In Response to Burma Digest
This is the gist of lectures given to the various universities and locations in North America and Europe. These lectures are published in response to the request of Dr Tay Za of Burma Digest, whose publication is considered is one of the most balanced reporting for the ethno democratic publications. Only relevant and intelligent questions are inserted. The lectures and all answers are Prof. BT Win's (Kanbawza Win) personal omissions and commissions and did not represent any university, organizations or movements.
In order to understand Burma one will have to know its history and the history of Burma is quite complicated. Several ethnic groups have lived in the region, the oldest of which are probably the Mon or the Pyu. In the 9th century the Bamar (Burman) people migrated from the Tibeto Burman tribe residing in Kansu in China and migrated along the valley of the Irrawaddy River.
Pyu
Humans lived in the region that is now Burma as early as 11,000 years ago, but the first identifiable civilization is that of the Pyu. The Pyu arrived in Burma in the 1st century BC and established city kingdoms (Binnaka, Mongamo, Sri Ksetra, Peikthanomyo, and Halingyi). During this period, Burma was part of an overland trade route from China to India. Chinese sources state that the Pyu controlled 18 kingdoms and describe them as a humane and peaceful people. Since then Theravada Buddhism has penetrated into the customs and culture of the people. In the 9th century it was sacked by the power kingdom of Nanzhao ending the Pyu's period of dominance.
Mon
The 6th century Mon kingdom of Dvaravati in the lower Chao Phra valley in present day Thailand extended its frontiers to the Tenasserim Yoma (mountains). With subjugation by the Khmer Empire from Angkor in the 11th century the Mon shifted further west deeper into present day Burma. The Mons adopted Indian culture together with Theravada Buddhism and have founded kingdoms in Lower Burma including Thaton in the 6th or 7th century and Pegu in 825 with the kingdom of Raman'n'adesa (or Ramanna) referenced by Arab geographers in 844–8. Their last kingdom was Hanthawaddy which is pronounced as Oaktha Pegu. (Now the Myanmarnization word is call as Bago)
Bamar (Mranma/Myanma)
To the north another group of people, the Bamar (Mranma/Myanma) , also began to settle in the area. By 849, they had founded a powerful kingdom centered on the city of Pagan filling the void left by the Pyu. The kingdom or Pagan grew in relative isolation until the reign of Anawrahta also known as Anuruddha (1044-77) who successfully unified all of Burma by defeating the Mon city of Thaton and founded the first Burmese empire. In the mid-12th century, most of continental Southeast Asia was under the control of either the Pagan Kingdom or the Khmer Empire.
The Pagan kingdom went into decline as more land and resources fell into the hands of the powerful Sangha (monks) and the Mongols threatened from the north. The last true ruler of Pagan, Narathihapate (1254-87) felt confident in his ability to resist the Mongols and advanced into Yunnan in 1277 to make war upon them. He was thoroughly crushed at the Battle of Ngasaunggyan, and Pagan resistance virtually collapsed. The king was assassinated by his own son in 1287, precipitating a Mongol invasion in the Battle of Pagan; the Mongols successfully captured most of the empire, including its capital, and ended the dynasty in 1289 when they installed a puppet ruler in Burma.
Shan Dominion (1364–1555)
After the collapse of Pagan authority, Burma was divided. A Burman/Myanmar Ava Dynasty (1364–1527) was eventually established at the city of Ava by 1364. The kingdom was overrun by the Shan in 1527.
The Kingdom of Ava was involved in continuous warfare with Tai (Shan) Saophas to the north on the frontier with Yunnan. There were repeated Tai raids on the capital of Ava and Ava sent military northwards to attack Tai fiefdoms such as Mong Mao. The Ming dynasty that ruled China from the late fourteenth century often tried unsuccessfully to put an end to this warfare through traditional Chinese diplomacy. Ava occasionally became involved in the warfare between the Ming and Tai in Yunnan such as in the Luchuan-Pingmian Campaigns (1436-49).
To the south in Lower Burma, a Mon dynasty established itself first at Martaban and then at Pegu. During the reign of king Rajadhirat (1383–1421) Ava and Pegu were involved in continuous warfare. The peaceful reign of Queen Baña Thau (Burmese: Shin Saw Bu;1453-72) came to an end when she chose the Buddhist monk Dhammazedi (1472-92) to succeed her. Under Dhammazedi Pegu became a centre of commerce and Theravada Buddhism.
Taungoo Dynasty(1486-1752)
After the conquest of Ava by the Shan in 1527 many Burmans/Myanmar migrated to Toungoo which became a new center for Burmese rule. King Tabinshwehti (1531-50) unified most of Burma. By this time, the geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia had changed dramatically. The Shan gained power in a new kingdom in the North, Ayutthaya (Siam), while the Portuguese had arrived in the south and conquered Malacca. With the coming of European traders, Burma was once again an important trading centre. Tabinshwehti's brother-in-law, Bayinnaung (1551-81) succeeded to the throne and launched a campaign of conquest invading several states, including Manipur (1560) and Ayutthaya (1569). Bayinnaung's grandson, Anaukpetlun, once again reunited Burma in 1613 and decisively defeated Portuguese attempts to take over Burma.
The Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1885),
Also called as Alaungpaya Dynasty was founded by U Aungzayya was a village chief who successfully rebels against the Mon and founded the last Burmese dynasty. Burma owes its existence as a nation state to this monarch. In 1760, he briefly conquered Tenasserim and on to Ayutthaya, but was unsuccessful His second son Hsinbyushin (1763-76) returned to Ayutthaya had conquered it before the end of the next year. Even China began to fear expansion of Burmese power in the East and sent armies to Burma, but Hsinbyushin successfully repulsed four Chinese invasions between 1766 and 1769 stretching its limits within Chinese borders. Another of Alaungpaya's sons, Bodawpaya (1781–1819), lost control of Ayutthaya, but added Arakan (1784) and Tenasserim (1793) to the kingdom. In January 1824, during the reign of King Bagyidaw (1819-37), a Burmese general Maha Bandula succeeded in conquering Assam, bringing Burma face to face with British interests in India. The last Burmese king was Thibaw abducted by the British.
British Burma
The expansion of Burmese empire had consequences along its frontiers. As those frontiers moved ever closer to British India, there were problems both with refugees and military operations spilling over ill-defined borders. In response to the continued expansion, the British and the Siamese joined forces against it in 1824. The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-26) ended in a British victory, and by the Treaty of Yandabo, Burma lost territory previously conquered in Assam, Manipur and Arakan. The Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852, which ended in the British annexation of Pegu province, renamed Lower Burma. Thibaw Min (ruled 1878–85) was a tyrant intending to side with the French to regain the lost territories. Taking advantage of France's recent defeat of China, and confident that China would not intervene to defend its tributary, the British declared war once again in 1885, conquering the remainder of the country in the Third Anglo-Burmese War resulting in total annexation of Burma.
History of the Ethnics
As said earlier the ethnics in Burma or rather the non Myanmar tribes has been living peacefully side by side with Burman/Myanma tribes but they soon discovered that the British administration is far more better than the Burmese kings and the leaders of the ethnic tribes began to give allegiance to the British administration. The British also discovered that the ethnic tribes were simple, obedient and make better soldiers and began to recruit them into their fighting forces.
