Has Japan suffered a diplomatic defeat?

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20081015TDY03104.htm

Hiroshi Yumoto and Takeo Miyazaki / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writers

The United States' removal of North Korea from its blacklist of state sponsors of terrorism--symbolically significant but with little immediate impact on Washington-Pyongyang relations--has come as a major psychological blow to Japan. People both inside and outside the government have said the delisting is tantamount to a "diplomatic defeat" for Japan, brought about in part by a domestic political vacuum.


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Criticism mounting


"I was extremely shocked [by the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the blacklist], as Japan would never agree to such a move," Finance Minister Shoichi Nakagawa said in Washington on Saturday.

Nakagawa's remark came during talks Saturday with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on the sidelines of a meeting of the Group of Seven finance ministers and central bank heads, who had convened to address the global financial market crisis.

According to Nakagawa's close aides who accompanied him on his U.S. trip, the minister was keen to voice strong unease over the decision on behalf of the Japanese families whose relatives were abducted by North Korea.

Takeo Hiranuma, an independent who previously served as economy, trade and industry minister and currently heads a suprapartisan Diet members league to seek a resolution to the abductions, said to reporters in Honjo, Saitama Prefecture, on Sunday, "[The government] must resolutely pass on its message [to the United States]."

Acting President Naoto Kan of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan lambasted the government the same day at a press conference in Tokyo, saying, "The government's lack of a solid diplomatic strategy [on the abduction issue] has resulted in the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in an extraordinarily untimely fashion."

Apparently in response to these opinions, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura, concurrently in charge of the abduction issue, said, "We believe all those people concerned about the abductees are deeply anxious [about the U.S. delisting]."

The chief government spokesman added, "The government is determined that the abduction issue will not be swept under the carpet."

Prime Minister Taro Aso and the Foreign Ministry, for their part, have said the U.S. decision was anticipated and that the delisting will not adversely impact Tokyo's efforts to settle the abduction issue.

However, while U.S. President George W. Bush was pondering the best time to announce the delisting following the White House's completion of procedures in August to obtain congressional approval for the decision, Tokyo failed to prompt Bush to press Japan's stand on the problem.

This was primarily due to domestic political turmoil in Japan in the wake of former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's abrupt announcement to step down in September.

But the new incumbent, Aso, apparently had no leeway to focus on the abduction issue immediately after assuming the top government post, as he reportedly was busy laying the ground to dissolve the House of Representatives for a general election immediately after the formation of his Cabinet.

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Sanctions vs assistance


The government must continue pursuing a resolution of the abduction issue. However, given Tokyo's increasingly weak hand, applying economic and financial sanctions against North Korea to prompt action from Pyongyang might prove difficult.

The government's basic stand of seeking a "comprehensive solution to North Korea's abduction, nuclear and missile problems prior to a full-fledged normalization of relations" between Tokyo and Pyongyang, has not changed.

The policy of extending economic aid to North Korea as envisioned for the final stage of the six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions "only in the event of the abduction issue being brought to a solution" has remained similarly unaltered.

During the six-party talks, however, it was agreed that North Korea would be provided with a package of energy assistance measures once the current second phase of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is completed.

But at a meeting in July of chief negotiators to the six-party talks, Japan said it would only participate in the assistance package "if the conditions for doing so are met."

The energy aid issue is a double-edged sword for this country: It could act as leverage to pressurize Pyongyang into addressing the abductions, but it also could force Tokyo into a corner over the abduction issue.

In light of the decision to remove North Korea from the blacklist, the bulk of the international community might tilt in favor of a conciliatory approach toward Pyongyang. If this comes to pass, pressure likely will be brought to bear on Japan to play a part in the energy assistance package as early as possible.

When the international community boosts assistance to North Korea, Japan's unilateral sanctions against Pyongyang, such as a ban on North Korean-registered vessels entering Japanese ports, will be enervated.

Tokyo's sanctions are designed to be partially lifted when North Korea acts on a promise to reinvestigate the abduction cases, something it has repeatedly postponed.

If the international community softens its stance toward Pyongyang, the North will be less inclined to launch a reinvestigation in exchange for a "carrot" from Japan. Even if North Korea launches a new probe, there is no way of knowing if it will abide by its promise, having already received "assistance" from the United States.

Aso, known for his hard-line stance on North Korea, is reportedly apprehensive about adopting a weak position toward Pyongyang in light of the looming general election. Under these circumstances, Aso's administration likely will be hard pushed to find an effective way to cope with the situation.

(Oct. 15, 2008)