News & Articles on Burma-Monday, 11 July, 2011-UZL

News & Articles on Burma
Monday, 11 July, 2011
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Aung San Suu Kyi to visit martyrs’ mausoleum
Will Suu Kyi Be Targeted?
Offshore helicopter crash kills 3 in Myanmar
Suu Kyi criticizes restoration of Myanmar temples
Wen Jiabao vs Aung San Suu Kyi
Burma Facing War on All Fronts?
Lao PM to visit Myanmar to promote friendship, co-op
Burma acts as neocolonial nationalist on ethnic people
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Aung San Suu Kyi to visit martyrs’ mausoleum
Monday, 11 July 2011 18:17 Ko Pauk

New Delhi (Mizzima) – Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi will visit the Martyrs’ Mausoleum on Tuesday with her youngest son Htein Lin to pay homage to fallen Burmese martyrs including her father Aung San, the hero of independence.

Burma’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi talks about her pilgrimage to Bagan at a press conference in front of her house on University Avenue Road in Rangoon on Monday, July 11, 201. Photo: Mizzima

Burma’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi talks about her pilgrimage to Bagan at a press conference in front of her house on University Avenue Road in Rangoon on Monday, July 11, 201. Photo: Mizzima
She will visit Shwedagon Pagoda at 7 a.m., and proceed to her mother Kyi Kyi’s tomb situated near Shwedagon Pagoda’s southern gate, after first worshipping at the pagoda but before visiting the mausoleum.

She will also attend a Martyrs’ Day ceremony on July 19 to lay a wreath and pay homage to the martyrs, she told reporters at a press conference at her residence on University Avenue on Monday morning.

Suu Kyi told reporters that her political and organizational tour could start only after the forthcoming 64th Anniversary Martyrs’ Day. The last time Suu Kyi paid homage to the fallen martyrs was in 2002.

A reporter at the press conference told Mizzima: “She told us that she would inform us about her political tour in a detailed itinerary. She said that she could not make these political tours silently.”
Aung San Suu Kyi said some people have told her that if reporters had accompanied her on her tour of upper Burma in 2003, the Depayin massacre might not have taken place.

“She said that it was true that the massacre might not have happened if the media had accompanied her,” the reporter said.

Suu Kyi described her visit to several pagodas in Bagan and said she was concerned about the conservation of and the greening of the Bagan historical site. She worried about the destruction of the ancient pagodas in the name of renovation, she said.

In other matters, National League for Democracy party Vice Chairman Tin Oo said a reading of a paper by presidential adviser and economist U Myint at NLD headquarters had to be cancelled at short notice.

U Myint planned to read a “poverty eradication” paper at the meeting. Tin Oo said the reason for the cancellation was unclear, but it may have had something to do with government regulations or advice. U Myint had originally volunteered to read the paper before NLD members. http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-burma/5577-aung-san-suu-kyi-to-visit-martyrs-mausoleum.html
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Offshore helicopter crash kills 3 in Myanmar

Jul 11, 2011, 12:17 GMT

Yangon - A helicopter serving Myanmar's offshore gas industry crashed Monday, killing three people, an industry source said.

The helicopter carrying a pilot, co-pilot and 10 passengers for Petronas Malaysia crashed in the Andaman Sea soon after taking off from a floating storage facility for the Yetagun gas field, an official who did not want to be identified told the German Press Agency dpa.

The three who died included the co-pilot and were all staff from Myanmar, he said. Nine people were rescued.

Myanmar's Energy Ministry with Malaysia's Petronas, Japan's Nippon Company and Thailand's PTTEPI developed the Yetagun gas field. The gas is sold to Thailand.

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/news/article_1650439.php/Offshore-helicopter-crash-kills-3-in-Myanmar
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The Star Online
Suu Kyi criticizes restoration of Myanmar temples

YANGON, Myanmar (AP): Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi has criticized restoration work on Myanmar's landmark Bagan temples as not meeting international standards.

Suu Kyi said Monday she was saddened by the condition of the temples in Bagan. Myanmar applied with the U.N. cultural agency UNESCO for World Heritage status but was rejected because of the quality of the restoration work.