Britain made Burma a province of India in 1886 with the capital at Rangoon. Traditional Burmese society was drastically altered by the demise of the monarchy and the separation of religion and state. After the opening of the Suez Canal, the demand for Burmese rice grew and vast tracts of land were opened up for cultivation. The civil service was largely staffed by Indians, and Burmese were excluded almost entirely from military service. Though the country prospered, the Burmese people failed to reap the rewards. (See George Orwell's novel Burmese Days for a fictional account of the British in Burma.)
In the meantime a new generation of Burmese leaders arose in the early twentieth century from amongst the educated classes and belief that the Burmese situation could be improved through reform. Progressive constitutional reform in the early 1920s led to a legislature with limited powers, a university and more autonomy for Burma within the administration of India. There were many strikes initiated by the University students.
World War II and Japan
Some Burmese nationalists saw the outbreak of World War II as an opportunity to extort concessions from the British in exchange for support in the war effort. Other Burmese, such as the Thakin movement, opposed Burma's participation in the war under any circumstances. Aung San co-founded the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) with other Thakins in August 1939, thought that it was an opportune moment to work for independence. Marxist literature as well as tracts from the Sinn Féin movement in Ireland had been widely circulated and read among political activists. Aung San also co-founded the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), renamed the Socialist Party after the World War II. He was also instrumental in founding the Bama htwet yat gaing (Freedom Bloc) by forging an alliance of the Dobama, ABSU, politically active monks and Ba Maw's Sinyètha (Poor Man's) Party.. After the Dobama (Not Domyanmar) organization called for a national uprising, an arrest warrant was issued for many of the organization's leaders including Aung San, who escaped to China. Aung San's intention was to make contact with the Chinese Communists but he was detected by the Japanese authorities who offered him support by forming a secret intelligence unit called the Minami Kikan headed by Colonel Suzuki with the objective of closing the Burma Road and supporting a national uprising. Aung San briefly returned to Burma to enlist twenty-nine young men who went to Japan with him in order to receive military training on Hainan Island, China, and they came to be known as the "Thirty Comrades". When the Japanese occupied Bangkok in December 1941, Aung San announced the formation of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in anticipation of the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942.
During the war in 1942, the BIA had grown in an uncontrolled manner, and in many districts officials and even criminals appointed themselves as the BIA. They now take the law into their hands and began to ill treat the ethnics and the minority which sow the discord between the Karen and the Myanmar. It become to such a point that it has to be reorganized as the Burma Defense Army (BDA) under the Japanese but still headed by Aung San. While the BIA had been an irregular force, the BDA was recruited by selection and trained as a conventional army by Japanese instructors. Dr Ba Maw was afterwards declared head of state, and his cabinet included both Aung San as War Minister and the Communist leader Thakin Than Tun as Minister of Land and Agriculture as well as the Socialist leaders Thakins Nu and Mya. When the Japanese declared Burma, in theory, independent in 1943, the Burma Defence Army (BDA) was renamed the Burma National Army (BNA).
Independent Burma
The surrender of the Japanese brought a British military administration to Burma christened as CASB ( Civil Affairs Service Burma) used out of the military budget. A rift has appeared in AFPFL that is the vanguard of the independence movement. It was between the Communists and Aung San together with the Socialists over strategy, which led to Than Tun being forced to resign as general secretary in July 1946. Aung San began negotiating with the British and successfully concluded the Aung San-Atlee Agreement on January 27, 1947. Most of the ethnics want to have independence of their own. The ethnic's army which had served faithfully under the British especially the Karen, Chins and the Kachins, the Shans and the Karennin are happier to stay under the British and was quite suspicious of the Myanmar/Burmese army who had bullied their tribes when ever there was a chance. But General Aung San was able to convince some of the Shan Saophas, Kachin Duwars and the Chin leaders and finally succeeded in concluding an agreement with ethnic minorities for a unified Burma at the Panglong Conference on February 12, celebrated since as 'Union Day'. The Karen refused to attend, the Arakanese and the Mons were considered as part of the Burma/Myanmar tribe having being subdued since the Burmese kings and was not consulted, the Karenni was an independent states and not invited.
Then a momentous event stunned the nation on July 19, 1947. U Saw, a conservative pre-war Prime Minister of Burma, engineered the assassination of Aung San and several members of his cabinet including the ethnic leaders attending the cabinet.
The first years of Burmese independence were marked by successive insurgencies by the Red Flag Communists led by Thakin Soe, the White Flag Communists led by Thakin Than Tun, the Yèbaw Hpyu (White-band PVO) led by Bo La Yaung, Arakanese Muslims or the Mujahid, now called Rohingyas and the Karen National Union (KNU).[2] Remote areas of Northern Burma were for many years controlled by an army of Kuomintang. Burma generally strove to be impartial in world affairs and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Israel and the People's Republic of China. By 1958, the country was largely beginning to recover economically, but was beginning to fall apart politically due to a split in the AFPFL into two factions, one led by Thakins Nu and Tin, the other by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. The situation however became very unstable in parliament, with U Nu surviving a no-confidence vote only with the support of the opposition National United Front (NUF), believed to have 'crypto-communists' amongst them. Army hardliners now saw the 'threat' of the CPB coming to an agreement with U Nu through the NUF, and in the end U Nu was forced to 'invite Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win to take over the country which some took it as the 1st military coup. Ne Win's caretaker government successfully established the situation and paved the way for new general elections in 1960 that returned U Nu's Union Party with a large majority. The situation did not remain stable for long, when the Shan Federal Movement, started by Yawnghwe Saopha Sao Shwe Thaik (the first President of independent Burma 1948-52) and aspiring to a 'loose' federation, was seen as a separatist movement. Staged a coup d'etat on March 2, 1962,
2nd Military Coup
Soon after seizing power, a peaceful student protest on Rangoon University campus was suppressed by the military, killing over 100 students on July 7, 1962. Peace talks were convened between the RC and various armed insurgent groups in 1963, but without any breakthrough, Ne Win quickly took steps to transform Burma into his vision of a 'socialist state' and to isolate the country from contact with the rest of the world. A one-party system was established with his newly formed Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in complete control. Commerce and industry were nationalized across the board, but the economy did not grow at first as the government put too much emphasis on industrial development at the expense of agriculture. A new constitution was promulgated in January 1974 that resulted in the creation of a People's Assembly
Beginning in May 1974, a wave of strikes hit Rangoon and elsewhere in the country against a backdrop of corruption, inflation and food shortages, especially rice. In Rangoon workers were arrested at the Insein railway yard, and troops opened fire on workers at the Thamaing textile mill and Simmalaik dockyard. In December 1974, the biggest anti-government demonstrations to date broke out over the funeral of former UN Secretary-General U Thant.
On March 23 1976, over 100 students were arrested for holding a peaceful ceremony (Hmaing Yabyei) to mark the centenary of the birth of Thakin Kodaw Hmaing who was the greatest Burmese poet and writer and nationalist leader of the 20th. Century history of Burma. He in 1978, a military operation was conducted against the Rohingya Muslims in Arakan, 250,000 refugees to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.
3rd Military Coup
The economy began to grow as the government relaxed restrictions on foreign aid, but by the late 1980s falling commodity prices and rising debt led to an economic crisis. In September 1987 demonetization and Burma applied for Least Developed Country Ne Win retired as president in 1981, but remained in power as Chairman of the BSPP until his sudden unexpected announcement to step down on July 23, 1988, the nation erupted in demonstration what we called the 8888 pro democracy movement.
