ews & Articles on Burma-Thursday, 03 March, 2011

News & Articles on Burma
Thursday, 03 March, 2011
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The Privileged Prisoner
Suspected Bomber Still Unconscious
Fog lifts on Myanmar-North Korea barter
Burma implicated in major oil fraud
ICC for Libya ... Why Not Burma?
China Is Your Special Friend
Aust publisher faces court in Burma
Cease-fire Groups Wary as Burmese Army Buildup Continues
Could Asean Drift Apart?
Myanmar airline launches Yangon-Guangzhou direct flight service
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The Privileged Prisoner
By WAI MOE Thursday, March 3, 2011

Ross Dunkley, the Australian co-founder and CEO of The Myanmar Times who is currently facing charges of assaulting a Burmese sex worker, is being treated far better than most of his fellow inmates at Rangoon's notorious Insein Prison, according to prison sources.

Dunkley, who appeared at a township court in Rangoon on Thursday for his second hearing since his arrest on Feb. 11, was stripped of his positions at The Myanmar Times and faces an uncertain future after more than a decade of doing business in Burma.

Although his current situation is a far cry from the life he had at his home on Rangoon's upscale Inya Road, it is still not as bad as that of most of the more than 10,000 detainees in Insein Prison. Sources at the prison say he is receiving “exclusive treatment” in a special cell built for high-profile prisoners.

The sources said that since his arrest three weeks ago, Dunkley has been staying in cell 14 of cell block 1, which was specially remodeled in the 1990s, when Than Tun, a prominent businessman, was detained there.

“Unlike other cells in Burma’s prisons, this one has a Western-style toilet and a bathroom,” said a prison official, speaking on condition of anonymity.

By contrast, ordinary prisoners—including an estimated 2,200 political prisoners—must use bowls placed on the concrete floors of their 12 foot by 8 foot cells as toilets.

“His [Dunkley's] cell has wooden floors,” said the prison official. “We put him there because he is a well-known foreigner who has close relations with our bosses.”

The official said that Dunkley declined to eat the boiled rice he was offered for breakfast, so he eats food and instant coffee sent to him by friends and colleagues, including Tin Tun Oo, who replaced Dunkley as CEO of The Myanmar Times.

In addition to the food supplied to him from outside the prison, Dunkley receives prison meals that include servings of chicken, eggs or fish, unlike the plain dishes of low-grade rice, fish paste, boiled beans and vegetable soup given to other prisoners.

“The rice we give him isn't of especially high quality, but it is cooked in the prison hospital, so it's better than what we give to the rest of the prisoners,” said the official.

One of the greatest dangers facing prisoners in Burma is infection and other health problems caused by unsanitary conditions. According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association of Political Prisoners-Burma (AAPP), 146 political prisoners have died in Burma’s prisons since 1988, while hundreds of non-political prisoners are believed to have died in prisons and labor camps.

Among the political prisoners who have died in a Burmese prison is one foreigner—Leo Nichols, the honorary consul for Norway, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland. He died in Insein Prison in 1996 within two months of his arrest on charges of operating an unregistered telephone and fax machine.

Although Dunkley isn't likely to meet a similar fate, a prolonged spell in Insein prison, even under special conditions, could take a toll.

“Dunkley's new life in Insein Prison will be a struggle, even though he's a foreigner facing non-political charges and receiving special treatment,” said AAPP joint secretary Bo Kyi, who spent seven years in prison as political prisoner.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20871
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Suspected Bomber Still Unconscious
By BA KAUNG Thursday, March 3, 2011

The Rangoon man who injured himself and seven others when he set off a bomb on Sunday is still unconscious in Insein General Hospital. Meanwhile, Burma's state-run media on Tuesday said authorities had found improvised explosive material in his family home.

The New Light of Myanmar (NLM) reported that the suspected bomber has been identified as Zaw Min Than, aged 26, and that he suffered serious injury to his left foot, right calf and fingers. Three others are reported to be in a critical condition. However, the other four, including a 3-year-old girl, did not sustain serious injuries, the newspaper said.

Rangoon officials search Zaw Min Than's home in Rangoon. (Photo: The New Light of Myanmar)
Earlier reports suggested that Zaw Min Than accidentally detonated an explosive device near a shopping store in Rangoon's Insein Township where he lives. Tuesday's report said that after a search of his home, officials seized an improvised bomb made of a detonator, four cells, a watch, TNT, and other materials.