Her visit to Bagan last week was her first trip out of Yangon since being released from house arrest last year.

Bagan, also known as Pagan, has more than 2,800 monuments built between the 10th and 14th centuries. The central Myanmar site is considered one of Southeast Asia's major historical landmarks, with Cambodia's Angkor Wat and Indonesia's Borobodur temple.
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/7/11/apworld/20110711193613&sec=apworld
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The Diplomat Blogs
Wen Jiabao vs Aung San Suu Kyi
July 10, 2011
By Trefor MossAbout the author

Burma’s opposition leader may have achieved less than the Chinese premier. But Suu Kyi’s less is definitely more.

Britain welcomed two distinguished Asian guests at the end of last month. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited London as part of a European tour to sign trade agreements and help sandbag the leaking Eurozone. The following day, Aung San Suu Kyi took over the BBC’s airwaves from back home in Burma to deliver the first of two highly-anticipated lectures, entitled ‘Liberty’ and ‘Dissent’, about her pro-democracy campaign.

Both came armed with criticisms. Wen’s were for his British hosts. ‘On human rights, China and the UK should respect each other, respect the facts, treat each other as equals, engage more in co-operation and less in finger-pointing,’ Wen said in a public rebuke to his British counterpart, David Cameron. Clearly irritated by the UK’s patronising and moralising refrain (as he saw it) about China’s lax human rights record, Wen went in for some patronisation of his own. China has a 5,000 year history, he observed, which has taught the Chinese not to lecture other countries, but to respect them on an equal basis – an evident hint that this was a lesson that the arriviste British might also eventually learn. Wen signed $2.25 billion in trade deals with Cameron, threw in two pandas for Edinburgh Zoo, and decamped to Germany.

Wen’s tetchy dismissal of British criticism raised the serious question of whether countries like Britain shouldn’t simply change the record. Lecturing China doesn’t seem to work – its human rights record has, if anything, deteriorated over the last year thanks to Beijing’s authoritarian reflex to the Arab Spring – and to raise the issue only appears detrimental to the country casting the aspersions. In Germany, which Beijing regards as being more permissive of Chinese policies, Wen concluded $15 billion in trade agreements, far more than he granted to the finger-pointing Brits.

Moreover, Wen arguably makes a strong case when he says that China has notched up impressive progress on many fronts, earning it other countries’ respect rather than this constant carping about human rights. His government stands, after all, for pragmatism over moralism: sticking to core socio-economic objectives that benefit the many, rather than dwelling on Western concepts of rights that suit the dissenting few – square conceptual pegs that don’t fit into the round holes of the Chinese context. Pragmatism, Wen would argue, is what still-developing China needs, not idealism.

Though Aung San Suu Kyi’s BBC Reith Lectures were in no way connected to Wen’s London lecture, a more complete or timelier rebuttal is hard to imagine. Suu Kyi lacks Wen’s pragmatic credentials, or his practical authority. Her record of changing the lives of ordinary people is much less impressive than his; in fact, one might argue that her material impact on Burma has been negligible, whereas Wen’s impact on China has been historic.
But in terms of moral authority, Suu Kyi outmatches Wen many times over. Wen’s pronouncements on human rights come from behind the parapet; hers are made beneath the walls, in the line of fire. Wen may talk of struggle in his Communist Party propaganda, but Suu Kyi lives it. The Burmese opposition leader, not the Chinese premier, is therefore the one best qualified to talk about human rights and whether countries are doing enough to uphold them.

The criticism in Suu Kyi’s lecture was mainly reserved for India, Burma’s democratic neighbour, which she accused of abandoning its principles in the international arena and ‘of putting trade and strategic interests in the forefront’ instead of showing solidarity with Burmese democrats. China has played the same game as India, she noted; but from Burma’s undemocratic neighbour she expected nothing more. India on the other hand has a moral imperative to stick to its democratic guns. Thus, turning Wen’s argument on its head, she told India that it had a clear duty to lecture other countries about their failings, and not, as Wen would have it, to keep quiet about them as a mark of self-serving respect.