Another military coup was initiated by the General Saw Maung and the military government announced a change of name for the country in English from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. Particularly after Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, and also faced economic sanctions. In April 1992 the military replaced Saw Maung with General Than Shwe.
U Nu was released from prison and relaxed some of the restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest, finally releasing her in 1995, although she was forbidden to leave Rangoon. Than Shwe also finally allowed a National Convention to meet in January 1993, but insisted that the assembly preserve a major role for the military in any future government, and suspended the convention from time to time. The NLD, fed up with the interference, walked out in late 1995, and the assembly was finally dismissed in March 1996 without producing a constitution.
During the 1990s, the military regime had also had to deal with several insurgencies by tribal minorities along its borders. General Khin Nyunt was able to negotiate cease-fire agreements that ended the fighting with the Kokang, hill tribes such as the WA, and the Kachin, but the Karen would not negotiate. The military finally captured the main Karen base at Manerplaw in spring 1995, but there has still been no final peace settlement. Khun Sa, a major opium warlord who nominally controlled parts of Shan State, made a deal with the government in December 1995.
After the failure of the National Convention to create a new constitution, tensions between the government and the NLD mounted, resulting in two major crackdowns on the NLD in 1996 and 1997. The SLORC was abolished in November 1997 and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but it was merely a cosmetic change. Continuing reports of human rights violations in Burma led the United States to intensify sanctions in 1997, and the European Union followed suit in 2000. The military placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest again in September 2000 until May 2002, when her travel restrictions outside of Rangoon were also lifted. Reconciliation talks were held with the government, but these came to a stalemate and Suu Kyi was once again taken into custody in May 2003 after an ambush on her motorcade reportedly by a pro-military mob. She remains under house arrest today. The government also carried out another large-scale crackdown on the NLD, arresting many of its leaders and closing down most of its offices. The situation in Burma remains tense to this day. In August 2003, Kyin Nyunt announced a seven-step "roadmap to democracy", which the government claims it is in the process of implementing. At that time there was no timetable associated with the government's plan, or any conditionality or independent mechanism for verifying that it is moving forward. For these reasons, most Western governments and Burma's neighbours have been sceptical and critical of the roadmap.
On February 17, 2005, the government reconvened the National Convention, for the first time since 1993, in an attempt to rewrite the Constitution. However, major pro-democracy organisations and parties, including the National League for Democracy, were barred from participating; the military allowing only selected smaller parties. It was adjourned once again in January 2006.
In November 2005, the military junta started moving the government away from Yangon to an unnamed location near Kyatpyay just outside Pyinmana, to a newly designated capital city. This public action follows a long term unofficial policy of moving critical military and government infrastructure away from Yangon to avoid a repetition of the events of 1988. On Armed Forces Day (March 27, 2006), the capital was officially
named Naypyidaw Myodaw (meaning Royal City of the Seat of Kings).
Analyzing the Background
Burma is a textbook case of arrested development, Burma falls more in the pattern of post-colonial Africa than it does Asia. From nearly a century of British colonial rule it inherited the structures and institutions of free market parliamentary democracy, but like many countries in Africa, was not able to translate these into an enduring foundation for sustainable democratic governance. The quasi self-rule that obtained in the latter colonial years produced a functioning parliamentary system after independence, but did not succeed in developing a sense of national identity and common interest for Burma's multi-ethnic society as a whole. Furthermore, preferences within the ethnic Burman ruling elite for socialist, centrally controlled economic structures derailed the
development of a vibrant market economy. The underlying political ferment and
discontent within the non-Burman ethnic groups and the deep political divisions among
those elected to government created fertile ground for the country's strongest institution
– the military – to grasp the reins of power in the name of bringing order to the country's
chaos.
Saffron Revolution
Despite its increased global interaction since 2000, Myanmar remained hampered by international sanctions—including intensified U.S. and EU sanctions in 2003 after the SPDC again detained Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It was clear that Myanmar's prospects for further economic growth and acceptance by the international community were contingent on democratic progress and an improved human rights record. When in September 2007 the monastic community staged a large-scale demonstration calling for democratic reforms, the harsh response from the military drew widespread international criticism. In the wake of this unrest, the National Assembly finally approved a draft of a new constitution to be ratified or rejected by public referendum in May 2008. Assuming the adoption of the fake constitution, the Burmese Junta promised elections in 2010.
The referendum, although held as scheduled, was disrupted by natural disaster. On May 3, 2008, a powerful cyclone (Nargis) struck the Irrawaddy delta region of south-central Myanmar, obliterating villages and killing tens of thousands of people. The hesitation of the government to accept foreign aid or to grant entrance to foreign relief workers elicited harsh criticism from the international community, as disease threatened to increase the death toll significantly.
This is the history of Burma or rather that of Myanmar. The Shan, Karen, Mon, Arakan, Kachin, Chin, Karenni and all have their own intricate histories which are intermingle with the Myanmar history. In other words Burma is a place where all the migrants meet. The Tibeto Burma tribe, The Tai Chinese and the Mon Khmer migrants meet.
The Two Problems
Currently, Burma has two major problems, one is for the prevalence of genuine democracy and the other is the ethnic problem. They are two sides of coin as one cannot stay without the other. One of the most stumbling blocks in the Maha Bama attitude which most of the Myanmar tribe harbour i.e. to rough ride shot over the ethnic nationalities. This was fanned by the Burmese army who really implemented the Maha Bama scheme by making one country called Myanmar, one religion Theravara Buddhist and one race the Myanmar. This is the crux of the problem for in order to have one race, they have to implement the ethnic cleansing and many tribes have been vanished from this earth. One religion also means the persecution of the other faiths particularly the Christians where most of the ethnics like the Chin, Kachin, Karenni and some Karens worship. The Burmese army also persecute the Muslim and the majority of them are the Mujahids/Rohingyas. Obvioulsy the Burmese army headed by the Junta does not want the Union of Burma but rather a monolithic states like France. Spain and England. That is why the word Federal is anathema to the Burmese Junta and anybody who uttered the word is considered as a traitor.
The other is the struggle of democracy more or less; spear headed by the Myanmar tribes led in inside Burma by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and in the Diaspora by a conglomerate of UB groups. These Diaspora Myanmar groups shared the Maha Bama attitude with the Junta and construe that once democracy is achieved all problems will be solved something like that of the pre coup days when they cajoled the ethnics. So until and unless these two problems are solved by any means, Burma will be a basket of problems in Southeast Asia.
This is the gist of the history of Myanmar and the non Myanmar and now the floor is open. Ask any questions regarding Burma and if I don't know how to answer I just say I don't know.
