Peaceful Burma (ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းျမန္မာ)平和なビルマ

Peaceful Burma (ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းျမန္မာ)平和なビルマ

TO PEOPLE OF JAPAN



JAPAN YOU ARE NOT ALONE



GANBARE JAPAN



WE ARE WITH YOU



ဗိုလ္ခ်ဳပ္ေျပာတဲ့ညီညြတ္ေရး


“ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတာ ဘာလဲ နားလည္ဖုိ႔လုိတယ္။ ဒီေတာ့ကာ ဒီအပုိဒ္ ဒီ၀ါက်မွာ ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတဲ့အေၾကာင္းကုိ သ႐ုပ္ေဖာ္ျပ ထားတယ္။ တူညီေသာအက်ဳိး၊ တူညီေသာအလုပ္၊ တူညီေသာ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ရွိရမယ္။ က်ေနာ္တုိ႔ ညီၫြတ္ေရးဆုိတာ ဘာအတြက္ ညီၫြတ္ရမွာလဲ။ ဘယ္လုိရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္နဲ႔ ညီၫြတ္ရမွာလဲ။ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္ဆုိတာ ရွိရမယ္။

“မတရားမႈတခုမွာ သင္ဟာ ၾကားေနတယ္ဆုိရင္… သင္ဟာ ဖိႏွိပ္သူဘက္က လုိက္ဖုိ႔ ေရြးခ်ယ္လုိက္တာနဲ႔ အတူတူဘဲ”

“If you are neutral in a situation of injustice, you have chosen to side with the oppressor.”
ေတာင္အာဖရိကက ႏိုဘယ္လ္ဆုရွင္ ဘုန္းေတာ္ၾကီး ဒက္စ္မြန္တူးတူး

THANK YOU MR. SECRETARY GENERAL

Ban’s visit may not have achieved any visible outcome, but the people of Burma will remember what he promised: "I have come to show the unequivocal shared commitment of the United Nations to the people of Myanmar. I am here today to say: Myanmar – you are not alone."

QUOTES BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL

Without participation of Aung San Suu Kyi, without her being able to campaign freely, and without her NLD party [being able] to establish party offices all throughout the provinces, this [2010] election may not be regarded as credible and legitimate. ­
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon

Where there's political will, there is a way

政治的な意思がある一方、方法がある
စစ္မွန္တဲ့ခိုင္မာတဲ့နိုင္ငံေရးခံယူခ်က္ရိွရင္ႀကိဳးစားမႈရိွရင္ နိုင္ငံေရးအေျဖ
ထြက္ရပ္လမ္းဟာေသခ်ာေပါက္ရိွတယ္
Burmese Translation-Phone Hlaing-fwubc

Wednesday, December 31, 2008

The Best and the Worst of 2008: The World

http://takingnote.tcf.org/2008/12/the-best-and-the-worst-of-2008-the-world.html

by Jeffrey Laurenti
Choosing which developments of the past year may prove of enduring significance, whether as the most positive or negative or some mixture of both, is inevitably subjective, but this observer of the global scene would spotlight the following:

Ten Best

· Bush agrees to Iraq withdrawal. After nearly six years of summoning America to fight till “victory” in Iraq, President George W. Bush capitulated to the demands of the elected regime the United States had brought to Baghdad for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops by 2011. Far from locking in an open-ended U.S. military presence in the Arab heartland as advocates of the invasion had expected, the status of forces agreement became the rallying point for a fractious Iraqi political class—emboldened by an improving security situation—to unite in demanding that the Americans go home.

· Cuba opens the door a crack. The Castro family continued to hold the reins in Havana after an incapacitated Fidel’s resignation, but successor Raúl initiated a series of steps to loosen the straitjacket of his brother’s purist communism: permitting Cubans to buy cell phones and computers; issuing private taxi licenses; opening foreign tourist enclaves to Cubans; allowing farmers to buy land and sell produce directly; even eliminating some salary caps. Though security services continued to jail dissenters, Cuba signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that Fidel had long opposed, prompting the European Union to relax sanctions against Havana and again join this year’s lopsided U.N. majority (185–3) calling for an end to the failed U.S. embargo.




· ICC prosecutor targets Sudan president on Darfur. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), threw the U.N. Security Council into turmoil by demanding from the ICC tribunal an arrest warrant against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, charging him with ordering genocide—Moreno did not shy away from the word—in the guise of “counterinsurgency.” Echoing longstanding arguments made by U.S. opponents of the ICC, Russia and China warned that an indictment would get in the way of a political deal to “solve” the Darfur crisis; human rights defenders, by contrast, saw the execution of arrest warrants as a big step toward a real solution, one founded on justice.

· Iraq accountability gathers steam. Raising hopes among U.S. advocates of the rule of law, the expiring Bush administration found itself under intensifying pressure on multiple fronts regarding widespread alleged illegalities in Iraq and in its treatment of detainees. Federal courts insisted on judicial review of Guantánamo detentions, inspectors-general documented massive waste in the U.S. occupation and willful deception on its failures, the administration’s favored private security force faced indictments for wanton killing of Iraqi civilians and expulsion from the country—and the Senate Armed Services Committee officially traced responsibility for torture directly to top administration officials.

· Literacy campaign produces progress. Halfway through the United Nations’ decade-long global effort to conquer illiteracy—of which U.S. First Lady Laura Bush has been a chief patron and honorary ambassador—the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reported a jump in the global literacy rate from 76 to 84 percent so far this decade. With the largest pools of illiterate adults residing in such high-growth developing economies as Brazil, China, and India, these countries’ redoubled investment in literacy should yield major reductions in the worldwide total of adults disabled by illiteracy, but UNESCO warns that most other developing countries are not on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving every country’s illiteracy rate by 2015.

· Lula’s Brazil eclipses Venezuela as lighthouse for the Latin left. Venezuela’s Bush-bashing president Hugo Chávez—beset by electoral setbacks at home and an abrupt crash in the oil revenues that had fueled his patronage of like-minded leaders abroad—continued to lose traction with Latin America’s resurgent democratic left. Brazil’s Lula da Silva, steadier and respected across the ideological spectrum, cemented his position as leader of the Latin left—deftly able to confront conservative Washington without provoking it, even while admitting communist Cuba into the Latin/Caribbean region’s Rio Group.

· Multiplying mediators move Middle East peace. As President Bush’s Annapolis “peace process” promising an accord between Israelis and Palestinians by the end of 2008 stalled out, other mediators emerged to facilitate negotiations that he could not—with Egypt and Qatar mediating talks between Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza (and between Hamas and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas’s West Bank-based authority), and Turkey as go-between for Israeli and Syrian negotiations. Though embattled prime minister Ehud Olmert outraged his former allies on the Israeli right by confessing that long-held “messianic dreams” of a greater Israel are unattainable and a return to the 1967 borders essential for Israel’s survival, his lame-duck government’s massive assault on Gaza when a fraying truce expired at year’s end left prospects for peace in 2009 problematical.


· Obama election excites worldwide “hope.” The world watched with amazement as American voters defied all expectations to nominate and then elect as president a biracial son of Africa, raised in Muslim Indonesia and pan-Asian Hawaii—symbolically as well as substantively as complete a repudiation as could be imagined of the harsh ideology Americans had accepted with Bush in 2004. The unprecedented 200,000 people who gathered in July to hear the candidate in Berlin evidenced the hopes for change invested in Barack Obama worldwide, as well as a reawakened admiration of America’s ideals, which his post-election commitment to “strengthening international institutions” did not disappoint.

· Polio, eliminated from Somalia, is again in retreat. Despite war and political anarchy, Somalis—supported financially by U.N. agencies, governments, and private funders such as Rotary International—succeeded in 2008 in eliminating polio, which had re-entered the country three years ago from northern Nigeria. With new polio infections worldwide having fallen from 350,000 twenty years ago to 1,308 in 2007, the World Health Organization this year targeted Afghanistan and Pakistan as the next countries to be made polio-free, leaving India and Nigeria as the last redoubts of the disease.

· Wobbly Pakistan returns generals to the barracks. Despite military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s efforts to cling to power through manipulated elections, Pakistan’s voters swept his loyalists out of parliament and handed power to a democratic coalition that forced the general into retirement. But the Islamabad security establishment—long involved with Islamic extremists in fomenting conflict in both Afghanistan and India—continues to resist control by elected civilians, as do restive tribal regions near Afghanistan, and the fate of Pakistan’s restored democracy remains very much in doubt.


Ten Worst

· Afghanistan unravels. Hamid Karzai’s beleaguered government in Kabul proved increasingly ineffectual in providing services to its population, or even security in its supposed strongholds, as Taliban insurgents extended their attacks throughout the country. Few European allies seemed to share the emerging Washington political consensus that more Western troops are needed to turn the tide militarily, and Karzai himself helplessly demanded control over high-casualty U.S. air strikes and invited direct talks with the Taliban’s Mullah Omar on an all-Afghan peace settlement.

· Burma cyclone heightens country’s misery and isolation. Myanmar’s rigid military rulers, whose violent suppression of Buddhist monks’ protests in September 2007 had outraged the West, adamantly rejected nearly all outside assistance when Cyclone Nargis, Asia’s most violent storm in two decades, slammed into the low-lying Irrawaddy delta, killing some 146,000 people. The upland-based military regime’s fierce indifference to survivors’ desperate circumstances seemed especially callous after even China welcomed aid following a deadly earthquake just weeks later, and it triggered calls in some Western circles for military intervention to deliver aid supplies (and presumably topple the regime) under guise of a “responsibility to protect.”

· Climate change negotiations stall. Even as U.N. meteorologists reported another year of rising average temperature and extreme weather, and despite the warning shot of a staggering spike in oil prices, negotiations on a global pact to reverse greenhouse gas emissions failed to make substantive progress, with the Bush administration frozen in continuing denial and newly industrializing countries coy about restricting their fast-growing emissions. With Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi citing the global economic crisis as a reason to block European Union commitments to deep reductions, even the Europeans began backpedaling, approving a climate-change package late in the year that the World Wide Fund for Nature charged would actually lower E.U. carbon emissions just 4 percent—not the promised 20 percent—below 1990 carbon emissions levels.

· Congo war drains lives and resources. Hopes that the U.N.-sponsored election in 2006 would lead to Congo’s peaceful reunification evaporated this year, as president Joseph Kabila’s government suffered demoralizing military reversals at the hands of Rwandan-backed rebel forces in eastern provinces and erosion in its authority elsewhere in the country. The Congo war, while drawing far less international attention than Darfur, continued as the world’s deadliest conflict, producing an estimated 5 million fatalities and tying down the U.N.’s largest peacekeeping operation of 19,000 troops at a cost of $1.2 billion a year.

· India, Pakistan veer toward confrontation. The progress that South Asia’s two nuclear-armed antagonists had seemed to make toward détente, especially after elected civilians regained office in Pakistan, was reversed late in the year after a Pakistan-based extremist group long tied to Islamabad’s secret security services launched a devastating terrorist attack on Mumbai. U.S. officials, anxious to keep Pakistan’s troops in its western provinces to suppress armed elements aiding Afghanistan’s Taliban, worked feverishly to contain the crisis; by explicitly citing Kashmir as part of the regional puzzle, President-elect Obama raised concerns among Indian officials who have long and successfully strived to keep the state’s status off the international agenda.

