreign Ministry warned Myanmar on Friday to “properly handle domestic problems and maintain stability in the China-Myanmar border region.”
Analysts said that the Chinese government had asked Myanmar’s generals to refrain from initiating military campaigns before the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic on Oct. 1.
In that light, China could view Myanmar’s campaign as provocative, especially since China is a large investor in Myanmar and plays the role of the junta’s protective big brother in the United Nations and other international forums.
Mr. Aung Kyaw Zaw said he suspected that the Myanmar generals wanted to demonstrate their independence to Chinese leaders. Their message, he said, is that “if we want to fight along the border, we can fight.”
“This is a political game,” he added.
Myanmar ethnic offensive tests vital China ties
Myanmar ethnic offensive tests vital China ties
Source: Reuters - AlertNet
Date: 01 Sep 2009
- Myanmar prioritising domestic control over China ties
- China to press Myanmar but influence may be limited
- More fighting with rebels possible, could be bloody
By Martin Petty and Ben Blanchard
BANGKOK/BEIJING, Sept 1 (Reuters) - Myanmar's assault on rebel militias on its remote border appears aimed at herding them into next year's election process, even if it comes at the cost of vital ties with its powerful northern neighbour, China.
Myanmar's military incursion into northeastern Shan State shattered a 20-year ceasefire with rebel armies on its border with China and could trigger the protracted instability that Beijing, the junta's strongest friend, has long feared.
A prolonged conflict that forces more refugees to flee to China would show that the junta is intent on controlling the rebellious region, despite any fallout with China, analysts said.
"Seizing control is more important, because they will not accept private armies with their own local administration, " said Bertil Lintner, an author and specialist on Myanmar.
"They're not as subservient to the Chinese as many people think. They're certainly not their puppets. The generals are megalomaniacs and they know China won't cut the trade ties."
China has called on Myanmar to ensure stability in the region, and Myanmar has apologised to Beijing.
But Myanmar's aim clearly is to establish power in the region ahead of next year's election, said Mary Callahan, a Myanmar expert at the University of Washington.
"(Its) behaviour in situations like this, which aggravate China, are first and foremost about its domestic agenda," she said. "Eliminating perceived threats to its (democracy) road map is right at the top of that."
The military's successful offensive in Kokang against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the weakest of the local ethnic groups, was simply to test the waters before battling a more formidable force, analysts said.
The real target could be the heavily armed United Wa State Army, a 15,000-20,000- strong force led by drugs barons and warlords. The junta may use drugs suppression to justify an assault -- and perhaps get more than it bargained for.
Ceasefire agreements in place since 1989 between the government and the militias had given the insurgents a great deal of autonomy in Shan state.
BIG CASUALTIES
"If they go all out against the Wait will be very bloody, with big casualties on both sides," said Lintner.
Further fighting could risk either spilling into China, or sending a renewed flood of refugees across the border. Many ethnic Chinese live in the rebel enclaves and Chinese businesses are involved in trading gems and timber across the border.
Anthony Davis, a security analyst at IHS-Jane's, said the situation in Kokang was "extremely precarious" and may escalate, especially if Myanmar picked a fight with the Wa.
The stakes may be too high for Beijing to allow that.
Dealing with problems on a sensitive and strategic border is the last thing China wants after violent unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the past two years.
Energy-hungry China is also one of the few powers willing to do business with Myanmar and has invested more than $1 billion there to get access to natural resources such as oil and gas.
"China's not going to want to let things spiral out of control. On this one, they will probably get their way," said Ian Holliday, a Myanmar expert at the University of Hong Kong.
"I think they will pull out all the stops and make it clear to the Burmese leadership that if they don't start to minimise the disruption on the Chinese border, then there will be serious consequences. "
ELECTIONS UNDER THREAT?
The prospect of a lengthy conflict could delay next year's long-awaited elections. No date for them has been announced, suggesting the junta is waiting for rebels to disarm and join an army-run border force before entering the political process.
The Kokang clashes might be an attempt to scare them into submission, but that could backfire and push back the polls. (For an analysis on Myanmar's elections: for scenarios and a Q+A.
But after holding a constitutional referendum in the immediate aftermath of last year's devastating Cyclone Nargis to pave the way for polls, the junta is unlikely to put up with any roadblocks to its "road map to democracy".
The assault sparked speculation in Beijing as to what Myanmar's ruling generals were thinking when they ordered an offensive they knew would push refugees into China.
Some people with close ties to China's leadership wondered whether Myanmar was punishing Beijing's efforts to stop it from strengthening military ties with nuclear-armed North Korea.
Regardless, some Chinese analysts played down the influence Beijing has over the generals.
"They're not great friends. They don't listen to what China says," said Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing.
"I think China will do everything it can to persuade Myanmar to peacefully resolve the problem but I fear that no country, not even China, can have much influence." (Additional reporting by Lucy Hornby in BEIJING; Editing by Benjamin Kang Lim and Bill Tarrant)
For more humanitarian news and analysis, please visit www.alertnet. org
With the exception of public UN sources, reproduction or redistribution of the above text, in whole, part or in any form, requires the prior consent of the original source. The opinions expressed in the documents carried by this site are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by UN OCHA or ReliefWeb. http://www.reliefwe b.int/rw/ rwb.nsf/db900SID /ACIO-7VGFK6? OpenDocument
China Silent on Burmese Refugees
China Silent on Burmese Refugees
By MICHAEL WINES
Published: September 1, 2009
BEIJING — Chinese officials imposed an information blackout Tuesday on the situation along its border with Myanmar and began taking down tents that had sheltered some of the estimated 30,000 people who fled into China to escape the recent fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic rebels.