Q. What are the psychology and the function of the Burmese Military Regime?
General Than Shwe considers himself to be the modern embodiment of Burma's ancient warrior kings and, to a certain extent, he models his deeply authoritarian rule on royal tradition. Like the ancient royalty, the power of the Junta relies not on popular support, but on popular fear and servitude, using the Buddhist Sangha (organization of monks) to legitimize itself with the people. Burmese armed forces, traces its roots to the anti-colonialist nationalistic Burmese army, formed originally by General Aung San, and it still harbours all the fervour it once had against foreign control, meddling, and influence inside the country. The military leaders are discomfited by the structures of government inherited from the colonial masters and have indoctrinated their ranks in the belief that Burmese are not culturally suited to Western style democracy and need to be ruled with a firm hand in order to avoid national disintegration. The decision to move the seat of government from Rangoon to Naypyidaw is an apt illustration of these historical characteristics in the military leadership: First, it represents a return to the practice of the ancient kings who would build lavish new capitals to consolidate their respective reigns; Second, it can be seen as an effort to expunge the final vestiges of the colonial period by abandoning the capital established by the British, which is still dominated by the old colonial buildings; and Third, the regime perceived it as a strategic move to the center of the country from where the military would be well placed to control potential insurgencies.
The current Junta is more or less the natural outgrowth of Ne Win's Socialist dictatorship, maintaining and even tightening military control over the country and clinging to the centralized command economy. Undoubtedly viewing the events of
1988 as the result of deficiencies in Ne Win's administration, they made a series of
adjustments over the years to avoid a repeat of these events. There were, for example,
adjustments in economic management to allow a small sector of free market activity and
attract foreign investment, to bring more commodities and natural resources under the
direct control of the military (at least in part to improve the military's revenue stream),
and to regulate more carefully the supply of essential commodities in urban areas to
avoid disruptions that might trigger riots. There were also adjustments to the educational system to reduce the potential for student movements and protests by scattering the universities and abolishing dormitories. Ne Win's personal rule was replaced by a committee structure dominated eventually by three senior figures, Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt. With the removal of General Khin Nyunt from the triumvirate in 2004, however, the Junta seems to have reverted to the pattern of personal whimsy that characterized Ne Win's regime, with General Than Shwe now providing the dominant personality.
The twelve members of the Junta team today are all military officers holding the most senior responsibilities in the army hierarchy. Cabinet ministers are also, with only two exceptions, military officers with little or no background in governance. The Junta
does not meet on its own as a body, but joins the once monthly cabinet meetings and
the thrice yearly meetings of all senior cabinet and military officials at which broad policy and strategic issues, including military activity, are decided. The Vice Senior General Maung Aye chairs the Trade Policy Committee, which meets once a week and rules on all decisions, both general and detailed, affecting external and internal economic
regulations. Senior General Than Shwe chairs the Special Project Implementation
Committee and the Special Border Projects Committee, which approve all decisions on
major economic undertakings, such as resource concessions (mining, forestry, etc.),
infrastructure construction (bridges, dams, irrigation, etc.) energy projects, and
Agricultural policy. Than Shwe's committees are more consequential than Maung Aye's
committee, although together they make all major economic decisions and are
responsible for the irrational and seemingly haphazard quality of the government's
approach to economic policy. The generals, especially Than Shwe, do not ask for
Advice and those beneath them do not dare to give it. Facts are routinely constructed to
meet perceptions of what the generals want to do or believe about the economy.
Unpleasant facts are scrupulously avoided. Those at the top framing the issues and
making the decisions has little to no expertise in economic management and lack long term vision. Their main concern is simply to make it through another day without any serious challenge to their absolute rule. In the end, however, the inner workings of the Burmese military hierarchy are largely inscrutable, even to those inside the regime. The internal dynamics of the armed forces are deliberately hidden and the essential
decisions are made at the top with little involvement of people at lower levels.
Ultimately, the absolute power of the Junta may be more a matter of appearance
than of reality.
Q. What is your perspective on the Burmese Generals?
Burma is ruled by a strongly nationalistic, xenophobic, military junta, whose understanding of what is best for its people is widely different. The Burmese army view is that the policies of the West are directed towards neo-colonial domination of Burma. This justifies their continued hold on power. From the army perspective is that in a battle there are only two aspects, the victors and the defeat and they are the victors, somewhat similar to Michiaville theory of ``the end justifies the means.`` They will do anything that might threaten "national security", no matter how unpopular it is with the international community.
Q. What about the policy of Narcotics Drugs?
The smaller states like Burma and North Korea—use their weaknesses and problems of drugs and trafficking of women and so forth, as a tool of national power. They use this tool to divide larger neighbors, to create leverage upon their neighbors to deal with these problems. It is, in my view, a deliberate aspect of strategy for Burma and North Korea.
Q. We often hear of 8888 generation. What is your opinion?
I myself belong to that category because I came out openly in 88. Most of the able leaders like Min Ko Naing and the likes inside Burma are under lock and key for the moment and cannot do much even though the spirit of 88 still lives on. As for the Burmese Diaspora most of them have become internet warriors intend on using the media highlight as an outlet, what in Burmese called megaphone diplomacy. It is good that some of them have become weekend politicians as in weekend they would gather at some place and change hot air. Of course most, if not all of them are 4 Bs (for Burma), but in Burmese we jokingly label as Bae Htaing, Baing Kya, Bu Pyaw, Ba Hma Ma Loke Bu meaning sit aside, no money, argumentative and will do nothing. Most of these associations needed actions, humanitarian or otherwise.
A couple of the de facto leaders have betrayed and even some of them went back to Burma or visited Burma with the blessing of the Junta, e.g. Crooked Master Zs (whose name start with Z). Most of the generations of 8888's mentality is far from the workings of democracy as the disintegration of the ABSDF indicates and partly is not their fault, but rather that of the Burmese regimes because they are brought up under the Burmese Way to Socialism of the Ne Win regime and the majority of them still needs to educate themselves about democracy and change their mentality..
Q. Why did the capital move from Rangoon?
In typically Burmese fashion, there has been no satisfactory explanation for the
sudden move to Naypyidaw. Although government spokesmen have suggested that it
was a strategic necessity to place the seat of government in the center of the country,
where it could relate more closely to the various ethnic minorities and ensure stability,
few have accepted this as the real reason. Many believe it was inspired more by the
irrational fears and ambitions of Senior General Than Shwe, who is believed by some
Burmese observers to be increasingly detached from reality as he ages. As said earlier Than Shwe has made no secret that he equates himself with the ancient Burmese warrior kings and feels a responsibility to restore the glories of Burma's royal traditions that were abolished by British colonialists. Among other things, it was customary for Burmese kings to consolidate their regimes by building elaborate new capitals to leave their own unique imprint on history. Similarly, there is no doubt among Burmese that the move to
Naypyidaw, especially its surprise timing, was conditioned heavily by the leadership's
interpretation of advice from the ever-present astrologers and soothsayers. The emerging outlines of the new capital suggest strongly that the move was inspired fundamentally by a perceived need within the military leadership to remove the final vestiges of colonialism represented by the capital of Rangoon, to return to a bygone era
when kings ruled the realm from grand strongholds in the center of the country, to fortify
the government against unwanted foreign influence, and to consolidate a firm ethnic
Burman cultural and political dominance in preparation perhaps for the return of some
form of parliamentary government.
Whatever its motivation, the capricious move has been a very expensive decision
for the government, because in addition to building infrastructure, it has had to offer
incentives to military and government officials to buy their acquiescence. In April, 2006,
for example, the salaries of all military and civil service employees were increased by a
multiplier of between five and twelve, depending on rank and position. In addition to
grand residences in Naypyidaw, senior officials have been given new houses in Rangoon
for their families to offset the inability or unwillingness of families to accompany
government employees to the new city. Many commodities and resources have been
diverted from Rangoon to Naypyidaw, creating significant market disruptions and a new
wave of inflation in Rangoon, which is home to more than ten percent of the country's
population. As might be expected, the sudden salary increase for government
employees propelled the inflationary wave to new heights. As with previous government
salary increases, the government simply printed more money to finance it.
