http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KA30Ae01.html
By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI - New hopes are rising that the goodwill engendered by the joint United Nations and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relief effort for Cyclone Nargis last year can be parlayed into greater multilateral access to the isolated and impoverished country through a possible aid-for-reform deal.
United Nations special envoy to Myanmar Ibrahim Gambari's seventh visit to the country is scheduled for this week and will be closely watched by international observers. Gambari said previously that significant steps, such as the release of political prisoners and moves towards genuine free and fair elections in 2010, would need to be taken before he would return to Myanmar.
That stand was a diplomatic response to junta leader Senior
General Than Shwe's refusal to meet with the envoy during his last two visits to the country. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi also declined to see Gambari during his most recent visit in August. Now there is speculation that Gambari aims to take a new diplomatic tack by dangling offers of development assistance in exchange for political reforms, including Suu Kyi's and other political prisoners release, and the inclusion of opposition parties in the upcoming polls.
A December 28 editorial in the Washington Post citing unnamed UN officials said "special envoy Ibrahim Gambari has proposed that nations offer Burma [Myanmar] financial incentives to free more than 2,000 political prisoners, including Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and to open the country to democratic change". A confidential document outlining the strategy was presented to UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon in November, according to the Washington Post.
A former UN official who claims to have seen the secret document, however, downplays those claims. While many hope the joint cyclone relief effort will open access to the rest of the country for badly needed development projects, the idea of holding out aid as a "reward" for political reforms runs counter to humanitarian norms that govern relief and development operations, he said.
What the document definitely does call for is increasing development assistance for projects aimed at Myanmar's most vulnerable and impoverished people, but not direct disbursements to the junta, the former UN official says. It also proposes that policy reforms are vital, including economic reforms, which, if properly implemented, would improve the investment climate. The UN official says this should not be perceived as a call for foreign direct investment to Myanmar, which is currently sanctioned by both the US and European Union.
One initiative Gambari is expected to push is the establishment of a forum of experts - both local and international - to advise on social and economic policy, including towards exchange rate unification, health, agriculture and education. He will aim to build on the on-the-ground presence of the UN, ASEAN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during the ongoing Cyclone Nargis relief effort.
UN and ASEAN officials have categorized that controversial operation as a disaster relief success story, although one aid worker notes that the first six weeks after the storm were "an abomination" due to the government's inept handing of the crisis and its initial blockage of foreign aid and international aid organizations.
According to the first periodic review of the relief effort, released on December 15, there has been "significant progress" in both relief and recovery, according to the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), a coordinating body composed of representatives from the UN, ASEAN and the Myanmar government.
While the relief effort is far from finished, recovery operations have already begun, including a three-year plan known as the Post-Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan, or PONREPP. PONREPP establishes the framework for the international community's assistance, scheduled to run from January 2009 to December 2011, which will focus on "restoring productive, healthy and secure lives".
The joint aid effort is expected to cost $400-$500 million per year; the UN's revised appeal for cyclone relief assistance now stands at 64% funded, with $304 million received from international donors. The world economic downturn is unlikely to affect donations for 2009, since most donors have already committed, but the second and third years of the recovery plan could face funding shortages.
Unprecedented access
The UN's and other organization's access to needy communities is unprecedented in Myanmar's humanitarian context, aid workers say. According to a recent paper written by Julie Belanger and former UN spokesman Richard Horsey for the Overseas Development Institute of the Humanitarian Policy Group, the TCG effort has been the most effective tool yet for successful coordination between the government, UN and international NGOs.
However, the TCG mechanism is due to expire in July this year, although its possible continuation will be broached at the ASEAN summit to be held next month in Thailand. With unprecedented direct and high level access to the junta, aid officials working in the cyclone-hit Irrawaddy Delta have been able to explain their operations and negotiate problems in a way that is all but impossible in other areas of the country.
The paper also cautioned that the future of humanitarian operations in the Delta, or elsewhere in Myanmar, will depend on the unsettled domestic political situation.
The UN and NGOs are sanguine that the goodwill won during the cyclone relief effort can be leveraged into greater access to other areas of the impoverished country. Myanmar is ranked as a least developed country and ranks 132 out of 177 on the UN's Human Development Index.
A mounting food crisis is a call for an expansion of aid. A report by the World Food Program (WFP) released this week states that, although widely assumed shortages due to damage caused by Cyclone Nargis did not materialize and this year's rice harvest was better than expected, one million Burmese are still short of food in the cyclone-affected Irrawaddy Delta and another five million in other areas are also in need.
Although there have been some openings, including increased access to provide food aid to the country's famine-hit western Chin State, some believe the xenophobic junta intends to maintain an "aid wall" around the cyclone-hit Delta areas. Local organizations and international NGOs usually are only allowed to operate in secure government areas, which are delineated by the geographical dividing line marked by the mountains lining its border with Thailand.
Those mountainous areas are where insurgent groups are still engaged in armed struggle against the military regime and where some of the most egregious rights abuses take place. Access to ceasefire areas along the Thai border is also difficult, with the UN and NGOs often denied access by the government - although local groups and staff are often able to enter the remote regions. As such, rather than going through Myanmar, international aid organizations distribute aid through a number of NGOs that work from inside Thailand along the two countries' border.
This longstanding cross-border aid operation was for the first time given an official stamp of approval by the UN, according to an undated confidential document compiled by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and reviewed by Asia Times Online. The document appears to mark one of the first times the UN has approved such an arrangement, which touches on sensitive sovereignty issues the global organization tends to shy from.
Sources in border-based relief organizations who declined to be named said that they were confused by the document and its confidential nature. That's because the prevailing perception in the Thailand-based aid community was that the UN was in favor of a shift to providing more aid through Yangon. There is some speculation that perhaps the UN is interested in keeping the cross-border option open in case its negotiations with the generals for greater access is denied.
While noting that there are issues that need to be addressed, such as the potential need for armed escorts and the diplomacy of dealing with local relief groups with known ties to armed opposition groups, the document notes that the people stuck in the middle of the armed conflict remain vulnerable and in need of aid which can only be distributed through Thailand.
The UN and aid workers have consistently contended that humanitarian aid and politics should be separate. Activists and opposition groups believe that UN-backed aid and development programs have recently lent international legitimacy to the regime. For instance, they note that while the UN worked alongside Myanmar officials in distributing cyclone relief, in other areas of the country the regime mounted a brutal crackdown on political dissidents, where thousands were imprisoned, and sustained a costly brutal war along its border with Thailand.
In those same border areas, relief and human-rights organizations such as the Free Burma Rangers, Backpack Health Workers and Karen Human Rights Organization report that their relief workers are often shot on sight by government soldiers. Several have been arrested, tortured and imprisoned, they say.
These presumably are some of the same organizations the UN now says it would support funneling aid through. Gambari's challenge will be to foster confidence in both the generals and political opposition at a time when the UN is sending mixed signals about its intentions.
Brian McCartan is a Chiang Mai-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Secret UN deals may entice Myanmar
Strategic Outlook of 2010 and the Role of Moderates in Burma Conflict-MIZZIMA
http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/1617-strategic-outlook-of-2010-and-the-role-of-moderates-in-burma-conflict.html
by Min Zaw Oo
Thursday, 29 January 2009 11:29
Key Points
1. The west-driven support to Burma's pro-democracy movement has reached its limit.
2. The regime has maintained its intuitional apparatus to crackdown domestic oppositions after the monk-led protest and the Cyclone Nargis.
3. The military is facing dilemma to proceed to the transition in 2010 because of the distrust of the oppositions and the lack of civilian partnership.
4. Factional mobilizations can lead to instabilities after 2010.
5. Conflict prevention based on reconciliation and nation-building should be priority after the coming election.
6. The emergence of moderate political forces is critical to promote reconciliation after 2010.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Burmese regime has claimed to hold a new election in 2010 to facilitate a formation of a civil-military government in accordance with the military-orchestrated constitution which was approved in a widely slated referendum held last year. The prospect of the new election is a moral and strategic dilemma to the oppositions, especially the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its supporters who are entrenched in their upholding of the NLD's victory in the eighteen-year-old election.
Any proponent of the new election will undoubtedly find it hard to make a moral advocacy without risking an inadvertent endorsement of the reprobated constitution. However, the participation of moderate pro-democracy forces in the 2010 election is strategically sound and practically necessary to avoid instability and foster much-needed reconciliation for Burma's political and ethnic crises. This essay addresses why the 2010 election is important, and how the moderates can nurture reconciliation after 2010.