Wen would probably retort that it’s easy for opposition figures to indulge in this kind of political idealism, and that serving leaders must instead make pragmatic and difficult choices. But what exactly are the facts about China’s human rights record that he told British Prime Minister David Cameron to respect? Repression in Tibet and Xinjiang; the detention of political activists; the curtailment of free speech: these must be the facts he was talking about. China’s government could walk tall on its practical record, if its total lack of moral authority didn’t have it constantly ducking for cover behind its repressive security apparatus at home and its financial power abroad.

At the Chinese Communist Party’s 90th anniversary celebrations last week, President Hu Jintao openly admitted that widespread corruption undermines the Party’s achievements; its cowardly approach to political reform does so, too. The administration of Hu and Wen has had China’s answer to Aung San Suu Kyi, fellow Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, locked up, along with other pretty harmless characters, like Hu Jia and Ai Weiwei (both recently freed) and young women cracking satirical jokes on Twitter. These aren’t acts that command respect.

Asia needs pragmatic leaders like Wen if it’s to keep developing successfully. But as China’s societal problems demonstrate, this kind of leader can only take you so far. If you want your country to be fair as well as rich, open as well as powerful, and respected rather than feared, then you need moral leaders too. Foreign observers like Cameron, who must be wondering whether to heed Wen’s rebuke and bite his lip about human rights, should remember that on this particular subject, Wen can’t claim expertise. It’s the leaders of moral stature, like Suu Kyi, the ones who have suffered for people’s rights, who really know their value. So Cameron should respectfully ignore Wen’s call for respectful silence on China’s human rights record – and only shut up when that record genuinely improves.

Suu Kyi and her beleaguered National League for Democracy, meanwhile, are sometimes accused of irrelevance, in spite of their bravery, and of struggling to absolutely no avail. And indeed, what has their long campaign actually achieved? ‘We have done as much as I think any party could do under the circumstances,’ she said at the end of her BBC talk. She has succeeded only in keeping dissent alive for dissent’s own sake.

But in a place like Burma, that’s a truly great thing. Wen, for all China’s headline-grabbing progress, hasn’t done all he could; his government has often ducked the brave choices and lashed out at those calling for those choices to be made. That’s why history will remember Aung San Suu Kyi as a great leader, and Wen Jiabao as an able manager.
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/07/10/wen-jiabao-vs-aung-san-suu-kyi/
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The Diplomat Blogs
Burma Facing War on All Fronts?
July 07, 2011
By Alex Ellgee

The Kachin people, marginalised by the Burmese government, are willing to fight for survival. Is China the only hope for preventing all-out war?

High in Burma’s rolling Kachin hills at a training camp in May this year, officers of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) were conducting artillery training. It was the first time in nearly six years, and the young cadets were eager to learn. ‘I joined the KIA for the revolutionary principles of our leaders and to fight for Kachin ethnic rights,’ says one cadet. According to the officer in charge, for the last six years Kachin, Burma’s northernmost state, has enjoyed relative peace, and there was no need for military preparation. Now, however, the situation is different. ‘Things are tense, we need to be ready,’ he says, before entering the training hall.

The KIA was right to prepare. On the afternoon of June 9, fighting broke out near Chinese-backed hydropower projects between the KIA and the Burmese government, signalling the end of a 17-year ceasefire. Both sides dispute who started it. In state media, the Burmese government blame the KIA. The KIA, on the other hand, claim it was the Burmese that opened fire on a Kachin camp after KIA soldiers refused to leave their territory near the hydropower projects. Later, tensions only worsened when Burmese soldiers allegedly returned the dead body of a KIA officer. The Burmese claimed he was killed in the fighting, however the KIA asserts that he was stabbed and tortured.

Formed in 1961, the KIA's raison d'être was to defend their region from Burmese troops and create an independent Kachin state. Previously, in 1949, the Kachin and other ethnic groups in the region had signed an agreement with Aung San to form a federal union, the leader of the Burmese army, under the watchful eye of the departing British colonials. After Aung San – the father of Aung San Suu Kyi – was assassinated, the ethnic leaders felt the Burmese government wasn’t respecting the agreement and many took up arms, engaging in gruelling guerrilla wars with the Burmese army in the dense jungle.