· Irish block E.U. integration. Ireland’s voters, whose spectacular economic growth has resulted directly from gaining membership in the European Union, in June voted down the Lisbon Treaty, a streamlined version of the draft E.U. constitution that was derailed in 2005. Though Dublin vowed to hold a new referendum in 2009, advocates of the overhaul to free E.U. decision-making from a single member’s veto feared that the continent’s small island outpost may have dashed hopes for a united Europe to become a credible heavyweight on the international stage.

· Russia’s estrangement divides the West. Russia—already irate about Bush administration plans to place antimissile facilities in Poland and expand NATO to include the ex-Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia—made good on its threat to counter Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence by crushing Georgia’s bid to seize control of South Ossetia and recognizing it and Abkhazia as independent. Washington found ready allies among NATO’s ex-communist member states for rushing Kiev and Tbilisi into the Atlantic alliance, but western Europeans lead by Germany, France, and Italy—all determined to prevent a gratuitous new cold war with Moscow—adamantly opposed extending NATO security guarantees to the two seemingly unready and politically divided states.

· Somalia breakdown spawns pirate swarms. Somalia’s bickering “transitional government” was poised to transit out of Mogadishu by year’s end as the Ethiopian troops that the Bush administration had recruited two years earlier to battle Islamist factions proved unable to control their resurgence. Unchecked by any government authority, Somali seafarers revived the ancient practice of piracy, hijacking freighters for ransom and imperiling shipping through the Red Sea; and the U.N. Security Council’s call for naval forces to suppress the pirates afforded China’s modernizing navy the chance to make its international debut.

· U.S. leads world economy over the brink. The free-market “pirates” who had hijacked the U.S. political-financial complex and infected financial institutions worldwide with their unregulated toxic securities sought government rescue as their house of cards collapsed, dragging one pillar of the U.S. economy after another into the black hole of a global financial meltdown. Spurning the Washington orthodoxy imposed on other troubled economies in recent decades, American authorities spent freely on serial bailouts hoping to free up credit, prop up demand, and avert a second Great Depression—leaving America’s yawning financial and trade imbalances with East Asia (and consequent power realignments) to the incoming Obama administration to sort out.

· Vise tightens on Zimbabwe. The desperate economic conditions caused by the aging Robert Mugabe’s implacable land expropriations led to his defeat in the first round of Zimbabwe’s presidential election, but he clung to power through a wave of terror unleashed by loyalist goons. While a number of African countries finally broke with the one-time liberation hero, South Africa led a Security Council bloc that rebuffed Western eagerness to intervene—but South Africa’s own much touted “quiet diplomacy” proved utterly incapable of persuading Mugabe to share power with the elected opposition, as by year’s end a cholera epidemic delivered nature’s own harsh verdict on his sclerotic regime.


Posted by Jeffrey Laurenti on December 30, 2008 in International Affairs | Permalink | Email this post

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Change we can believe in? 2008 showed the world needs it

http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/editorial/change-we-can-believe-in-2008-showed-the-world-needs-it-20081230-77c9.html?page=-1

December 31, 2008
AROUND the world, 2008 challenged preconceptions and overturned complacent assumptions. It is a year in which an "unsinkable" global economy steamed into the iceberg of the US financial crisis. The resulting crises dramatically altered the political calculus, at national and global levels. At the same time as the financial crisis demonstrated the worldwide impact of US policy, it helped ensure the remarkable election of America's first black president, Barack Obama.

By the time of the US election, it was clear the status quo was no longer tenable — whether the issue be financial regulation, economic development and trade, energy policy and climate change or global security and diplomacy. The US has a central role to play in almost every one of these global challenges. No wonder the eyes of the world are on the US President-elect to see what change he delivers once he assumes office on January 20.

Eight years of the Bush Doctrine has laid bare the intellectual poverty of the "with us or against us" mentality of the "war on terror". Squandering the sympathy aroused on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration alienated even once friendly nations with its scorn for multilateral diplomacy and international laws and conventions.

It is easier to avoid a mess in the first place than to clean it up later. The closure of Guantanamo Bay is emblematic of the difficulties confronting Mr Obama, but may be among the least of them. Six years into the disastrous folly of the Iraq war, George Bush is the last of the leaders of the so-called coalition of the willing still in office. Mr Obama is committed to withdrawing US troops from Iraq, but the seven-year conflict in Afghanistan is now sucking in the depleted stocks of the US and its allies.The Obama administration will need to harness global diplomacy and political progress in Afghanistan in tandem with military muscle, the limitations of which are now obvious.



The US and Europe will also have to repair relations with Russia after the war in Georgia. Even though the Kremlin might have been chastened by the collapse of oil revenue and foreign investment, any eastward expansion of NATO and missile defences will be seen as provocative — and Europe's energy dependence on Russia is open to exploitation.

The world will again look to the US to give the lead in tackling a long list of festering conflicts, failed states and the humanitarian disasters that inevitably accompany these. The people of Sudan's Darfur region, Congo, Burma, Somalia and Zimbabwe, among others, are dying as they wait for the world to go beyond diplomatic platitudes. One of the Bush Administration's undeniable achievements was a multibillion-dollar increase in AIDS relief for Africa, but rich nations as a whole have not lived up to their Millennium Development Goal promises to end hunger and disease. Mr Obama's appointment of UN ambassador Susan Rice, an advocate of "dramatic intervention" to stop crimes against humanity, could be seen as a signal of intent to bolster, rather than undermine, the UN.

Every conflict represents ongoing political failure. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Middle East, where generations of Israelis and Palestinians have been trapped in a conflict that defies resolution by military means. In the absence of meaningful political dialogue to halt the rockets that threaten its civilians, Israel has resorted to a military assault on Hamas strongholds in Gaza, with disproportionate casualties among Palestinian civilians. Never has the need for the US and other global powers to twist arms to secure a settlement been clearer; rarely have the prospects for peace seemed dimmer. The Obama administration should aim to reclaim the mantle of honest broker, prepared to speak home truths about the concessions needed to achieve a just and secure future for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Outcast nations such as Syria must be induced to be part of the solution.

Concerted diplomatic efforts are also needed to defuse the nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea and to put nuclear rivals India and Pakistan back on the path of rapprochement after the terrorist atrocities in Mumbai. If there is a silver lining to the clouds of global recession, it is that old enemies China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan have already begun improving relations in their desire to co-ordinate their responses. It remains to be seen how China's leaders manage the domestic fallout.

Long after economic hard times are past, the uncertainties of climate change will still confront every nation. A post-Kyoto agreement is due to be struck at a UN summit late next year. In contrast to his obstructionist predecessor, who ensured the US is now the lone dissenter from Kyoto, Mr Obama has talked the talk on climate change. Now he must lead global action. If 2008 was the year the world held its breath to see if the US would elect a leader capable of re-engaging with other nations and global institutions, 2009 will establish the worth of the change that Mr Obama and other leaders are now promising.



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Burma’s Bleak Prospect in 2009-IRRAWADDY

http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=14860

NEWS ANALYSIS
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By WAI MOE Tuesday, December 30, 2008


All parties in Burma can expect 2009 to be a busier year than the one now ending as the country heads for a general election in 2010, with uncertainty and many more challenges to be faced.

The election will be the fifth stage of the seven-step “road map” to a system of “disciplined democracy” unveiled by the ruling generals in August 2003.


The year 2009 will be consequently quite exciting. The military junta, their cronies and proxy parties will be preparing for victory, applying various strategies to achieve that result.

According to the state-run media, Burmese government ministers and leading members of the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association have been making field trips to rural areas, meeting with local people. These trips were seen as part of the preparations for the coming election.

However, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) said in a forecast for Burma that the military junta would face serious challenges ahead of the 2010 election, despite maintaining its firm grip on power in the next two years.

The EIU said the political scene in Burma would be volatile as the public held the military in intense abhorrence because of its handling of the Cyclone Nargis disaster and the military’s brutal suppression of the September 2007 demonstrations.


Diplomats at the UN also hope that democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi will be released from house-arrest in 2009. There are rumors that she could be freed as early as January, perhaps as a strategy to appease western governments and critics before confining her again in her home.

The EIU, however, doesn’t share those hopes or believe the rumors. It said in its December report: “There is little prospect that Aung San Suu Kyi will be released from house-arrest ahead of the election.”

In September 2008, the junta released Suu Kyi’s former associate, the veteran journalist Win Tin, after 18 years’ imprisonment.

After his release, Win Tin attempted to reorganize Suu Ky’s National League for Democracy (NLD). The party re-launched its regular weekly meetings of the Central Executive Committee – since 2003 these meetings had been held randomly.

He also held a regular roundtable called “Youth and the Future” at the party’s headquarters. Suu Kyi had previously participated in the discussions.

Win Tin also visited family members of political prisoners to offer moral support. This initiative, called the “White Campaign,” was previously carried out by the 88 Generation Students group led by prominent pro- democracy activist Min Ko Naing and former student leaders, most of whom are now in jail.

It is expected that the NLD will become more dynamic in 2009, and some party members expect reforms that will replace ageing leaders with younger people.

So far, however, the NLD has kept quiet about the election. It did call in September, though, for a review by the regime of the military-sponsored constitution.

Predicting Burma’s future is not easy, although the EIU said in its report: “Nevertheless, it is still unlikely that any attempt to overthrow the military would succeed, as the armed forces can be expected to remain vigilant and will crack down hard on any signs of gathering protest.”

It added that internal conflict is the most likely obstacle to smooth progress by the military in implementing its plans.

The health of junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe is a factor in the election run-up, the EIU suggests.

By making two trips within as many recent weeks to the cyclone-devastated Irrawaddy delta, Than Shwe has shown the world, however, that he’s in good health and that he remains firmly in control. Burma’s future thus remains as bleak as ever.




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Breaking News: 9 NLD members being arrested while marching -BDD

http://burmadd.blogspot.com/

BDD

9 NLD members have been arrested by SPDC police and civilian coat intelligence units before Hlut Taw (Parliament) building on Prome Road in the afternoon today. 9 NLD members and group have marched for Free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi peaceful demonstration, report said.

NLD members led by Ma Htet Htet Oo Way, Tun Tun Win, Ye Ni, Win Myint, Kung Htet Hlaing, That Maung Htun, Pyi Pyi, Min Thein and Aung Pyo Wai were taken to the unknown place, report said. They were beaten while they were being detained.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be freed on 4 of January 2009, Independence Day, rumored floating in Rangoon. However, regime could detain her until May 2009 that regime declared its' right to detain her according to the law.

Posted by BURMA DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT at 12/30/2008 04:37:00 PM


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Life-skills training helps young people to prevent HIV in Myanmar

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/myanmar_46969.html

By Sandar Linn

KYAING TONG, Myanmar, 29 December 2008 – In the village of Wan Ku Thit, a remote Ah Khar ethnic group enclave in Kyaing Tong Township, eastern Shan State, very few people are aware of the risk of HIV and how to prevent AIDS.

El May Ja, 19, is one of many in her village who, until recently, did not have a lot of prior knowledge about HIV.

“My family, my friends, my neighbours and even the head of our village don't know these things,” she said. “Although we have heard about HIV/AIDS, because there are some people in other villages who went to work in border areas and came back as they got infected with HIV, we have not received any in-depth information about it.”

Learning life skills

At a recent UNICEF-supported life-skills training programme, about 30 young people aged 15 to 24 learned about HIV and AIDS.