The State of the Opposition Movement
Before we think of the future, we should honestly assess our pro-democracy opposition movement, especially its west-driven support.
The attack on Aung San Suu Kyi's motorcade in Depayin and the crackdown on the NLD in 2003 marked a turning point in the conflict. The Depayin incident was also an enlightening moment for some opposition members to re-evaluate their strategies in Burma's protracted conflict.
The Depayin clampdown invigorated ferocity and anguish among the Burmese opposition communities. The emotional instinct called for escalation of the conflict to punish the military's onslaught on the NLD. Furious responses from the international community, including the abrasive condemnations coming from the US senior official, appeared to convince Burmese oppositions that their supporters in the west were ready to boost up Burma's opposition movement beyond rhetoric and miniscule financial supports.
Nevertheless, Burma's pro-democracy movement was merely a moral case for the west. Moral concern is usually inferior to strategic needs in international relations.
Even the Bill Clinton's administration approved about $ 100 million to support the Iraqi oppositions in 1998.1 Compared to this amount, less than $10 million of US funding, including the money to assist refugees and humanitarian programs, was a drop in an ocean of need to boost up an opposition movement.
The Depayin crackdown revealed the reality of the international support to the pro-democracy movement. A few exiles had reached a conclusion on the international front—the west-driven support to Burma's pro-democracy movement has exhausted its capacity in the international system.
On the political front, the NLD explicitly called for the intervention of the United Nations Security Council. The actual reason behind the NLD's SOS signal was its leadership's realization that the government had effectively clamped down the party's capacity to mobilize inside the country. While Aung San Suu Kyi and her able colleagues were under detention, the junta's restrictions had potently demolished the party's grassroots foundation.
The Burmese oppositions and their supporters in exile well heeded the NLD's distress call. Some activist lawyers in Washington prepared a lengthy and controversial appeal, commissioned by Former Czech President Vacláv Havel and noble laureate Desmond M. Tutu. The document argued that Burma under the military junta was a threat to regional stability although all neighboring countries refused to endorse this claim. Burma's threat to peace allegation came neither from the Pentagon nor the US intelligence community. It was a pure agenda from the activists using it as leverage to elevate pressure over the regime.
Despite the understanding in advance that such appeal at the UNSC would not survive, the US Congress and the Bush administration rode the flow of the activists' agenda. In contrast, the Clinton administration chose not to pursue the similar agenda at the UNSC after US ambassador to UN Madeleine Albright met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 1995 because of the same reason of an eventual failure. The result is the history.
Both the free Burma movement and the free Tibet campaign share the same fate. Both movements have been remarkably successful in awareness campaigns. However, awareness is only the first step to mobilize international support in transnational causes. The actual policy making depends on the willingness and capability of the international powers. Both free Burma and Tibet movements grind to a halt when their fates fall into the hands of the international system.
In the domestic front, the junta faced two major crises almost simultaneously within 8 months. The monk-led uprising brought thousands of people to the streets for the first time in eighteen years. Cyclone Nargis virtually destroyed the rice bowl of Burma in the delta region and killed over 130,000 people, marking it the worst natural disaster in Burma history. Nevertheless, the regime survived both crises.
The military proved its institutional capacity to shoot, arrest and torture even monks who are regarded one of the three most revered in Burmese society. The Cyclone deepened poverty and forced people to prioritize their economic survival over political dissatisfaction. The regime has successfully preserved its capacity to quash political challenges after two major crises.
The Limitations of the Military Junta
The major difference between Gen. Ne Win's military coup in 1962 and the current junta is the former's ability to consolidate its power by institutionalizing a one-party state 12 years after the military takeover. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) successively claimed it was a coup d'état government. The nature of the current junta is transitional. Unlike Ne Win's coup, the current junta is not capable of institutionalizing its rule into a formal political system.
In addition, the regime is under constant pressures domestically and internationally although the junta is capable of withstanding them from pushing it to collapse or concede the oppositions' demands. The Depayin incident accelerated the regime's eventual end game, 7-step Road Map to a political transition.
The transition plan is based on the regime's orchestrated constitution which the junta forced through in a rigged referendum amidst the cyclone crisis in May 2008. According to the Road Map, the regime will hold a new election in 2010 and form a new government. The military will have 25 percent of seats in the Parliament, and the military's interests will be protected.
However, the interpretation of the constitution in practice will depend on the degree of participation by civilian politicians in the election and the authority of the elected representatives in the government. The constitution itself does allow elected members to hold substantial power in the new government. The legitimacy of the 2010 election depends on the participation of pro-democracy civilians and their roles in the new government.
The regime is also facing a dilemma based on three major concerns. First, the military is reluctant to open up political space for the civilian politicians to mobilize to contest in the election because the regime learned a hard lesson after it had released former student leaders and allowed them to organize their supporters. Their mobilization paved a way to the monk-led protest in 2007. The regime is very careful this time not to repeat the previous mistake.
Second, the regime is concerned with the repetition of the NLD's another victory in the 2010 election. The dominance of anti-military oppositions in the civilian portion of elected representatives will encourage the oppositions to challenge the military after the election. In other words, the military wants more 'moderate' opposition to contest in the election than the hard-liners. The release of student leaders in 2004 partially aimed at creating a so-called 'third force' between the NLD and the regime. However, the student leaders chose to take hard-line stance.
The regime's strategy appears to minimize the influence of hard liners, including the NLD, in the opposition movement. The recent arrests and severe jail-terms imposed on the activists are a part of the plan to steer clear hard-line elements before the election comes. On the other hand, an alternative third-force in the opposition movement is not in an organized form. Because of the nature of polarization in Burma's conflict, many moderate individuals are reluctant to engineer a third-force platform which is a politically derogative term for the Burmese oppositions.
Third, the regime is worried that the emerging civilian-led government would undermine the military's institutional interests. The military wants to avoid creating a Frankenstein monster by its own Road Map. The military therefore embedded protective clauses in the constitution to guarantee its own interests because of its distrust on civilian politicians.
Overall, the SPDC does not have viable civilian partnership in the new government after 2010. Lack of confidence on civilian politicians and amicable partnership has fostered siege mentality among the military leaders who cling onto the constitution and use suppression to safeguard their interests.
Civilian Forces in the 2010 Election
Depending on their roles and stance towards the coming election, there are four types of civilian politicians, in addition to the pro-military elements to contest the election. The majority of the oppositions strongly condemned the regime's road map. They will continue to reject the 2010 election and refuse to participate. These hardliners among the opposition movement are mostly in exile. Most hardcore activists inside the country have been placed under detention since the crackdown of the monk protests. The hardliners' voice will make little impact on the holding of the election.
The second type of oppositions sees the election as a step towards a confrontation with the military. Despite its call to recognize the result of the 1990 general election, the NLD is likely to participate in the 2010 election because it is the only option for Daw Suu's party to reclaim its legitimacy and remobilize its supporters after 2010. For many hardliners, including the Burmese Communist Party, the coming election is a tactical battleground for further escalation of the conflict.
The third political group views the coming election as an enticing opportunity to pursue their interests. Many ceasefire groups fall into this account. They will seek to strengthen their legitimacy through the existing electoral process regardless of the degree of fairness and freedom of the election. Some ceasefire groups are also inclined to transform into the fourth category, the third force.
Most individuals in the so-called third force inside Burma are non-NLD pro-democracy activists who disagree with the NLD's sanction-oriented policy and confrontation with the regime. They regard themselves moderates and share a view that the current NLD-led opposition movement is a failure. Many individuals in the third force include former political prisoners, elected representatives from the NLD, current leaders in NGOs, and environmental activists. Although they have not emerged as an institutionalized political force, they are likely to establish their political platform to contest the 2010 election.
Potential Instability after the 2010 Election
Under the current constitution, the likely polity in Burma is inclined towards illiberal democracy after 2010. Illiberal democracy is the most potent ingredient for instability when poor economic performance and factional mobilization characterize a new transition, according to the study of world-wide instabilities since 1955.2
Any new government, regardless of the forms of transition, will not be able to revive the country from current economic pauperization in a short term. Poverty will continue and quality of life remains poor after 2010. Economic destitutions are usually channeled towards political discontent. Under poverty, Burmese people will remain dissatisfied with the government as long as the military is a part of the ruling institution.
Illiberal democracy also expands political space for formerly suppressed oppositions who were deprived of political mobilization under the previous system. Economically dissatisfied public is vulnerable to political instigation stirring up unrests. The hardline oppositions will utilize newly emerging political space to mobilize poverty-stricken angry publics to pressure the new government. Their objective will aim to scrap the existing constitution and boot the military out of politics.