The authorities have not linked Zaw Min Than with any anti-government group. But according to unconfirmed reports, the authorities found his cellphone at the bombing scene, and based on the contacts on the phone, they are tracking down members of the outlawed All Arakan Students' and Youths' Congress (AASYC), which is based in Thailand.

On Thursday, the AASYC told The Irrawaddy that they denied any link to the explosion and its suspected bomber. “We had no idea about this incident,” said Tun Zaw, the group's general secretary. On the AASYC website, the group says its policy is to engage “in non-violent opposition to the Burmese military regime, in alliance with any and all democratic organizations.”

Zaw Min Than faces the prospect of lengthy imprisonment if he recovers from his injuries, and is tried for making or detonating the bomb.

In 2009, a group of 23 Arakanese young men were arrested for alleged connections with the AASYC and receiving financial support from it for anti-government activities. According to Asian Human Rights Watch, 13 of the suspects were tortured before being sentenced to lengthy prison sentences on charges of contacts with illegal associations and of trading in drugs and explosives.

Several former political prisoners in Rangoon told The Irrawaddy that they were questioned by Burmese authorities over Sundays' incident. http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20868
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ASIA TIMES ONLINE:Mar 4, 2011
Fog lifts on Myanmar-North Korea barter
By Bertil Lintner

BANGKOK - With the Middle East and North Africa in turmoil, North Korea risks losing some of its oldest and most trusted customers for military hardware. Pyongyang has over the years sold missiles and missile technology to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Syria and Iran, representing an important source of export earnings for the reclusive regime. The growing uncertainty among those trade partners could explain why North Korea is now cementing ties with a client much closer to home: military-run Myanmar.

In April 2007, North Korea and Myanmar resumed diplomatic relations. Those ties were after North Korean agents planted a bomb in the then capital of Yangon in October 1983, killing 18 high-ranking South Korean officials who were on a visit to the country. Only days after the restoration of diplomatic ties, a North Korean freighter, the MV Kang Nam I, docked at Thilawa port, 30 kilometers south of Yangon.

Officials claimed at the time that the ship docked to seek shelter from a storm. However, two local reporters working for a Japanese news agency were turned back and briefly detained when they went to the port to investigate, indicating that there could have been other, more secret reasons for the Kang Nam I's arrival.

The same ship was put on global radar in June 2009 when it was pursued by the USS John S McCain and then reversed course. It was believed that it was on its way back to Myanmar with more unspecified cargo. Military observers tied the Kang Nam 1 incidents to the arrival of another North Korean ship, MV Bong Hoafan, at a Myanmar port in November 2006 before the resumption of diplomatic relations. Curiously, it was also reported to have been "forced" to seek shelter at a Myanmar port because of "adverse weather conditions".

An Asia Times Online investigation has found that those were not isolated incidents. Shipping records from Myanmar show that North Korean ships have been docking regularly at Thilawa and Yangon ports for almost a decade. Even the ill-fated Kang Nam 1 had docked in Myanmar long before the 2007 and 2009 incidents. The ship made its first voyage to Myanmar in February 2002, carrying what was declared as "general cargo," according to the shipping records.

North Korean shipments are almost invariably specified as "general goods" and sometimes "concrete", but both in and outgoing cargo is usually handled by Myanmar's Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, which supervises the country's defense industries, the armed forces' Directorate of Procurement, and the military's own holding company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH).

When the MV Bochon, another North Korean ship, arrived at Thilawa in October 2002, the Myanmar military's high command sent a document marked "top secret" to the port authorities, requesting them to clear the entire docking area for "security reasons". They were also advised, according to the shipping records, that some "important cargo" would be offloaded within 36 hours.

When the MV Chong Gen approached Thilawa on April 12, 2010, it asked for permission to fly a Myanmar flag instead of its North Korean one, according to the shipping records. The captain also requested a Myanmar SMC card (smart media card) for a mobile phone, along with coastal charts. These were odd requests for a ship that was officially carrying 2,900 tons of cement and 2,105 tons of "general goods" from the North Korean port of Nampo.

Bizzare barter

Indeed, the requests made by North Korean ships traveling to Myanmar have often been outright bizarre. MV Du Man Gang appears to be one of the most regular North Korean visitors at Thilawa. On one of its many trips to Myanmar, in July 2009 it asked for 150 crates of Myanmar brandy. In March 2010, when another North Korean ship, the MV Kan Baek San, arrived in Myanmar, the North Korean ambassador asked for an unspecified quantity of Myanmar vodka to be sent to the ship, according to the shipping records.