“Today is the second day of our training,” explained El May Ja. “Now we know exactly how the virus is transmitted, how we can protect ourselves.... We are going to learn more about life skills in the next three days, and I’m so excited about that.”

Life skills are abilities for adaptive and positive behaviour that enable individuals to deal effectively with the demands and challenges of everyday life. Among the lessons that were taught so far, El May Ja cited the topic ‘Value Myself’ as her favourite.

“The tradition and culture is already in place for girls to value themselves, and one of the major facts is to abstain from having sexual relations until one gets married. But the knowledge from this training adds more value to this,” she said.

Peer groups teach prevention

For effective HIV prevention, skills such as critical thinking, decision-making, problem-solving and communication are essential to help young people adopt safer behaviours. Ten core skills, including empathy, are embedded in the health-related topics so that after training, the participants are able to show more supportive attitudes toward people living with HIV.

Following the life-skills training, participants are encouraged to share their newly gained knowledge with their peer groups so that it benefits the wider community.

“We discuss these things outside training,” El May Ja said, standing with a group of her friends. “We also talk about HIV and life-skills lessons that we have learnt so far with our friends from other villages, where they don't get this information. We enjoy learning life skills because it is important in our daily lives to know what is harmful to us.”



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UN’s ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ Won’t Work in Burma -IRRAWADDY

http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=14853

EDITORIAL

Monday, December 29, 2008

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This year we saw many twist and turns and ups and downs in Burma—but the tragedy of Burma seems to have no end in sight.

Early this year, the regime surprised the world by announcing that it would go ahead with a constitutional referendum implementing part of its seven point road map to prolong military rule. UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari accepted the proposal, while pushing for an independent monitoring body—but without considering the opposition parties’ stand, let alone the opinion of most people of Burma, who want to see regime change.

Political issues were swept away by the deadly cyclone that slammed into lower Burma in May, killing more than 100,000 people and making millions homeless.

The international community responded to the disaster with sympathy and offers of material aid. The US, Britain and France sent warships to the area, loaded with food, medicines and other supplies. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon toured the cyclone-flattened region and met leaders of the military government, urging them to allow more aid into Burma.



Not surprisingly, the junta opened the door slightly to aid agencies after dragging its heels on the dispatch of emergency relief to the cyclone victims.

At the same time, the regime went ahead with its sham referendum, claiming 92 percent approval for its proposed constitution.

Then, to the surprise of many, the regime launched its “shock and awe” strategy, handing out heavy prison sentences to prominent opposition leaders and humanitarian workers and sending them separately to remote prisons.

Now it is shocking to learn that Gambari has suggested that governments should offer Burma financial incentives to free its political prisoners, estimated to number more than 2,000—including Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi—and to initiate democratic change.

The Nigerian diplomat must be insane to think that the corrupt generals who terrorized the whole nation can be bribed into compromise.

The influential Washington Post has reported: “In the months ahead, the UN leadership will press the Obama administration to relax US policy on Burma and to open the door to a return of international financial institutions, including the World Bank.”

Several years ago, when the World Bank offered the Burmese regime US $1 billion in return for political reform, it was told, in effect: “Don’t give us bananas, we are not monkeys.”

Minutes of a meeting between Gambari and a UN Burma team led by Ambassador Kyaw Tint Swe—obtained by The Irrawaddy—seem to suggest that Gambari, a citizen of one of Africa’s failed states, is giving advice to some officials from a failed state of Southeast Asia.

The Irrawaddy reported that Gambari had told the Burmese team that if there was progress towards reconciliation in Burma before the new administration took office, Washington might modify its Burma policy.

The Washington Post, in its report, quoted the Nigerian diplomat as saying: “It cannot be business as usual. We need new thinking on how to engage with Myanmar [Burma] in a way that will bring tangible results.”

The UN, he said, cannot rely simply on “the power of persuasion with too little in the [diplomatic] toolbox.”

Gambari appears to be suffering from the “Stockholm syndrome”—held captive by the deceptions of the Burmese regime, he is in danger of succumbing to them. If he thinks that the UN and the international community can bribe the regime to free political prisoners and Suu Kyi, his understanding of Burma is indeed questionable. It clearly shows that the UN envoy is out of juice.

More dangerously, Gambari—snubbed by the regime and opposition leaders alike—appears to be deluded.

It cannot be business as usual to allow the UN and Gambari to work as normal on Burma. The UN’s engagement with the regime must be strictly monitored to ensure that it is transparent and accountable.

The Burmese generals must be laughing at Gambari and his proposal. The country’s political prisoners, however, have nothing to laugh about. They will be asking whether a more effective and better informed UN special envoy cannot be appointed.

Persuasion and bribes won’t move the captors of more than 2,000 innocent people.

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India’s double standards

http://musliminsuffer.wordpress.com/2008/12/29/indias-double-standards/

While India blames Pakistan for inaction after Mumbai’s terror attacks, it turns a blind eye to a dangerous terror organisation


Kapil Komireddi
guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 December 2008 13.00 GMT
Article history

“There should be no double standards in the global fight against terrorism,” the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh declared last week. The message was intended for Pakistan, but if Dr Singh is concerned about double standards, he should look closer to home.

Earlier this month Sri Lanka’s state-run Sunday Observer published an interview with the country’s army chief, Sarath Fonseka, who, while expressing solidarity with India after the Mumbai attacks, severely criticised some Indian politicians for supporting the LTTE. Fonseka had particularly harsh words for the powerful Tamil Nadu politicians Vaiko Gopalsamy and P Nedumaran, calling them “jokers” and accusing them of being venal mouthpieces of the LTTE. He wondered why these men would support an organisation that had assassinated an Indian prime minister, and warned that they were a threat to India’s own integrity.

Within hours of the interview’s publication, Tamil Nadu’s political establishment united in condemnation of General Fonseka. In a letter to the Indian prime minister, Vaiko demanded that New Delhi seek an apology from the president of Sri Lanka. “In a democracy,” he wrote, “army generals do not criticise leaders of a foreign country.” Sensing trouble, Sri Lanka’s president issued a statement “regretting” General Fonseka’s remarks, and last week the Sunday Observer’s editor Dinesh Weerawansa was summarily sacked. But all of this, far from diminishing General Fonseka’s claims, only casts light on India’s own irresponsible role in the vortex of terror that threatens to consume Sri Lanka.

The LTTE could not have grown without the support of successive state governments of Tamil Nadu in India. Founded in 1972, the LTTE was among the many groups formed to resist the majoritarian constitution of Sri Lanka which imposed Sinhala as the “sole official language” upon the country. Tamil Tigers used Chennai as a safe haven, and their activities, as the Indian historian Ramachandra Guha wrote, “were actively helped by the state government, with New Delhi turning an indulgent blind eye”. The 1987 pact signed by Rajiv Gandhi and JR Jayawardene put a temporary halt to this, and India agreed to send peacekeeping forces to Sri Lanka to help Colombo disarm the LTTE, an adventure so disastrous that one Indian journalist at the time called it “India’s Vietnam”. The Tamil Tigers retaliated by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi.



The LTTE is arguably the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisation. It is the only terrorist outfit to have successfully carried out assassinations of two heads of government. Its international cadres regularly extort money from Tamils in Canada and Australia and even Britain. By imposing the “one family, one fighter” rule, it has enslaved the very people whose liberation it claims to fight for. It has its own air force (Air Tigers), its own navy (Sea Tigers), an elite fighting unit (the Charles Anthony Regiment) and a dedicated suicide squad (Black Tigers). The Tamil Tigers make al-Qaeda look amateurish. But because the LTTE’s victims are not western, it does not elicit the same kind of response that Islamist terror groups do.

India banned the LTTE in 1992, but a report released by Jane’s Information Group last year identified Tamil Nadu as the principal source of LTTE’s weapons; and Fonseka was not exaggerating when he said that the Indian politicians who support the LTTE are a threat to India’s own integrity—much as the men who supported the Mumbai attackers are a threat to Pakistan’s. Vaiko, the LTTE’s fiercest Indian supporter, was recently arrested for suggesting that India’s unity would be jeopardised if it supported the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers.

New Delhi did not intervene on behalf of Tibetan protesters—even though their leader, the Dalai Lama, was described by the Indian prime minister as the “personification of non-violence” — and it was conspicuous in its silence over the protests in Burma. It has accepted that Tibet is an integral part of China, and it has struck lucrative petroleum deals with the Burmese Junta—even though protesters in both nations have relied mostly on non-violent means to make their voices heard.

But it has consistently meddled in Sri Lankan affairs, stymieing Colombo’s efforts against an adversary that has used almost exclusively violent means to achieve its ends. Much of this is no doubt a consequence of coalition politics: the government in New Delhi has to do certain things to keep its allies happy. But New Delhi dismisses Pakistan’s messy internal problems as an excuse which Islamabad invokes to justify its inaction against Islamist terrorists based on its soil. How can it use the same excuse to carry on its do-nothing policy against Tamil terrorists based on its soil? After the Mumbai attacks Singh stated in emphatic terms that there can be no negotiations with terrorists; then, kowtowing to pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians, he agreed to send his Foreign Minister to Colombo to push the Sri Lankan government to do exactly that. If this does not amount to double standards, what does?

source: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/28/india-mumbai-terror-attacks

===
-muslim voice-


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Why did Burma's leaders build a new capital in Naypyidaw?

http://thailandtonight.blogspot.com/2008/12/why-did-burmas-leaders-build-new.html

On Naypyidaw
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore


Asia Research Institute
Working Paper Series No. 79
The Road to Naypyidaw:
Making Sense of the Myanmar Government's
Decision to Move its Capital
_________________________________________

Maung Aung Myoe
Asia Research Institute
National University of Singapore
arimam@nus.edu.sg
November 2006
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

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ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore


The Road to Naypyidaw:
Making Sense of the Myanmar Government's Decision to Move its Capital
Maung Aung Myoe
Many people are curious about the rationale behind the Myanmar government's decision to
move its capital from Yangon to a new location in central Myanmar, now known as
Naypyidaw. It was first announced at a press conference held on 7 November 2005 by
Brigadier General Kyaw San, the Minister for Information, that government departments
would move to the new "administrative capital". In fact, the order to move had been issued to
all government departments a day earlier. In the official explanation, the relocation of
government departments to a new location near Pyinmana, about 240 miles north of Yangon,
was "to ensure more effective administration of nation-building activities." The minister
further explained: "With the expansion of the government's national development activities to
border regions and remote villages, it was necessary to move the government's administration
to a location which is more centrally located and placed strategically on major transportation
networks."1