Tired of endless fighting, in the 1990s many of the ethnic armies signed ceasefires with the Burmese government, and up until very recently enjoyed the perks that came with peace. Benefiting from a border with China, the Kachin were able to build up their territory and main city Laiza, which boasts hotels, casinos and even a nightclub. At one point, citizens were renting cheaper accommodation on the Chinese side and making the daily journey back to Laiza for work. But the peace wasn’t to last.

In the run up to the 2010 elections, Burma's generals proposed that all the ethnic armies that had observed the ceasefire become ‘Border Guard Forces.’ By agreeing, the Kachin would have been required to allow Burmese commanders into their ranks, lay down their weapons and become part of the state army. For the Kachin, and nearly all the other major ethnic armies, this was completely out of the question. ‘We will never agree to their proposal,’ Lama Gum Hpan, the secretary of the Kachin Independence Council (KIC), which governs the region, said in his headquarters last month. ‘If we accept (the Burmese government's offer), the whole struggle by the people for our Kachin land will be in vain.’

But it was clear very early on that the Burmese government wasn’t going to take no for an answer. Targeting the smallest first, The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, an ethnic Kokang, 1,000-man army based on the Sino-Burma border, was first to go. Within 24 hours the Kokang had been driven from their territory. Their leaders still hide in China. During the elections last year, fighting began with a renegade group from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) that had rejected the BGF. Then, last month, on the border of Kachin territory, the Burmese government attacked the Shan State Army – North, another ethnic group that had rejected the proposal.

As the rainy season ended, the Burmese army renewed military action against the Kachin. Some analysts argued that the new government, which officially took office in February following an election mired by allegations of fraud, would avoid conflict in an attempt to repair their hugely damaged international legitimacy. It appears, however, that little change has actually occurred. The same leaders are controlling the country, with the same military mentality – force not dialogue is seen as the best way to deal with ethnic minorities.

Why has the military dominated government once again risked losing its legitimacy? One theory suggests that some members of the Burmese government or military are unhappy with the potential reforms, which would reduce their power. In order to destroy the legitimacy of the new government and maintain the status quo, they may have encouraged other government factions to launch the offensive. The ethnic conflicts that haunt Burma have long given the military a claim to legitimacy, as without conflict there’s no need for the military. Since independence, the ethnic armies argue that the Burmese have always sought to exert control over them. Another theory suggests that the Burmese army was only trying to take back territory needed for Chinese hydropower plants and didn’t anticipate an escalation of the conflict, which they thought could be contained.

Publicly, China has shown impartiality toward the conflict and has been urging the parties to take steps to ease tensions. At first, they simply demanded Chinese citizens were kept safe. Then, when the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) ceasefire broke down on June 9, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman urged the two parties to ‘exercise restraint’ and ‘resolve the relevant disputes through peaceful negotiations.’

However, behind closed doors, many are suspicious about China’s true stance. Unlike the United Stated Wa Army (USWA), which has adopted many of China's systems, the Kachin is composed of Baptist Christians, is pro-democracy and close with the West. And as the Kachin protested in March against the creation of the hydropower projects over fears of mass displacement and the environmental impact, China may now see the KIA as an obstacle to domestic development. Despite the KIA not showing any resistance to various other Chinese projects in Kachin state, and having enjoyed a healthy business relationship with China for nearly two decades, many suspect that during a recent high level meeting between Naypyidaw and Beijing, a tacit blessing was given to attack the Kachin.

In the meeting, the official Xinhua News Agency reports that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called ‘for the smooth implementation of infrastructure projects.’ Only a few weeks later, the conflict erupted as Burmese soldiers entered into the Kachin territory surrounding the Chinese backed Myitsone dam.