On the other hand, the military is likely to be politically defensive after the 2010 election while taking shelter under its brainchild constitution. The military's 25 percent of representatives in the parliament and its supporters will continue to preserve the military's institutional interests threatened by the oppositions' mobilization. Alternatively, the military may disenfranchise potential hardliners in the 2010 election and continue to deny their political freedom even after 2010. In both scenarios, the confrontation between the military and hardcore oppositions is likely to escalate after the election.
Another challenge for the post-2010 government is disarrangement and demobilization of ceasefire groups. Twenty-year old ceasefire has not addressed political settlement of fifteen major ceasefire groups whose strength reaches over 40,000 armed troops, approximately four-time larger than the size of Taliban in Afghanistan. Any misstep in the 2010 transition can trigger the revival of major armed conflicts in the country. The outbreak of wars will inevitably promote the role of military in Burma's politics.
Realistic Reconciliation after 2010
The only way to avoid potential instabilities, destructive confrontation and the revival of suppression is to purse realistic reconciliation after 2010. Reconciliation needs political space, common ground and readiness of both parties. The opposition's call for reconciliation in the past has failed because of the lack of all major premises.
The transition in post-2010 may not foster willingness to reconcile but will create political space to expand shared common ground where confidence can be restored among major parties in the conflict. In the past up to this point, both sides use 'reconciliation' merely as a political lexicon to take advantage over another while neglecting common grounds to cooperate on shared interests of the nation.
It will be the first time in 22 years both civilian politicians and the military representatives will be sitting under the same roof in the Parliament. It will also be the venue for both the military and civilians to interact in policy making and mutually envisioning the future. Against all odds, the transition in 2010 offers an opportunity to jumpstart confidence building to seek much need reconciliation for the country.
Realistically, the regime's Road Map is inevitable. The military will not drop its Road Map and seek an alternative political settlement with the opposition. Any political outcomes have to go through the military-led transitional process. In the past, the military is asked to sit down at a table set up by the opposition. It is now inexorable for the oppositions to proceed to the table prepared by the military.
The reconciliation after 2010 may not be an immediate tripartite dialogue among the military, pro-democracy oppositions, and ethnic minorities. The process will be likely initiated in phases, starting with the military and moderate political forces in the parliament and the government. The ceasefire groups in the political process can play a crucial role in steering the dialogue towards the issues of ethnic minorities.
Prevention of destructive conflicts and nation-building should be the priorities after 2010. These two critical processes are the indispensable steps towards successful democratization. Factional mobilization will be detrimental to any progress of liberalization and democratization. The grim truth about democratic transition is the fact that among 108 democratic transitions, only 12 countries have consolidated democracy since 1955.3 In many cases, instability follows transitions. Some countries fell back to some forms of autocracy. Many transitional countries are still struggling with factionalism.
Moderates Matter
Burma conflict is vastly factionalized, and the polarity between the military and the oppositions is deeply entrenched. The traditional opposition forces will likely take the path of confrontation with the military after 2010. Confidence building won't be materialized as long as both the civilian politicians and the military fail to cooperate in shared common interests, such as economic development, health care, security and public welfare. The essential approach is collaboration in common grounds instead of all-out confrontation.
As long as the junta sees no viable civilian partnership after 2010, the military will restrict the participation of civilian politicians in the coming election and their capacity to mobilize. The only civilian force willing to categorically cooperate with the military is moderate non-NLD pro-democracy activists who feel discontented with the status quo in the opposition movement. Although the military may not trust this so-called third force, it is the only viable civilian partnership the military needs to implement its Road Map.
The military and the third force share similar interests in development-related fields which can be the initial point of cooperation to foster confidence in civil-military relation. Pro-democracy orientation of the moderates can bridge the relationship between traditional oppositions and the military. The third force can function as a requisite buffer between both ends of hardliners by minimizing polarization in Burma conflict.
The major drawback of the potential third force in Burma is the lack of substantial leadership and institutionalization. The moderate force has not been able to organize its political platform and leadership structure to function as a feasible political institution. The election in 2010 will likely be a breeding ground to shape the structure of moderate force in Burmese politics. As long as the military's Road Map is the inescapable point for a change in Burma, the emergence of competent third force is strategically important to jumpstart reconciliation after 2010.
(Min Zaw Oo is a security analyst focusing on South and Southeast Asia region. He is also a PhD candidate at George Mason University, writing his dissertation on the analysis of 108 democratic transitions. Oo holds a MA in Security Studies, Georgetown University, and a MS in Conflict Analysis and Resolutions, George Mason University.)
EU experts to help improve Myanmar marine products export quality
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/29/content_10733166.htm
www.chinaview.cn 2009-01-29 13:36:11 Print
YANGON, Jan. 29 (Xinhua) -- Experts of the European Union (EU) will examine Myanmar's marine products to help improve quality of export products for the European market, the local Yangon Times quoted the Myanmar Fisheries Products Producers and Exporters Association as reporting Thursday.
Invited and proposed by the association, the EU experts will visit Myanmar early next month to inspect the export quality of fishery products from 22 fisheries-related cold storages.
Myanmar's marine product exports amounted to 353 million U.S. dollars in the first three quarters (April-December) of the fiscal year 2008-09 ending March, a drop of 30 million dollars from 2007-08's 387 million dollars correspondingly, according to earlier local report.
The report attributed the fall to the impact of the global financial crisis.
Myanmar's fisheries Department revealed that purchase order from abroad was down by 50 percent compared with normalcy, while domestic purchase power fell by 40 percent.
Along with the reduction of foreign market demand, price of fish also dropped in the domestic market, the report added.
Of Myanmar's marine exports through both normal trade and border trade, fish, prawn and crab are leading.
In 2007-08, Myanmar exported 352,652 tons of marine products, gaining 561 million U.S. dollars, according to official statistics.
In Myanmar's marine export country line-up, China stood atop, followed by Thailand, Japan and Singapore.
The country's fishery sector remained as the fourth largest contributor to the gross domestic product and also the fourth largest source of foreign exchange earning during the past five years.
Editor: Yao
'Six million Burmese need food'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7856265.stm
By Jonathan Head
BBC South East Asia correspondent
Some rural areas of Burma have been plagued by rats
The United Nations has warned of acute food shortages in parts of Burma, despite a better than expected rice harvest over the past year.
Its World Food Programme has issued a report warning that six million people in Burma are now in need of food aid.
They include a million in the Irrawaddy Delta, hit by Cyclone Nargis last year.
But the WFP says it cannot get enough food aid to the western Rohingya and Chin areas, because of restrictions imposed by the military government.
When Cyclone Nargis wiped out Burma's rice-bowl, the Irrawaddy Delta, last year, it was widely assumed that the country would face severe food shortages.
And the UN's World Food Programme says that is what has happened - but not because Burma is growing any less rice.
Military restrictions
Production has dropped by half in the Irrawaddy Delta - but in other regions, yields have been much higher, so that there is actually a healthy surplus available for export.
Burma's 'abused Chin need help'
But the number of Burmese who cannot grow or buy enough to eat has risen sharply to six million, says the WFP.
The UN wants to increase food aid - but cannot, because the government inexplicably stopped it from buying rice locally last year, and because the military restricts access to the worst-hit areas along the western border.
These are where ethnic Rohingya and Chin people live; their plight is reported to be desperate, with Chin state hit by a huge plague of rats.
The UN is hoping its appeal will persuade the Burmese government to lift these restrictions.
The dire conditions in which most Rohingyas live is one of the factors driving so many of them to Thailand, where they claim to have been subjected to brutal treatment at the hands of the Thai military in recent weeks.
China slow down hits Burmese mining
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/1613-china-slow-down-hits-burmese-mining.html
by Moe Thu
Wednesday, 28 January 2009 14:40
Rangoon (Mizzima) -- Like most other sectors that earn Burma hard currency, the mining sector is likely to crash given the slow down in China, which has dramatically brought down mineral and metal prices.
The price of refined tin and lead went down to US$11,000 a ton in the second week of this month in the world market, a 27 percent drop compared to early November 2008.
"We are inevitably planning to stall the operations of mining in Tanintharri Division," said one of the local miners, adding that decreased prices of minerals provided a very limited option to sustain. It is a reflection with mines across the country.
The operation would suffer more losses, if it continued in addition to higher operation costs here, the miner said. Most miners came up with a decision to stop production and to shift to maintenance works at their sites.
