Sinking: China’s Soft Diplomacy on Burma

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: In the past year, the Chinese government has made a number of assertions about its relationship and role in Burma, many of which are misleading or inaccurate. 8-8-08 for Burma provides the following two-part analysis of Beijing’s recent statements.


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2 July, 2008

Contact: Cristina Moon (cmoon@8808forburma.org, 347.756.4088)



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: In the past year, the Chinese government has made a number of assertions about its relationship and role in Burma, many of which are misleading or inaccurate. 8-8-08 for Burma provides the following two-part analysis of Beijing’s recent statements.

The first part of the analysis addresses points publicly made by the Chinese government. The second addresses China’s response to the humanitarian disaster wrought on Burma’s southern delta region by Cyclone Nargis on May 2nd, 2008.

INTRODUCTION
Over the past three years, China has come under increasing attention for its ties to the military regime in Burma led by Senior General Than Shwe. On September 18, 2007 Burma advocates held protests in 10 countries, spanning four continents, targeting Chinese embassies and consulates and expressing solidarity with pro-democracy protests that had engulfed Burma in the previous month. On that same day, leaders of the 88 Students Generation pro-democracy movement inside Burma released a public letter to Chinese leaders. Both protesters and the 88 Students Generation condemned China’s ongoing support for the Than Shwe regime, and implored Chinese leaders to do more to encourage democratic reform in Burma. As Buddhist monks and nuns took leadership of the protests in Burma shortly thereafter, Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams published an article in the Wall Street Journal calling on the international community “to pressure China’s leaders to use their considerable influence in Burma”.

China’s role in Burma was again brought into the spotlight when General Than Shwe blocked shipments of aid and international aid workers from reaching the 2.4 million people affected by Cyclone Nargis. These actions prompted foreign governments and human rights organizations to pursue numerous avenues of pressure and appeals, including calling on China to use its influence in Burma to remove restrictions on humanitarian access.

China has responded to this attention by making statements in international and Chinese media outlets, and at the United Nations Security Council where it is a veto-wielding member, defending its approach to Burma and denouncing the positions of its critics. China has advocated for a soft approach of “consultations” with the Burmese military junta, citing supposedly positive steps General Than Shwe and his junta have taken towards democratic reform.

A careful assessment of China’s characterization of its own actions vis-à-vis Burma fails to withstand reasonable scrutiny, revealing that China’s actions have actually hampered efforts for peace and democratic opening in Burma.

CHINA’S CLAIMS
China has defended its role in Burma in the past year by putting forward five main arguments, each of which fails to hold water.

CHINESE CLAIM 1:
There is no “special relationship” between China and Burma.

ANALYSIS:
Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya has referred on numerous occasions to the facts that China is an immediate neighbor to Burma and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to explain why China wishes as much, if not “more than any other country in the world, to see political stability, economic development and national unity” in Burma .

China is one of Burma’s largest trading partners and foreign investors – mostly in extractive industries such as natural gas, mining, and logging – and is expected to sign a US$1 billion contract in 2008 to construct a pipeline carrying oil and natural gas through Burma and into western China . China has invested extensively in Burmese infrastructure like roads and ports on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – a strategic move to streamline China’s energy acquisition since over 90% of China’s oil is currently delivered by ocean-going tanker .

China has also been the regime’s most important defender in the United Nations, blocking and weakening measures that would compel the generals to end their widespread violence and abuse of Burma’ 55 million citizens. Moreover, while many other countries have placed arms embargoes on Burma, China has sold US$2-3 billion in weapons and military equipment to Burma .

REALITY:

In addition to being an immediate neighbor of Burma with significant geo-political interests, China also has an unparalleled economic relationship with Burma. The result is unrivaled influence upon Senior General Than Shwe and the Burmese junta. The actions of China, more than any other country, have facilitated abuse, repression, and potential crimes against humanity in Burma.