Initially, the government did not disclose the name of the new administrative capital and
insisted that Yangon remained the national capital. Meanwhile, in accordance with one of
104 basic principles laid down at the on-going National Convention, Yangon would continue
to be the capital of Myanmar. However, in less than a month, at another press conference
held on 3 December 2005, Major General Khin Aung Myint, Director of Public Relations of
the Tatmadaw [Armed Forces], confirmed that a new military regional command named
"Naypyidaw Command" had been established at the new administrative capital.2 Only then
did people realize that the new administrative capital was named "Naypyidaw". On the same
occasion, the government press committee told the media that the capital of the nation would
continue to be in accordance with the new Constitution. Three months later, on 27 February
2006, the Myanmar government issued Order No. (3/2006) that appointed Colonel Thein
Nyunt, Minister for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs,
1 Myanmar Times (English), Vol. 15, No. 292 (14 November 2005)
2 Khit Myanmar, Vol. 3, No.12 (16 December 2005); Yangon Times, Vol. 1, No. 10 (8 December 2005)
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

concurrently as the Mayor of Naypyidaw.3 Naypyidaw was territorially organized upon three
townships under Pyinmana District: Pyinmana, Lewe, and Alar. Alar Airport, which had been
out of service for decades, was renovated and upgraded to become Naypyidaw Airport. Then
on 12 July 2006, for the first time, General Thura Shwe Mann stated that "Naypyidaw will
become the nation's capital in accordance with the new Constitution to be adopted."4 Now it
became clear that Naypyidaw would be the future capital of Myanmar; it was no longer
merely the administrative capital. Why Naypyidaw? Since Naypyidaw was the term used in
pre-colonial Myanmar to denote the royal capital or the palace site, it became clear that the
government wanted its new capital to be the "Royal Capital".
Map of Myanmar Showing the Location of Naypyidaw
Naypyidaw g
3 Myanmar Gazette, No. 10, 10 March 2006, Vol. 59, p. 1
4 Myanma Alin (13 July 2006)
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore


WHY DID THE MYANMAR GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO MOVE ITS CAPITAL?
THERE ARE SIX POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS.
(1) Information Security
The government, especially the Ministry of Defence, is aware of serious breaches of security
and leaking of information from various government departments. The military is particularly
concerned with the leak of military secrets or confidential information. That partly explains
why the Tatmadaw renamed its intelligence apparatus “Military Affairs Security”. Being in
Yangon, in the view of the Tatmadaw, the military establishment is practically under the
surveillance of "unfriendly forces", who could be in collaboration with "foreign agents". The
Tatmadaw even suspected that some diplomatic missions in Myanmar might be bugging its
communication links. Since employees of the ministries, especially the Ministry of Defence,
are living among the population in wards, they perceive a huge problem of leaking state
secrets and confidential information. Relocating government staff to a remote and isolated
location or into a cantonment could address this problem. Satellite communication also poses
another problem for information security since all hand-phone conversations could be
intercepted and eavesdropped upon. At the present, Myanmar is using the Thai Shin Satellite
for its wireless communication; and this provides ample opportunity for the Thai intelligence
community to eavesdrop at the gateway. Although the government could easily install mobile
communication facilities at Naypyidaw, it is not doing so for the sake of information security.
Only fiber-optic cable lines are allowed to be used for communication.
Concern for information security was also apparent in the way the military government
announced its decision to move its administrative capital. Although the news about moving
the Ministry of Defence [War Office], or a portion of it as an alternative command, had been
floating around in the country for about three to four years, nobody actually thought that the
capital would be moved. 5 Until the last moment, just before the announcement to move the
offices, ministries had only vaguely known about it. Many thought that only liaison teams for
the Ministry of Defence from various ministries would go there on a rotation basis. When it
was announced, most of the people were caught by surprise. Some ASEAN countries openly
5 In fact, there was a rumor about the separation of command between upper and lower Myanmar and the
possible appointment of General Thura Shwe Mann as the army commander in Upper Myanmar.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

expressed their disappointment with the Myanmar government's decision for not consulting
with them; from the point of view of the present Myanmar leadership, it was a domestic affair
and consultation with any other country was not necessary. Now, in Naypyidaw, the military
leadership enjoys information security.
(2) Military-Strategic Factor
The decision could be motivated by a worst case scenario generated by the siege mentality
among the senior Tatmadaw leadership. The same rationale lay behind the Tatmadaw's
decision in early 2002 to move the Western Command HQ from Sittwe, a city on the Rakhine
coast, to Ann, an inward location. Yangon is too close to the coastline and is certainly
vulnerable to amphibious warfare. Although the Tatmadaw leadership realizes that a U.S.-led
invasion of Myanmar is rather remote in terms of likelihood, considering the fact that the U.S.
is occupied with the Middle East problem and its armed forces are bogged down in both
Afghanistan and Iraqi theatres, in addition to other more pressing situations such as North
Korea and Iran, it never underestimates this possibility nor gambles on the fate of the nation.
The military leadership has not forgotten that the U.S Navy [an aircraft carrier and four
warships] violated Myanmar territorial waters in September 1988 during the political chaos in
Myanmar. The military government is more concerned with a proxy war supported by the
U.S.. Thus the military government would not take anything lightly that could compromise or
endanger national security, which is always conflated with state security and regime security
in Myanmar security perspectives.
By looking at the articles in various publications by the Tatmadaw, one can glean that the
military leadership understands the modern war-fighting method of effect-based operations
and airpower in parallel attacks or inside-out attacks; but what it wants is more time to
prepare for resistance. In the age of asymmetric warfare, also known as 4th Generation War
(4GW), for the military leadership, the fundamental principle is what Mao Zedong called
"you fight your kind of war and I will fight mine [你 打你 的，我 打 我 的 -- ni da ni de, wo
da wo de]." Senior military commanders are also familiar with the concept of "Unrestricted
Warfare" put forward by the People's Liberation Army of China. By moving the seat of the
government and military high command to about 240 miles north of the coast, the military
could buy more time for its defence against both air and ground attacks; thus it could provide
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

a defense-in-depth. From the Tatmadaw's point of view, it is the trading of space for time.
Being located in the vicinity of mountains and jungles in a spot that sits on major
communication links between upper and lower Myanmar, the Tatmadaw could mount
considerable resistance against an invasion force using a military strategy of protracted
people's guerrilla warfare of attrition. The Tatmadaw's training regime continues to
emphasize principles of guerrilla warfare, such as "if the enemy advances, we withdraw; if
the enemy rests, we harass; if the enemy tires, we attack; and if the enemy withdraws, we
pursue” [敵進我退，敵駐我擾，敵疲我打，敵退我追” -- Di jin wo tui; Di jiu wo rao; Di
pi wo da; Di tui wo jui]. In this context, the surrounding areas of Naypyidaw could be
considered as the heartland or base area where enemy should be "lured deep for annihilation".
A major drawback of the new location of the military high command is that it has become a
solely military target with almost no likelihood of collateral damage.

(3) Gaining a Sense of Control


The location of Naypyidaw is very close to the intersection of major highways linking India to
Thailand and China to Bangladesh.
Besides, it commands the major road links between
Upper and Lower Myanmar, on both sides of the Bago mountain range, and it controls both
the Ayerwaddy and Sitaung rivers; therefore, it is at the tip of the chokepoint. The centrality
of the location also serves the purpose of radiating state authority into the periphery,
particularly into the areas populated by non-Bamar ethnic nationalities. As the new capital is
physically closer to the Kachin, Kayah, Shan, and Kayin states, it could become
psychologically closer to these nationalities. In the official explanation, the new location "is
centrally located and has quick access to all parts of the country." 6 Moreover, it is much
better and more cost-effective to build a new city rather than renovate the old city of Yangon,
if there is proper urban planning. Yangon city is plagued with traffic congestion and drainage
problems. After all, capital cities nowadays are not necessarily on the sea coast. 7
6 "Seeing Stars over Myanmar's Capital shift, The Straits Times (12 November 2005), p. 26.
7 Canberra (Australia), Islamabad (Pakistan), New Delhi (India), and Beijing (China) are all inland.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

(4) Decolonization
In 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government decided to
change the English names of the country and capital from Burma to Myanmar and Rangoon
to Yangon; restoring the original names or their pronunciation in the Myanmar language.
Further, Bassein became Pathein and Tavoy became Dawei. Arakan State and Irrawaddy
Division are now written as Rakhine State and Ayeyarwady Division while the Salween River
has become known as the Thanlwin River. Maymyo [named after Colonel May] was renamed
Pyin Oo Lwin. Moreover, names of streets, blocks, avenues and islands named after British
colonial authorities, English names or the names of those considered as traitors who
collaborated with the British were replaced by the names of prominent figures in Myanmar
history or in the anti-colonial struggle. In this process, nearly 200 places were renamed. Thus,
Windsor Road became Shin Saw Pu Road, Dufferin Road became Sandaku Road, Maung
Htaw Lay Street became Bo Sun Pat Street and Maung Khine Street became Bo Ywe Street.
In the same light, as Rangoon [Yangon] was made the capital of Colonial Burma by the
British after the occupation of Mandalay and the deposition of the last Myanmar King, it
could be considered a symbol of humiliation for the Myanmar people. Perhaps, in the view of
the present leadership, the capital of Myanmar should not be a symbol of humiliation.
Therefore, in the process of decolonization, a new capital should be established.
(5) Isolating Civil Servants From The Larger Population Centre
In the 1988 uprising civil servants, including some troops, particularly from the navy and air
force, were involved in anti-government demonstrations, and in the view of the present
leadership this was mostly due to their residence in the wards, rather than the cantonment or
in government quarters. This situation resulted in the government machinery being
completely paralyzed during the 1988 uprising. Therefore, in this context, keeping key civil
servants and military personnel away from population centres could create a better space for
managing state affairs in any contingency.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

Map Showing the Locations of Ministries at Naypyidaw
(6) Traditional Myanmar World View
Although some may be quizzical about this explanation, one cannot dismiss outright the role
of fortune-tellers or soothsayers in the decision. Father Sangermano once unsympathetically
described Myanmar as a nation so given to superstition that not only do people practise
judicial astrology, and divination, and put faith in dreams, but also they have an infinity of
foolish and superstitious customs. 8 After all, as Rudyard Kipling claimed: "This is Burma,
and it will be quite unlike any land you know about." No one could deny the fact that the
occult and superstition play a role in a traditional society like Myanmar. People in Myanmar
have grown accustomed to the very notion that there is a parallel between the Macrocosm and
the Microcosm, and between the universe and the world of men, and humanity is constantly
influenced by forces emanating from the movements of stars and planets. 9 Besides, it is
believed that other supernatural forces also influence human life. Therefore, consultation with
prognosticators, such as astrologers, palm-readers, and even clairvoyants, is quite common in
Myanmar society.
8 Father Sangermano, A Description of the Burmese Empire (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1969), p. 141
9 Robert Heine-Geldern, Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia, p. 1.
MINISTRIES
RESIDENCE
DEFENCE
AIRPORT
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

In the traditional Myanmar pattern of authority, it is believed that a person can rise to
prominence through the combination of three factors: Phon (glory), Hnalone (wisdom) and
Letyone (physical prowess). The combination of these three elements will produce one with
Azwa (influence) and Ahna (power or authority). Perhaps the most important concept in the
traditional idea of power and authority is Phon, without which one cannot become a leader.
In traditional Myanmar belief, Phon is conceptually linked to Kamma, which is a result of
one's Kutho (merits) in the previous life and present existence. The accumulation of more
merit can lead to more Phon; thus, patronizing religious order [Sangha] is important, with
actions such as building pagodas and monasteries and performing good deeds for both monks
and laymen. In this context, "although Phon is intrinsic to the inner force of an individual,
there are ways to tap external forces to sustain and reinforce one's Phon, and one way of
enhancing one's Phon is by performing rituals such as coronations and acquiring objects of
magical potency such as Buddha images, relics, white elephants, amulets, and other
objects."10 Also because of the Phon of the king, these objects, such as a white elephant,
could come into his possession. Therefore, the possession of white elephants was greatly
desirable in the pre-colonial Myanmar polity as it indicated the possession of great Phon, by
extension a symbol of a Cakkavattin [world conqueror].
When one relies heavily on Phon alone [because of weakness in Hnalone and Letyone], then
the enhancing of Phon becomes more important. Although one's Phon cannot be easily
contested, when Phon becomes weak one cannot escape from a downturn in life and that
person will face a challenge from aspirants with superior Kamma. Thus, enhancing Phon is
important, and it can be done through accumulating merit and performing rituals. Acquiring
magical potency, through Letphwe [amulets], Gartar [incantations], Mantan [mantras],
Piyasae [philters] and Inn [cabalistic diagrams], helps protect oneself or cushion, if not
enhance, one's own Kamma. Besides, Myanmar people look for omens and prophetic sayings
in order to avoid misfortune and to decide whether to take or not to take a particular action.
Several different practices come under these two broad categories. 11
10 Myo Myint, Pattern of Authorities in Pre-Colonial Myanmar, unpublished paper, p. 14.
11 For detail, see Maung Than Swe (Dewai), "Myanmar Doei Lawki Pyinnya [Myanmar Occults]", Atwe Amyin,
Issue 178, July 2006, pp. 162-167; Saw Lu, "Tabaung Shepye Laelarchet [Preliminary Survey of Prophetic
Saying]", Ngwe Taryi Magazine, Issue 429, April 1996, pp. 26-35.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore


Where there is a bad omen or prophecy,


in addition to the above-mentioned practices, one
can avoid misfortune by performing a Yadaya. The noun “Yadaya” is defined in the
Myanmar-English Dictionary as "something done in keeping with an astrologer's advice to
avert impending misfortune or to realize what one wishes. 12 The verb form "Yadaya-che"
means to follow an astrologer's advice on what one must do to avert an impending event or to
achieve what one desires. 13 In the "Myanma Min Okchokpon Sadan" (Treatise on the
Administration of the Myanmar King), U Maung Maung Tin described Yadaya in the
following terms: "Treatises of Yadaya were based on the belief that whatever circumstances
arose could be managed by performing a certain act or ritual so that one can either avert
misfortunes or fulfil desires. Our renowned scholars used to claim that this practice began
with Ari monks in the Bagan period."14 Nevertheless, Yadaya is very commonly practised in
present-day Myanmar. 15 In this context, there are some people who think the moving of the
capital is performing a particular Yadaya; it is difficult to substantiate, but the possibility is
there. The shape of the ministry buildings, which look just like scorpions, however, is
interesting to note. According to some believers, it is a Yadaya in the form of Katkin
[preventive measure to ward off any impending ill fate].16
12 Department of Myanmar Language Commission, Myanmar-English Dictionary, sixth printing (Yangon:
DMLC, 2001), p. 382.
13 ibid.
14 U Maung Maung Tin, Myanma Min Okchokpon Sadan" [Royal Administration of Myanmar], Vol. 4 (Yangon:
Baho Press, 1971), p. 197.
15 One recent example, according to some rumours or hearsay, is the building of a pagoda in a city with two
Wednesday letters of the Myanmar alphabet as a Yadaya; thus, a pagoda was built in Lashio as both "La" and
"Ya" in the name of the city are Wednesday letters. Consequently, a hillock in Lashio was named "Vijaya-
Bumi Maha-Aungmye Mingalar Kone-daw" (literally Victory-land, Great Victory-land, and Auspicious Hill)
and the pagoda named "Yan-Taing-Aung" [Victory in Every Strife] was built.
16 There were scorpion statues at the Aungzeya Hillock in Maesai, Thailand, which is just across the Myanmar
town of Tachilake. According to the oral history, these statues were built by the Myanmar King Alaungpaya,
also known as U Aungzeya, during his Yodaya [Ayutthaya] campaign in the 1750s. The Thai called their
capital "Ayutthaya" which meant "the city that could not be conquered by the fighting or war". But to reverse
it, Myanmar called it "Yutthaya" so that "the city that could be conquered by the fighting or war", and it
eventually became "Yodaya". In the same fashion, King Alaungpaya built scorpion statues and issued a curse
that the Thai could never conquer Myanmar. [Naung (Correspondent), "Consequences of Turning the
Scorpion in Thailand towards Myanmar", Natkhetta Yaungchi (No. 179, June 2001), pp. 9-12.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore


In Southeast Asian history, rulers have often moved their capitals


or seats of government to make symbolic statements at the start of new dynasties and to propitiate spirits. Myanmar
history is full of examples of kings building new royal capitals, especially at the start of a
new dynasty.
How did Myanmar kings build their new royal capitals in pre-colonial days? Myanmar
chronicles provide examples of the significance of Tabaung in building new royal capitals in
Myanmar. Tabaung, which offers prophecies in the form of verses in rhyme, was one of the
most common forms of prophecy in Myanmar.17 According to the Myanmar chronicles, King
Thihathu (1309-1322) built his royal capital at Pinya because he heard a Tabaung that
discouraged him building the capital at Myinsaing and recommended a move to the south
without delay. Likewise, King Thado Minpya (1364-1368) built a new royal capital at Innwa
after hearing Tabaungs that preferred Innwa over Sagaing.18 Similarly, King Mindon (1852-
1878) also built Yadanabon (Mandalay) after hearing Tabaung.19 There is no clear evidence
to support the theory that the recent moving of the capital to Naypyidaw was in accordance
17 Even in the early Second World War period, in 1941, Aung San named Colonel Suzuki, the leader of the
Japanese Army's secret organization known as Minamikikan, as Bo Mogyo [Thunderbolt] in line with a
Tabaung that was popular in late 1930s, which said that thunderbolt would strike the Htiyoe [umbrella stem],
an implicit reference to the British in Myanmar.
18 U Kala, Mahayazawingyi, Vol. 1 (Yangon: Yarpyae Sarpay, 2006), pp, 259; 273-274
19 U Maung Maung Tin, Konebaungset Mahayazawin, Vol. 3 (Yangon: Yarpyae Sarpay, 2005), pp. 171-172
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

with or because of Tabaung.20 Nevertheless, the moving of the capital indicates the beginning
of a new rule, if not a new dynasty. However, based on rumours that the Senior General Than
Shwe and his family have been behaving like royalty, the Irrawaddy Magazine in Chiang
Mai produced an image of the Senior General in the traditional dress of a Myanmar king with
regalia.
What would kings do after founding a new royal capital [Naypyidaw]? Having announced the
arrival of a new dynasty, Myanmar kings usually built a palace and a pagoda in the new royal
capital, since the capital stands for the whole country. These represent Cakkavattin Mandaing
[political Mandala] and Bodhi Mandaing [religious Mandala] respectively.21 By doing so, the
king declares himself not only a Cakkavattin [world conqueror] but also a Bodhisatta [future
Buddha], who resides on the continent of Jabudipa [paradise on earth]; therefore, in
Tambiah’s terms, the king is the "World Conqueror and World Renouncer".22 In the Buddhist
cosmology, Mount Meru forms the centre of the universe and there lie four continents known
20 There was a Tabaung before the fall of the BSPP regime. It was: "Kalapaya-Htitawtin; Naymingyi-Laewin
[When the finial is hoisted on the Indian Pagoda; the Sun will set]". The Indian Pagoda is the Mahavijiya
Pagoda enshrined with the Buddhist relics brought from Nepal and the Sun referred to General Ne Win
["bright sun"]. Another Tabaung appeared in mid 1990s. It was: "Swaetaw-Hnitsu-Atutu; Pyithu-Laemwe-
Tatlaekwe [The two Tooth-relic pagodas are similar; people would be impoverish and the army would split]".
This could well be politically motivated. Anyway, the fissure between the infantry and intelligence factions
within the Army was serious in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but it was overcome by the elimination of the
intelligence faction by the infantry faction by 2004.
21 Mandala is generally considered as sphere of influence.
22 Stanley J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

as Mahadipas, one in each of the cardinal directions. The continent south of Mount Meru is
Jabudipa. This Jabudipa, considered the most auspicious continent, was the place where the
Buddhas were born, future Buddha will attain enlightenment, and the Cakkavattin [world
conqueror] will be born. At present, there is no evidence that the government is building
palace-style buildings; but some could argue that there is a possibility of sanctifying some
buildings as such, yet we will never know. However, recently, the Myanmar government
announced that it had begun building a pagoda in Naypyidaw of almost the same size and
shape as the Shwe Dagon Pagoda; and it is named "Uppatasanti" which means development
and stability.23 The stake-driving ceremony for the pagoda was held on 12 November 2006.
The invitation card for the ceremony opened with a phrase "Rajahtani Naypyidaw [the royal
capital where the king resides]".

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In pre-colonial Myanmar, kings moved their capitals occasionally; but they remained mostly
in Central or Upper Myanmar. Bagan lasted for over three centuries, from the 11th to the 13th
century. Myainsaing became the centre of Myanmar authority for about a decade. Thihathu
built a new capital at Pinya in 1312, not far from the previous site, and it remained as capital
until 1364. Sagaing was a rival capital between 1322 and 1364. Then, Innwa became the
capital of ethnic Bamar in 1365 while Bago, also known as Hantharwaddy, was the capital of
the Mon in the south that controlled Ramanyadesa. This situation was described as "One
Basin, Two Poles" in Myanmar by Victor Lieberman.24 Innwa was attacked and destroyed by
Shans in 1526; and the Innwa throne passed into the hands of Shan rulers. By then, Taungoo
under Mingyinyo and Tabinshwehti rose to prominence and became the centre of Myanmar
authority.
Tabinshwehti decided to move his capital from Taungoo to Bago, further south. This was
perhaps primarily to take control of commercial ports which had increasingly become major
sources of maritime revenue. With the domination of the Shan in the north, especially after
the fall of Innwa in 1526, the revenue from overland trade with China had become less
23 Weekly Eleven, Vol. 1, No. 44 (16 August 2006), p. 9. The pagoda is just less than one foot shorter than the
Shwe Dagon Pagoda. Uppatasanti is the name of a sutra, not part of the Tripitaka, but prepared by a monk in
the early 16th century. It is to be recited in time of crisis especially in the face of foreign invasion.
24 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800 - 1830 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 85- 211
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

significant for the Myanmar polity in central or upper Myanmar. Moreover, it was a
geopolitically significant decision as remaining in Taungoo or moving to Innwa would invite
security challenges from either the Shan in the north or the Mon in the south. By taking firm
control over the Mon, through residence at the Mon capital and adoption of Mon customs,
Tabinshwehti could avoid a two-prong attack. Nevertheless, as indicated by Lieberman, it
was the first and only time in the precolonial history of Myanmar that a capital with authority
over most of the Ayerwaddy-Sitaung basin was located in the south, near the coast.25
Bayinnaung, despite his re-conquest of Innwa in 1555, called Bago his home and built a new
palace and held his coronation there. Thus, Bago served as the capital of Myanmar in the
period between 1539 and 1599. Bago was completely destroyed by Rakhine in 1599.
Meanwhile, in central Myanmar, Prince Nyaunagyan, governor of Yemathin and a son of
Bayinnaung, tried to restore the empire of his father and established the Nyaungyan dynasty
in 1597. He decided to move his power base from Yemathin to Innwa in 1598. Innwa
remained the official capital of the Nyaungyan dynasty until it was destroyed by the Mon in
1752. However, from 1623, King Anaukphetlun and his successor, Thalun, made Bago a
temporary residence and it was only in 1635 that Thalun decided to go back to his official
residence and the royal capital at Innwa. King Thalun's decision to return and make Innwa his
home has generated a scholarly debate among some historians on Myanmar. G. E. Harvey
remarked that Thalun's decision to abandon Tabinshwehti's dream of Mon-Bamar national
kingship resulted from the failure of the attempted coalescence with the Mon; thus, the
Myanmar court relapsed into its tribal homeland in Upper Myanmar. The decision pushed
Myanmar back into the past, according to Harvey, as its appropriate future lay on the seacoast;
and it subsequently contributed to the isolation of Myanmar from international
developments.26 D. G. E. Hall went even further and wrote that the move of the Myanmar
capital from Bago to Innwa in 1635 was, without doubt, one of the cardinal events of
Myanmar history and it signalled the triumph of the more intransigent elements in Myanmar
character and government policy that contributed ultimately to the political ruin of the
country.27 But Maung Htin Aung, known for his nationalist perspective, disputed the long-
25 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels, p. 151
26 G. E. Harvey, History of Burma: from the earliest times to 10 March 1824 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Led,
1967), p. 193.
27 D. G. E. Hall, Early English Intercourse with Burma 1587-1743 (London: 1928) p. 11.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