But news reports stated that many thousands of refugees remained in China, unwilling or unable to return to Myanmar, formerly called Burma, and it was not clear how the Chinese government intended to address their plight.
The Chinese authorities withheld comment on the border situation Tuesday, aside from saying, in a Foreign Ministry briefing, that “necessary humanitarian assistance” was being provided. And they began ordering foreign journalists to leave the area around Nansan and Genma, Chinese towns on the mountainous border where the refugees have been housed in seven separate camps.
While about 4,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar on Monday, the day after the fighting ended, the pace has since slowed dramatically. Only about 30 people crossed the border into Myanmar in a half-hour period on Tuesday morning, The Associated Press reported.
“It seems to be slowing down,” one foreigner near Nansan said in a telephone interview on Tuesday. “There’s still a large number of refugees in and around Nansan, both in the camps and hanging around.” The foreigner, who refused to be identified, said Chinese Army troops had stepped up patrols in the area.
An unknown number of those who fled to China during the fighting are Chinese citizens who have been conducting business in Myanmar, where China is building dams and other projects and has extensive mining ventures. They are unlikely to return soon.
China has insisted that northern Myanmar’s Kokang region is safe and stable after the fighting last week, in which hundreds of government troops overwhelmed an armed ethnic group, breaking a cease-fire that had prevailed for two decades. Human rights groups and others have warned that the junta’s actions could ignite a wider conflict in the area, where other, better armed ethnic groups also are resisting government control.
Both Thai newspapers and The Irrawaddy, an independent magazine that focuses on Myanmar, have reported that the government is sending fresh troops into the northern state of Shan in an attempt to consolidate its control there. The army wants the rebels to disarm and join a government border patrol force, as required under a new constitution. Most of the rebels have resisted the order, which would effectively place them under government control.
Myanmar’s military junta apparently seeks to take control of the region before elections, the first in almost 20 years, that are scheduled for next year. Outside monitors accuse the military junta of brutal human rights violations as part of its effort to stay in power. The Myanmar government has said that 26 of its soldiers and at least 8 rebels died in three days of battles.
The Myanmar conflict has thrust the Chinese government, one of the government’s only staunch backers, into an awkward situation. China has provided diplomatic support to the junta in exchange for access to its considerable mineral wealth and cooperation in efforts to suppress a growing cross-border trade in heroin and other illicit drugs. The flood of refugees prompted the Chinese to issue muted criticism of the junta, calling on Friday for it to secure Myanmar’s borders.
China, Myanmar share responsibility to maintain border stability: FM
China, Myanmar share responsibility to maintain border stability: FM
www.chinaview. cn 2009-09-01 19:13:52 Print
BEIJING, Sept. 1 (Xinhua) -- The Foreign Ministry Tuesday said it was the common responsibility of China and Myanmar to safeguard the stability of their common border.
"Safeguarding the stability of the China-Myanmar border is in line with the vital interests of both people and is the shared responsibility of both governments, " said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu.
Referring to recent unrest in Myanmar's Shan province, Jiang said: "We hope the situation will calm down as soon as possible and Myanmar border inhabitants who fled to China can return to their homeland at an early date," Jiang said. She said some of those who had crossed the border into China's Yunnan Province had already returned to their homes in Myanmar.
About 37,000 border inhabitants crossed the border into China after armed conflict broke out last week in Myanmar.
Jiang said China and Myanmar were friendly neighbors and China hoped Myanmar would maintain peace and stability.
"Based on humanitarian principles, China took active rescue and relief measures to help Myanmar border inhabitants settle down," Jiang said,
"We hope Myanmar can resolve its domestic issues and take all necessary measures to restore order and stability in the border area," she said.
The situation originated from a standoff between Myanmar army troops stationed in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region, and ethnic minority forces in the area, on Aug. 8. Armed conflicts triggered a large outflow of border inhabitants into neighboring Yunnan Province's Nansan area.
Editor: Li Xianzhi http://news. xinhuanet. com/english/ 2009-09/01/ content_11979578 .htm
Rangoon Opinions Differ on Kokang Assault
Rangoon Opinions Differ on Kokang Assault
By LAWI WENG Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Rangoon residents are expressing different opinions on the reasons for the recent government attack on the Kokang militia known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Shan State, according to sources in Rangoon.
A Mandalay-based journalist said he believes the government troops attacked the MNDAA so that senior generals could postpone the planned 2010 election because they do not want to share power with civilians.
He believes the military will stage a coup in the future and Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye will order his troops to attack before the election.
Many Journalists in Rangoon disagree with the attack, saying the government should negotiate instead of fight, according to sources.
However, a military retiree said he supported the attack because the MNDAA trafficked drugs and weapons.
“They broke the law and threatened peace and stability. This government has to fight them just as a new one would have to as well,” he said.
A law student in Rangoon University said the government would not postpone the election because of the conflict, saying they attacked the MNDAA as a warning to other ethnic armed ceasefire groups refusing to transform their troops into border guard forces.
“They attacked to make an example of them,” he said.
A Rangoon-based business analyst said continued fighting would damage Rangoon’s economy because many ethnic Kokang and Wa run businesses there.