Another miner, who mines for mineral and gem stone, said he began to struggle carrying on production of mineral and gems stone. However, he said he reduced the volume of production as the prices started declining.
China is buying nearly all the mineral and jade stones produced in Burma. According to official figures, China is the second biggest trade partner of the Southeast Asian nation after Thailand.
"I think the sale at the up-coming emporium, Burma is planning to stage in March, will not be good as the Chinese economy is slowing down," a miner said.
The miners said some small mining companies were likely to sell their businesses due to the decrease in mineral and gems prices.
Burma exports jade, raw mineral, fishery products and teak to China and imports electronic products and machinery from China.
China's economy slowed to 6.8 percent in the final quarter of 2008 and 9 percent for the whole year, which was down from 13 percent growth rate in 2007, the National Bureau of Statistics reported, confirming the world's third-largest economy was severely hit due to the burden of the global financial crisis and domestic constraints.
Another miner said another reason of closing down of the mining companies is due to the higher operation costs and government's tax policies.
Mining companies need to pay 30 per cent of their production, 10 per cent for export tax and need to pay tax to the internal revenue department.
"The government takes 48 per cent as tax, so we only get half of what we produce," he said adding that plus there is high cost of fuel and dynamite that is used at the mines.
There are some 30 local mine operators, who are primarily involved in metal mining, most of which are no longer competitive in the unfortunate face of the on-going financial turmoil.
"As they are not in a competitive position, they could not survive like a few other foreign companies such as Ivanhoe and China Nonferrous Metal Mining company (CHMC) CNMC Nickel company," said a Rangon-based business writer.
Apart from them, there are 60 local miners that are involved in gems and jade mining.
UN: Myanmar faces food crisis because of cyclone
Source: Associated Press
BANGKOK, Thailand (AP) — Myanmar faces food shortages in many parts of the country, largely due to last year's cyclone and a rat infestation that destroyed crops elsewhere in the impoverished country, according to a U.N. report released Wednesday.
The report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program forecasts that 85,000 tons of emergency food relief will be needed this year in the cyclone-affected Irrawaddy delta. Almost 100,000 more tons will be needed elsewhere: Food stocks in Chin State have been ravaged by rats while Rakhine in the north, historically among the country's poorest states, also needs assistance.
Blessed with abundant natural resources and fertile land, Myanmar was once the world's top rice producer.
But years of government mismanagement have placed it among the 20 poorest countries in the world, the United Nations estimates, with a per capita income of only $200 — 10 times less than its neighbor Thailand.
Border pillar disappears, Myanmar encroaching
http://www.e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=1..280109.jan09
Molcham learns to live with bunkers
Source: The Sangai Express / Laishram Shamungou
Indo-Myanmar border, January 27 2009: Along with disappearance of border pillar 94 erected at Charoi village under Kamjong sub-division of Ukhrul district along the international boundary with Myanmar, the eastern neighbour has also claimed Charoi Khunou village as theirs.
Even though the area around border pillar 66 erected at Molcham village in Chandel district is regarded as a disputed site between the two countries, Myanmar has been encroaching into the area.
On the other hand, for the Assam Rifles and Army deployed along the international border with Myanmar, it remains a mammoth challenge to ensure security of the inhabitants.
Under such circumstances, every household located in the border areas have been building bunkers inside their houses for their safety in the event of any gun battle between security forces and militants.
These were observed by this reporter during an extensive tour of these villages located along the 350 kms long borderline with Myanmar starting from border pillar 39 erected at Singhat sub-division of Churachandpur district and covering villages along the international boundary in Chandel district till border pillar 129 erected in Chingai sub-division of Ukhrul district.
During the extensive tour of these villages after the Somtal Operation where the security forces and insurgents are still engaged in gun fights, some villagers even asked this reporter if he didn't fear for his life.
After the disappearance of border pillar 94 erected at Charoi village in Kamjong sub-division of Ukhrul district, Myanmar Army often come to nearby Charoi Khunou village with the claim that the area is within their territory, said some villagers while interacting with this reporter.
They further informed that the joint effort of Indian army and local villagers to locate border pillar 94 proved futile last year.
Charoi village has been totally deserted after the ethnic clash between Kukis and Nagas in early 90's, they conveyed.
Since border pillar 66 erected at Molcham village under Khengjoi TD Block of Chandel district disappeared, over 100 acres around the spot where the border pillar was identified by the two countries as disputed area and no one was allowed entry from either side.
But Myanmarese have encroached upon the disputed area and have been cultivating pine-apple, sugar-cane and banana over an area of 10 acres, informed the Molcham village chief.
Talking over the matter with officers of the 10 JK Light Infantry stationed at Molcham, they said that the spot from where the border pillar disappeared has been identified.
A border pillar may be re-erected any time there if the Govt directs them to this effect, they said.
For the 26, 27 and 10 Sector AR and Army deployed in border areas in CCpur, Chandel and Ukhrul, it remains a mammoth task for the security personnel to contain insurgent activities or maintain law and order in these border areas.
Even as the AR claimed to have driven off all UG elements after Operation Somtal, all households in villages along the international boundary have been digging holes insides their houses as a sort of underground bunkers, noting the possibility of gun battle between SF and UGs any time.
Ear lier when gun fights broke out between SF and UGs, villagers used to flee to safer areas.
But these days, the villagers feel more secure in their underground bunkers instead of running in the open field.
When there was gun fight, the villagers called in their children and put them inside underground bunkers.
At these border villages, empty, dilapidated houses earlier occupied by fled away villagers could be observed.
It was also observed that no villagers residing in these border areas were allowed to venture outside once night falls.
Security in border villages under Singhat subdivision of CCpur district, particularly Behiang area was very tight.
Stringent and detail checking was conducted when this reporter went to this border villages.
No person including media persons could get easy passage into the border villages of Ukhrul district.
Security forces deployed in the border villages of Kasom Khullen etc conducted veirfication of each and eeery visitor meticulousy and asked details about the purpose of their visit.
Villages located along the border with Myanmar in Ukhrul district like Wanglee, Skipe, Kamang Ashang Khullen etc face wildfire every summer which originated from Kabow valley and often consumed their properties including houses.
The villagers made 'firelines' around their houses to protect themselves and their properties from such destructive wildfire.
Sometimes Myanmarese Army wielding weapons intrude into Skipe village under Kamjong sub-division, conveyed the villagers.
Report: Myanmar's Chin people persecuted
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jMyxf92WgZCIgmp4uRUmOP52IUkwD95VSUOG0
By DENIS D. GRAY –
BANGKOK, Thailand (AP) — The "forgotten" Chin people, Christians living in the remote mountains of northwestern Myanmar, are subject to forced labor, torture, extrajudicial killings and religious persecution by the country's military regime, a human rights group said Wednesday.
A report by the New York-based Human Right Watch said tens of thousands have fled the Chin homeland into neighboring India, where they face abuse and the risk of being forced back into Myanmar.
"The Chin are unsafe in Burma and unprotected in India, but just because these abuses happen far from Delhi and Rangoon (Yangon) does not mean the Chin should remain `forgotten people,'" the report said.
It said the regime also continues to commit atrocities against its other ethnic minorities.
Myanmar's ruling junta has been widely accused of widespread human rights violations in ethnic minority areas where anti-government insurgent groups are fighting for autonomy. The government has repeatedly denied such charges, but an e-mailed request for comment on the new report was not immediately answered.
A top official for India's Mizoram state, Chief Secretary Vanhela Pachau, said he hadn't seen the report and could not comment.
Human Rights Watch said insurgents of the Chin National Front also committed abuses, including the extortion of money from villagers to fund their operations.
"(The police) hit me in my mouth and broke my front teeth. They split my head open and I was bleeding badly. They also shocked me with electricity. We kept telling them that we didn't know anything," said a Chin man accused of supporting the insurgents, who are small in number and largely ineffective.
He was one of some 140 Chin people interviewed by the human rights group from 2005 to 2008. The group said the names of those interviewed were withheld to prevent reprisals.
A number spoke of being forced out of their villages to serve as unpaid porters for the army or to build roads, sentry posts and army barracks.
"We are like slaves, we have to do everything (the army) tells us to do," another Chin man said.
The report said the regime, attempting to suppress minority cultures, was destroying churches, interfering with worship services and promoting Buddhism through threats and inducements. Some 90 percent of the Chin are Christians, most of them adherents to the American Baptist Church.
The suffering of the Chin, the report said, was compounded by recent food shortages and famine caused by a massive rat infestation in Chin State, already one of the poorest regions of Myanmar.
