News & Articles on Burma-Saturday, 15 January, 2011

News & Articles on Burma
Saturday, 15 January, 2011
-------------------------------------------------------------
China strikes deal with Burma to guarantee oil supply
FMs address South China Sea, Myanmar issues
Will Tavoy be Burma’s Shenzhen?
Myanmar aims to privatize most state-owned businesses
Conscription and Parliament, the new weapons of the military junta
-----------------------------------------




China strikes deal with Burma to guarantee oil supply

China has put the final piece of its energy supply jigsaw in place, signing a deal with Burma that will make it impossible to choke off Beijing's oil supply.

By Malcolm Moore, Shanghai 9:00PM GMT 14 Jan 2011

In a move that was described as a "golden bridge of friendship", Burma's ruling junta has given Beijing permission to build and operate a wharf on Burma's west coast to receive tankers arriving from Africa and the Middle East and then pump their cargo overland to southern China.

The new facility, at the deep sea port at Kyauk Phyu, is the culmination of decades of planning by Beijing to safeguard its energy supply.

Currently, as much as 80 per cent of China's imported oil and gas is forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow bottleneck between Malaysia and Indonesia.

With an Indian naval base on the Andaman and Nicobar islands at the mouth of the straits, and with a large US Navy presence in the region, China has fretted for years that its trade and energy routes are vulnerable to a blockade.

Hu Jintao, the Chinese president, warned in 2003 that some "big countries" were attempting to "control the transportation channel at Malacca".
In response, China has crafted a strategy known as the "string of pearls", a chain of naval bases across the Indian Ocean that could protect its tankers in case of emergency. These bases include Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

In addition, China has patiently courted the Burmese junta, sending an estimated £800 million worth of tanks, fighter jets and weapons to its southern neighbour during the 1990s to prop up the regime.

After signing a trade agreement in 1988, China has also helped to rebuild Burma's roads and railways and even sent People's Liberation Army advisers to provide guidance and expertise.

Last year, Hu Jintao pledged unconditional support to the Burmese regime, telling Than Shwe, one of Burma's most senior generals, that China's policy "will remain unchanged regardless of changes of the international situation".

In return, the Burmese junta has granted access to its rich natural resources and is now allowing China to make use of Burma's key geographical position on the Indian Ocean.

After China's tankers reach the deep sea port at Kyauk Phyu, oil and gas will be pumped through twin 500-mile pipelines to the province of Yunnan. The station will be operated by China National Petroleum Corporation, the country's largest oil company, and Qingdao Port, the ninth-largest port operator in the world.

The pipelines, which are already under construction, should be able to carry a daily maximum of 440,000 barrels of oil and 400 billion cubic feet of gas when they are completed in 2013.

In addition, China plans to build thousands of miles of new railways to connect the southern Chinese city of Kunming with ports across Burma and South East Asia, including Yangon, the former Burmese capital. Not only will China's partnership with Burma help safeguard its own energy supply, but it will also give Beijing a key strategic advantage over Japan and South Korea, who also rely on the Strait of Malacca for part of their energy supplies.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8259551/China-strikes-deal-with-Burma-to-guarantee-oil-supply.html
-----------------------------------------
FMs address South China Sea, Myanmar issues
Abdul Khalik and Andi Haswidi, The Jakarta Post, Lombok | Sat, 01/15/2011 4:18 PM | Headlines
A | A | A |

Indonesia is attempting to lead ASEAN to solve the region’s two most high-profile political and security issues — democracy in Myanmar and the overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea — during its chairmanship this year.

As foreign ministers of the 10-member grouping kick off their three-day retreat here Saturday, the dispute around the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and democracy in Myanmar will draw most of their attention.

Foreign Ministry’s director general for ASEAN affairs Djauhari Oratmangun said Indonesia was also keen to play a role as a broker in finding solutions to disputes in the South China Sea, one of the world’s key hotspot that has become a stage for China and the US to showcase their power in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the Lombok meeting, the ASEAN working group on the South China Sea would report to ASEAN senior officials on the results of its meeting with the Chinese delegation in Kunming, China, last December. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines have sovereignty claims in the resource-rich territory, while Indonesia does not.