The involvement of North Korean diplomats in these shipments is otherwise more convoluted. In September 2009, the MV Sam Il Po docked at a smaller terminal in Yangon and both the North Korean ambassador Kim Sok Chol and defense attach? Kim Kwang Chol were present to inspect the cargo along with Lt Col Thein Toe from the Myanmar military. The unspecified cargo was received by UMEH, which in return supplied 1,500 tons of rice which was taken back to North Korea.

That was not the only incident when North Korean freighters returned with Myanmar rice. The MV So Hung arrived in November 2008 with 295 tons of material for the Ministry of Defense and left with 500 tons of rice. When the MV Du Man Gang docked in July 2009 it left with not only brandy but also 8,000 tons of rice. In June 2010, the MV An San arrived with 7,022 tons of what was alleged to be "concrete" and left in July with 7,000 tons of rice.

All this seems to confirm what diplomatic observers have long suspected: that Myanmar and North Korea, two countries with limited access to bank and other international financial trade facilities, are engaged in barter trade. Myanmar's ruling generals want more weapons but often don't have the foreign funds handy to pay for them - or at least they don't want such transactions to show up in their bank records. North Korea, meanwhile, is starved for food and likewise lacks the finances to pay for imports.

When money is involved in North Korea-Myanmar trade, transactions are always done in cash and thus untraceable. Like all other ships, North Korean ones have to pay port fees in Myanmar. The MV Du Man Gang, for instance, asked to pay US$30,994 in cash rather than make a bank transfer. Other ships have made similar requests which has led to speculation about the kind of currency the North Koreans, notorious for counterfeiting US dollars, may be using.

Large quantities of counterfeit US notes have recently shown up in areas around Myanmar. In July and August 2009, a customer tried to change U$10,000 in fake notes at the State Bank of India's main office in Imphal, Manipur. The fake bills were all of the US$100 denomination and of excellent quality, according to sources. It was the first such incident in Manipur. Although it is not clear whether the bogus notes were printed in North Korea, Imphal is located just over 100 kilometers from Moreh, an Indian town opposite Myanmar's Tamu where a virtually unregulated border trade is booming.

Trade between North Korea and Myanmar is also apparently being done through front companies. In June 2010, the North Korean freighter MV Ryu Gong arrived with 12,838 tons of what was also described as "cement". While the shipment was handled by the Ministry of Heavy Industry 2, the stated recipient was a little-known company known as Shwe Me, or "black gold" in Myanmar.

Port documents show that the company has nearly a million US dollars in assets but what it actually intended to do with all that cement is unclear. Just as puzzling is the involvement of Singapore-based shipping companies, which handle most of the cargo's logistics and operate under innocuous sounding names including words like "maritime" and "services". One of the companies has a distinct Korean name but is actually based in Singapore.

Port records point to a brisk trade between North Korea and Myanmar, all of which is handled by Myanmar's military rather than civilian-owned private companies. In August last year, then prime minister and now president Thein Sein visited Pyongyang. According to the official Korea Central News Agency, he said that "the government of Myanmar will continue to strive for strengthening and development of the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries."

With those intentions publicly well-stated, Myanmar may well be on its way in overtaking Egypt, Libya and other traditional military trading partners in the Middle East and North Africa as North Korea's main market for its military hardware.

Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and the author of several books on Myanmar. He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MC04Ae01.html
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Burma implicated in major oil fraud
By JOSEPH ALLCHIN
Published: 3 March 2011

An investigation in the Maldives has implicated the Burmese military and a number of private companies in an $US800 million money-laundering scam involving the sale of Maldivian cut-price oil.

The allegations were made after the Maldivian government in March last year hired a UK-based auditing firm called Grant Thornton to investigate the corruptive practices of former president and autocrat Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who left office in 2008.

The audit unearthed fudged accounts that showed that the unit prices of barrels of oil differed in invoices for different accounts, with one irregularity amounting to over $US5 million. A Maldivian government official who asked to remain anonymous told DVB that the total scale of the fraud was more than half the country’s GDP.