"For too long, ethnic groups like the Chin have borne the brunt of abusive military rule in Burma," said the report, using the former name for the country.
Ethnic insurgencies erupted in Myanmar in the late 1940s when the country gained independence from Great Britain.
Former junta member Gen. Khin Nyunt negotiated cease-fires with 17 of the insurgent groups before he was ousted by rival generals in 2004.
Among rebels still fighting are groups from the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Chin minorities.
At least half a million minority people have been internally displaced in eastern Myanmar as a result of the regime's brutal military campaigns while refugees continue to flee to the Thai-Myanmar border. More than 145,000 refugees receive international humanitarian assistance in Thai border camps.
Associated Press writer Muneeza Naqvi in New Delhi contributed to this report.
UN envoy to ‘test waters’ in Myanmar
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090128/FOREIGN/716423762/-1/NEWS
Larry Jagan, Foreign Correspondent
Last Updated: January 28. 2009 9:30AM UAE / January 28. 2009 5:30AM GMT
The reclusive Myanmar leader Senior Gen Than Shwe salutes during the 10th graduation parade of the Defense Services Medical Academy in Yangon, Myanmar, last month. Khin Maung / AP
BANGKOK // The UN’s special envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, will make another visit to the country this week in what may be his final effort to broker talks between the military government and the detained opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.
The trip starts on Saturday and is scheduled to end on Tuesday, Mr Gambari told The National. But he declined to give any more details. “We are still working on the modalities of the visit,” he said.
He is expected to meet senior members of the military government, opposition leaders, including Ms Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest, and representatives of the country’s ethnic minorities, according to senior UN officials who requested anonymity.
“Although it’s only a four-day working trip, he will extend his stay if it seems progress can be made on his top priorities,” a UN official close to Mr Gambari said. “Meeting Aung San Suu Kyi and hearing her views is obviously a crucial part of this visit,” he said. She did not see him on his last visit, though she had on a previous trip.
The former Nigerian diplomat will tour the region after his talks with the military, according to UN sources in New York. Although all the stops have not yet been finalised, he is expected to visit Bangkok, Beijing, Jakarta, Singapore and Tokyo for discussions on how best to proceed.
This visit signals the UN’s renewed efforts to engage directly the military regime in Myanmar, once known as Burma, after months of debate about how best to encourage the junta to introduce genuine democratic reforms and include all the country’s political players, especially Ms Suu Kyi. A planned December visit by the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, was cancelled because he felt his visit would not produce any results.
Mr Gambari’s latest visit – his first in five months, and his seventh since he took the job in early 2006 – is something of a stock-taking mission, according to diplomats in Yangon, the former capital.
“Mr Gambari will be testing the waters, seeing where the regime might be willing to accept international support and assistance, while at the same time reiterating the international community’s message: national reconciliation must be genuine and truly inclusive,” said a western diplomat in the former capital. Most analysts remain pessimistic Mr Gambari will achieve much.
The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Ms Suu Kyi, is hopeful that the visit will at least break the ice, and may lead to renewed contact between them and the junta, and the possible start of tentative talks – at least at a lower level within the regime.
But many analysts are cautious about raising expectations for this visit because Mr Gambari’s failed efforts to produce results on his last visit led to massive resentment within the country. “Don’t expect anything,” said a western diplomat who has been close to the international mediation efforts. “The visit has a very low objectives and expectations,” he said.
The real test of whether the envoy’s forthcoming trip is more successful than usual will be whether he is able to meet the junta’s top general, Than Shwe. The senior general has refused to meet him on all but his first few visits.
“He is likely only to be allowed to meet the largely ceremonial prime minister, Thein Sein,” said Win Min, a Burmese academic based at Chiang Mai, Thailand. “The top general obviously has no regard for him and believes it isn’t necessary to talk directly to him.”
The NLD said it would discuss with Mr Gambari the arrest and harsh sentencing of more than 300 NLD members and other political prisoners over the past few months. The number of political prisoners has more than doubled in the past year to nearly 2,500, according to Benjamin Zawacki, the Myanmar researcher of the UK-based group Amnesty International.
But the envoy is more likely to be trying to find a way to get the regime to accept international mediation. The junta did eventually agree to a tripartite formula – the UN, the regional grouping ASEAN and the government – to provide and monitor international assistance to the regime after Cyclone Nargis, which hit the country in May. “This may also be a formula for the political arena as well,” Surin Pitsuwan, the ASEAN secretary-general, recently said in an interview.
ljagan@thenational.ae
Burmese Monk Talks about Compassion, Obama in Mahachai -IRRAWADDY
.jpg)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By LAWI WENG Tuesday, January 27, 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-MAIL
PRINT
TEXT SIZE
About 10,000 Burmese migrant workers living in Mahachai, in Thailand’s Samut Sakhon Province, attended a Buddhist sermon on compassion given by Dr Ashin Nyanissara, a famous Burmese monk, on Monday night, said one of the organizers of the talk.
Dr Ashin Nyanissara, who is better known as Sitagu Sayadaw, is the abbot of the Sitagu International Buddhist Missionary Center in Sagaing and one of Burma’s most respected monks. He has been active in raising funds for relief efforts in the Irrawaddy delta, where over 130,000 people were killed by Cyclone Nagris on May 2-3.
Monday’s talk raised about 400,000 baht (US $11,450) in donations, according to Ashin Wayama Sayadaw, a monk who helped organize the event.
This was the second time that Sitagu Sayadaw had come to Mahachai to speak. Last July, he gave a talk to around 5,000 people at the Thai Union Sports Stadium in Mahachai.
In his two-and-a-half-hour sermon, Sitagu Sayadaw discussed the common Buddhist themes of compassion and change. On the latter topic, he focused on the message of new US President Barack Obama, whose inaugural speech last Tuesday attracted worldwide attention.
“Most people who live here want to see change, so [Sitagu Sayadaw’s] talk really spoke to them,” said Ashin Wayama Sayadaw. “It gave them a way out of their feeling. I was also very impressed.”
Sitagu Sayadaw (Photo: Myo Thaw)
Myo Thaw, a Burmese worker who attended the talk, said, “It is difficult for us to hear dhamma talks here. After I listened to him speak, my mind was cleansed and strengthened. This is what I desperately needed.”
“In Burma, it would be very difficult to see him. I could only see his picture in Burma,” he added.
Moe Thee, another Burmese worker, said, “When I heard him talk about how our donation would be used to provide clinics and schools in the delta, I felt very happy. I donated as much as I could. I want to donate more.”
Many Burmese migrants had the day off on Monday because it was the start of the Chinese New Year. According to sources, the event was held in part to give Mahachai’s large Burmese migrant population an opportunity to gather as a community.
It is estimated that more than 4 million migrants work in Thailand, of whom only about 500,000 are registered.
According to the Thai Labor Promotion Network, there are about 300,000 Burmese migrants, including those who have registered or are waiting for registration, in Mahachai.
A week after Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta, Sitagu Sayadaw set up emergency relief centers and clinics in Ka Don Ka Ni, Amar, Set San and Kunthi Chaung, which were among the worst-hit villages in the region.
Myanmar, children exploited for less than 30 cents a day
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=14318&size=A
01/27/2009 12:04
MYANMAR
They work as farmhands, waiters, on building sites and in the fishing industry. Their “wage” varies from 0.25 to 0.85 US dollars a day. According to Save the Children over 400 children have abandoned school.
Yangon (AsiaNews/Agencies) – Small children forced to work for a “wage” less then 30 cents of a US dollar a day. The alarm is being sounded by a non governmental organisation – that asks to remain anonymous for security reasons – in Myanmar, according to who the practise of the forcing minors to work, in slave-like conditions, is still widespread today. Among those worst hit are children in the Irrawaddy delta region, badly hit by cyclone Nargis last May.
Burmese businessmen, fishermen, and farmers use male workers aging between 10 and 15 in order to pay out below minimum wages: for one working day the children receive a wage that varies between 300 and 1000 kyat ( 0.25 – 0.85US dollars), compared to an adult wage that varies between 1500 and 3000 kyat (1.50 – 2.50 US dollars).
“Children willingly work for 300 kyat and a meal”, says a member of the NGO, while local sources add “they are easier to control and they put up with heavy workloads”. In Myanmar it is not uncommon to meet children as young as eight who work aboard fishing boats, as waiters in the building industry or in the fields.