While many expected the China-ASEAN meeting on the South China Sea to settle the problems, officials expressed pessimism about the mid-level meeting, which they said did not have the capacity to solve such a big issue.

The working group, in fact, only worked to clarify guidelines within the so-called declaration of codes of conduct (DOC) on the South China Sea that has existed for years.

“We haven’t agreed on the guidelines as there are still differences between China and ASEAN on the perceptions of the goals of the meeting. Actually, we are still trying to close that gap and creating
guidelines, which can evolve into codes of conduct that can be used to keep the area peaceful,” Djauhari said Friday.

Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said earlier that under Indonesia’s chairmanship, dialogue between ASEAN and China on the dispute would continue, with the hope that all parties could develop codes of conduct on how to jointly manage the area and settle the problem of claims to the sea.

“However, in the final analysis, it is the claimant states themselves that have to solve the claims problem bilaterally in accordance with international law,” Marty said.

Meanwhile, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan Win is scheduled to brief ASEAN counterparts on the country’s progress in executing its roadmap to democracy after it completed its general elections to elect members of parliament late last year.

Indonesian diplomats said the Myanmar issue was nearly resolved as no matter how deficient the process, the country had conducted a general election and Indonesia hoped the issue could be resolved during its chairmanship this year.

“ASEAN wants to declare the Myanmar issue settled once and for all this year. But first Myanmar must form a government that is inclusive based on their own constitution, which specifies that anyone
can hold a position within the government, including those that did not join the election,” the ministry’s director for ASEAN political and security affairs Ade Padmo Sarwano said Friday.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/15/fms-address-south-china-sea-myanmar-issues.html
----------------------------------------------------
NEWS ANALYSIS
Will Tavoy be Burma’s Shenzhen?
By HTET AUNG Saturday, January 15, 2011

Looking to the example of its northern neighbor, Burma is seeking to become Asia's next miracle economy by establishing a special economic zone (SEZ) in the southern port city of Tavoy. The plan, which will see an estimated US $8 billion pumped into the project by Thai investors, is to revive Burma's moribund economy by following the model of Shenzhen, the first SEZ created as part of Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's sweeping economic reforms in the late 1970s.

Interest in the project has grown steadily since May 2008, when the foreign ministers of Thailand and Burma signed a memorandum of understanding on the sidelines of a regional gathering in Singapore. It took another step forward in November of last year, when Burma's ruling military regime reached a final agreement with Italian-Thai Development PCL, the Bangkok-based company that was awarded the contract to carry out the project.

“Than Shwe said he wanted this project to be like the Shenzhen economic zone,” Italian-Thai president Premchai Karnasuta said at the time, referring to the Burmese junta's top general, Snr-Gen Than Shwe.

But despite speculation that this could finally be the first step toward real prosperity in Burma, questions remain about the viability and likely long-term impact of the Dawei Development Project, as the Tavoy SEZ is officially known.

Although it is impossible at this stage to say whether Tavoy stands any real chance of matching Shenzhen's success, we can at least ask if the Burmese project meets the same conditions that helped turn Shenzhen into a platform for transforming China's economy.

As Hongyi Harry Lai, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore's East Asian Institute, has noted, Shenzhen's development was far from smooth. But it ultimately overcame its many problems through a combination of factors, not the least of which was radical change within China's government.

By looking at Lai's 2006 paper, “SEZs and Foreign Investment in China: Experience and Lessons for North Korean Development,” and other academic studies of China's SEZs, we can get a better sense of the challenges that lie ahead for the Tavoy SEZ and determine whether it is indeed set to become the answer to Burma's economic woes.

Administrative Reform

The first hurdle facing China's SEZs was the country's command economy, which was built on a system of centralized political control. To attract foreign investment, the administrative mechanism had to be radically reformed to reduce red tape in the SEZs, as well as fight corruption and provide strong incentives to foreign investors.

As steps toward improving Shenzhen's administration, the local government was downsized and the number of officials was cut by 65 percent, including a reduction in the number of vice-mayors from seven to three. Three different departments responsible for economic policies became accountable to the mayor, who became the most authoritative person in the SEZ.