According to Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, North Asia project director for the International Crisis Group, many of the Kachin feel politically marginalised and economically disadvantaged even as they are seeing an increase in Chinese investment in their region. ‘Lack of local participation in development decisions and the absence of transparency around many projects have contributed to the build-up of ethnic tension in the region,’ she says. ‘Moreover, the construction of hydropower projects and the major gas and oil pipelines has also increased the militarisation of the ethnic areas in which they’re located or traverse, as Naypyidaw and Chinese companies seek to protect the security of this infrastructure.’

Seeing China’s concerns over its investments, the Burmese government hasn’t held back on using this as an excuse for the conflict. Burmese state media recently stated, ‘The only objective of the Tatmadaw in launching attacks on the KIA was to protect its members and import hydropower to the nation without any intention of aggression or oppression.’

It’s still unconfirmed whether China gave the green light to the Burmese army, but it’s clear which side they’re on. Kachin leaders recently sent a letter to Beijing asking it to mediate peace between the two sides, but are yet to receive any reply on the matter. The Kachin News Group (KNG) recently reported that a meeting was held between Burmese and Chinese officials on the Sino-Burma border, where it was agreed that Burmese soldiers could enter Chinese soil to launch an attack on Liaza, the KIA headquarters. Then, on June 29, KNG reported that hundreds of Burmese soldiers were seen passing through several Chinese checkpoints in civilian uniform.

The news site is run by Kachin exiles, and the validity of information disputed.If the news is true, however, it could spell disaster for Kachin people seeking refuge in the border area. Already, over 13,000 refugees have fled to KIA territory fearing torture by the Burmese army, or being captured and taken to be porters on the frontline, as has been widely documented in other ethnic conflicts throughout the country. Many of these refugees are farmers who have had to leave behind their farmlands, and will lose their livelihoods if they can’t return. As the conflict rages on, bridges have been destroyed, communications have been disrupted, and trade routes closed, further increasing difficulties for people across Kachin state. And in recent weeks, news has emerged of women being raped by Burmese soldiers, and civilians being killed.

While fighting has subsided somewhat, there’s still a real danger of the conflict escalating into all-out war. The KIA repeatedly blames Naypyidaw’s unwillingness to enter into sincere dialogue as a driving factor for the ongoing conflict. According to the leading Burmese news site, The Irrawaddy, whose correspondent attended a meeting on June 30 between KIA leaders and Col. Than Aung, the Kachin State Minister for border affairs of the Burmese government, Than Aung wasn’t carrying official documents, and when asked to provide formal evidence that Naypyidaw would consider ending the hostilities, said he would have to consult, ‘higher authorities.’ Following the meeting, on July 3, the KIA issued an order to stop all attacks on state soldiers and infrastructure while they wait for an official response from Naypyidaw. However, in the article, the author, Ba Kaung says there’s little hope in the KIA that a ceasefire will be reached, citing a lack of trust.

It’s not only the Kachin who are in danger, but every ethnic army in Burma, as few are ready to accommodate Naypyidaw’s demands. Like the other ethnic armies, the Kachin continue to hope that the ‘new’ government will respect the Panglong agreement made in 1949. During an interview at the KIA headquarters in April this year, Lama Gum Hpan said that if the new Burmese government were willing to work with the Kachin people to ‘form a real and authentic federal union,’ then the KIO (the political wing of the KIA) would help them to do so, and join the state army. The Kachin people, he says, have always been committed to this under the conditions of the Panglong Agreement. He also added that the Kachin people have tried to enter domestic politics, but three parties were barred from joining the 2010 elections. ‘Even when we try to work with them through democratic ways, they prevent any progress,’ he says.

When Maj. Soe Win, the commander of the Burmese army’s Northern Regional Command, was reported to have said, ‘The age of Panglong has been cancelled and it’s gone now,’ this confirmed to the Kachin that there’s little chance Burma will have a functioning federal union in the near future. The Burmese offensive against the Kachin has only buried the hopes of ethnic minorities throughout the country. In the face of such threats, ethnic leaders from all corners are attempting to form their own union, without Naypyidaw. The United Nationalities Federal Council Union of Burma (UNFC), as it has been called, would see ethnic armies being legally bound to provide military support to those being attacked by the Burmese state army. If this is achieved, both Naypyidaw and Burma more widely could be in serious trouble, as the country descends into war on all fronts.