“I am tired but I am happy that I survived”, 10 year-old orphan Myo Min tells The Irrawaddy. Now he lives with his brother and works full time on a fishing boat. 11 year-old Po Po, also lost a brother and his father last May: he has abandoned his studies and now works as a waiter in a restaurant in Labutta. He earns 5000 kyat a month (equal to 4.20 US dollars) as a dishwasher and says he cries “every night” because he misses his mother.
According to the international organisation Save the Children An estimated 400,000 children did not return to school after the cyclone; about 40 percent of the 140,000 people who were killed or disappeared in the cyclone disaster were children. Many who survived were orphaned or separated from their parents.
Is armed humanitarian intervention the answer in Burma?
http://www.hot001.com/index.php/htm/education/2009-01-27/58067.html
at：2009-01-27 12:24:25 Click: 50
The blogosphere is fired up by the notion of using force to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Burma/Myanmar. However, is that the right course of action? Notable blogs such as The Duck of Minerva, Hidden Unities and Coming Anarchy have recently posted items discussing this subject. They're not the only ones, over at the Washington Post, Fred Hiatt argues forcefully for the international community to keep the promise made at the UN's 60th anniversary, to "intervene, forcefully if necessary, if a state failed to protect its own people." Anne Applebaum, at Slate makes an equally strong case to use force to deliver aid to the thousands of Burmese affected by this catastrophe. To boot, Robert Kaplan has provided a blue-print for how to do this militarily, even as he also argues for us to hold a realistic view of the dangers involved, echoing former Secretary of State Colin Powell's Pottery Barn rule, "we break it, we own it". Even the French government, through its Foreign Minister, Bernard Koucher, has called for a military humanitarian intervention in this case (The European Commission rejected his proposal). One of the few voices arguing against embarking on such an endeavor is Dave Schuler at The Glittering Eye, who questions the premises on which such calls are based, as well as the slippery slope they lead us to, if we are truly to follow the path of military humanitarianism.Peter at the Duck of Minerva focuses on what factors lead to a possible American intervention, or what would make Burma part of the Axis of Evil. In Burma, the US is not really interested in its natural resources, and though the generals in charge are horrible thugs, they generally keep to themselves, and do not seek to shake the international order, so American interests are not really at stake. In his words: Moral of the story: if you’re evil, we’ll go to the mattress to take care of business. If you’re just plain bad, you’re probably in the clear.To be sure, Peter, like most commentators, recognizes that part of the reason behind the military junta's intransigence has more to do with what they see as the danger of allowing international aid; a challenge to their legitimacy. Here, think of how the Bush administration's handling of Katrina led to his losing the trust and support of the majority of the population in the United States. In an authoritarian dictatorship, the loss would be even more crippling as they already have problems with legitimacy to begin with, and far worst than just a disputed election.
Eddie at Hidden Unities argues that given that "the credibility of the international human rights regime and the concept of 'responsibility to protect' is an at all time low, this catastrophe presents an opportunity to rehabilitate it. Not only that, but it would also help rehabilitate the value of "coalitions of the willing" which any action would have to be, given the fact that both Russia and China would veto any action through the UN Security Council. Still, he argues that these countries, along with India, Singapore and Thailand could be embarrassed into participating in one way or another, since the threat of force by a large coalition would force them to pressure the junta a lot more to accept international aid. He ends by arguing that "the concept of waging personal war against dictators and tyrants is one that should be further explored by governments and interested groups." This is in line with Thomas Barnett's theory, which calls for taking out those regimes which are so devoid of being rehabilitated, examples of which he cites as North Korea, and Zimbabwe. Eddie, argues that given the current reality, Myanmar's (Burma's) military junta is a good candidate. Eddie, however, does not argue for bringing democracy to the country, but suggests that even a junta controlled by Beijing, but which is actually competent would be preferable to the status quo.Applebaum and Kaplan essentially make the same argument, that given the current situation the lesser of the two evils is to intervene with force, not necessarily to topple the military junta, but to deliver aid to the areas where it is needed. Kaplan even suggests that the US navy, which currently is holding exercises in Thailand, could enter the Irrawaddy Delta delivering aid from ships, with a small military footprint on the shore to reduce the likelihood of a military engagement with the military of Myanmar/Burma. Following this, Kaplan rightly recognizes that such an operation may hasten the collapse of the country's government, leaving the US and the international community dealing with not only a humanitarian crisis, but also a country which has historically led with various insurgent movements by various minority ethnic groups fighting against largely Burman controlled governments. Kaplan ends his piece by stating: It seems like a simple moral decision: help the survivors of the cyclone...Sending in marines and sailors is the easy part; but make no mistake, the very act of our invasion could land us with the responsibility for fixing Burma afterward.Indeed, as noted above, many of these bloggers, pundits and government officials base their arguments on the UN recognized R2P or Responsibility to Protect, which was adopted in 2005 partly due to remorse for the shortcomings exposed in the international community's failure to act during the Rwandan genocide in the 1990's.The case is made even stronger by what Applebaum's argues is the Junta's overriding objective, its survival, at the cost of that of its own people. The crisis and number of dead so far, 60,000+, is only surpassed by the North Korean famine of 1995, which claimed the lives of as many as 3 million people. What makes matters worst is that according to recent news reports, not only is the military junta insisting that all aid go through the military, but also the fact that many aid groups are now complaining that the junta is in fact stealing aid meant for the victims, diverting it or warehousing it and not allowing it to reach those in need. As if all of this was not enough, to make you want to support forceful action, the economist reported last year that both Pyongyang and Russia were helping the military junta in Myanmar/Burma, in setting up a 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor in the country.On the other side, it seems clear that the military junta is paranoid when it comes to outsiders, and it truly believes that any attempt to deliver aid using military vessels, such as has been suggested by Kaplan and others, is actually seen as a foreign invasion, and an attempt to topple the government. Hence, the voices calling for such action, rather than helping to build the trust of the junta, may actually be increasing their fears, and hence fueling their intransigence. This of course, is premised on them having ready access to the internet, particularly online papers such as the Washington Post, or the New York Times, if not other international media which no doubt have reported on these grumblings.Dave Schuler, has a pretty good argument against intervening. Rather than summarizing it, I'll place a snippent here for your reference. To read the rest, please visit his site. Dave argues as follows What argument can be made for coercive humanitarian aid in Burma that couldn’t have been made 20 years ago?Is it the scale of the calamity? Following that logic we should have invaded China a dozen times over. Over the period of the last 60 years the Chinese government has killed a number of its own citizens greater than the total population of Burma. As had the Soviet Union.Is it the lack of willingness of the ruling junta to accept aid? On that basis any number of governments including our own would justify invasion....Bad things happen. Our hearts go out to those who are suffering. The purpose of our military is to defend our country and its interests seen in a fairly narrow sense.Must we go abroad in search of monsters to destroy? Where does it end?Indeed, if we intervene in Burma/Myanmar, based on any of the factors mentioned above, it does open the door to other types of intervention that would further undermine the principle of state sovereignty, something which given most of the third worlds history of colonialism, many are loathe to support. This is part of what explains South Africa's opposition to the violation of state sovereignty, be it in Burma/Myanmar or Zimbabwe. To be sure, economic interests play a huge role as both India and China want to enlarge ports in Burma/Myanmar to increase their access to its oil wealth. This while Thailand wants to tap its lumber industry and Singapore wants to continue providing for its banking needs.The US, and those members of the international community that care about this, can indeed put pressure on the regime through attacking their bank accounts, as Eddie suggested, or even waving the possibility of trial and judgment by the ICC for crimes against humanity. However, what is exposed in all this is the lack of a mechanism for processing failed states. Tom Barnett has written extensively on this at his blog and in Blueprint for Action and summarized here courtesy of the SecondLife Future Salon blog.China, India and Russia would have to be part of this system, it cannot work without them, but before they can accept it, they need to be sold on its need and the opportunities it presents.However, that is something to address at the theoretical level. In Burma, Myanmar the suffering now is real. It remains to be seen, how the recent earthquake in China will affect its posture vis a vis Burma. After all, if China's nationals have the right to expect that their government will do everything it can to bring aid to them following such a catastrophe, why shouldn't the Burmese people have the right to expect the same from their own government, or the international community?For now, the international community continues to beg the military junta in Myanmar/Burma to allow more international aid in, and so far that is all its limited to. Meanwhile, the Burmese population continues to wait, for aid that may never come, and if it does, may come too late.So what is the answer to the question in the title of this post? As a neo-Barnettist, I can get behind the push for an armed humanitarian intervention, but only if we can have more players (like France, China and India) to help us carry the load, and with the caveat that we work toward creating a regime for dealing with these failed states in the future. Still, as Dave Schuler argues, we also need to address the very real problems that such an intervention would create, in terms of how we deal with the implications of our actions. After all, the US is stretched thin as a result of Iraq and Afghanistan, and we can ill afford to get caught in another low-intensity conflict, particularly with China on the opposing end. Watching the suffering, it's hard not to be for intervening, and fast, but as they say, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.Other links of interestSecurity Dilemmas: To Send Aid Or Not To Send Aid, That Is The QuestionLooks at how aid allows the junta to remain in power, hence the question of whether or not to send aid.