Following last year's election, Burma will also undergo changes in its administrative structure, introducing a new bicameral Parliament and a civilian government headed by a president. However, it will be interesting to see whether the new government will initiate the radical changes needed to fight the deep-rooted corruption and incompetent bureaucratic governance that have resulted in decades of economic stagnation despite huge revenues from the sale of offshore natural gas to Thailand.

As Italian-Thai's Premchai said, if Burma's generals want to see a China-like economic success at home, they will have to take bold step to change the current economic management of the country, which at present only benefits a handful of senior military leaders, their families and their cronies.

The Importance of Geography

Geography was obviously a major consideration when Tavoy was selected as the site of Burma's first SEZ. As a deep-sea port on the Andaman Sea coast, it is well-suited to serving as a regional transport and industrial hub, linking the rest of mainland Southeast Asia with the oil wells of the Middle East and the markets of the European Union.

In this respect, Tavoy clearly follows the example of the SEZs of China, which were also carefully chosen to exploit geographic advantages. As Lai observed of China's four SEZs: “Shenzhen is adjacent to Hong Kong, Zhuhai is connected to Macao by land, and Xiamen is close to Taiwan. … Shantou is located between Hong Kong and Taiwan. All of them are coastal cities and have access to seaports. They were in advantageous positions to expand trade with developed economies.”

Unlike the Chinese SEZs, however, Tavoy has only one strong economy in close proximity—that of Thailand. But even though it is far ahead of Burma in terms of economic development, Thailand is still behind many other countries in the region. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia all have stronger economies, and their interest in the Tavoy SEZ is still uncertain. Japan and South Korea, meanwhile, have yet to show any interest at all.

It seems, in fact, that the chief beneficiary of the Tavoy SEZ could end up being Thailand itself. A dual railway and highway link between Bangkok and Tavoy would increase the importance of the Thai capital in facilitating trade in the Mekong region, while plans to build an oil refinery and coal-powered electricity generating plant in Tavoy would ease environmental pressures on Thailand's heavily industrialized Eastern Seaboard.

To be of any real advantage to Burma's economy, the Tavoy SEZ would need to be connected to the rest of the country. However, as it stands, the only link between Tavoy and Rangoon, Burma's former capital and still its main commercial center, is a poorly maintained highway with very limited transport capacity.

Sociocultural Bonds

The success of the Chinese SEZs was partly due to their social and cultural ties with their neighbors. Businessmen based in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao were able to successfully navigate many of the problems they faced when they set up operations in the SEZs because they could communicate in their own language and in many cases had personal ties to the regions where they were doing business. As Lai noted: “Many overseas Chinese came from Guangdong and Fujian (the two provinces within which the SEZs are located) ... had become successful entrepreneurs, yet had strong sentimental bonds with their Chinese home towns.”

In Tavoy, however, it is a very different story. Thais and Burmese have historically regarded each other with mistrust. And although there are an estimated two million Burmese living in Thailand, they are unlikely to play any role in easing tensions that could easily arise. The vast majority belong to an exploited underclass of economic migrant workers eking out a living in industries shunned by Thais, with no capacity to invest in their homeland.

One potentially positive effect of the Tavoy SEZ, however, is that it could lower cross-border tensions by drawing many of these migrants back to Burma, just as the SEZs reduced the need for Chinese migrants to illegally enter Hong Kong. But for this to happen, workers would need to be given wages at least equivalent to what they could earn in Thailand.

Infrastructure Building

At the outset, China faced another challenging task: building modern infrastructure, including transportation, communications and a world-standard banking system. The recruitment of human resources was crucial to running the SEZs, demanding many energetic, innovative and educated young Chinese.

Recalling Shenzhen's past situation, Lai wrote: “The city also desperately needed talent, capital, infrastructure, and office buildings. ... From 1979 to 1983, the number of engineers grew from two to 732.” In such a short time, the Chinese government was able to overcome all these challenges.

The creation of the Tavoy SEZ will present the same problems, but on a far greater scale. Burma lacks not only decent infrastructure but also the human resources it will need to build it. Most skilled professional positions will likely be filled by Thais or other foreigners, while Burmese will do most of the unskilled work. Indeed, the abundance of cheap Burmese labor is one of the main attractions for Italian-Thai, which has said it will need “tons of workers” to complete the project, which will be carried out over the next 10 years in three overlapping five-year phases.