“They will have to return home if the fighting continues. A lot of businesses would close,” he said.
Another Rangoon resident said many have mixed feelings. They worry about a civil war and wonder whether the Chinese government will change its policy toward the Burmese government after the recent influx of refugees from the Kokang area.
“China never supported sanctions against the junta at the UN, but they might act differently now,” he said.
Another Rangoon-based journalist said, “China might change its policy toward the Burmese government. They could even support the democracy movement in Burma, pressuring the junta to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and open dialogue with the opposition.”
Some Burmese democracy activists say the government took over the Kokang area to clear the way for the construction of an agreed gas pipeline starting in September.
Over 30,000 civilians fled to the Chinese border town of Nansan in Yunnan Province during the three days of clashes between junta troops and the Kokang militia.
Burma’s state-run media said government troops defeated the MNDAA forces, saying 26 Burmese policemen and at least eight rebels were killed.
Some civilians have said government troops looted their homes after they abandoned them.
The Burmese government recently announced the area is stable after about 700 MNDAA troops surrendered their arms to Chinese authorities.
The Burmese government is allowing Kokang residents to return, meanwhile. 4,000 have re-crossed the border, according to Chinese authorities, who said many others remain at the makeshift camp in Nansan.
Aung Thet Wine contributed to this article.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy. org
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Q+A- Will the conflict in northern Myanmar intensify?
Q+A-Will the conflict in northern Myanmar intensify?
Article layout: raw
BANGKOK, Sept 1 (Reuters) - An incursion by Myanmar's army into northeastern Shan State has raised fears of more clashes with ethnic minority rebels that could exacerbate a refugee crisis at its border with economic and political ally China.
Some analysts are predicting a protracted conflict will be ignited in the region, which could anger Beijing and derail plans for army-ruled Myanmar's first election in nearly two decades.
WHY HAVE MYANMAR TROOPS BEEN DEPLOYED IN SHAN STATE?
The Myanmar regime wants ethnic minorities to take part in the election and wants to recruit their fighters for an army-run border patrol force. The offensive could be an effort by Yangon to force the groups into submission.
The aim, analysts say, is to disarm and neutralise the insurgents, allowing the army to establish control over the rebellious region for the first time in its nearly five-decade rule.
However, the real target of the military is likely to be the United Wa State Army, a powerful force involved in the illicit drugs trade.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHO IS INVOLVED?
Myanmar's armed forces entered the Kokang area and last week broke a 20-year ceasefire with rebels in the region when it overwhelmed the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), widely seen as the weakest of the area's factions.
The junta kept silent about the incursion for several days and announced via state media that the clashes occurred after troops were attacked by rebels holding 39 policemen hostage.
A recently formed ethnic minority alliance known as the Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front (MPDF) has called for dialogue and has issued statements to the regime, and to Beijing, urging an end to hostilities.
The alliance groups the MNDAA, the Kachin Independence Organisation and the United Wa State Party, the ethnic Wa armed faction's political wing. The groups are aware that a joint effort is necessary to counter the army.
IS THE SITUATION LIKELY TO ESCALATE?
There are concerns that if the fighting intensifies, other members of the alliance could enter the fray and provide a serious challenge to the Myanmar army, resulting in fighting and heightening the risk of a refugee crisis for China.
The Wa group is a formidable fighting force, with at least 15,000 members, and analysts say any clashes between the Wa and the army would be bloody.
A lot is at stake for all involved, China included, and neither side will want to engage in any kind of protracted conflict. However, any wrong moves by forces on the ground could trigger all-out war.
HOW HAS CHINA REACTED?
Beijing, one of Myanmar's few diplomatic backers, has called on Yangon to maintain stability at the border. It is likely much more is being said behind the scenes. China has long chosen not to comment on Myanmar's internal affairs.
China beefed up its border security and provided support for 37,000 refugees, most of whom are returning to Kokang.
HOW WILL THIS AFFECT THE JUNTA AND ITS ELECTIONS?
The junta wants full control over the region before the elections, even if it has to upset China to achieve this, analysts say.
It wants to bring the groups into the political fold to neutralise them and give the polls legitimacy, but its breach of the ceasefire will complicate matters.
Yangon has yet to announce a date for the election, or say who can take part. The delay is largely a result of its inability to convince, or force, ethnic minority groups to enter into the political process. (For an analysis on Myanmar's elections: for scenarios and a Q+A: )
WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR CHINA AND MYANMAR?
Energy-hungry China is building oil and gas pipelines through Myanmar that will supply Yunnan province, relieving pressure on its own oil industry to supply its southwest.
China's overriding concern is a stable Myanmar, and the Yangon regime would be loathe to upset its powerful neighbour because of the economic and diplomatic assistance it provides.
Floods of refugees entering China, shelling over the border and injuries to Chinese civilians are likely to anger Beijing, although not enough for a rare intervention or any move that would damage their close, if increasingly awkward, relationship.
Several Western academics say China will try to use its influence to halt the conflict, but Chinese-based analysts have played down that influence and say Yangon will do what it wants.
(Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing; Compiled by Bangkok Newsroom; Editing by Alan Raybould and Robert Birsel) Keywords: MYANMAR CHINA/ (Bangkok Newsroom; +66 2 637 5610)
Copyright Thomson Reuters 2009. All rights reserved. http://www.iii. co.uk/news/ ?type=afxnews&articleid=7501484&subject=companies&action=article
The Yunnan Connection-By LARRY JAGAN
COVER STORY
The Yunnan Connection
By LARRY JAGAN SEPTEMBER, 2009 - VOLUME 17 NO.6
Closer ties between Burma and China’s southwestern province raise concerns in Beijing
Yunnan, China’s southwestern province bordering Burma, has always taken the lead in forging closer relations with its neighbor, usually with Beijing’s blessing. But in recent years, this special relationship has caused some irritation among China’s political leaders in the north.
In the past, China’s political supremos were happy to leave trade to those based in the southwestern region, while taking responsibility for all political issues. This relationship between Burma and China’s border areas has a long history.
The Joint Check Centre of Ruili on the northern Sino-Burmese border is an important economic zone where trade is increasing. (Photo: Kyaw Zwa Moe/The Irrawaddy)
Long before becoming chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization in 1975, Brang Seng moved thousands of Kachins into Yunnan for safety after declaring war on the Burmese government.
The Wa leaders, who formed a significant section of the Burma Communist Party, were all trained in the Yunnan capital, Kunming, and fondly remember those times.
At the start of Mao Zedong’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward” in 1958, more than 100,000 Chinese fled across the border into Burma for safety, according to a senior Chinese official. Most of them may never have returned, he added. In the past 10 years more than 200,000 Chinese have crossed into northern Shan State in search of work and financial opportunities. In Panghsan, the Wa capital, the local authorities run a casino school which trains young Chinese from across the border how to become croupiers.
Around 50 pupils at a time pay the school 300 yuan (US $45) for one month’s training; they qualify for jobs on graduation in the casinos along the border and some even find work in Cambodian casinos along the border with Thailand.
A quarter of Panghsan’s population are Chinese who have settled in the Wa area since 1997, according to a senior Wa leader. An entire Chinese Wa village even relocated in Burma six years ago to take advantage of the UN’s rice cultivation scheme—part of the organization’s support for alternative crop programs intended to replace opium production. In Mong La, further along the border, more than one in eight residents within the city limits are recent Chinese arrivals, according to the city’s mayor.
The business life of hundreds of small towns and villages along the Burmese border with China is dominated by Chinese immigrants who migrated to the area in the last 10 years.
Families often send their children across the border to China for education, and many of the Wa leaders’ sons and daughters study in Kunming. The daughter of the former Mong La mayor recently graduated from a university in Shanghai. Many others are receiving higher education in Chengdu, Guilin and Kunming.
While traditional links have helped fuel this close cross-border relationship, in the past 25 years it has been trade that has been the main locomotive.
Since 1993, according to local Chinese officials, cross-border trade has mushroomed. Trade between Yunnan and Burma represents around half of the total bilateral trade between the two countries. Official Burmese government figures put this at $2.4 billion in the 2007-2008 fiscal year, almost double the previous year’s.
This trade, however, has primarily benefited the Chinese—almost all the increase has been the result of the massive rise in the volume of Chinese imports, as the value of Burmese exports has remained relatively constant since 1988.
As part of plans to further promote trade between the two countries, special economic or free trade areas are also being set up. The border crossing between Muse and Ruili is the biggest trade route at present. The Yunnan provincial government has recently proposed setting up a Ruili cross-border economic cooperation zone, while the Dehong zone county government, in which the area falls, proposes to construct a Ruili-Muse free trade area. The Burmese government is also in favor of the plans, so the project is expected to move ahead in the near future.
Burma agreed more than three years ago in principal to establish a tax-free trade area near Muse. Nearly 300 square kilometers have been designated for the zone, known now as “Muse 105 Ma.” Chinese exports are free to enter Burma through Muse, Jiugu and Nankang, and are processed in the zone. Although yet to be officially announced, according to Chinese officials, this has already made Muse and Jiugu a very special economic zone, which offers Chinese goods extremely preferential treatment.
A border export processing base has also been established at Kunming, Honghe, Dali, Baoshan and Dehong, forming the main trade hubs in the zone. Many enterprises which produce export products have set up offices and factories near the border areas to directly benefit from the growing border trade.
The Yunnan authorities understand that protecting the growing trade with their neighbor is extremely important to the province’s long-term economic future. The provincial government recently drew up detailed plans to further promote border trade with Burma. This has included favorable customs and visa procedures, and streamlined bureaucracy. But there are fears that because of the low level of trade, there may be central government interference in the future.
“The preferential policies protecting cross-border trade [which had been approved by Beijing in 1996] are vitally important to Yunnan Province, although the trade is relatively small,” a senior Kunming customs official told The Irrawaddy.
“Yunnan would be seriously affected should the preferential policies be removed by the central government,” he said.
The central authorities are currently concerned that the system may contravene World Trade Organization rules. But local officials at the Yunnan commerce department reject this view, pointing out that the US and Mexico, adjacent to each other, have preferential policies.
While Beijing may not be concerned about the official trade between the province and Burma, the central government there is more concerned about the unofficial and illegal trade that is taking place, in the form of drugs, timber, wildlife and human trafficking.
Local Chinese merchants once benefited from the abundant supply of high grade timber imported from Burma. “We love Myanmar [Burmese] timber because it is good quality,” a businessman in Fujian province, on China’s southeastern coast, told a Chinese academic. “We can process it into furniture and then sell it on to Japan and the US.”