View text Add Favorite Close
Customs clarifies rules on banned Burmese gems
http://www.nationaljewelernetwork.com/njn/content_display/colored-stones/color-market-reports/e3ieb36f849687dcd17c00c374ec2a4503c
The Burma Task Force, composed of the Jewelers Vigilance Committee, the American Gem Trade Association and Jewelers of America, have issued a press release that provides guidance on the steps importers and exporters must follow to import non-Burmese rubies and jadeite.
January 26, 2009
New York--The U.S. Customs Department has issued a set of more specific regulations for ruby and jadeite importers, including requirements that the companies obtain exporter certification and evidence of tracking, to ensure they are complying with a law banning the importation of Burmese rubies and jadeite into the United States.
In September 2008, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 became law, specifying that all rubies and jadeite originally from Myanmar (formerly called Burma), including jewelry containing those gemstones, be banned from the United States, even if the gemstones had been "substantially transformed" in a third-party nation.
The act was an effort by U.S. lawmakers to encourage democratic reforms in Myanmar, where the ruling military junta--which profits from state-run gemstone auctions--has a long history of human rights violations.
After the act passed, there were some lingering questions among gem dealers regarding how the law would be enforced and how companies could comply. On Jan. 16, 2009, Customs issued updated regulations addressing "conditions for importation" of Burmese and non-Burmese rubies and jadeite.
Burmese rubies and jadeite that were in the United States prior to Sept. 27, 2008, and items imported for personal use are exempt.
After reviewing the revamped Customs regulations, The Burma Task Force, composed of the Jewelers Vigilance Committee (JVC), the American Gem Trade Association (AGTA) and Jewelers of America (JA), issued a press release that provides guidance on the steps importers and exporters must follow to import non-Burmese rubies and jadeite.
"We look forward to assisting the trade to fully comply with the previsions of this law," said Cecilia L. Gardner, JVC's president, chief executive officer and general counsel, in a media release.
The guidance from The Burma Task Force is as follows:
Importer obligations: Under the new regulations, importers are still required to certify that their rubies and jadeite were not mined or extracted from Myanmar. The importer certification is created through the use of new Harmonized Tariff Codes.
Exporters must ensure that Burmese rubies and jadeite are not intermingled with non-Burmese-origin rubies and jadeite. Importers must secure a written certification from the exporter stating that the rubies and jadeite were not mined or extracted from Myanmar.
The exporter must also provide "verifiable evidence" that tracks rough stones from mine to place of first export, polished loose gems from mine to place of final finishing, and finished jewelry from mine to place of final finishing of the jewelry.
Exceptions to these provisions include the re-importation of rubies, jadeite or jewelry containing either that were in the United States prior to Sept. 27, 2008, but only if those materials were re-imported by the same entity or person who exported them originally from the United States and as long as their value has not increased. Another exception applies to rubies, jadeite or jewelry containing either that was re-imported for personal use.
Recordkeeping obligations: Importers of non-Burmese rubies and jadeite must maintain records of each transaction for five years. These records include complete information regarding purchase, manufacture or shipment of covered articles and the exporter's certification. Importers are required to produce such records to Customs upon demand.
This includes maintaining the exporter certification and the statement regarding "verifiable evidence" indicating the source of rough, polished or finished jewelry, depending on which was imported.
Verifiable evidence could be an exporter's warranty stating the country of origin of the covered articles, the place in which they were polished and the place where they were manufactured into jewelry. Such a warranty should also include a statement that the exporter has available records that corroborate the statement in the warranty.
Importers and exporters are required to name on the invoice a "responsible employee" of the exporter who has or can obtain knowledge of the transactions. The information that this employee should have access to includes the verifiable evidence of the source and movement of the covered articles.
Industry leaders say the new information from Customs should clear up many of the questions surrounding the Lantos act.
"The guidance created by the Burma Task Force reflects the culmination of a tremendous amount of work and cooperation between jewelry industry representatives and the U.S. government," AGTA Chief Executive Officer Douglas Hucker said in the release. "It will certainly help to clear up a lot of the anxiety we had about complying with the act. We look forward to introducing this guidance at the AGTA GemFair in Tucson. AGTA is eager to communicate this important information to our members and to help them to be in compliance with this important legislation."
JA also praised the clarifications from Customs.
"Jewelers of America welcomes the government's amended Burmese gem regulations, which further clarify importers' obligations and place new responsibilities on exporters," JA President and Chief Executive Officer Matthew Runci said in the release. "We will ensure that our members are fully aware of the new requirements."
For those seeking further information, the JVC, AGTA and JA will present a seminar titled "Burma and Beyond--Operating Your Business in Today's New Regulatory Environment" at the AGTA GemFair in Tucson on Feb. 7. This seminar can help importers and exporters avoid interruptions in international business and will ensure they understand their legal obligations in this seemingly complex area. An international trade specialist from U.S. Customs and Border Protection will be present to answer questions, and written resources will be available.
The AGTA GemFair seminar will take place in the Mohave Room at 11:00 a.m. Registration is not required but space is limited. E-mail AGTA's Adam Graham at adam@agta.org or the JVC's Amy Greenbaum at amy@jvclegal.org with questions.
Visit the JVC's Web site, JVCLegal.org, for an explanation of the Jan. 16 regulations and other important legal-compliance information, products and services.
Situation in Burma critical, says exiled prime minister
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2009/0127/1232923366879.html
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Prime minister Dr Sein Win (right) and Ashin Sopaka of the International Burma Monks Association, at the Strategic Consultation Forum of exiled MPs and leaders of Burma, in Malahide, Co Dublin, yesterday.
FIONA GARTLAND
BURMA IS in crisis, its exiled prime minister said in Dublin yesterday. Dr Sein Win, who was re-elected prime minister of the exiled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) last week, said repression under the military regime has worsened.
Political prisoners are receiving longer sentences, he said, and even social workers are being arrested for carrying out humanitarian work.
Dr Win was attending the Members of the Parliamentary Union (MPU), four-yearly congress, held in Malahide, Co Dublin, over the weekend and funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Some 33 Burmese exiled MPs, making up the MPU, travelled from the US, Thailand, India, Norway, Australia and other countries to the seaside town to elect a prime minister and to discuss the situation in Burma. It was the second time the congress was held in Ireland.
The NCGUB was formed after the military regime in Burma would not allow elected representatives of the National League for Democracy to take power following the 1990 elections, when they won 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats.
The party’s chairman, U Tin Oo, was jailed and its general secretary Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was put under house arrest.
Many members of parliament were also arrested and some became exiles, forming a government abroad and promising to dissolve once democracy and human rights were restored in Burma.
Dr Win said the Irish Government was very sympathetic to their cause.
The situation in Burma had become critical, he said; the economic situation was at its worst following the global recession and cyclone Nargis, which caused devastation in the country last year.
“The repression is very high with serious [prison] sentences given to MPs, also to activists and monks, and even to social workers because they tried to help the people in the Nargis,” he said.
Only half of the financial aid promised by the international community after the cyclone has reached Burma, Dr Win said, because donors did not trust the military government. There were issues with misuse and problems such as artificial exchange rates.
Aung San Suu Kyi, still under house arrest in Burma, is occasionally able to get a message out to the exiled cabinet.
Dr Win, who is her first cousin, said they understand she is in good health.
“The situation inside is very sensitive and you have to be very careful of what you say . . . but we believe she is in good health,” he said.
The military regime in Burma has said it will hold democratic elections in 2010. Dr Win said the process is not an inclusive one.
“What we are saying is ‘you release Aung San Suu Kyi, start talking and then make this process inclusive’ . . . up to now the military is ignoring the call,” he said.
He said the fundamental problem is not with the elections as such, but with the country’s constitution. It stipulates the country’s president must have military experience, must not be married to a foreigner, and the commander-in-chief of the army may stage a coup when he thinks necessary.
“Of course we have hope that things will change, but we don’t know how,” he said.