CHINESE CLAIM 2:
“Pressure would not serve any purpose” in dealing with Burma. Rather, progress “is undeniably being made, slowly and steadily,” as a result of “consultations” with the Than Shwe regime

ANALYSIS:
China’s opposition to using sanctions and pressure on the Than Shwe regime, its advocacy for soft measures (chiefly in the form of bilateral “consultations” and economic encouragement), and its insistence that the junta is making progress ignores a clear pattern of intransigence on the part of the Than Shwe regime. The disparate, even conflicting, responses of the international community have meant that ethnic cleansing continues unabated, as does widespread repression of democracy activists. Than Shwe’s regime also continues to flout international law related to forced labor, child soldiers, and the treatment of women.

Following crackdowns on monk-led protests in Burma in late 2007, China increased the strength of its rhetoric vis-à-vis Burma and the Than Shwe regime, participating in a UN Security Council Presidential Statement that “deplored” the regime’s use of force against peaceful protesters. The regime’s response – taking the violence off the streets (and into prisons), inviting two previously-barred UN envoys into the country for stage-managed visits, and reinvigorating their “7-Step Roadmap to democracy” – was emblematic of how the regime deals with soft pressure; they do the bare minimum to create an illusion of progress, only to backslide once the pressure recedes.

Another way the regime responds to soft pressure is to ignore it altogether – for example when General Than Shwe refused to postpone its scheduled May 10 constitutional referendum or even to receive phone calls from UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon in the week following Cyclone Nargis.

REALITY: Than Shwe’s regime has demonstrated that it does not respond to soft measures, except with superficial developments meant to curb international pressure and continued repression, abuses, and atrocities.

CHINESE CLAIM 3:
“China firmly supports the Secretary General’s good offices” . “China supports ASEAN in playing a leading role in the Myanmar issue”.

ANALYSIS:
China has consistently undermined the good offices of the UN Secretary General, vetoing efforts to empower the UN Secretariat with a mandate from the UN Security Council and engaging in behind-the-scenes bilateral consultations with Burma’s military junta instead.

China first vetoed putting Burma on the UN Security Council agenda in 2006, and then vetoed a US-sponsored resolution on Burma on January 11, 2007. Shortly after casting its no-vote, Chinese state-owned enterprise PetroChina received extraction rights for 6.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas off Burma’s western coast from the Than Shwe regime – despite having been outbid by India .

In May 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed their concern for the lack of tangible progress towards democratic reform in Burma and called for the release of Nobel Peace laureate and General Secretary of the election-winning National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi. China refused to support these calls for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, on the grounds that her detention is Burma’s “internal affair” .

REALITY: China has consistently undermined the ability of the United Nations and multilateral organizations like ASEAN to effectively address Burma’s human rights crisis, instead pursuing its own interests.

CHINESE CLAIM 4:
“China has made its due efforts to promote stability in Myanmar and encourage the Myanmar government to continue its engagement with the international community” .

ANALYSIS:
China has taken some positive steps on Burma, such as hosting talks between the Than Shwe regime and then-US Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of State in June 2007 and more recently stating a desire for democratic reforms and more openness in Burma. However, since 2006 when Burma was placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council – a move China opposed – China has been a relentless supporter of Burma’s military regime, continuing its economic and military support, and thwarting attempts by the United Nations to address the junta’s abuses and atrocities.

At the same time, China has increased trade with Burma, continued to sell military equipment to the regime, signed large deals for natural gas extraction, given soft loans to the generals, vetoed a non-punitive UN Security Council resolution on Burma, and weakened two UN Security Council Presidential Statements on the situation in Burma.

REALITY: For at least the past two and a half years, essentially all of China’s actions supported the military regime in Burma, enabling its atrocities and repression.

CHINESE CLAIM 5:
Linking China’s Burma policy and the Olympics would be “inappropriate and unpopular” .

ANALYSIS:
China’s goals as Olympic host to highlight its “peaceful rise” and be seen as a responsible stakeholder in the global community directly conflict with its ongoing support for Burma’s atrocity-committing regime. China’s relentless support for General Than Shwe and his junta tarnishes the ideals and legacy of the Olympic movement, and should urgently be called into question.

However, Beijing’s leaders have an opportunity to demonstrate global leadership in resolving Burma’s current crisis – one that includes the world’s longest currently-running armed conflict, the world’s largest number of child soldiers, and potential crimes against humanity. By taking a leading role in resolving Burma’s crisis, the leadership in Beijing could not only mitigate the global controversy around its hosting the Olympics, but directly do justice to the fundamental principles upon which the Olympic movement was built.