Q. Prof Win, you yourself is an exile Burmese, and earlier you have said that there are 3 to 5 million Burmese in exiles. Can you tell us about the exile resources.
After so many years of harsh conditions in Burma, the Burmese Diaspora has become rather extensive. Some left during the Ne Win years; many more left after 1988 because of political persecution if not economic strigency.. The former group of Burmese expatriates tends to be engaged in professional pursuits in Western countries. The latter group includes a large number of political activists, who have remained focused on overthrowing the military regime and bringing about transition to democracy in Burma. With the assistance and encouragement of US and European foundations and governments, some of these activists have also formed specialized groups that study various aspects of Burma's institutional structures, articulating and planning the necessary reforms. For example, some look at economic reforms, some at legal reforms, and others at free press and political debate.
When the opportunity for serious transition presents itself, these groups will be
extremely helpful, not only as sources of ideas and advice for Burmese, but also as
bridges between foreign donors and local Burmese institutions and society. Among
them, they have amassed considerable experience with democracy in practice and a
large body of information on the institutions of democracy worldwide.36 It will be
important for the international community to assist in engaging them systematically and
productively in transition activities.
Among the Burmese expatriates who came out earlier and settled into professions abroad, there will also be many who wish to assist in the country's transition to democracy. Some are already engaged to a limited extent in some business endeavours in Burma and are able to come and go regularly. This may be another resource for foreign assistance to transition when the time comes.
Q. What do you think of Sanctions?
Some people construe that the U.S. objectives as simply being the isolation of the regime and sanctions. The sanctions are a means to an end, not an end in them. E.g. North Korea does not respond to pressure, but North Korea does not respond without
Pressure." I think the same can be said in the case of Burma, that sanctions are a
necessary but not sufficient element of a policy. The sanctions policy has not led
to the result the Western governments seek. This is not because they are the wrong tool, but by themselves they are an insufficient tool. They are insufficient because there has been too much cacophony and disagreement among the parties around the periphery of Burma.
Q. What is your opinion on Isolation and Sanctions?
The proponents of isolation (both governments and advocacy NGOs) would also argue that the aims of isolation have changed: the objective is no longer to try to bring the government to collapse, but to maintain a high level of pressure, so that the consequences of failing to reform are high. This is a laudable aim, but it cannot work long term, as the Junta can find other ways of securing the benefits that might otherwise accrue from the West, or decides it can do without them. Both these things are already happening in Burma, with the Burmese army relying increasingly on China, and at the same time turning inwards on it to promote a new form of the isolationist BSPP era where self reliance is the key to sustainable growth.
There is however signs that a second rethink of Burma policy has begun. With the developments in international diplomacy and intervention in East Timor, following so soon after that in Kosovo, it was hoped that concepts such as "preventive diplomacy" and "conflict resolution" would finally be combined with political will to intervene before a crisis gets out of hand. The first review of Burma policy took place in 1993/4 when America, the EU and Australia each developed their own versions of benchmarks (critical dialogue or roadmaps) in progress in human rights and democratic reform. But there was no success. EU, Australia and Canada are perhaps not so much a policy as a set of possible initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society. If any of these new ideas are to have some success, they must, as long-time Burma watcher David Steinberg put it, be "a way to deal with Burma that involves neither confrontation nor appeasement, but rather engagement with a big stick. An iron hand with a velvet glove approach should be adopted. Engagement along this line might is one of the possible way to wrench Burma out of its political and economic morass, short of intervention.
Q. What is your opinion on the regional approaches to Burma?
The regional powers on the Burma issue have various idiosyncrasies and different
Soft spots that the Burmese Military Government is very effective at hitting at. ASEAN, in with its Constructive Engagement Policy is simply paralysis and quite frustrated except that it manage to exploit the natural and human resources of Burma. The Junta has managed to swindle all of the ASEAN countries. The blocking phrase being that noninterference in internal affairs principle that was so central to ASEAN that no one is
willing to criticize and interfere in Burma's internal affairs. So much so that Burma has become as a threat to ASEAN security and integration. While ASEAN as a whole doesn't agree with Security Council attention, I think that there is a growing frustration.
India, which also champions democratic principles under, has a very realpolitik look at Burma, sees the energy needs, sees a road to Southeast Asia, and is very conscious of competition with China for influence. China is seeking influence but also has problems with Burma. The governor of Yunnan is not too pleased about trafficking and drugs and infectious diseases creating problems for his province. So China also has something of a mixed view. Obviously China does not want to have a vibrant democracy at has back yard when she himself is a communist dictatorship.
Japan also approaches Burma with certain idiosyncrasies. On the one hand, Japan is extremely sensitive to Chinese influence, particularly since the mid- 1990s, and is seeking not to allow China's influence to grow at the expense of Japan in Burma. On the other hand, Japan is increasingly promoting norms of democracy and good governance. There seems to have is a conflict in Japan's approaching the Burmese problem. I construe that there is shifting ground in Japan's approach with certain difficulties.
Regarding this I like to repeat the story which I have read. Once in a hilly and forest clad country there were a lot of tigers and every body feared them. One day somebody brought a donkey to that region and it was kicking and braying, the tigers have never seen a creature that kicks and brayed and so they were quite upset and stay quite a distance. They tried to talk to the Donkey not to bray or kick but it would not listen and kick more and brayed some more. After some time one of the tigers said, why after all we are tigers so let us kill the Donkey and eat him and so they did. So also will be the case of Burma.
Now China, Japan, India and ASEAN are all tigers by their right. Once they agree among themselves and have their idiosyncrasies level out (each country has its own particular idiosyncrasies in their approaches to Burma that divided them and Burma exploited the situation), there will be peace in Burma or the country will be disintegrated with the ethnic groups joining the nearest country of their choice.
I'm not proposing that the U.S., Japan, India and China eat up Burma. The point is that when the weakest state uses its weakness as a national tool to divide the rest of the neighboring countries, the leaders of these neighboring countries should be thinking about what common approach they can take to make progress A United Front? If the neighboring countries should speak in unison with the right mix of sticks and carrots
a package deal and demand the Burmese men in uniforms the unconditional release of the Burmese Nobel Laureate and ethnic leaders in a transparent, clear process with benchmarks for national reconciliation and a restoration of constitutional democracy. I think the Burmese tragedy which is a thorn in the world forum should be ended.
Q Is Burma a real threat to the region?
This is also another difficult question as it depends on the perspective of the individual or country. If one were to ask China, India, Bangladesh, Thailand and ASEAN countries of whether they feel threatened by Burma you would get a sound "No" for an answer. In fact Burma is like a beautiful damsel woo by all the suitors like China, India, Japan Thailand and ASEAN countries and compete for Burma's favors, the Generals know about it.
The real threat is the export of Narcotics, Aids and other diseases, flow of refugees and illegal immigrants as outline in the paper submitted to the UN by Desmond Tu Tu and Harvel.