term significance of the move.28 In fact, Victor Lieberman has correctly pointed out that Bago
was never the official palace site between 1613 and 1635, and Innwa remained the official
capital of Myanmar.29 Both Anaukphetlun and Thalun treated Bago as a temporary residence
and stayed in Thakama Tetaw [hut] or Yaye Nantaw [temporary palace] as indicated in the
Myanmar chronicles. Bago, then, was like a command post for military or pacification
campaigns in the south. Hence, as stated in the chronicles, King Thalun returned to Innwa the
royal capital on 24 December 1634 and entered the Thetnge Nantaw [thatched palace] on 14
January 1635.30 Then the king built a new palace and consecrated it on 24 May 1635. With
regard to the decision to move the capital from Lower to Upper Myanmar, Victor Lieberman
explained:
Although the north obviously lacked direct access to maritime trade, it profited
from commerce with Yunnan, while a series of provincial reforms preserved
direct control over the invaluable ports. In the event of rebellion, an interior
capital always made sense: one could go downriver up to seven times more
quickly than one could ascend the Irrawaddy. Most critical, with refugees
streaming up the Irrawaddy and with Upper Burma prospering from 80 years
of more or less continuous peace, population in the north again rose markedly.
Reinforced by deportations, in 1635 the dry zone contained over three times
more people, hence potential soldiers, than Lower Burma. To control some
4,000 villages spread throughout this zone was a far more critical task,
requiring on-site royal supervision, than to control a far smaller number of
villages and two or three ports in the south. Unfavorable climate later in the
17th century may have hit Upper Burma harder than the coast, but of course,
when the decision to change capitals was finalized in 1635, this problem lay
well in the future. In any case, famines around the Bay of Bengal from 1630-
1635 slammed Lower Burma no less savagely than the interior.31
28 Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 143-146
29 Victor Lieberman, "The Transfer of the Burmese Capital from Pegu to Ava", Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1980; no.1), p. 64.
30 Ukala III, p. 192.
31 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels, p. 159.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

When Alaungpaya established the Konbaung dynasty on 17 April 1752, he made Shwebo his
capital. Perhaps, the Konbaung dynasty was the only dynasty in pre-colonial Myanmar to
move its capital five times. Alungpaya gave Shwebo, his capital, the name "Yadana Theinga"
on 21 June 1753. His son, Sinbyushin, the third king of Konbaung, moved the capital from
Shwebo to Innwa on 20 March 1766. Then his brother, Bodawpaya, the 6th Konbaung king,
moved the capital from Innwa to Amarapura on 9 January 1783. Bodawpaya's grandson,
Bagyidaw, the 7th king of Konbaung, moved the capital back again to Innwa on 3 March
1824. Twenty seven years later, Amarapura was made capital again on 9 July 1841 during the
reign of Thayarwaddy. Finally, on 16 July 1858 Mindon moved his capital from Amarapura
to Mandalay. After the last king of Konbaung, Thibaw, was dethroned on 27 November 1885,
Mandalay ceased to exist as the capital of Myanmar. Yangon then became the capital of both
colonial and post-colonial Myanmar until late 2005.
With regard to Mindon's decision to move his capital, Prince Damrong Rajanubhab from
Thailand, during his journey in Myanmar in 1935, remarked:
Judging from the history of the period, there were other factors in the
construction of Mandalay, although the annals did not point them out. From
the time that the Burmese lost their first war with the British, the Burmese
kings became somewhat deranged, and three of them in succession had to be
removed from the throne. This situation must have been regarded as
inauspicious for the former capital.
The most important reason, however, must have been the arrival of European
steam-powered trading ships. During the reign of King Min-don, steamers
began to come up to Ava and Amarapura. Since both towns were on the bank
of the Irrawaddy, it would have been possible for the Europeans to bring
artillery pieces up-river aboard the trading ships and to shell the capital. The
Burmese therefore thought the capital should be moved some distance from
the river, beyond the range of enemy fire. Although this must have been the
original reason, King Min-don was sensitive about being accused of fearing
the Europeans. And so, pointing to his portentous dream and the prophesy of
the Lord Buddha, he instructed his chief minister to discuss his view with the
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

Heir Apparent, senior princes, ministers, royal councillors, ecclesiastical
chiefs and court Brahmins. Most of them accepted the king's idea.32
Nevertheless, the Myanmar kings' decision to move their capitals, especially during the
Konbaung period, did indicate their desire to make a fresh start. This was apparently the case
as they moved back and forth between Innwa and Amarapura. Mindon's decision would have
been partly influenced by the military-strategic factors; yet it was certainly a symbolic
gesture of a fresh start after losing two wars to the British in 1824 and 1852, from Innwa and
Amarapura respectively; both cities could be considered as inauspicious.
With regard to the Myanmar government's decision to move the capital in late 2005, Michael
Aung-Thwin said that the recent move of capital to the dry zone of Upper Myanmar has
nothing to do with soothsayers, but was based on historical, cultural and strategic
considerations. "It is where the capital of the first classical state of Burma, Pagan, and where
all subsequent capitals of its dynasties except one have been centred. It is the ancestral home
of the Burmese people and is very much part of their psyche, unlike Rangoon which has been
a reminder of the country's colonial experience." said Aung-Thwin. 33
Some people have argued that the recent decision to move the capital from Yangon to
Naypyidaw might be somewhat influenced by the birthplaces of the top two leaders. They
pointed out that Senior General Than Shwe and Vice Senior General Maung Aye were
natives of Kyaukse and Kantbalu, respectively, in Upper Myanmar. [However, former prime
minister General Khin Nyunt was from Kyauktan, near Yangon, while General Thura Shwe
Mann is a native of Kanyuntkwin, between Bago and Taungoo.] This could not be the case.
Many people are concerned with the economic impact [cost] of building a new capital which
could take at least another four years. 34 It is reported that the Naypyidaw now has about
80,000 migrant workers and the labour costs alone total over four billion kyat a month.35
32 H.R.H Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, Journey Through Burma in 1936 (Bangkok: River Books, 1991), pp.
78-79.
33 Bangkok Post (26 November 2005).
34 Living Color (No. 137, December 2006), p. 62.
35 Ibid.
ARI Working Paper No. 79 Asia Research Institute ● Singapore

CONCLUSION

The Myanmar government's decision to move its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw does
reveal certain aspects of its security and strategic perspectives and the leadership's worldview
as well. It is now certain that the military government will make a change in the
National Convention to endorse Naypyidaw as the national capital. However, whether
Myanmar with its new capital, Naypyidaw [the royal capital], will ever represent the Jabudipa
[Paradise on Earth] remains to be seen.

Gigantic building under construction in Naypyidaw Naypyidaw Water Fountains Garden Naypyidaw Water Fountains Garden with City Hall in Background


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Naypyidaw City Hall Naypyidaw, "City of Roundabouts" Naypyidaw Taxi


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Busy lunchtime @ Naypyidaw YKKO Kyae-oh Joint Quiet Sunday Afternoon in Naypyidaw Tha-byay Gone Shopping Strip More hotels being built in Naypyidaw Hotel Zone


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Map of Naypyidaw (Government Offices District) Map of Greater Naypyidaw Aerial View of Yangon-Naypyidaw highway


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Pushing limits of 92' Corolla on Yangon-Naypyidaw highway Some nice sceneries along the Yangon-Naypyidaw highway This CAT is long way from home.


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Everyone's working hard ... Schedule must be tight! First sighting of Concrete paver-Road Construction Equipments Not a single gas station/town in ~400km stretch of highway


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Posted by Saigon Charlie at 7:05 PM

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Monday, December 29, 2008

အႏိႈင္းမဲ့ ေမတၱာရွင္-

by ရဲရင့္သက္ဇြဲ

လာတုန္းကလည္း
တေယာက္ထဲပါပဲ
ဘ၀မွာ လိုအပ္သမွ်
အေမက ျဖည့္ဆည္းေပးခဲ့ရ
အေတာင္အလက္ မစံုခင္
အေမ့ရင္ကို ေျခစုန္မကန္ခင္အထိေပါ့ ။

ေမတၱာတရားရဲ ့စြမ္းပကား
ႀကီးမားပံုမ်ား
အေမ့ရင္ခြင္ခိုလံႈ
အႏွစ္ႏွစ္ဆယ္ဆိုတဲ့ နိဗၺန္ဘံုဟာ
ေပ်ာ္ရႊင္စရာ အဖံုဖံုနဲ ့
ဘ၀မွာ ကံုလံုႁကြယ္၀ခဲ့ေလရဲ ့ ။

အခုေတာ့
ကိုယ့္လမ္း ကိုယ္ေဖာက္
ကိုယ့္လမ္း ကိုယ္ေလွ်ာက္
တေထာင့္ငါးရာ ေမတၱာေတာမွာ
ရင္ခံုစရာ အစံုစံုကို တြယ္ငင္ရစ္ခ်ည္
ဆယ္သက္ဆယ္ကမၻာထင္မိၿပီးတဲ့ေနာက္မွာေတာ့
အေမ့ရဲ ့နိဗၺန္ဘံုဟာ မကံုလံုေတာ့ၿပီပဲ ။

ေလွ်ာက္စမ္း
ကိုယ္ခင္းတဲ့လမ္း
ကိုယ္ေရြးတဲ့လမ္း ဆူးၾကမ္းခ်င္ ႀကမ္းစမ္း
ခ်စ္သူရဲ ့အၿပံဳး အားေဆးတခြက္လို သံုးစမ္း
ကိုယ့္ဘ၀ကိုယ္ ရိုက္ႏွက္ေမာင္းႏွင္ထားစမ္း
ကံကိုသာယံု ဆူးပံုနင္းစမ္း
ကိုယ့္အခ်စ္နဲ ့ အရာရာကိုအေကာင္းတိုင္းျဖစ္ေစခဲ့ေပါ့ ။

ငမိုက္သား
ကမ္းကုန္ေအာင္မိုက္ခဲ့ပံုမ်ား
အေမအိုကို ေမ့ထားခဲ့ၿပီး
ကိုယ္ယံုၾကည္ရာစခန္း
လွမ္းခ်င္တိုင္းလွမ္း ၾကမ္းခ်င္တိုင္းၾကမ္း၊
ဒီလိုနဲ ့
မိဘေနရာ ေရာက္ရွိလာခဲ့
ႏူးညံ့သိမ္ေမြ ့ခ်စ္ခ်င္းေမတၱာရဲ ့အေတြ ့ဟာ
အသိတရားတေပြ ့တပိုက္နဲ ့
ငါ့ရင္ကိုတိုက္ခတ္လာတဲ့အခါ
ေခတ္သစ္ အဇာသသတ္ဟာ
ငါကိုယ္တိုင္ျဖစ္ေနပါေရာ့လား၊