REALITY: China’s goals as Olympic host are in direct conflict with Beijing’s Burma policy, promoting repression and atrocities instead of the fundamental principles of the Olympics – human dignity, peace, and brotherhood.

CHINA’S REACTIONS TO CYCLONE NARGIS
Despite compelling evidence of a major humanitarian disaster in Burma following Cyclone Nargis, China’s ongoing defense of Burma’s military regime has hindered global efforts to accurately assess and respond to the catastrophe in the Irrawaddy delta region, potentially costing tens of thousands of lives.

ISSUE 1: CHINESE RELIEF AID TO BURMA POST-CYCLONE NARGIS
China’s humanitarian aid to Burma after Cyclone Nargis served to further Beijing’s vast economic relationship with the Than Shwe regime rather than provide timely assistance to cyclone survivors.

In the first days following Cyclone Nargis, Beijing’s leaders committed $1 million to relief in Burma. They later increased their commitment by a further $4.3 million for post-disaster reconstruction as well as relief. Incredibly, $500,000 of the initial commitment went in cash to the junta, without a public accounting as to how those funds have contributed to the relief of 2.5 million displaced by the cyclone . Moreover, China’s contribution to cyclone aid is trivial when considered in the context of its huge economic relationship with Burma – China’s total commitment is less than 3% of one interest-free loan made to the Than Shwe regime in 2006, a time when the regime was increasing attacks in eastern Burma that have displaced 1.5 million people.

ISSUE 2: CHINA ASKS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NOT TO ‘POLITICIZE’ AID
China’s appeals to the international community not to ‘politicize’ cyclone relief to Burma are misplaced and call into question China’s strong and ongoing support for the Than Shwe regime’s “7-Step Roadmap to Democracy.”

While the Than Shwe regime refused to allow foreign aid and aid workers into Burma after the May 2 cyclone, and then diverted national resources from cyclone relief to a previously-scheduled constitutional referendum only one week later, China called on the international community – not Burma’s generals – not to “politicize” aid to Burma .

By discouraging international pressure on the junta to allow unfettered aid and access into Burma and yet again pursuing bilateral consultations instead, China undermined the efforts of the international community to find a comprehensive solution to Burma’s post-cyclone humanitarian crisis. At the writing of this paper, aid continued to only trickle in and the small measures taken by the Than Shwe regime – such as allowing in a 50-person Chinese medical team – are having only a trifling impact on a major humanitarian disaster. In contrast to its timely and appropriate reaction to its own May 12 earthquake, China facilitated the denial of life-saving aid to the 2.4 million people affected by Cyclone Nargis in Burma.

URGENT ACTION NEEDED ON BURMA
Following last fall’s uprisings and Cyclone Nargis, the situation in Burma is dire and in need of radical change. Significant pressure urgently needs to be exerted on the Than Shwe regime from the international community as well as from inside the country. Because of its unrivaled influence with the Than Shwe regime, China should drastically increase the strength of its public statements on Burma and call for genuine dialog between the Than Shwe regime, ethnic representatives, and the democracy movement led by Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. China should also join the international community in taking concrete steps to cut the Than Shwe regime off from the flow of arms.

If China fails to use its leverage with the Than Shwe regime to facilitate genuine democratic reforms and the creation of a political environment conducive to humanitarian relief before the Olympics, it will be regarded as culpable for the deaths of countless thousands of innocent civilians. China will be seen as a country that chose to pursue its own interests in Burma at devastating human cost – characteristics unbefitting an Olympic host.

The Beijing Games are set to open approximately one year after Burma’s Saffron Revolution, and exactly twenty years after a months-long democracy movement in Burma that culminated in nation-wide protests on August 8, 1988. China should take immediate action to help bring Burma’s crisis to an end before this important day.

August 8, 2008 can be a day to celebrate human achievement and perseverance - in China, in Burma, everywhere. But only if China takes action now.

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Posted Tuesday, July 1st, 2008.


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