Burma was and is not a question of peace and security that should have been debated in the Security Council. After both the United States and Europe have isolated themselves from Burma and deprived themselves of the chances to influence developments there, the debate in the Security Council was an act of frustration because these powers had no other way of "getting" at Burma. China is the only power that can put pressure on Burma and obviously she won't share this trump card to the West particularly to the Americans and being a dictatorial regime itself does not like a democratic regime behind its back door. The Geo strategic options are very high on the Chinese's agenda
Q What is your opinion on the neighbouring countries of Burma?
India have become the greatest facilitators for the Junta, providing financial resources and military assistance in return for access to Burma's natural resources. They are now engaged in avid competition for Burma's large off-shore natural gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal, promising billions of dollars of revenue to the government in years to come. While it is quite natural that the world's two most populous and rapidly developing countries, who straddle a small neighbour relatively rich in natural resources, should see their relations with Burma in strategic terms, it is not wise for them to disregard the country's future welfare and stability. The kind of economic investment, loans, and assistance they are providing Burma today do not contribute much to the country's economic development. Chinese and Indian investments are most likely to be diverted to the generals and their families or to be used to finance hard-currency imports at the expense of domestic economic development.
In fact both India and China should be giving the Burmese Generals a strong message about the importance of restructuring the economy to expand the business sector and they should be managing their own economic relations with Burma to reinforce this message.
For example Japan – through patience and persistence was able to make considerable progress with the Burmese government in outlining a program for phased macro-economic reform. India, the world's largest democracy, never send a message of the need for political transition. It is perhaps an encouraging sign that China's
Ambassador to the UN, even though he vetoed the proposed UNSC resolution urging
democratic transition in Burma, regretted that he had to do so, because "it was clear
Myanmar was not moving quickly enough to promote stability. He urged the military
regime to move toward 'inclusive democracy' and 'speed up the process of dialogue and
reform.
Since accepting Burma into its midst, ASEAN has suffered a heavy political cost in its relations with these two large partners US and EU, ASEAN governments
have been dismayed by the sheer intransigence of the Generals. In recent years, the rise
of parliamentary consultative groups within ASEAN has translated into strong pressure
on ASEAN governments by elected officials to speak out against the Junta's harsh
repression of Burma's democratic forces and its refusal to move forward seriously with
its own plan for political transition.
Although some ASEAN voices have raised the question of expelling Burma from
the organization, this is probably not a practical course, because it would eliminate an
important channel of communication and coordination with the seriously xenophobic
Burmese leadership. It is also vitally important for ASEAN to remain a source of political pressure on Burma. The Junta and its successors will continue to value membership in ASEAN as a collective means of dealing with China and other large countries, and therefore will have to pay some heed to ASEAN's concerns about how Burma's actions affect the welfare of the collective organization.
Q. What is your analysis of the international community towards Burma?
I might as well says that I am a child of 1988 even though I belong to the generation of 7-7-62 when for the first time in my life I saw the soldiers shooting point blank on the peaceful students. Since 1988 the international community had undergone incredible changes. In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union, a new international era – the New World Order – was heralded. The days when internal abuses of human rights by governments against their own people would be ignored if the country concerned were fighting off communism, or capitalism, were over. It seemed to many at the time that Burma might benefit from the acclaimed international resolve to put concern for human rights and democratic government at the forefront of foreign policy, and create a world where dictators could find no home. Even in ASEAN In the case of East Timor both Thailand and Malaysia sent troops to join the UN peace-keeping mission there. But that is only a dream.
Soon this New World Order was torn apart, the failure of interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Chechnya. the "non-interference" , which for so long held off effective intervention to prevent human rights violations, is no longer sacred. However, it soon gave rise to a new East/West divide and an ideological battle over human rights versus "Asian values". Burma profited by this divide, seeking to ally itself with Asian powers which could, it hoped, defend the country from Western "neo-imperialist tendencies.
Constructive Engagement has come to be a pseudonym for an "unethical" foreign policy, and sanctions its "ethical" opposite. However, this polarization has allowed sanctioning governments to get away with policies which are morally satisfying, but can be a fig leaf to cover a lack of real political will to bring about the desired changes. It also allows "engaging" countries to avoid any concerted and detailed monitoring to ensure that they do indeed get something constructive out of their engagement with pariah states. While Western governments grappled to find a Burma policy, there was a burgeoning of grassroots advocacy on Burma – from the work of the exiled Burmese community at the United Nations and other international forums, to the proliferation of local campaign groups calling for boycotts of companies working in Burma.
But the debate on how to bring about change has become deeply polarized up to this day however this polarization is perhaps beginning to break down, as it surely must if there is to be internal reconciliation. If there is one thing that the international community can do for Burma now it is to show that concern for the human rights of the people of Burma, that is their health, education, development, right to life and other civil and political rights, is more important than rhetoric, or pride. Progress and reform in all aspects has long been an imperative – not a dream as the cyclone Nargis has demonstrated. At least it drives home to the Burmese men in uniforms that the international community really cares for the people of Burma and not the gun tooting generals.
Q What do you think of the United Nations role in Burma?
With the veto of a UNSC resolution on Burma by China and Russia and the Junta's reduced responsiveness to the UN I think the UN has become just a forum for debate as it has been in the past, and a vehicle for the international community to exert rhetorical pressure on the generals.
Initially as a long-standing member and the fatherland of former UN Secretary General U Thant, Burma places the United Nations at the center of its diplomacy. During the years that General Khin Nyunt managed Burma's diplomatic relations, UN activity in Burma expanded substantially. UN agencies were allowed to set up missions in the country and establish programs for various forms of welfare and humanitarian assistance.
From time to time, the Secretary General's representative was received to facilitate communication between the Junta and political opposition groups. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur was allowed, off and on, to visit the country and report extensively on humanitarian conditions. Annual meetings of the UN General Assembly have traditionally served as a forum to chronicle and inveigh against the regime's record of repression and failure to move forward with political transition. Calculating that the Junta's was particularly sensitive about its image in the UN, Burmese exile groups and their supporters have placed great hope in the UN as a means of forcing change, particularly when the Security Council agreed in 2006 to put Burma on its agenda. But after Khin Nyunt's purge, the UN's role as an engine for change in Burma appears substantially less promising.
As a practical matter, the UN cannot become a central force in bringing about
change in Burma, unless the Burmese government seeks and accepts its assistance.
But when genuine transition begins in Burma, the UN may become a more important source of advice and support, not only through its assistance agencies, but also through the ability of the Secretary General to facilitate mediation of internal disputes. Because of
historical Burmese respect for UN neutrality, the UN might ultimately be the most
acceptable external interlocutor for all sides in an internal dispute, if mediation is sought.
Q. What is your perspective on the UN now that Gambari has failed in his attempt?
As a long-standing member and the fatherland of former UN Secretary General U
Thant, Burma places the United Nations at the center of its diplomacy. During the years
that General Khin Nyunt managed Burma's diplomatic relations, UN activity in Burma
expanded substantially. UN agencies were allowed to set up missions in the country
and establish programs for various forms of welfare and humanitarian assistance. From time to time, the Secretary General's representative was received to facilitate communication between the Junta and political opposition groups. The UN Human Rights Rapporteur was allowed, off and on, to visit the country and report extensively on humanitarian conditions.