Between 2001 and 2005, imports of timber represented around one-fifth of the volume of Burma’s bilateral trade with Yunnan. But that ended abruptly when Chinese President Hu Jintao intervened after several Chinese loggers were arrested in Burma. If Chinese lives are at risk, national and political considerations overrule local economic business interests. Illegal logging has been effectively banned by the Chinese and very little now makes its way across the border, timber merchants in Kunming told The Irrawaddy.
Fears that unofficial cross-border trade—especially in arms, drugs and people—was getting out of hand a few years ago also prompted the central authorities to intervene. In late 2003, in a move to tighten border controls, Beijing assigned the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to replace the border police along the Sino-Burmese border. In December 2004, the Burmese junta’s No 3, Gen Thura Shwe Mann, and Gen Ge Zhenfeng, the PLA’s deputy chief of staff, signed a Memorandum of Understanding that established a mechanism of meetings, talks and contacts between the Chinese and Burmese armies to deal with border affairs.
This seems to be the new pattern. Yunnan and other border areas may be pushing for greater trade and contacts between Burma and China, but Beijing wants to limit anything that may be unintentionally promoting corruption and crime, including drugs smuggling and human trafficking.
The overall concern in Beijing is that Chinese policy in practice should not indirectly make the border areas unstable and insecure. The divergent interests of Kunming and Beijing may yet be put to the test if the Burmese military government’s attempts to disarm the ethnic rebel ceasefire groups, especially the United Wa State Army, and form a force of guards on the Burmese side of the border fail and the danger arises of renewed armed conflict.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy. org
http://www.irrawadd y.org/print_ article.php? art_id=16677
UN, West pressure Myanmar for change from within
By JOHN HEILPRIN (AP) – 17 hours ago
UNITED NATIONS — Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Monday that elections in Myanmar must be free and fair, amid mounting concerns that they won't be.
"We need to work more for the democratization of Myanmar," Ban told a press conference in Oslo, Norway, with Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. "This election in 2010 must be a fair and credible and inclusive one."
Ban said he was working hard to keep the pressure on General Than Shwe and other of Myanmar's leaders to live up to their commitments to hold legitimate elections in 2010. At a minimum, the U.N. wants Suu Kyi and 2,000 other political prisoners released. A transcript of Ban's remarks were made available at the U.N. in New York.
Than Shwe has resisted U.N. demands to open up democratically, ignoring four Security Council statements and direct entreaties by Ban and a top envoy. Suu Kyi has been in detention for 14 of the last 20 years since her pro-democracy party won in the polls but was denied power.
Myanmar's government has given no indication it will release her or the 200 political prisoners that Ibrahim Gambari, Ban's top envoy, told The Associated Press he expected would be freed after Ban's most recent trip.
Western and U.N. diplomats increasingly view Myanmar as intent on holding staged elections to enshrine its military dictatorship next year, with few other than the government or neighboring China able to steer an alternate course.
"It's the Burmese leadership that have to take the decision to move forward, rather than to keep their country held back in a state of lack of freedom, military regime and an environment in which there's going to be very little international investment," British Ambassador John Sawers said in an AP interview.
China and Russia, two of Myanmar's main weapons suppliers and trading partners, oppose the idea of a U.N.-backed international arms embargo, and they also blocked the council from making anything more than a tepid protest of Suu Kyi's return to house arrest on Aug. 11.
Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. http://www.google. com/hostednews/ ap/article/ ALeqM5hTLKeb1OEm TBx0wCiSeGVbwOkZ yAD9AE2MPG1
UN's Ban says has his own leadership style
Mon Aug 31, 2009 5:15pm IST
OSLO (Reuters) - U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon responded to Norwegian criticism of his leadership on Monday by saying he had his own style and charisma.
Ban met Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg to discuss climate change during a visit that followed the leak of a scathing memo in which Norway's deputy U.N. Ambassador Mona Juul said Ban suffered from "a lack of charisma"
Juul accused Ban, a former South Korean foreign minister, of weak, ineffective and at times counterproductive leadership, Norwegian daily Aftenposten had reported.
Norway has stressed that the letter was an internal diplomatic memo and not a statement by the government.
"We all have a different background, leadership styles. We must respect each others'," Ban told a news conference. "I have my own leadership style, my own charisma."
Juul reportedly wrote that Ban was a mere "passive observer" after Myanmar's arrest of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and that his visit there to meet the hardline generals was fruitless and could create problems for lower-level diplomats.
The secretary-general pointed to his diplomatic efforts last year, when he persuaded Myanmar Senior General Than Shwe to lift humanitarian aid restrictions after Cyclone Nargis. Ban said he was committed to work for democratization of Myanmar.
© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved http://in.reuters. com/article/ worldNews/ idINIndia- 42110220090831
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【コーカン地区で戦闘？ 難民1万人が中国に】
・中国に接するシャン州コーカン地区で、コーカン軍MNDAA
（1989年に軍政と停戦合意）が親軍政派と反軍政派に分裂した。
軍政も派兵し、同地区の首都ラオカイを制圧した。現地のメディア
によればMNDAAの反軍政派と国軍との間で散発的な衝突が
起きている。住民約1万人が中国側に難民として流入した
（26日ロイター、28日ブルームバーグほか）。
・ワ州連合軍（UWSA）やカチン独立機構（KIO）などの
停戦団体がMNDAA（反軍政側）と同盟関係にある。UWSAの
拠点を狙ったビルマ国軍の砲弾が国境を越えて中国側に落ち、
死傷者が出たとの情報もある（28日シャン・ヘラルド・ニュース）。
【背景】軍政は来年予定の選挙を前に、停戦協定を結んだ
武装勢力に対しそれぞれの軍部を国境警備隊に再編し、
国軍の指揮下に入れるよう要求している。MNDAAに対しては、
8月初旬に違法薬物捜索の名目で議長宅に兵士を送るなどし
圧力を強めていた。
【外務省、親軍政団体の幹部を日本に招待】
・軍政の農業灌漑大臣で、軍政の翼賛団体「連邦連帯開発
協会」（「連邦団結発展協会」とも。略称はUSDA）の総書記も
務めるテーウー少将らが、外務省の招きで20日から来日した。
24日には在日ビルマ人団体などが抗議デモを行った
（22日朝日ほか）。
・同協会は2003年5月のアウンサンスーチー氏襲撃事件への
関与が指摘されたほか、2007年9月のデモ行進の際にも会員
がデモ参加者を殴打、逮捕したと報告があった。協会幹部は
欧米の制裁対象者となっており、米国やEUに原則として入国できない。
・中曽根外相は25日の記者会見で、テーウー少将の訪問は
「偶然この時期になった」、また「連邦連帯開発協会における
地位とは、今回お呼びしたのと何ら関係のないこと」と述べた。
同日テーウー少将と会談し「来年の総選挙が国際社会から祝福
されるため…民主化がすべての関係者が含まれる形で進められ
ることを強く希望する」と伝えた（25日外務省）。
【イェトー氏「警備員は握手して入れてくれた」】
・5月にビルマの最大都市ラングーン（ヤンゴン）の湖を泳いで
湖畔のアウンサンスーチー氏宅を訪れた米国人男性ジョン・
イェトー氏が帰国した。ニューズウィークの質問に対し、スーチー氏
宅敷地に入ったとき「AK-47（ライフル）を持った警備員が握手して
入れてくれた」と語った。CNNテレビの番組では、スーチー氏は
彼の訪問を喜んでいたと述べた（22日ニューズウィーク、28日CNN）。
【アウンサンスーチー氏が来週にも控訴へ】
・イェトー氏を自宅に入れたことを理由に11日に有罪判決を受け、
自宅軟禁されているアウンサンスーチー氏は来週にも控訴する予定
（27日AP）。
【ビルマへの政府開発援助（ODA）約束状況など】
新たな発表はなし
【イベント情報】
・在日ビルマ人共同行動実行委員会ほか
ビルマ軍政に対しアウンサンスーチーさんと全ての
政治囚の釈放と民主化勢力との対話を要請するアピール行動
（在日ビルマ大使館前、24～28日15～16時）
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フォルムズ烏丸御池102「森の小枝」、
8月25日～9月13日11時～19時）（月曜除く）
・日本ビルマ救援センター月例ビルマ問題学習会
特別講演会 梶藍子さん「メータオ・クリニック現地活動報告」
（阪南大学サテライト（中小企業ベンチャーセンタ－）、9月6日16時～）
・日本ビルマ救援センター「2009年夏 国境訪問報告会」
（クレオ大阪東 研修室2F、9月20日18時～）
報告内容：訪問地、各難民キャンプの現状、
メータオ・クリニックの活動、BRCJ支援状況、他
・第13回ビルマ市民フォーラム総会
最新のビルマ情勢報告（仮題）
報告者 根本敬氏・秋元由紀氏
（池袋・ECOとしま8階、9月12日18時～）
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Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Daily aspirin may do more harm than good: study
Healthy people taking a daily dose of aspirin to prevent heart attacks may be doing themselves more harm than good, according to a new study by British scientists.(DDP/AFP/File/Jens Schlueter)
Researchers found that the risks of bleeding from taking aspirin were such that its routine use in healthy people "cannot be supported" -- although they did not dispute its use in patients with a history of vascular problems.
The results of the Aspirin for Asymptomatic Atherosclerosis (AAA) study add to a long-running debate about whether the potential dangers of taking aspirin could outweigh the benefits from reducing the risk of clots.
"We know that patients with symptoms of artery disease, such as angina, heart attack or stroke, can reduce their risk of further problems by taking a small dose of aspirin each day," said Professor Peter Weissberg, medical director of the British Heart Foundation which helped fund the research.
"The findings of this study agree with our current advice that people who do not have symptomatic or diagnosed artery or heart disease should not take aspirin, because the risks of bleeding may outweigh the benefits."
The study was led by Professor Gerry Fowkes from the Wolfson Unit for Prevention of Peripheral Vascular Diseases in Edinburgh, Scotland, and presented at the European Society of Cardiology Congress in Barcelona Sunday.
It involved 3,350 men and women aged 50 to 75 years who tests revealed may have a condition where the arteries in their legs were furred up -- but who had no symptoms of heart disease or history of heart attack.
They were given either a daily 100 mg dose of aspirin or a placebo (a dummy pill) and monitored over eight years.
While there was no difference in the number of heart attacks, strokes and other cardiovascular events suffered, major bleeding occurred in two percent of the aspirin group compared to just 1.2 percent of the placebo group.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China
Washington is Playing a Deeper Game with China
by F William Engdahl
Global Research, July 11, 2009
After the tragic events of July 5 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China, it would be useful to look more closely into the actual role of the US Government’s ”independent“ NGO, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). All indications are that the US Government, once more acting through its “private” Non-Governmental Organization, the NED, is massively intervening into the internal politics of China.