The scam, which can be read in full here, used a joint venture between the Singaporean subsidiary of the Maldivian State Trading Organisation (STO), set up by Gayoom’s half brother, Abdul Yameen, and a Malaysian company called Mocom, also based in Singapore. Amongst the management and directors of the joint venture were several people of Burmese origin, namely Gemyl Aung and Kamal Bin Rashid, also known as Myint Lwin Oo.

Ships carrying the oil from Singapore, which had been channeled through the two companies, had records demonstrating that they embarked but never arrived in the Indian Ocean archipelago. Instead the vessels were selling on the bounty to international buyers on the black market, including Burma’s military junta. The Burmese then helped hide the fraudulent transactions to create a “super profit”, as the Grant Thornton audit puts it.

The companies which show up on invoices seen by the auditors were the powerful Kanbawza Bank, which is owned by junta crony Aung Ko Win, the Golden Aaron Pte Ltd. and SH Trading, both owned by members of the same family which owns Asia World, namely Steven Law and his Singaporean wife, Cecilia NG. The junta parastatal company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH), also appeared to have played a role.

The Singaporean police are reportedly investigating the situation, but failed to respond to DVB’s request for confirmation.

Both Gayoom and Yameen both strenuously deny the charges. Gayoom claims that the investigation is an attempt to “tarnish [his] reputation” following his party’s recent success in local elections in the Maldives. Yameen meanwhile described the charges as “absolute rubbish”, according to the Minivan News.

The Gayoom regime was unseated in a 2008 election and replaced by the government of Mohamed Nasheed, who had been a political prisoner under Gayoom. The former president had been Asia’s longest serving head of state after coming to power in 1978.
http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-implicated-in-major-oil-fraud/14566
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COMMENTARY
ICC for Libya ... Why Not Burma?
By HTET AUNG Thursday, March 3, 2011

2011 has begun with a series of pro-democracy uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East quickly nicknamed by the world's media the “Jasmine Revolution.” But the sweet scent of freedom drifting across the Maghreb got lost along the way in Libya.

In mid-February, inspired by successful demonstrations that ousted leaders in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, disgruntled Libyans took to the streets to protest the stagnant corrupt rule of Muammar al-Qadhafi, who has ruled his so-called “Jamahiriya,” his very own people's republic, with an iron fist since staging a coup in 1969.

Unlike the pro-democracy demonstrations in other parts of the Arab world, Libya's unarmed protesters were met with the wrath of al-Qadhafi who cracked down harshly on the opposition, deploying his loyal armed forces, mercenaries, and even fighter jets.

On Feb. 25, the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) convened a special session in Geneva. It quickly passed a resolution by consensus calling for the Council “to dispatch an independent, international Commission of Inquiry [CoI] to Libya to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the country.”

The day after the HRC resolution, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a historic resolution to impose sanctions against the al-Qadhafi regime, including a referral of the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate whether the Libyan regime had committed “a crime against humanity” in attacking its own citizens.

In a rare move in recent UN history, the five nations that wield veto power—the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia—were united in voting for action against the al-Qadhafi regime.

The ICC initiated on Feb. 28 a process to decide whether to open an investigation on crimes against humanity in Libya. ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said that there would be no impunity for guilty leaders, and that he would make a decision “without delay,” according to the UN News Center.

Within days, the world body proved that it can be strong and effective in dealing with a rogue regime, and it must be commended for that. But why then is the UN so impotent in dealing with the military junta of Burma?

The answer is plain and simple: in condemning the Libyan government, the UNSC spoke with one voice, an approach that has been totally absent in the case of Burma.

The Burmese people suffered under a barrage of brutal crackdowns each and every time they have stood to call for a transition from military dictatorship to democracy. All the Burmese protesters can expect is: to be shot in the street; to be arrested and tortured; to be forced to flee into exile; or to receive an inhumane prison sentence.

In 2007, Burma's military rulers showed their utter contempt by ordering their troops to fire on not just unarmed protesters but Buddhist monks and nuns.

In 2003, the junta committed an act of thuggery by staging a premeditated attack on pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her motorcade in Depayin, a town in central Burma, with loyalist thugs killing an estimated 70 activists using little more than sticks and stones and their bare fists.

In the past 20 years, the Burmese army has burnt down more than 3,000 villages in Burma's frontier ethnic states, causing a half million displaced persons, mostly ethnic minority groups, in jungles or fleeing across the border into Thailand.

All these human right abuses have been well documented in resolutions, and have been heard at the UN General Assembly and the HRC every year since the early 1990s.