အံ့ၾသထိတ္လန္ ့
ရိႈက္ငင္ငိုေႁကြး ငါ့ကို အျပစ္ေပးပါ
ငါ့ကို အျပစ္ေပးပါ
အေမအိုထံပါး ၀ပ္တြားဦးခိုက္
မိုက္ျပစ္အေႁကြး ခြင့္လႊတ္ေပးပါ၊

အေမအိုရဲ ့ေဆြးေျမ့တဲ့ အေတြးမွာ
သားအတြက္နာက်ည္းစရာမပါ
အေမ့ရင္မွာ
ခ်စ္ေမတၱာတရားသာ လႊမ္းၿခံဳ
သားဘ၀ကို ကံုလံုႂကြယ္၀ ေနေစဦးမွာပါ သားရယ္ ။

(သားဆိုး သားမိုက္မ်ားနဲ ့ မဟာဂရုဏာရွင္ ခ်စ္ခ်င္းတရားျပည့္၀သူအေမမ်ားသို ့)


၂၀၀၈ ဒီဇင္ဘာ ၂၉

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The Chinese Military-Industrial Complex

http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/dr-gary-k.-busch/the-chinese-military-industrial-co.html

Written by Dr Gary K Busch
Sunday, 28 December 2008

There seems to be a great misunderstanding of the nature of Chinese capitalism; the great engine of modernisation which is hailed as leading to the restructuring of the Chinese State and towards its eventual democratisation. The misunderstanding arises because there is only a dim perception in the international community that the large bulk of these Chinese companies are owned and operated by the Chinese military. They are corporations created in a similar structure to what might be called ‘zaibatsu’ in Japan or ‘chaebol’ in Korea. These ‘zaibatsu’ were large centrally-controlled vertical monopolies consisting of a holding company on top with a wholly-owned banking subsidiary providing finance, and several industrial and trading subsidiaries dominating specific sectors of a market, either solely, or through a number of sub-subsidiary companies. These are now international in scale.

The influence of the Chinese military in the economic affairs of China has been extensive for the last three thousand years. They have always dominated the agricultural sector and, after the death of Mao Tse Tung, they have been the dominant force in Chinese industry and politics. There has been a long tradition of warlords in China especially from 1916 to the late-1930s, when the country was divided among military cliques, a division that continued until the fall of the Nationalist government in the mainland China regions of Sichuan, Shanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangdong, Guangxi, Gansu, Yunnan, and Xinjiang. In this period a warlord maintained his own troops loyal to him, dominated and controlled the agriculture and mining in his area or region; and acted as the de facto political power in that region. To maintain themselves they often fought with their neighbouring warlords and against any attempt by the Emperor or central government to control them. Some of the most notable warlord wars, post—1928, including the Central Plains War, involved nearly a million soldiers. The central government was weak and relied on the power and support of these fractious warlords. The central government provided a national civil service and a national administrative regime but was uniformly weak.



The defeat of the Kuomintang leadership of the ex-warlord Chiang Kai-shek in the wake of the Second World War left the ravaged China in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Tse-Tung. Mao was both the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party as well as the Chairman of the Central Military Committee. His rule was personal, direct and disastrous. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution led to the virtual self-destruction of China. Millions starved to death; many more were exiled or driven away from the cities. He was succeeded by Hua Guofeng who attempted to keep a tight control over the power structures of China, including the Central Military Committee. However, his power waned and control was transferred to the reformer Deng Xiaoping, who revolutionised the economy of China. Deng never held office as the head of state or the head of government, but served as the de facto leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978 to the early 1990s as the leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Deng represented the second generation Chinese leadership and was instrumental in introducing Chinese economic reform, also known as the socialist market economy and partially opened China to the global market. He is generally credited with pushing China into becoming one of the fastest growing economies in the world and by raising the standard of living. Deng Xiaoping's ouster of Hua Guofeng was the moment when the market policies of economic reform began. This reform was carried on primarily by the military companies created in the various regions by the armies which controlled them.

It is not difficult to see why. The People’s Liberation Army (‘PLA’) controlled the security situation in its region. That meant it issued permits to enter or leave the region; it controlled the communications network in the region; it had the trucks and other transport under its control; and it was charged with maintaining order. It was, in fact, in charge. This was not controlled by one central PLA group but was under the control of the individual army for each region; some, like the 28th Army and the 39th Army were in economic hotspots and were able to thrive quickly. The Northern Army was quick to exploit its opportunities.

The opportunity arose in the wake of the civil disturbances of the Tiananmen Square uprising, when the Chinese Communist Party, under Li Peng, cracked down on China's democracy movement, ordering in the troops to battle the students. The PLA was ambivalent about this and seven retired senior military officers openly criticized the martial law order imposed by the Beijing government and called for the ouster of Premier Li Peng. In the march towards the capital at a village five miles southwest of Beijing, soldiers and peasants engaged in a brick- and rock-throwing brawl that injured as many as 40 people. The PLA did its duty but the populace were outraged and the authority of the Communist Party waned. The PLA realised it was free from the controlling hand of the Party and became agents of change; primarily corporate change, encouraged by Deng Xiaoping (retired but active).

They already had numerous companies under PLA control manufacturing goods for the defence sector. During Mao Tse-tung’s rule and the era of Sino-Soviet tensions, the military moved many of its factories inland in case of a possible attack on China. Manufacturing purely military products, such as arms, ammunition, as well as electronics, plastics and metals for military applications, these so-called "third-line" factories were built in remote mountain regions, far away from transportation routes and power sources. The factories bought supplies at subsidized costs from other factories, manufactured the weaponry and related products -- generally low-tech and low-quality -- and then sold them to the military at subsidized prices.

After Mao's death in 1976, the new leadership encouraged the military plants to begin exploring civilian uses for their products and to engage in the broader liberalizing economy. The most nimble managers were free to exploit new markets for their goods. During the early 1980s, the PLA's share of the national budget declined, spurring it to look to other sources for cash, especially hard currency. The higher organizational levels of the PLA created trading companies like China Xinxing, China Poly and China Songhai to take advantage of the opening of China's economy to the international market.

They formed banks, holding companies and international trading companies like Everbright to market these goods worldwide. Now the PLA runs farms, factories, mines, hotels, brothels, paging and telephone companies and airlines, as well as major trading companies.

The number of military-run business exploded during the boom of the late 1980s. The "third line" factories opened branches in the coastal areas, earning increasingly high profits from the manufacture of civilian goods. Even the lowest levels of the PLA set up production units. In fact the PLA had a largely captive audience of Chinese who had never really had the chance to acquire personal goods produced in China before. In addition to their international arms sales, their production of consumer goods for the domestic market soared.

The government first attempted to regulate PLA business activities in 1989 with a series of decrees, among them a prohibition on active military personnel concurrently holding positions at commercial enterprises. The reforms were intended to keep management of PLA enterprises under the control of senior military leaders and prevent lower-ranking officers from becoming involved in the daily functioning of the military companies. In the wake of the rejection of the Party in 1989 these government strictures fell away. The government tried again the early 1990s, when the central leadership of the military took steps to coordinate the production of the vast number of military factories by tying the plants together under "group companies." The groups, acting like conglomerates, have been fairly successful in centralizing management and production, running the trading companies and expanding the groups' business operations. The PLA now acts as a state within a state, with its power growing substantially in the latest wave of Chinese economic expansion.

Many of the PLA companies have become firmly enmeshed in the global economy. According research done by David Whelker (Multinational Monitor), “in pursuit of hard currency, many of the companies have listed themselves on capital markets in Hong Kong and elsewhere, opened representative offices in overseas markets, solicited foreign companies for joint ventures and partnerships in China and emphasized exports.” The so-called red chips, companies listed on the Hong Kong exchange but which are in fact mainland Chinese firms, are the hottest stocks on the market. Hong Kong is the PLA's favoured stock exchange because of its loose disclosure guidelines. China Poly Group has two listed companies: Continental Mariner Company Ltd. and Poly Investments Holdings Ltd. Both Continental Mariner and Poly Investments have a large number of subsidiary companies in mainland China, Hong Kong and tax havens like Liberia, the British Virgin Islands and Panama. China Carrie's listed company in Hong Kong is Hongkong Macau Holdings Ltd. China Carrie also owns HMH China Investments Ltd. on the Toronto Stock Exchange and HMH Gold Mining on the Australian Stock Exchange. 999 Enterprise Group, another company controlled by the PLA General Logistics Department, operates Sanjiu Pharmaceuticals Group, the largest pharmaceuticals manufacturer in China. 999 recently announced its plan to list soon on the Hong Kong exchange. Smaller military enterprises, like the Songliao Automobile Company owned by the PLA Shenyang Military Region, have also listed in the domestic Chinese markets.

China Poly Group is a commercial arm of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department. The PLA General Logistics Department operates China Xinxing. The PLA General Political Department owns and operates China Carrie. And the PLA Navy runs China Songhai.

These are not small operations. As early as 1994, with $382 million worth of import-export trade, China Poly Group was the fifty-ninth largest import-export company in China, according to China State Statistical Bureau. China Xinxing ranked 170th with $159 million, China Carrie ranked 203rd with $137 million, and China Songhai ranked 395th with $71 million.

Foreign companies looking for a foothold in China like partnering with the PLA because of the stability it can offer to any long-term project. Companies with military partners get the added security of knowing that the top "management" of many of the PLA companies are from the ranks of the "princelings," the children and relatives of senior Chinese Communist Party officials. These influential princelings assure that the business operations of the PLA will have the government connections that are so important in China's corrupt system. In the case of China Poly, chair Wang Jun and president He Ping act as brokers between the government and the military. Wang Jun is the eldest son of the late Vice-President Wang Zhen. He Ping is the son-in-law of the late Deng Xiaoping. Wang Jun's brother, Wang Bing, is the chair of the PLA Navy Helicopter Company. China Carrie's president is Ye Xuanning, the second son of late PLA Marshal Ye Jianying.

These international Chinese military companies are very rich and powerful. Some have entered into very controversial projects. A good example is the Hutchison-Whampoa, Hutchison Port Holding (HPH). HPH is a huge, multibillion-dollar company which has set up operations in ports all around the world. From Panama to the Philippines, an arm of Hutchison-Whampoa, Hutchison Port Holding (HPH), has become the world’s largest seaport operator, embedding itself in strategic seaports all across the globe. In fact now Hutchison holds the exclusive contract to operate the Panama Canal.

Hutchison-Whampoa has spread everywhere. It has a base in Tanzania where it runs Tanzania International Terminal Services Ltd. In the Western Hemisphere it has seaport services in Buenos Aires, Argentina; Freeport, the Bahamas; Veracruz, Mexico; and at both ends of the Panama Canal. HPH’s latest acquisition involved taking over eight Philippine ports. New ports in Mexico, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Tanzania and Thailand make Hutchision-Whampoa the world’s largest private port operator with 23 cargo berths, bringing its worldwide total of ports to a staggering 136.