“It depends on the military . . . the only thing that is failing is a serious talk with the military.”
He thanked the Irish Government for its support and said Ireland could do many things to help Burma, including working with the EU to talk to Burmese neighbours “to make them convinced a solution in Burma is best for all of us”.
He also called on the UN to secure the release of political prisoners as soon as possible.
This article appears in the print edition of the Irish Times
Is Burma's former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt to be freed soon?-MIZZIMA
http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/1603-is-burmas-former-prime-minister-khin-nyunt-to-be-freed-soon.html
by Salai Pi Pi
Monday, 26 January 2009 22:20
New Delhi (Mizzima) – Rumours that Burma's military junta will soon free its detained officers above the rank of Colonel to involve them in the ensuing election, is making the rounds in military circles in Burma, a source in the military establishment said.
The source said the junta is planning to release former Military Intelligence (MI) officers of ranks above Colonel, who were arrested, charged and detained along with the MI chief and former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt.
"Some family members of former MI officials are expecting their release," the source told Mizzima.
The source added that the release is likely to include the former MI chief Khin Nyunt, who is currently under house arrest.
According to the source, who declined to be named, General Khin Nyunt, who was dismissed and arrested on charges of corruption in 2004, will be used to contest the election along with the recently release Sandar Win, daughter of former military dictator General Ne Win.
Khin Nyunt was tried in a Special Tribunal inside Insein prison in Rangoon and was sentenced to 44 years on corruption charges in 2005. However, it is widely believed that he is being put under house arrest instead of being detained in prison.
While Mizzima was unable to make an independent verification of the rumours, sources said it is spreading like wild fire in military circles in Rangoon.
A Thailand based Burmese military expert Htay Aung said, while he is unaware of the rumours, he does not rule out the possibility of the release of Khin Nyunt as the ruling junta does not act in keeping with the law.
"Since the law of the country is in the hands of regime, they can do whatever they want to. Sometimes speculations could also be true," Htay Aung said.
In Burma, whose military rulers keep a tight hold over freedom of expression and information flow, rumours are common, and in many cases, tends to bear a high percentage of truth.
Htay Aung said he has heard that the regime had occasionally secretly allowed the former Intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt to go out despite being kept under house arrest.
"I have heard that the regime often allowed him [Khin Nyunt] to meet some guests," Htay Aung added.
Link to 2010 election
According to the source, rumours are spreading that the military regime is convincing General Khin Nyunt and the recently freed Sanda Win, daughter of the former dictator General Ne Win, to form a political party to contest in the ensuing 2010 elections.
Khin Nyunt, after he took over as Prime Minister in 2003, announced the seven-step road map to democracy that the present regime is still implementing.
According to the roadmap, a general election is in slated for 2010.
Htay Aung, however, dismissed speculations on Sanda Win and Khin Nyunt teaming up to form a political party to contest the elections, saying, "The regime will not allow their enemy to take over power."
According to him, the Generals in power including Snr. Gen Than Shwe consider Khin Nyunt dangerous for the military rulers, and does not prefer having him on their side.
He, however, said, if Khin Nyunt is to be freed, the generals might be thinking of using him to negotiate with cease-fire groups, whom Khin Nyuint, during his tenure as the MI chief, convinced to stop fighting.
"Compared to the leading generals of the regime, he [Khin Nyunt] has strong influence over the cease-fire groups," said Htay Aung. "So they might want to reuse him to handle them [cease-fire groups]."
Sources close to the ceasefire groups said, the Burmese military regime has recently stepped up pressure on cease-fire groups to disarm and form political parties to contest the elections.
However, major ceasefire groups such as the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) and United Wa State Army (UWSA) said they will not surrender their arms though they do not oppose the junta's planned elections.
Possible Fresh crackdown
The source, further said, while rumours of the possibilities of Khin Nyunt being freed are spreading, military supremo Snr. Gen Than Shwe is still nervous about the possibilities of Khin Nyunt's followers remaining in the army.
Than Shwe's fresh suspicions about Khin Nyunt followers, might lead to another brutal operation within the military in the form of a crackdown on Khin Nyunt's associates, the source added.
Myanmar targets to export 500,000 tons of surplus rice in 2008-2009
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=434758
Updated January 25, 2009 09:38 PM
YANGON (Xinhua) -- Myanmar has targeted to export 500, 000 tons of surplus rice from the Ayeyarwaddy delta during the current financial year of 2008-09 ending March, the local Yangon Times reported in this week's issue.
The export will be done by 28 companies, the report said.
According to the figures of the Central Statistical Organization, in 2007-08, Myanmar exported 358,500 tons of rice, gaining 100 million US dollars.
The export tonnage in the first three quarters (April-December) of 2008-09 went to 150,000 tons amid storm.
Of the rice export, 101,235 tons were shipped to South Africa, 11,908 tons to Singapore, 8,007.85 tons to Sri Lanka, 2,499.7 tons to the United Arab Emirate, 1,500 tons to South Korea and 1,197.7 tons to Egypt, the Myanmar Agricultural Produces Trading was quoted as saying.
Myanmar government has urged agricultural entrepreneurs to make greater efforts for exporting more rice, saying that the country has enough cultivable land to boost paddy production.
Out of 17.6 million hectares of cultivable land, only 11.6 million hectares of paddy or 65.9 percent could be grown, the authorities said.
The calendar year 2007 saw a production of 30 million tons of paddy out of 7.6 million hectares grown, but only about 20,000 tons of rice were exported.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Burmese celebration ‘shows we are united’
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090126/LOCAL/301269987
Jeff WieheThe Journal Gazette
Writing a poem can land you in jail, they tell you, or even worse. It can get you beheaded.
Aung Naing and Maugn Soe say that back home, in the southeast Asian country they still call Burma, there is no such thing as the free sharing of ideas.
You don’t say what you really want to say; you can’t always get together and dance or celebrate how you want; you’re lucky to get your daily intake of bread; and you definitely can’t criticize a military government that now calls the country Myanmar.
You don’t even risk jotting down something very simple on a piece of paper – like a poem.
So, it was a special moment Sunday for both men as they watched several ethnicities of Burmese come together – a rarity in Myanmar – at the downtown library in a celebration of that country’s culture. There was dancing, pomp, music, genuine dress and food, all for anyone who wanted to take it in.
“This would be very unique,” Naing said of such an event in Myanmar.
Mapped out by the local Phi Theta Kappa chapter of Ivy Tech Community College, the event was designed to celebrate the mixed culture of the more than 5,000 Burmese refugees who now call Fort Wayne their home and to educate a curious public who may be critical of why any Burmese are here at all.
“Our goal became to raise awareness,” said Sheri Dunlavy, coordinator of the Indiana Region for Phi Theta Kappa, the International Honor Society of the Two-Year College.
For Soe, who said he came to the United States in 1997 and became an American citizen in 2003, the event showed a unity he hopes will one day help his country out from the shadow of a military regime that has drawn criticism from many developed countries around the globe – including the U.S.
“This is important,” said Soe, instrumental in bringing together the different ethnicities and affiliations in the area for the event. “This shows we are united.”
Soe said he was part of a 1988 pro-democracy uprising that some national news organizations have reported led to the deaths of 3,000 protesters at the hands of the country’s military. He said for a pro-democracy movement to succeed, there needs to be financial support from the United States, like the $1 billion America pledged to the Republic of Georgia after its fight against Russia last year.
Plus, he and Naing said, there should be a concerted effort to free Myanmar from its current regime instead of constantly finding homes for refugees.
“We need to end the regime,” Soe said. “Day 1, we end the regime. Day 2, we make democracy.”
With President Obama taking the reins in the United States, Soe said he hopes the end of the regime in Myanmar can happen soon. He said he liked President Bush, but found where that administration stood on issues hard to fathom based on the history of his secretary of state.
Condoleezza Rice, who served in that position for Bush, spent about 14 years on the board of energy and oil giant Chevron Corp., which has done lucrative business as one of the few Western-based businesses operating in Myanmar.
The United States at one point banned new investments in Myanmar, but Chevron was allowed to operate there because it was there before the ban.
Though Rice left the board when she accepted her position as secretary of state, Soe still couldn’t understand how an administration that talked tough on making democracy for Myanmar did not press harder for Chevron to leave the country.
“We stay confused about U.S. policy,” he said.
Amid criticism about its presence there, Chevron last summer did donate $2 million for relief in the wake of a devastating cyclone in Myanmar, according to The San Francisco Chronicle.
jeffwiehe@jg.net
Posts