However, the Burmese military junta continues to enjoy impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The lack of the independent CoI has exacerbated the situation, and has convinced the generals that they are untouchable in any of the international legal arenas.

In early 2010, Tomás Quintana, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights to Burma, took an unprecedented move in a report to the HRC, calling for a CoI into possible crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma. Neither the HRC nor the UNSC have acted on this recommendation to date.

The Asian Legal Resource Center (ALRC) issued a press release on March 3 regarding its separate submission to the 16th regular session of the HRC [Feb. 28 to March 25] in Geneva. In its press release, the ALRC referred to the Japanese government delegation's questions to the Burmese delegation during the session, and said:

“The problem of systemic rights abuse in Myanmar [Burma] is less a problem of refusal to engage with the standards of the international community, less a problem of engagement with international law, than it is a problem of engagement with domestic law, or rather, with any standards of law whatsoever.”

The statement also pointed out the weakness of the HRC, stating: “The gap between domestic law and reality in Myanmar is not a simple consequence of practices that engender rights abuses; it is a matter of policy. This is a primary cause of chronic rights abuse in Myanmar, yet it is one that has not yet been properly or fully acknowledged by the Human Rights Council.”

Unfortunately, the people of Burma never hear one voice from the UNSC, and the consequence is a lack of any international legal framework to address the junta's continuing code of human rights violations.

Is it because Burmese strongman Snr-Gen Than Shwe has not bombed peaceful demonstrators in the streets like al-Qadhafi? Is it because the junta has successfully covered up its bloody tracks? Is it because there has never been a division within Burma's military ranks?

Although the current state violence in Libya is quite different from the incidents in Burma in terms of intensity and scope, the people of Burma have long deserved that the UN proclaims the injustice in the country with one clear voice.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=20865
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China Is Your Special Friend

March 3, 2011: The new democracy in Myanmar is very much the same old military dictatorship. The recent elections were rigged and the parliament is full of supporters of the generals. Thus the military has gotten 23 percent of the government budget for the next year. The generals expect to get more for their money, mainly because North Korea just lost a lot of its weapons customers with the overthrow of several Arab dictatorships. As a result, Myanmar can demand more for less from a desperate North Korea. The trade has been going on since 2007, when diplomatic relations were resumed with North Korea, and a barter trade (rice from Myanmar for weapons and other goods from North Korea) established. This avoided problems with international embargos on North Korean arms exports. Cargo ships coming from North Korea had cargos described as "cement" and "general cargo." These ships were unloaded in heavily guarded, military controlled, port areas.

The extra cash for the military is going to pay for new weapons from China and Russia. Later this month, Russia is expected to begin delivering 20 MiG-29 fighters that were ordered two years ago. Indian firms will provide maintenance and technical support. India has long used MiG-29s and has built an infrastructure to support this aircraft. While most Indians do not approve of the generals running Myanmar, they do appreciate the cooperation of the generals in defeating tribal separatists and communist rebels in India's northeast. India is also building a road to connect with Myanmar in the northeast, to encourage trade and help build the economy in the thinly populated area that borders China and Myanmar.

China has replaced Thailand as the largest foreign investor in Myanmar. The Myanmar generals see China as their economic savior, and China is eager to have an ally so close to India. Increased maritime trade with Myanmar is but the beginning of a process that will lead to Chinese warships eventually operating out of Myanmar ports. This is a nightmare for India, which is trying to make nice with the Myanmar generals, in an attempt to halt the growth of Chinese influence, and presence, in the area.

February 27, 2011: A bomb exploded in the capital, wounding four people. No one took credit for it.

February 19, 2011: Tribal rebels in the east killed four civilians, during an encounter with troops. http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/myanmar/articles/20110303.aspx
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Aust publisher faces court in Burma
Ron Corben
March 3, 2011 - 8:24PM
AAP

Australian Ross Dunkley, publisher of the Burma-based Myanmar Times, faced a special court on Thursday on charges of breaching Burma's immigration laws and assault, legal sources said.

Dunkley, 55, has been held at Burma's notorious Insein prison since his arrest on February 10, in a case some analysts say is tied to a fight for control of the Rangoon-based publishing company, Myanmar Consolidated Media (MCM).

Dunkley and investors including Australian mining magnate Bill Clough hold a 49 per cent share in MCM. The remaining 51 per cent share is held by Burmese businessman Dr Tin Htun Oo.
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An agreement was reached last month to appoint Dr Htun Oo as chief executive officer and editor of the Burmese-language Myanmar Times.