Although it is possible that many Burmese skilled laborers will be nurtured by the SEZ over the next 60 years that Italian-Thai holds the lease over the 250 square kilometer project area, the current shortage of properly educated Burmese—a legacy of the regime's past long-term closures of universities and continuing failure to raise educational standards—will hamper Burmese companies looking to get in on the action. This could easily translate into a permanent disadvantage for local businesses and force Burmese workers to remain in low-tier positions.

Political Stability

Another significant factor contributing to the success of the Chinese SEZs is the political stability not only of the SEZ areas but also of the whole country. Unlike China, however, Burma has encountered political instability both in major cities and in the frontier areas over the past 20 years.

Ethnic Mon and Karen armed resistance groups are still active in the area around the transnational railway and highway link that will be set up between Thailand and Burma. Despite the regime's success in reaching cease-fire agreements with more than a dozen ethnic armed groups over the past two decades, many of these are now in doubt due to the junta's pressure to transform the groups into Border Guard Forces under Burmese military command.

Apart from this instability, Burma is also currently facing economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union which are not likely to be lifted in the near future. In this situation, potential investors will have to carefully weigh the risks of investing in the Tavoy SEZ.

The Disadvantages of the SEZs

The factories that Italian-Thai will build in Tavoy SEZ include a steel mill, a fertilizer factory, a 4,000 MW coal-fired power plant and a petrochemical complex, including oil and gas storage facilities, an oil refinery, a gas separation plant and a combined cycle power plant.

In Thailand, there has been significant resistance to the construction of such factories on the grounds that they are known to cause a wide variety of serious environmental and health problems. Rather than address these concerns, however, Thai companies now see the Tavoy SEZ as way of avoiding them.

“By moving to Burma, [Thai companies] can leave behind the environmental problems of Map Ta Phut and Rayong courts,” said a recent editorial in The Bangkok Post.

Even Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has acknowledged this as a major consideration behind the decision to move to Tavoy. “Some industries are not suitable to be located in Thailand. This is why they decided to set up there,” he said in a recent television address.

Apart from the environmental issue, another major concern is the impact on local people. Land confiscation, forced relocation of residents from the SEZ area and the loss of farmers' livelihoods due to the transformation of arable land into a massive industrial zone are just some of the issues that will result from the establishment of the Tavoy SEZ.

These problems also exist in China's SEZs, with predictable consequences: “In 2004, the [Chinese] government admitted to 74,000 riots in the countryside, a seven-fold jump in ten years,” wrote Bhaskar Goswami in his paper, “Special Economic Zones: Lessons From China.”

According to Italian-Thai, 3,800 households will have to move to make way for the Tavoy SEZ. It has not said how this mass relocation will be carried out, but in Burma, forced relocation and land confiscations without compensation are considered the norm.

Like other major overseas business partners of the Burmese regime, Italian-Thai will be exposed to international condemnation if it does not act to ensure that such abuses do not take place in Tavoy. However, given its motives for pursuing the project in the first place, it may be unrealistic to expect that it will take its responsibilities in this area seriously.
Copyright © 2008 Irrawaddy Publishing Group | www.irrawaddy.org
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20531
--------------------------
Myanmar aims to privatize most state-owned businesses

Skeptics think the privatization effort is designed to make sure that most of the nation's business assets will be sold cheaply to people closely associated with government officials.
Source: AHN Reporter: Linda Young
Location: Yangon, Myanmar Published: January 14, 2011 12:04 p.m. EST
Topics: Government, Privatization, Politics, Business, Economy, Business And Finance, Parties And Movements

Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, plans to privatize 90 percent of state-owned industrial businesses, according to local news outlets.

However, it is not known if the percentage refers to the number of businesses or to revenue figures.

The secretive military junta government began selling off some state-owned businesses last year, shortly after the nation's first elections in 20 years. It sold about 250 state-owned businesses including movie theaters, warehouses, gas stations and port facilities on the Yangon River. The buyers were reportedly close associates of government officials.

Many observers think government officials want to sell as many state-owned businesses as possible before a new parliament is formed. Although the elections were not viewed as free and fair, civilians won a significant amount of power.