In order to avoid impending doom, many are looking to China as a way out. While the international community continues to release statements, nothing they do will have any weight compared with how China chooses to use its leverage over Burma. The United States and the EU can threaten Naypyidaw all day long, but without a real attempt by China to end the conflict, little will be achieved. The change needs to come from within. While Suu Kyi and other political activists fight for ethnic rights and keep the struggle alive, it’s proven that they have little effect on the generals’ mentality.

In the ‘new’ government, mainly made up of former generals, there are some moderates, and as the hardliners coerce the country into a renewed state of war, these moderates must find a way to change the mentality of their leadership. This is no mean feat when faced with generals who seem hell bent on wiping out any ethnic resistance, however small, to their rule of the country. If they continue along this route, then the country and its people will be destroyed. The Kachin, it appears, won’t back down, and while it’s unclear how long they can continue to repel government troops, the fighting spirit of the KIA and other ethnic groups has evidently not diminished, despite signing ceasefires.

‘We’re ready to fight for our ethnic rights, self-determination and justice for Kachin people,’ says La Sam, a 19-year-old cadet, before running off to his next training drill. ‘We will never back down.’

Alex Ellgee is a British freelance journalist based in Thailand covering ethnic conflict, politics, and human rights issues.

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Lao PM to visit Myanmar to promote friendship, co-op
13:17, July 11, 2011
by Feng Yingqiu

Lao Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong is due to pay an official visit to Myanmar Monday at the invitation of Myanmar President U Thein Sein.

Thongsing's trip represents the first one by a Lao leader after a new government was installed in Myanmar.

U Thein Sein, as then prime minister, visited Laos in 2007, initiating a memorandum of understanding on establishing sister cities between Myanmar's ancient city of Bagan and Laos' Luang Prabang which was signed in 2009.

In October last year, former Myanmar top leader Senior-General Than Shwe paid a state visit to Vientiane before Myanmar's general election and had discussions with Lao leaders on mutual friendship and cooperation between the two nations.

The two sides touched on cooperation in economic and social sectors between the two countries, construction of the Myanmar- Laos-Vietnam motor road, jointly building of the Myanmar-Laos Mekong River Friendship Bridge and anti-narcotic drives between the two countries.

The two sides also signed a memorandum of understanding on setting up of the Lao-Myanmar Provincial Regional Border Committee to address issue on timely basis.

Myanmar and Laos, sharing border of over 230 kilometers, established diplomatic relations in 1955. http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/7435689.html
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Burma acts as neocolonial nationalist on ethnic people
Mon, 2011-07-11 02:01 — editor
By - Zin Linn

A 9-page analysis paper revised on 1st July, 2011- Burman Troop’s Offensive War against Kachin: A Postcolonial Nationalistic Interpretation By Zau Lawn - about offensive war against Kachin by Burma Army has been delivered publicly 10 July through Kachin News Group’s online information bulletin.

Amidst constant political insecurity across Burma (Myanmar) due to the Burma Army’s offensive war against the ethnic armed groups, Zau Lawn from ‘The Kachin Research Group’ has written a vivid research-paper explaining the norms of military system in the name of the “Disciplined Democracy” which stands for the policy of the newly civil dressed military government under the leadership of President Thein Sein.

Moreover, the paper underscores the effort and genuine collaboration of Ethnic nationalities - Kachins, Shan and Chin - in view of the 1947 Panglong accord. The paper also criticizes the current situation that the implementation of the Panglong belief in formulation of a Federal Union, has been systematically downgraded till today. The Burmese government in power used to say that “the era of Panglong is over.

In one clause, the research paper says: “Having manipulated the power to rest only in Burmans and constructed Burman nationalism based on chauvinism and jingoism, the Burman groups grasped both the central and the state power rejecting the provision of sharing power by means of the Federalism. Moreover, all the “rights and privileges” provided are cut off. Instead the Burmans in power are treating Ethnic nationalities as their alien and enemy.”