Mr Clough, also CEO of Twinza Oil, with a $30 million stake in Burma's oil industry, took up the post as acting managing director and editor-in-chief of the English-language version of the Myanmar Times.

David Armstrong, chairman of Post Media, an investor in MCM, said the agreement reached marked a "compromise" between the foreign and Burmese shareholders.

Mr Dunkley's lawyer, Saw Yan Naing, told The Irrawaddy on-line magazine the Australian faced two charges - breaching Burma's immigration laws and assault of a Burmese woman, translated as harassing a woman's dignity.

Saw Yan Naing said the trial could take up to three months. A guilty verdict on either charge could mean a prison term.

Mr Armstrong expressed his support for Dunkley as he faced court on Thursday.

"I'm sure he,s innocent of these charges," Mr Armstrong told AAP.

He said Dunkley's lawyers were expecting up to ten witnesses to be cross-examined by the prosecution.

Dunkley purchased a Cambodian daily, the Phnom Penh Post, in 2008 and had invested in media in Vietnam in the 1990s. In 2000, he took a share in the Myanmar Times, which also publishes two Burmese-language magazines and employs more than 350 people.

Human rights activists say the fighting over control of MCM reflects the military's moves to tighten its grip on the media.

© 2011 AAP http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/aust-publisher-faces-court-in-burma-20110303-1bgch.html
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Cease-fire Groups Wary as Burmese Army Buildup Continues
By SAI ZOM HSENG Wednesday, March 2, 2011

The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the strongest ethnic armed group to reject the Burmese junta’s Border Guard Force (BGF) plan, is watching recent moves by the regime to increase its troop strength in northern Shan state with concern.

A UWSA officer speaking on condition of anonymity said that the group has been on the alert since the regime recently started sending several battalions and tanks to areas bordering Wa-controlled territory.

“We have been watching closely since they started sending tanks and troops to Mong Naung through Tangyan at the end of February because Tangyan is not very far from our headquarters,” he said, speaking to The Irrawaddy on Wednesday.

However, the troop buildup in the area is not directed at the UWSA, but at Brigade 1 of the Shan State Army-North (SSA-North), according to Aung Kyaw Zaw, a Burmese military observer based on the Sino-Burma border.

The SSA-North has also been pressured to join the BGF plan, but the group's Brigade 1 has refused and engaged in several skirmishes with regime troops since last September.

Brigade 1, led by Col Pang Fa, is the strongest of the SSA-North's three brigades, with an estimated 3,000 troops. Brigades 3 and 7 have already joined the BGF and are now standing as local militia groups.

According to Aung Kyaw Zaw, the regime's reinforcements in the area are mostly just part of an effort to increase pressure on SSA-North Brigade 1.

“If they really wanted to defeat the SSA-North, they would need to send several infantry divisions, as they did when they seized control of Manerplaw,” he said, referring to the former headquarters of the non-cease-fire Karen National Union (KNU).

One reason the junta is not likely to attack the SSA-North breakaway faction is the proximity of the UWSA and another group, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-South), which continues to fight the regime.

At the end of February, the SSA-South captured three military outposts controlled by Pa-O Phyu militia groups in southern Shan State, killing six and seizing over 100 kg of opium and chemicals used to process heroin.

Both the UWSA and the SSA-South have offered support to SSA-North Brigade 1 since it resumed hostilities with the Burmese army. The UWSA source confirmed that his group has provided ammunition and food to the SSA-North, but declined to say if it took part in skirmishes with Burmese troops.

The UWSA and the SSA-North are both members of the recently formed Committee for the Emergence of a Federal Union, an umbrella group of anti-regime forces that also includes the KNU, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and several other ethnic armed groups. The SSA-South is not a member, but has reportedly considered joining.

Meanwhile, relations between the Burmese junta and the KIO have worsened since the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the KIO's armed wing, clashed with regime troops in early February.

According to a KIO source, the KIA had planned to destroy thousands of acres of poppies in the Satone area of Kachin State, but is wary of engaging a BGF formed by another ethnic Kachin armed group.

“The regime has been putting pressure on us at our liaison office in Myitkyina. We planned to destroy the poppy fields in Satone, but if we did, it would start big trouble between us and the Kachin BGF,” the source said, adding that the Burmese army's Northern Regional Command also has several battalions in the area.