The reasons for Washington’s intervention into Xinjiang affairs seems to have little to do with concerns over alleged human rights abuses by Beijing authorities against Uyghur people. It seems rather to have very much to do with the strategic geopolitical location of Xinjiang on the Eurasian landmass and its strategic importance for China’s future economic and energy cooperation with Russia, Kazakhastan and other Central Asia states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The major organization internationally calling for protests in front of Chinese embassies around the world is the Washington, D.C.-based World Uyghur Congress (WUC).
The WUC manages to finance a staff, a very fancy website in English, and has a very close relation to the US Congress-funded NED. According to published reports by the NED itself, the World Uyghur Congress receives $215,000.00 annually from the National Endowment for Democracy for “human rights research and advocacy projects.” The president of the WUC is an exile Uyghur who describes herself as a “laundress turned millionaire,” Rebiya Kadeer, who also serves as president of the Washington D.C.-based Uyghur American Association, another Uyghur human rights organization which receives significant funding from the US Government via the National Endowment for Democracy.
The NED was intimately involved in financial support to various organizations behind the Lhasa ”Crimson Revolution“ in March 2008, as well as the Saffron Revolution in Burma/Myanmar and virtually every regime change destabilization in eastern Europe over the past years from Serbia to Georgia to Ukraine to Kyrgystan to Teheran in the aftermath of the recent elections.
Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was quite candid when he said in a published interview in 1991: “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”
The NED is supposedly a private, non-government, non-profit foundation, but it receives a yearly appropriation for its international work from the US Congress. The NED money is channelled through four “core foundations”. These are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, linked to Obama’s Democratic Party; the International Republican Institute tied to the Republican Party; the American Center for International Labor Solidarity linked to the AFL-CIO US labor federation as well as the US State Department; and the Center for International Private Enterprise linked to the US Chamber of Commerce.
The salient question is what has the NED been actively doing that might have encouraged the unrest in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and what is the Obama Administration policy in terms of supporting or denouncing such NED-financed intervention into sovereign politics of states which Washington deems a target for pressure? The answers must be found soon, but one major step to help clarify Washington policy under the new Obama Administration would be for a full disclosure by the NED, the US State Department and NGO’s linked to the US Government, of their involvement, if at all, in encouraging Uyghur separatism or unrest. Is it mere coincidence that the Uyghur riots take place only days following the historic meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?
Uyghur exile organizations, China and Geopolitics
On May 18 this year, the US-government’s in-house “private” NGO, the NED, according to the official WUC website, hosted a seminal human rights conference entitled East Turkestan: 60 Years under Communist Chinese Rule, along with a curious NGO with the name, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO).
The Honorary President and founder of the UNPO is one Erkin Alptekin, an exile Uyghur who founded UNPO while working for the US Information Agency’s official propaganda organization, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty as Director of their Uygur Division and Assistant Director of the Nationalities Services.
Alptekin also founded the World Uyghur Congress at the same time, in 1991, while he was with the US Information Agency. The official mission of the USIA when Alptekin founded the World Uyghur Congress in 1991 was “to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the [USA] national interest…” Alptekin was the first president of WUC, and, according to the official WUC website, is a “close friend of the Dalai Lama.”
Closer examination reveals that UNPO in turn to be an American geopolitical strategist’s dream organization. It was formed, as noted, in 1991 as the Soviet Union was collapsing and most of the land area of Eurasia was in political and economic chaos. Since 2002 its Director General has been Archduke Karl von Habsburg of Austria who lists his (unrecognized by Austria or Hungary) title as “Prince Imperial of Austria and Royal Prince of Hungary.”
Among the UNPO principles is the right to ‘self-determination’ for the 57 diverse population groups who, by some opaque process not made public, have been admitted as official UNPO members with their own distinct flags, with a total population of some 150 million peoples and headquarters in the Hague, Netherlands.
UNPO members range from Kosovo which “joined” when it was fully part of then Yugoslavia in 1991. It includes the “Aboriginals of Australia” who were listed as founding members along with Kosovo. It includes the Buffalo River Dene Nation indians of northern Canada.
The select UNPO members also include Tibet which is listed as a founding member. It also includes other explosive geopolitical areas as the Crimean Tartars, the Greek Minority in Romania, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (in Russia), the Democratic Movement of Burma, and the gulf enclave adjacent to Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and which just happens to hold rights to some of the world’s largest offshore oil fields leased to Condi Rice’s old firm, Chevron Oil. Further geopolitical hotspots which have been granted elite recognition by the UNPO membership include the large section of northern Iran which designates itself as Southern Azerbaijan, as well as something that calls itself Iranian Kurdistan.
In April 2008 according to the website of the UNPO, the US Congress’ NED sponsored a “leadership training” seminar for the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) together with the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. Over 50 Uyghurs from around the world together with prominent academics, government representatives and members of the civil society gathered in Berlin Germany to discuss “Self-Determination under International Law.” What they discussed privately is not known. Rebiya Kadeer gave the keynote address.
The suspicious timing of the Xinjiang riots
The current outbreak of riots and unrest in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang in the northwest part of China, exploded on July 5 local time.