Annual meetings of the UN General Assembly have traditionally served as a forum to chronicle and inveigh against the Junta's record of repression and failure to move forward with political transition. Calculating that the generals were very sensitive about its image in the UN, Burmese exile groups and their supporters have placed great hope in the UN as a means of forcing change, particularly when the Security Council agreed in 2006 to put Burma on its agenda. With the veto of a UNSC resolution on Burma by China and Russia and the Junta's reduced responsiveness to the UN since Khin Nyunt's purge, the UN's role as an engine for change in Burma appears substantially less promising.
As a practical matter, the UN cannot become a central force in bringing about
change in Burma It can only be a forum for debate and a vehicle for the international community to exert rhetorical pressure on the generals. But if and when genuine transition begins in Burma, the UN may become a more important source of
advice and support, not only through its assistance agencies, but also through the ability
of the Secretary General to facilitate mediation of internal disputes. Because of
historical Burmese respect for UN neutrality, the UN might ultimately be the most
acceptable external interlocutor for all sides in an internal dispute, if mediation is sought.
Q What do you think of the U.S. Goals in Burma?
I strongly view that the US wants stability in Southeast Asia, not instability. The U.S. wants to see ASEAN integration and cooperation strengthened. The Bush administration has actually put money behind this principle and helped with the ASEAN secretariat, held meetings with the ASEAN leaders that participate in APEC, agreed upon the enhanced ASEAN partnership last year to strengthen U.S. cooperation with ASEAN as a whole, and helped ASEAN work together because, for strategic and trade response, a strong and consolidated ASEAN is in the U S interest.
At the same time, however, the U.S. has very clear interests in preventing threats to security, broadly defined, in this region. Burma represents some significant threats to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The Burmese Junta's Four Cuts strategy has led to a range of problems that are destabilizing. The very dangerous combination of trafficking in persons, drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS and other easily transmitted diseases, all
combined present enormous challenges for Thailand, India and China. Additionally, Burma's involvement in the arms trade is problematic. Burma's relationship with North Korea, which receives relatively little press, is extremely problematic. All of these
taken together represent a serious security threat that warrants the attention of the U S.
Of course the U.S. seeks and wants to see national reconciliation and a restoration of democracy in Burma. These objectives area almost the same as all of the neighbors of Burma
Q. What is your perspective on the US Policy?
Under the current circumstances, U.S. policy is focused appropriately on pressuring the Junta to return Burma to civilian democratic government. The fact that Burma is considered to be of little to no strategic interest to the United States, especially
when compared to the many more urgent concerns the U.S. faces abroad, has allowed
the development of multiple layers of U.S. sanctions inhibiting relations with Burma as a
means of pressure.
As governors of the major international banks, the U.S. and its partners have managed to prohibit the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank from undertaking any significant programs in Burma. Since various U.S. attempts to seek broader international sanctions through the UN, the EU, and ASEAN have not succeeded over the years, it now appears that most U.S. sanctions against Burma are destined to remain largely bilateral. With the possibility of some degree of generational evolution in Burma's military leadership growing increasingly likely, this might be an opportune moment for U.S. policymakers to undertake a fundamental review of the assumptions underlying the policy that has been in place for nearly two decades and re-evaluate it in the context of today's international environment and evolving U.S. interests. Among other things, such a review should encompass a number of fundamental issues. First is the question of U.S. strategic interests in the Southeast Asia region, particularly in light of the rapid economic development in China and India that will inevitably affect power balances in the region, as well as the way those two countries deal with regional partners.
My thinking is that does the United States perhaps have a greater strategic interest in Burma than has commonly been assumed the notion that total isolation is the most appropriate? If so, has this produced positive results in Burma? Finally, policymakers should take a hard look at how the US have been interacting with regional and international partners in seeking to maximize pressure. While such a review might conclude that current U.S. policy toward Burma remains well founded and most appropriate to the current situation, it would at least have the beneficial effect of drawing attention to the gradual subterranean changes that are always underway in any situation, no matter how glacial it appears on the surface. It would also focus attention on what modifications and adjustments in U.S. policy would be effective and appropriate in response to changes in Burma, and it might shed light on new international strategies for bringing pressure to bear more effectively on the Junta.
It is inconceivable that the United States would not want to play a central and
constructive role in supporting transition in Burma, once it begins. Yet some of the
constraints built into current U.S. policy will make it difficult for the U.S. to contribute
quickly and constructively to potentially positive developments in Burma, let alone to
facilitate gradual changes in Burma that would encourage transition and build the
foundations for stable democracy. For example, strict prohibitions on private business
activity and on economic assistance, both bilaterally and through IFIs, may serve to
assure that the U.S. is not contributing to the financial gain of the dictatorial Junta. However, they also have the effect of prohibiting some kinds of economic activity that could encourage economic reform and the development of Burma's free market sector, if carefully targeted. The United States should therefore consider positioning itself better to play a leading role in facilitating the development of democratic institutions during a process of staged transition, which is the course that Burma is most likely to take before returning to full democracy.
Finally, the U.S. sanctions regime and its confrontational style with Burma's
military leadership, no matter how well justified, have relegated the United States to a
backseat position in the effort to persuade the Burmese men in uniforms to proceed with transition. It is simply a fact of life that Burma's Asian neighbours will remain its key interlocutors and points of contact until the appropriate time comes for the United States to ease its sanctions and adjust its demeanor. Therefore, the U.S. should consider whether it might be more productive to work in partnership with Burma's neighbours to ease the generals into reform and transition, rather than simply exhorting their governments to copy U.S policy. This would only require a change in style and not in the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward Burma, and might help to uncover new possibilities for encouraging the process of change inside Burma.
For example, during this period when transition is still prospective, the United
States might consider spearheading a wide-ranging effort to develop coordinated
international plans to offer Burma assistance with economic and political development at
specified points in the future. The OECD principles for assistance to fragile states
(appended to this study) represent a comprehensive starting point and roadmap for such
an effort. Burma and its specific conditions would provide the ideal case study for
testing the viability of these principles. This kind of effort might even make it possible to
involve Burmese experts in articulating some of the tasks and proposed assistance
programs. But whatever policy adjustments the new US administration might decide to make in the future, however, U.S. policy must remain firmly fixed on the objective of achieving federal democratic government in Burma and therefore on unfailing support for the country's democratic and ethnic forces.
When the time comes for real transition, Burma will need a steady point of reference to articulate and demarcate the route to democracy. Although it will certainly be a healthy sign if many new democratic voices emerge, it will be a long time before any of them can attain the national stature and democratic vision of the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Q. Since, you have worked at the EU, what is the European (EU) interest in Burma?
Having a Euro Burma Office in Brussels supported by the EU does not mean that Europe is very much interested in Burma. It is just a minimal. Of course they are interested in political stability, development, and democracy. But we have to remember that EU is a soft power in Asia and seldom throw their weight around. Rather their influence is on technology transfer, trade, investment, political consultation. For reasons of geography and strategic weight, the Europeans are not as important in Southeast Asia as the United States, the ASEAN members, China and India. By their actions it seems that E U has come to the conclusion that the sanctions have not achieved their political objective and are hurting the population rather than the military government. But it would be painful for them to admit that the sanctions were a mistake, so they leave them intact, and instead seriously increased its humanitarian help both inside and outside the country.