The junta has called on ethnic cease-fire groups to transform themselves into BGFs under Burmese military command. However, most armed groups, including the KIA, UWSA and the SSA-North, have refused and called for political dialogue.
http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20862
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Could Asean Drift Apart?
By GEOFF WADE / ASIA SENTINEL Thursday, March 3, 2011

Last year the Association of Southeast Asian Nations celebrated its 43rd anniversary with fanfare, but cracks were visible in the organization.

Thanks to the lopsided development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region, propelled by China with the help of the Asian Development Bank, the area along China's border has been transformed into a region of its own—a trend that could permanently divide Asean.

The Greater Mekong Subregion, or GMS, nominally comprises Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam as well as Thailand and two Chinese provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi.

However, in reality, China in toto is a member with national-level technocrats engaging in GMS initiatives, and through this massive membership imbalance, the country of 1.3 billion overwhelms the polities and economies of mainland Southeast Asia.

About US$11 billion has been injected into infrastructure investment in the GMS region over the last decade with one-third coming from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This aid has been channeled into three so-called economic corridors—multi-country transport arteries now being built across mainland Southeast Asia.

The North-South Economic Corridor connects Kunming to Bangkok, while the East-West Corridor ties the Indian Ocean coast of Burma with the South China Sea ports of Vietnam. The Southern Economic Corridor connects Bangkok with Phnom Penh, Ho Chi Minh City and Vung Tau. China openly declares that GMS is the most effective economic mechanism in the region.

The Mekong River—after which the grouping is named—is itself a bone of contention. China already has four dams on the upper part of the river, currently invests in three hydropower dam projects in Laos and another in Cambodia, and plans 12 more on the lower part.

Under a new initiative launched by Chinese President Hu Jintao in July 2009 Yunnan province has been designated as the bridgehead to the mainland of Southeast Asia, through transportation routes, mines, energy infrastructure and foreign trade production bases in mainland Southeast Asia.

The China- Asean Free Trade Agreement, or CAFTA, initiated on 1 January 2010, has greatly increased Chinese trade and investment in the mainland Southeast Asia states. In these increasing interactions, among China's aims is the promotion of renminbi settlement in trade exchanges with GMS partners.

In the first half of 2010, the Agricultural Bank of China started a renminbi-settlement program for cross-border trade with Yunnan, part of China's push to internationalize its currency. Up to 50 percent of cross-border trade is now settled in renminbi.

The funding for economic development of mainland Southeast Asia derives from both ADB coffers and Chinese loans and investment, often difficult to distinguish. China is establishing a US$10 billion China-Asean Fund on Investment Cooperation to support regional infrastructural development. Integration measures include communications and transport infrastructure.

An integrated railway system will connect all GMS countries by 2020, with China as key in providing skills and funding. China-funded high-speed railways and roads will connect Kunming with Yangon, Bangkok, Vientiane and Phnom Penh, while a network of hydro-dams, power-transmission grids and energy pipelines also tie the mainland states to China.

The Kyaukphyu-Kunming oil and gas pipeline, connecting the Burmese coast with Yunnan, when completed in 2013, will reduce China's reliance on the Straits of Malacca for its vital energy supply.

Investment funds have also flowed into these countries from China in much greater volumes.

More than US$8 billion of Chinese funds has been invested in Burma since March 2010 in hydropower, oil and gas, and mining.

By July 2010, Cambodia had 360 Chinese investment projects, the value of agreements totaling US$80 billion.

In November, Wu Bangguo, chairman of China's National People's Congress, visited Cambodia and signed 16 more deals totaling US$6.4 billion.

The degree to which Chinese interests are gaining control over most of the upstream industrial sectors in Vietnam is evident from the official estimate that about 90 percent of engineering, procurement and construction contracts are won by Chinese firms.

Numbers of Chinese people moving into these countries are burgeoning.

Laos, a country of 7 million, estimates 400,000 illegal immigrants from China are in the country.

In the cultural sphere, the countries report increased education in the Chinese language, with Cambodia now claiming the best Chinese language curricula in Southeast Asia and schools staffed with hundreds of teachers from China.

This flurry of developments along its border and the growing Chinese engagement with the countries of mainland Southeast Asia—in effect dividing Asean—have not gone unnoticed by regional powers.

Japan has met with the Mekong nations of Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam, without including China, assuring them of assistance.