According to the website of the World Uyghur Congress, the “trigger” for the riots was an alleged violent attack on June 26 in China’s southern Guangdong Province at a toy factory where the WUC alleges that Han Chinese workers attacked and beat to death two Uyghur workers for allegedly raping or sexually molesting two Han Chinese women workers in the factory. On July 1, the Munich arm of the WUC issued a worldwide call for protest demonstrations against Chinese embassies and consulates for the alleged Guangdong attack, despite the fact they admitted the details of the incident were unsubstantiated and filled with allegations and dubious reports.
According to a press release they issued, it was that June 26 alleged attack that gave the WUC the grounds to issue their worldwide call to action.
On July 5, a Sunday in Xinjiang but still the USA Independence Day, July 4, in Washington, the WUC in Washington claimed that Han Chinese armed soldiers seized any Uyghur they found on the streets and according to official Chinese news reports, widespread riots and burning of cars along the streets of Urumqi broke out resulting over the following three days in over 140 deaths.
China’s official Xinhua News Agency said that protesters from the Uighur Muslim ethnic minority group began attacking ethnic Han pedestrians, burning vehicles and attacking buses with batons and rocks. “They took to the street…carrying knives, wooden batons, bricks and stones,” they cited an eyewitness as saying. The French AFP news agency quoted Alim Seytoff, general secretary of the Uighur American Association in Washington, that according to his information, police had begun shooting “indiscriminately” at protesting crowds.
Two different versions of the same events: The Chinese government and pictures of the riots indicate it was Uyghur riot and attacks on Han Chinese residents that resulted in deaths and destruction. French official reports put the blame on Chinese police “shooting indiscriminately.” Significantly, the French AFP report relies on the NED-funded Uyghur American Association of Rebiya Kadeer for its information. The reader should judge if the AFP account might be motivated by a US geopolitical agenda, a deeper game from the Obama Administration towards China’s economic future.
Is it merely coincidence that the riots in Xinjiang by Uyghur organizations broke out only days after the meeting took place in Yakaterinburg, Russia of the member nations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as Iran as official observer guest, represented by President Ahmadinejad?
Over the past few years, in the face of what is seen as an increasingly hostile and incalculable United States foreign policy, the major nations of Eurasia—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan have increasingly sought ways of direct and more effective cooperation in economic as well as security areas. In addition, formal Observer status within SCO has been given to Iran, Pakistan, India and Mongolia. The SCO defense ministers are in regular and growing consultation on mutual defense needs, as NATO and the US military command continue provocatively to expand across the region wherever it can.
The Strategic Importance of Xinjiang for Eurasian Energy Infrastructure
There is another reason for the nations of the SCO, a vital national security element, to having peace and stability in China’s Xinjiang region. Some of China’s most important oil and gas pipeline routes pass directly through Xinjiang province. Energy relations between Kazkhstan and China are of enormous strategic importance for both countries, and allow China to become less dependent on oil supply sources that can be cut off by possible US interdiction should relations deteriorate to such a point.
Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev paid a State visit in April 2009 to Beijing. The talks concerned deepening economic cooperation, above all in the energy area, where Kazkhastan holds huge reserves of oil and likely as well of natural gas. After the talks in Beijing, Chinese media carried articles with such titles as “”Kazakhstani oil to fill in the Great Chinese pipe.”
The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to be completed in 2009 will provide transportation of transit gas to China via Xinjiang. As well Chinese energy companies are involved in construction of a Zhanazholskiy gas processing plant, Pavlodar electrolyze plant and Moynakskaya hydro electric station in Kazakhstan.
According to the US Government’s Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan’s Kashagan field is the largest oil field outside the Middle East and the fifth largest in the world in terms of reserves, located off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea, near the city of Atyrau. China has built a 613-mile-long pipeline from Atasu, in northwestern Kazakhstan, to Alashankou at the border of China’s Xinjiang region which is exporting Caspian oil to China. PetroChina’s ChinaOil is the exclusive buyer of the crude oil on the Chinese side. The pipeline is a joint venture of CNPC and Kaztransoil of Kazkhstan. Some 85,000 bbl/d of Kazakh crude oil flowed through the pipeline during 2007. China’s CNPC is also involved in other major energy projects with Kazkhstan. They all traverse China’s Xinjiang region.
In 2007 CNPC signed an agreement to invest more than $2 billion to construct a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. That pipeline would start at Gedaim on the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and extend 1,100 miles through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Khorgos in China’s Xinjiang region. Turkmenistan and China have signed a 30-year supply agreement for the gas that would fill the pipeline. CNPC has set up two entities to oversee the Turkmen upstream project and the development of a second pipeline that will cross China from the Xinjiang region to southeast China at a cost of some $7 billion.
As well, Russia and China are discussing major natural gas pipelines from eastern Siberia through Xinjiang into China. Eastern Siberia contains around 135 Trillion cubic feet of proven plus probable natural gas reserves. The Kovykta natural gas field could give China with natural gas in the next decade via a proposed pipeline.
During the current global economic crisis, Kazakhstan received a major credit from China of $10 billion, half of which is for oil and gas sector. The oil pipeline Atasu-Alashankou and the gas pipeline China-Central Asia, are an instrument of strategic ‘linkage’ of central Asian countries to the economy China. That Eurasian cohesion from Russia to China across Central Asian countries is the geopolitical cohesion Washington most fears. While they would never say so, growing instability in Xinjiang would be an ideal way for Washington to weaken that growing cohesion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization nations.
F William Engdahl is a frequent contributor to Global Research
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14327
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