The researcher recounted about the civil war between Burmese Military and the KIA. As said by the paper, the almost seventeen year old cease?fire agreement between the Burmese Military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) completely collapsed once Thein Sein’s troops invaded the KIO’s territory at Sang Gang and seized the KIA’s Bum Sen post on the 12th of June, 2011.

It occurred amidst having been officially warned repeatedly by the KIO in order to avoid the civil war across the land. The Sang Gang war broke out on 9 June as a defensive action against the Burmese military troops which fired first toward the KIA. The conflict lasted for three days and nights. This war made the KIO declare “civil war between Burmese Military troops and the KIA across Kachinland and beyond”, on 12 June 2011, the paper explained.

It also continues its explanation that for the sake of security, the KIA has destroyed a dozen bridges used for major communication of government troops. As the war has spread out across the area, it is assumed that there is high number of causalities, particularly to the government side.

The paper points out that during the civil war, attention is given towards a particular issue of Burman Nationalism on the bases of the government’s troops’ ill-treatment. Burmese soldiers committed inhumane torture, rape, dehumanization and killing of local Kachins in the war zone, violating the UN Declaration of Human rights and the international law for prisoners of war.

According to ‘The Kachin Research Group’, the analysis is based upon accessible data form radio news, news papers, messages and interviews. The first category is the analytical synthesis to the policy of waging war upon KIO by Thein Sein’s troops as the state?run, the New Light of Myanmar “blames Kachin rebels for fighting” in the aftermath of the week long war. The state-paper claims that the fight at the KIA’s Bum Sen post was its “inevitable reaction to the ethnic Kachin rebels, who fired first, in order to protect a major Chinese?built hydroelectric power project.”

The research-paper says in a place: “This wording “the ethnic Kachin rebels” and “protection of a major Chinese?built hydropower project” is to be considered logically and realistically and reflect the plan and fundamental policy of Burmanization, exercised as Burmese Nationalism. Obviously, it indicates the government troops, sent by Thein Sein, are an official body deployed in order to protect the state?run project for the prospect of economic development with military might and KIA as “the rebels”, which resist the state’s policy and its project.”

It says that Ethnic nations like Kachin, Kayin and so on are not to be condemned by accusing them as “the separatists” from Union of Burma. Rather Kachins have struggled for federal democracy from the hands of consecutive Burmese military nationalists. The current government also represents the neocolonial power within the respective ethnic soil. The spirit of friendship and or brotherhood established between General Aung San and Kachin Duwas could activate the Panglong agreement. But at present, the research-paper says, Kachins are treated as the “enemy” of the Burman majority in various ways.

In conclusion it says: “Therefore, it is not the time to stick too much on a certain nationalism which leads one to be disloyal to one’s country. Instead, the right nationalism has to be the act of revolution, identification of a common political policy which could render hope, security, prosperity, peace and dignity for all. Therefore, the nationalism here has to be a civilized ideology, which is the real power in the contemporary era, resisting all uncivilized manner of discrimination, ethnic extermination and domination, not to love a certain group of people and to campaign on a mission in its interest by misuse of its power, particularly with military might.”

Burma’s sixty-four year-old Historic Panglong Agreement has been ignored by the successive Burmese military regimes up to this day. The said agreement has been ignored by the current President Thein Sein government which is also under military control.

The question of Panglong Agreement nowadays become a key point in the contemporary history of Burma’s politics.

“All the armed forces in the union shall be under the command of the Defense Services,” says section 337 of the 2008 constitution.” It means ethnic armed troops must be under state control and the union government will not allow self-determination of the ethnic people. Equality of ethnic minorities with the Burmese majority was out of the question to the new constitution.

Aung San Suu Kyi told the media a day after her release that she would like to call for a second Panglong Conference that is fitting to the 21st century perspective.

Without addressing and honoring the ethnic people’s political aspirations, the new military-controlled President Thein Sein government will be toothless to stop political and civil strife throughout ethnic areas. National reconciliation and ethnic self-determination are two sides of a coin.

- Asian Tribune - http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/07/10/burma-acts-neocolonial-nationalist-ethnic-people

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