Other ports include Jakarta, Indonesia; Karachi, Pakistan; India (where the company runs the cellular phone services); Burma; China; and Malaysia. There are port operations in Britain at Harwich, Felixstowe (Britain’s largest port), and Thamesport, and in the Netherlands at Rotterdam. The company is biding to set up in South Korea’s largest port, Pusan, and is already in Kwangyang, another South Korean port.

According to a US government report "The Panama Ports Company is 10 percent owned by China Resources Enterprise [CRE], which is the commercial arm of China's Ministry of Trade and Economic Co-operation.” In its investigation into China's attempts to influence the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign, the U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee identified CRE as a conduit for ‘espionage - economic, political and military - for China.’ Committee Chairman Senator Fred Thompson said that CRE has ‘geopolitical purposes. Kind of like a smiling tiger; it might look friendly, but it's very dangerous.’”


The company is headed by a Li Ka-Shing, the chairman of Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. Intelligence sources say he has deep connections with the Chinese Communist government. According to that report "Li has invested more than a billion dollars in China and owns most of the dock space in Hong Kong. In an exclusive deal with the People's Republic of China's communist government, Li has the right of first refusal over all PRC ports south of the Yangtze river, which involves a close working relationship with the Chinese military and businesses controlled by the People's Liberation Army,” the AFP report stated.

"Li has served as a middle man for PLA business dealings with the West. For example, Li financed several satellite deals between the U.S. Hughes Corporation and China Hong Kong Satellite [CHINASAT], a company owned by the People's Liberation Army. In 1997 Li Ka-Shing and the Chinese Navy nearly obtained four huge roll-on/roll-off container ships, which can be used for transporting military cargo, in a deal that would have been financed by U.S. taxpayers.”

According to the Thompson Committee, Hutchison Whampoa's subsidiary, HIT, has "business ventures with the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) which is owned by the People's Liberation Army.” COSCO, which failed in a notorious attempt to lease the former U.S. Naval base in Long Beach, Calif., has been criticized for shipping Chinese missiles, missile components, jet fighters and other weapons technologies to nations such as Libya, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

In 1996, the U.S. Customs Service seized a shipment of 2,000 automatic weapons aboard a COSCO ship at the port of Oakland, California. The man identified as the arms dealer, Wang Jun, is the head of China's Polytechnologies Company, the international outlet for Chinese weapons sales. Jun also sits on the Board of CITIC, China International Trust and Investment Corporation, the chief investment arm of the Chinese central government. It is also the bank of the People's Liberation Army, providing financing for Chinese Army weapons sales and for the purchase of Western technology. Li is also a board member of CITIC.

Li is a busy man indeed. In New Zealand, the newspapers announced that Wellington’s electricity network was sold to Asia’s richest man, Li Ka-Shing. His company Cheung Kong Infrastructure bought the Wellington power grid from Vector for $785 million. Many have wondered why the Government has allowed Wellington’s power grid, which covers the Wellington Central Business District, Porirua, and the Hutt Valley to be sold to China, after refusing to allow a minority stake by Canadian investors in Auckland Airport on the basis that it’s a “strategic asset”. Prime Minister Helen Clark has stated that the Wellington power network does not involve “sensitive land” and is not a “strategic asset”. Many are asking why a PLA-owned company is allowed to control the lifeline not only of Wellington commerce and technology, but, the Government itself, Security Intelligence HQ, defence, government departments, etc.

Hutchinson-Whampoa is not alone. PLA companies are active in supplying Iran with a large amount of dual-use components. Several government-owned Chinese companies are "proliferators of weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) according to the Bush administration, and the administration has taken legal actions against these companies. They are accused of selling advanced missile and WMD technology to Iran.


The Department of the Treasury issued a Press Release in 2006 saying that the US had frozen the assets of the three top Chinese military firms. "The companies targeted today have supplied Iran's military and Iranian proliferators with missile-related and dual-use components," said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). The Chinese companies are Beijing Alite Technologies Company, Ltd. (ALCO), LIMMT Economic and Trade Company, Ltd., China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), and China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC).


The U.S. representative office of CGWIC is G.W. Aerospace, Inc., which is located in Torrance, Calif. "The Chinese firms have provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) and/or the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)," AIO, a subsidiary of the Iranian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, runs Iran's missile program. SBIG, an affiliate of AIO, is also involved in Iran's missile programs. SBIG produces the Fateh-110 missile and the Fajr rocket systems. The Fajr missiles are a series of North Korean-designed weapons produced under license by SBIG. Both systems are capable of being armed with chemical warheads.

There was an effort by the Chinese Government to try and rein in some of these companies but to no avail. More than a year after the Chinese military was ordered to disband its octopus-like business empire (1999) and return to the barracks, its influence over the nation's economy continues. During 1999, some PLA high-profile investments, such as Beijing's five-star Palace Hotel, were handed over to central government shareholders with great public fanfare. And at least 150 large, profitable enterprises were grabbed up by the central government. Most, however, stayed with the PLA.

By the mid-1990s, the so-called PLA Inc. included over twenty thousand companies in everything from agribusiness to electronics to tourism to arms exports. In 1998, because of concerns about corruption and discipline, the leadership ordered the PLA to divest itself of its profit-oriented businesses in exchange for increases to the military budget, and shortly thereafter declared the divestiture a success. But the PLA has not completely withdrawn from the economy, nor have divested firms completely severed their ties with the PLA.

These issues are best illustrated by the example of Poly Technologies, founded in the 1980s by the son of a PLA marshal, and currently headed by the son in law of Deng Xiaoping. Before 1998, Poly was one of the major exporters of weapons and technology from China. It had several U.S. subsidiaries involved in technology acquisition, and representative offices in Rangoon, Bangkok and Islamabad. Its employees were implicated in the 1996 attempt to smuggle AK-47s into the U.S. The effects of the divestiture order on Poly are not entirely clear. Its arms-trading entities are believed to have been retained by the newly created General Armaments Division of the PLA, where they are not easily subject to civilian control.

Now known as China Poly Group, the divested Poly has diversified into a broad conglomerate, active in tourism, infrastructure construction and real estate (It has even brokered a deal to buy Bombardier jets for China’s PLA run airline). China Poly Ventures Company, a Poly subsidiary, is believed by U.S. intelligence to have transferred production technology for Pakistan Ghauri medium range ballistic missile in 1999, and possibly later. Newly independent firms have strong economic incentives to continue arms sales, since their management is now responsible for profit and loss for the enterprise. Many managers of Poly and firms like it are former military officers or family members, who retain close ties to high government officials, which makes these enterprises difficult to control. On the other hand, divestiture probably weakened bureaucratic relationships which enabled proliferation activities in the past. For example, Poly is believed to have influenced defence production and procurement entities to over-supply the PLA arsenal, with Poly then selling the surplus abroad at reduced prices. It is unlikely that Poly and firms like it will continue to exercise such influence, which will make their arms exports less profitable. It was Poly Industries who were the suppliers of the arms for Mugabe which were seized in Durban, aboard a COSCO (Chinese Overseas Shipping Company – a PLA company) vessel.

The second wing of arms production in China is the civilian defence industry. This can be further divided into the state-owned and the private sector, each of which is probably involved in international arms sales in a slightly different way. The five major state-owned defence industry conglomerates have no formal links to the PLA, and are controlled by China’s State Council through the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND). Protected from competition for political and security reasons, the state-owned defence industrial complex is a bloated and inefficient sector, which employs about 10% of China’s total industrial workforce.

According to Canadian Security Intelligence report 84, the best-known defence conglomerate is NORINCO, the corporation formed out of the former ordinance ministry (Fifth Ministry of Machine Building). It now has 800 000 employees working in over 200 subsidiaries, including 11 in the U.S. While it now also produces civilian products, its arms-related products include armoured vehicles, howitzers, mortars, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank missile systems, small arms, ammunition, explosives, and nuclear, biological and chemical protection systems.

“NORINCO and its subsidiaries have long been of security concern.” As early as 1984, the firm was named in documents relating to attempts to smuggle military related high-tech items from the USA to China. Three employees of NORINCO were sentenced to jail terms in China in the case of smuggled AK-47s to the US in the late 1990s. NORINCO continues to engage in sales of conventional weapons abroad. In March 2000, it sold US $65.9 million in arms including anti-personnel shells and assault rifle grenades to the government of Zimbabwe. Recently announced upgrades to Pakistan’s T-59 Al Zarrar tank were the result of cooperation with NORINCO. More recently, on 23 May 2003, the U.S. State Department issued a two-year ban on imports of products from NORINCO and subsidiaries to the United States, charging that the entity had sold rocket fuel and missile components to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Iranian government agency in charge of developing and producing ballistic missiles. The ban will affect at least US$200 million in goods, and, according to CIA estimates, as much as five times that figure if U.S. customs can identify all of NORINCO subsidiaries, which export everything from toys and shoes (Wal-Mart is a major purchaser) to auto parts and aluminium heat sinks for computers. Other firms in this category, such as China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, and China Great Wall Industrial Corporation, are among those currently sanctioned by the U.S. for illegal transfers of weapons, dual-use material and technology to Iran.

NORINCO has been consecutively ranked among top 225 world largest international engineering project contractors; including railway and highway construction, power plant, energy exploitation and telecommunications. NORINCO has accomplished a number of projects such as Tehran subway and electrified railway in Iran, highway and hydropower plant in Ethiopia, digital switching exchanges in Pakistan, and Century Bridge in Haikou, China. NORINCO has maintained strong competitive edge in such fields as optronic products, sport arms & equipment, vehicles, logistic service, packing products, and microelectronics. NORINCO is the largest exporter of optoelectronic products, and one of the largest retail sellers of automobiles in China. It enjoys unique advantages in the logistic of hazardous goods and professional advantages in optical cold processing, development of flexible circuit board, and manufacture of tinplate containers. This is all in addition to its defence business.

The PLA also operate ‘private’ companies. Besides state-owned defence producers, China also has private companies involved in defence production, such as the telecom firm Huawei. With offices in Cuba, Iran, and Burma, Huawei has been a major supplier of dual-use telecom equipment. In 2001, its Indian subsidiary was accused of tailoring a commercial order for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Also in 2001, Huawei supplied Iraq with fibre optics to link its radar and anti-aircraft systems, triggering U.S. and U.K. bombings. Private defence firms often also enjoy the shielding of powerful patrons. Huawei was founded by a former PLA officer, and benefitted from early sales to the PLA. But it also receives state support in the form of tax privileges and state-sponsored credit because it has been designated a “national champion” of new technology. Its supporters have included top general Yang Shangkun and head of the China International Trade and Investment Corporation, Wang Jun (also president of Poly). Unlike state-owned defence producers, private firms are more likely to be profitable. A further level of complexity in their proliferation activity is that foreign firms seeking to do business with them may try to shield them from U.S. sanctions.

What Does It Mean?

There are a number of governments, intelligence agencies and political parties which are nervous of the spread of the PLA-owned companies around the globe. There is a particular concern about the PLA’s involvement in the ports, telecommunications and energy businesses. Recently incidents of cyber warfare from China has been traced to PLA-based institutes and corporations. Throughout Africa, and increasingly in Latin America, Chinese military and security personnel are operating under corporate cover and are, unless some egregious act takes place, operating with immunity. The takeover of key ports (Panama, Freeport, etc.) gives the Chinese military and advantage it would not have had if these companies were merely private enterprises. There is not very much anyone can do about this and it is making people very nervous.



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