Deputy minister of industry Khin Maung Kyaw was quoted in local media as saying the sell-off was in order to put Myanmar in line with other democratic nations.

However, skeptics think the privatization effort is designed to make sure that most of the nation's business assets will be sold cheaply to people closely associated with government officials in the current regime in order to ensure the assets and wealth remain in their hands.

Read more: http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7021713678?Myanmar%20aims%20to%20privatize%20most%20state-owned%20businesses#ixzz1B7GxPSW5
------------------------------------------------
Myanmar: India: Burmese dissident:
Conscription and Parliament, the new weapons of the military junta

The dictatorship has introduced military service for adult males and females. A law drawn up before the elections on Nov. 7, but only made public in recent days. On January 31 the first sitting of the Chambers, the new "armed wing" of the junta in power for over 20 years. The institutional ...
Friday, January 14, 2011

New Delhi - The Burmese military junta has recently drafted a law providing for compulsory military service for men and women, without distinction. It was also fixed the date of the first session of Parliament - the result of the November 7 elections - scheduled for Jan. 31. The political framework is evolving in Myanmar, but power remains in the hands of the military junta, which represses all forms of democratic change. Little hope for change remains, for those who want to peacefully defeat the regime "from within".

On these latest events we have sought the opinion of Tint Swe, a member of the Council of Ministers of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), composed of refugees from Myanmar who fled after the 1990 elections won by the National League for Democracy, and never recognized by the junta. He fled to India in 1990 and since December 21, 1991 Tint Swe has lived in New Delhi, he is responsible for information on Asia South and East Timor in the Council.

The Burmese military regime has recently made a couple of important pronouncements. One of them was the so-called law which could draft all males between over men and women into military service. Nobody knows exactly why such a law was kept away from public eyes for two months and it is also bizarre that it was signed before the election held in 2010 because the Parliament is just about to convene.

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) got 259 out of 330 seats i.e. 78.48% in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and 129 out of 168 seats i.e. 76.79% in the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities). Those numbers are to be added by 25% selected army parliamentarians. So there is no question of possible rejection to any new law in the forthcoming parliament.

Before the National Service in Military (NSM) has been in practice but applied only for medical doctors. Out of the fresh MBBS and BDS degree holders some of them were inducted into military service for exact three years. They had to undergo a month-long basic military training at the Medical Corps Center. Regrettably it was found that majority of recruited doctors showed no signs of interest in army and 90% of them left after the term. Moreover the Tatmadaw (Army) had been short of physicians and dental surgeons because all Universities and schools were repeatedly shut down following after the 8888 student-led uprising. Then the military regime invented the Defense Services Medical Academy in 1992 providing early stipends and exclusive facilities only for them.

According to the Human Rights Watch, Burma has the largest number of child soldiers in the world. In 2002 there was a report named "My Gun was as Tall as Me: Child Soldiers in Burma" and in 2007 a new report was titled "Sold to be Soldiers: The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma."

In October 2006 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) handed over a list of 17 complaints of child recruitment to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In March 2007 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Burma, expressing grave concern at the continuing recruitment and use of child soldiers and strongly urging the regime to put an immediate end to the practice. In April 2007 the UN Security Council working group on children and armed conflict placed the situation of children affected by armed conflict in Myanmar on its agenda.

In February 2007 a Supplementary Understanding was signed by the SPDC and the International Labor Organization (ILO), which has been monitoring rampant forced labor practice in Burma. It provides for a complaint mechanism which allows the citizens to bring cases of forced labor under ILO Convention 29 Concerning Forced Labor to the ILO liaison office in Yangon. Since then ILO office in Rangoon is busy.

The public become aware of three military related laws, which were signed by SPDC chairman on 4th November 2010 and printed in the government gazette on 17th December 2010. According to the Peoples Military Service Act (SPDC Law # 27/2010) all males from 18 to 35 and all females between 18 and 27 years of age can be drafted into military service for two years. The ages for professionals are up to 45 for men and 35 for women for three years service. This new scheme is not only meant for emergency situation because they all could be called again when emergency arises.