Japan's official development assistance committed to the Mekong region over the coming three years is US$ 5.9 billion and more private investment in the GMS is encouraged.

Korea has also declared intentions to participate in GMS development, particularly in terms of transforming transport corridors into full-fledged economic corridors and addressing environmental issues.

In a July 2010 speech in Hanoi, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of US interests in the South China Sea and noted that the US saw its relationship with Vietnam "not only as important on its own merits, but as part of a strategy aimed at enhancing American engagement in the Asia-Pacific and in particular Southeast Asia."

Recent US inclusion in the East Asian Summit partially aims at countering perceived Chinese hegemony in mainland Southeast Asia.

The idea of "Asean centrality" in regional architecture, being widely promoted by western interests, is premised on two conditions: that Asean will develop sufficient weight to constitute a bloc, and that members will adopt a common stand on key issues.

Neither condition is likely to be realized, much less maintained, in the near future.

Asean states show an unwillingness to surrender any sovereignty to a central administration and the inability of the body to take unified positions on international issues.

In turn, new physical infrastructure connections, economic interactions, and intimate political and military engagements with China increasingly divide mainland Southeast Asian states from the maritime Asean countries.

Burma, Cambodia and Laos are already virtual client states of China, while Vietnam and Thailand are economically beholden to the economic behemoth.

Asean's most recent response to threat of division is a call for more "connectivity" among its members.

A master plan—announced at the 17th Asean Summit in Hanoi in October 2010, for physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity—openly recognized emerging division: "This is not likely to be smooth sailing, especially since the two programs [Asean and GMS] have been pursuing parallel efforts and have sunk substantial investments in certain areas of cooperation."

With growing distance between the mainland and maritime states, the likelihood of an Asean Community coming into being by 2015 is increasingly slim. Together with China, the mainland states are now forming a Greater Mekong Region, and the links being developed will override those existing and planned among Asean states. Asean is indeed dividing.

These changes may simply reflect the mainland states' geographic proximity to China or could be a manifestation of a long Chinese tradition to either divide neighboring polities or incorporate them within the Chinese polity.

In either case, revival of a hierarchy is underway in mainland Asia, a phenomenon that some perceive as an indication of the Westphalian system's irrelevance to Asia.

Geoff Wade is a historian with interests in Sino-Southeast Asian relations over time and comparative historiography.
http://irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=20863
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Myanmar airline launches Yangon-Guangzhou direct flight service
English.news.cn 2011-03-03 17:26:46 FeedbackPrintRSS

YANGON, March 3 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar Airways International (MAI) launched its maiden flight between Yangon, Myanmar and Guangzhou, China on Thursday to boost exchange between the two cities, sources with the airline said.

Using Air Bus A-320, the flight will operate biweekly and special package tour will be planned later, it said.

The MAI represents another airline that link Yangon with the Chinese southern city after China Southern Airlines.

Another newly-bought A-320 aircraft of MAI, expected to arrive later this month, will be used to fly the routes of Yangon-New Delhi and Singapore-Jakarta-Singapore, while the A-330 aircraft, anticipated to reach by October, will be used to fly South Korea, Japan, United Arab Emirate and Qatar.

At present, MAI operates with three airbus of A-320 and one airbus of A-321 to Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Gaya and Siem Reap (Angkor Wat).

On Feb. 23, the MAI launched its inaugural flight between Yangon and Siem Reap (Angkor Wat), an ancient city of Cambodia, offering biweekly flights on Wednesday and Saturday.

The private-run MAI was once a joint venture set up by the state-run Myanmar Airways and a Singapore-based company in 1993.

In 2007, the Region Air of China's Hong Kong took over the stake from the Singapore's with 49 percent held by it, while the remainder 51 percent possessed by the state-run Myanmar Airways.

In May 2010, a giant Myanmar private company group, Kanbawza, took over the MAI for continuous operation under the government's privatization plan, buying up 80 percent stake of the airline with the remainder continued to be held by the government.

Besides the MAI flying internationally as Myanmar's national flag carrier, there are also 13 foreign airlines flying Yangon which comprise Air China, China Southern Airline, Thai Airways International, Indian Airlines, Qatar Airways, Silk Air, Malaysian Airlines, Bangkok Airways, Mandarin, Jetstar Asia, Phuket Airline, Thai Air Asia and Vietnam Airlines.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/travel/2011-03/03/c_13759814.htm