So the new law will help to recruit soldiers at will. But for what purpose! The observers predict that more young Burmese will be leaving the country to escape from three years imprisonment if they fail to serve in the armed forces. They will do so because they dislike military service as the regime has severely damaged the integrity of once reputed Burma Army. They also do not think it is right while no possible foreign aggression is perceived and only ethnic armed groups are under attack and being escalated after the recent election.

So far there have been five million Burmese living or working in other countries. Twenty years ago before this military junta seized the power, for Burmese citizens going abroad was a luxury item and only political dissidents crossed the borders with Thailand, India, Bangladesh and China to seek shelter. The prediction that the election held on 7th November 2010 would not halt or stop refugee and migrant workers outflow is proved correct and an inventive category of Burmese in exile is coming up that is to evade military service made by law. As the junta foresees such an eviction the Act says that the order will be delivered either into the parson’s hand or his or her relatives’ hands.

The more controversial one is the new Reserved Forces Act (SPDC Law # 28/2010) signed three days before the election in 2010. The retired army personals have to serve in the reserved armed forces for next five years and they can retain the same military titles and uniforms and promotions and demotions are possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services can also extend that officer’s additional military service more years. So those who are loyal to C-i-C can be the permanent soldiers and the generals from the SPDC will be there forever.

The date for parliaments which will be met at 8:55 AM on 31st January 2011 was also broadcast on 10th January. Next morning 17 manual booklets for parliaments were also sold at government shops but an elected representative failed to buy a copy after 45 minutes in a long queue. Although the official price of a set is 2300 Kyat but it needs to pay 8500 Kyat (US$10) at road-side shops.

Apart from the USDP, other parties do not receive any official information on the date for parliaments. In three different levels of Assemblies there will be 1046 elected legislators added by a quarter of that number appointed by Chief of Army will be meeting then. But the list of military representatives is yet to be announced.

Those who will be in the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) and in the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities) can correctly guess that they will have to go Naypyitaw. But Region and State parliament representatives have no idea where they have to make debates and laws.

One parliamentarian who was also elected in 1990 election said, "We have waited for two decades to make our demands through the parliament. Now that the parliament is going to be convened, I hope I will be able to work for the good of the people and the country from within the system." He is from the National Democratic Force (NDF).

Many observers continue making mistake that NDF which won only 8 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw, 4 seats in the Amyotha Hluttaw and 4 seats in the Regions and States Parliament is the sister party of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which did not contest in the election held in 2010. The NDF is totally different from the Party for National Democracy (PND) which was purposely formed before 1990 election for fearing of dissolution of the NLD. When Aung San Suu Kyi received the leaders of NDF on 30th December, it was mere social or personal and no politics was discussed during an hour long meeting.

If not euphoria there are optimistic viewers who hoped for better life and condition after the election. However those optimists have seen no release of prisoners, no relaxation at all and more censorship instead since after the much-criticized election. So they have to look forward to convening the parliament and formation of the new government. Will they be lucky?

The restrictions for parliamentary conducts have been made known. Any protest staged within parliament is liable to two years of imprisonment. It is meant particularly for non-USDP representatives: 66 in the Pyithu Hluttaw, 107 in the Amyotha Hluttaw, 886 in the Regions and State Parliaments and 29 ethnic representatives.

Some distant observers think that USDP is a pro-junta party. In fact it is more than a sister party but the identical twins. So all policies and practices will be exactly the same as those of the SPDC era. The Burmese people cannot expect any improved livelihood and the neighbors cannot hope for enhanced cross-border relations. Yes there will be civilians and ethnic peoples in sitting. But …

The epic Ramayana, “Life and journey of Rama” is the most read and repeatedly performed elegantly not only in the Hindu majority countries such as India and Nepal but also in the Buddhist countries like Burma, Thailand and Sri Lanka as well as in Muslim Indonesia.

Though the play performed in different countries and on different theatres, all characters Rama, Sita, Ravana and Hanuman and etc. have to act the same. Yes on a larger stage more followers of Hanuman and those of Ravana can be seen. But all have to act accordingly. So a new stage has been set in Burma to perform the old drama. http://www.speroforum.com/a/46727/Myanmar--India---Burmese-dissident-conscription-and-Parliament-the-new-weapons-of-the-military-junta?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+speroforum%2Fnroq+%28Spero+News%29