All in all I think that the West's policy is a perfect example of an exclusively moral policy. I am not defending the murderous Junta, whom I loath very much but if the West have live with China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, Libya and many Afro Latin American states which are not democracies, why focused on the moral outrage against Burma. How good it is to have the moral high ground, when you don't do anything for the fall of the regime? I recollect Dr Zani's approach when he said that if you are for the sanctions are you for democracy in Burma but if you are skeptical of their use and convinced about their damage to the people of Burma then you must be chummy with the generals. Instead we should construe Burma from the Geo strategic consideration with some compromise in the Western policies.
Burma's social and economic conditions are mainly homegrown, but by the Western sanctions, they have greatly contributed to the sad state of the country. The West want the Burmese Junta to release Daw Suu and the political prisoners. But they did not know that once she was fully release it means the end of the Burmese Junta.
Q. Why do you think that the democratic and the human rights movement has failed in Burma for so long?
From my perspective is that the biggest flaw is the failure of democratic and human rights movements to understand and articulate the linkages between justice and politics, and how strategies can be developed to address the two simultaneously. Various forms of pressure on a political front may eventually force a military regime to give in to demands for democratic reforms, but these may also fail to account for the consequences to mechanisms of justice in a country that has been under military rule, for more than half a century.
Many years of neglect and deliberate abuse of justice institutions results in them withering and becoming all but dead. It is like a living-dead organ, existing for the purpose of supporting military rule. It is a system of injustice that has become organically linked to the equally unjust political system of the country, and one that if pressured can but work harder to support the diseased body with which it has become fully integrated.
Globally, the demands placed on military regimes are articulated in very simple terms. They often come down to the holding of an election so that a government of popular choice can be installed. There is nothing objectionable in that. However, a political system that has destroyed a country's justice mechanism cannot be changed by a mere election.
First, often elections are not honored, when the National League for Democracy overwhelmingly won the vote but was not allowed to take office. The same thing happened in Cambodia when the FUNCINPEC party won the May 1993 UN-sponsored ballot but was forced to share power with the Cambodian People's Party of Hun Sen, which later consolidated control and has effectively brought about a one-party system of the sort that preceded international intervention. There too the ruling group has used the courts to ensure firm control of parts of government not directly under the executive.
Second, the political and judicial system may be so perverted by military control that it may bring into power unlikely and unsuitable candidates and it may anyhow be impossible for whoever takes power to do anything about the institutional arrangements. This is the problem faced in Thailand, where the courts have become complicit with the armed forces and other powerful groups in the country in defeating the political party process itself. That the country is increasingly treated as ungovernable by anyone apart from an authoritarian- type leader is not a consequence of the behavior of its people or anything innate in the workings of its institutions but a consequence of a deliberate agenda towards that end by these groups who are hostile to people having a genuine say in what goes on in their lives.
Then it can be asked of why has the global human rights movement not challenged itself over these failings? Why have the real problems of military control, political power and justice remained so far removed from much of its debate? The intellectuals from the developed world, who are still the strongest players in this discourse, do not have living experience of the real problems. For them the rule of law and the institutions of justice are as part of the real world as the air they breathe or the water they drink. Their systems are sufficiently advanced that those who come into them and debate their mechanics cannot conceive, other than at a shallow intellectual level, of political and legal systems that lack all of the qualities which they take for granted. When an intellectual from a developed country comes across problems of the sort found in a country like Burma he or she may hold the view that if enough political pressure can be generated from outside in tandem with that from a local movement then surely something must budge. All the effort goes in to "regime change" when experience shows that even a short term and oversimplified goal like this often remains beyond reach, and in places where it has succeeded, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, although conditions may in certain respects improve, the forced collapse of institutions under the old regimes have lasting and intense consequences for the new ones.
Q. So you were saying that Burma first need to over hall the justice system?
Yes that is my perspective. If more people in democratic and human rights movements locally and globally adopt this sort of dual approach of politics and judicial we may have certain success. Simply by putting pressure on its military regime to hold an election and admit some superficial political reforms as they are going to do the election in 2010 with a fake constitution will not work. For instance, despite all the United Nations experts, diplomats and officials coming and going and talking about Burma, how much effort has been paid to documenting and monitoring the work of its judicial system? In terms of international standards and putting forward proposals on specific items that need to be addressed, items on which the Junta will feel some obligation to respond and on which local lawyers, human rights defenders and activists also can work in their respective ways?
The answer to this question is shorter than the question itself. No such work has been done, even with the presence of country offices like the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Monitoring and reporting on the policing system similarly has so far amounted to nothing, other than that incidental to other research. The human rights movement has remained stuck at the point of documenting individual violations and incidents without steps to bring that work into bigger and more meaningful studies on systemic issues. Serious work in these areas could be more effective than the types of two-dimensional back and forth about political party issues that goes on at the moment. It is in this respect that we now need to develop our thinking and planning and hone our expertise if better strategies for the protection and the promotion of human rights of people in Burma are to figure in the global democratic and human rights agendas.
Q. Now that Burma problem case is already half a century and most of the country has agreed on principle that it is a threat to international community as you said, what about humanitarian intervention?
Burma poses a threat to regional stability is not a matter of interpretation. These idea often cross my mind of whether this could be a humanitarian intervention. I think in the academic circles, the theory of humanitarian intervention has not yet been put on a solid basis. But in practical terms, since the 1990s there have been many cases of humanitarian intervention, mostly accompanied by the use of an armed attack like in Bosnia, Kosovo, Srebrenica, Rwanda and so forth. My idea is whether there could be a kind of humanitarian intervention in a softer form without the use of violence. And I cannot answer that. But one thing I know the Security Council should give some advice to alleviate the difficulty of people at the grassroots—such as on infectious diseases, poverty, education, health and so forth. At the same time, the international community
should intensify our humanitarian assistance using all means and in all forms. This is from my good will toward the people of Burma.
Q What is the role of the external factors especially foreign powers?
There is no easy answer to the question of whether and to what degree external actors should intervene to trigger or force transition in extreme cases of autocratic or failed governance. Often in the zeal to hasten the demise of bad regimes inadequate consideration is given ahead of time to how the international community can best prepare a backward country for effective democratic governance. Burma – a prime case of arrested development brought about by decades of stubborn, isolationist military rule – provides ample illustration of this dilemma. The great hope for instant transition to democracy that was raised by the 1990 parliamentary elections in Burma was dashed almost immediately by the failure of the military regime to seat the elected parliament. Motivated by despair, many governments adopted policies making regime change a sine qua non for engagement with Burma, hoping this would force the military to follow through on its original promise to return to elected government.
Twenty years later, however, the military remains firmly entrenched in power and the country's political, economic, and human resources have seriously deteriorated. Even if an elected government could be seated tomorrow, it would find itself bereft of the institutions necessary to deliver stable democratic rule.
Starting from the assumption that some degree of transition is inevitable in the not-too distant future, it must explores the depth of Burma's deprivations under military rule, focusing on questions of how to make the country's political, social, and economic institutions adequate to the task of managing democratic governance. It will have to identify the international mechanisms available to assist in this task, as well as innate strengths that can still be found in Burma, and it discusses what the limitations on assistance might be under various scenarios for political transition.
Q Should outside actors intervene or force transition in extreme cases like Burma?
In countries where diverse societies have been held together by autocratic rule, which purposely exacerbates internal animosities and impedes the development of complex civil society, transition has often been plagued by internal conflict and tension, making democratic outcomes all the more difficult. In fact, Burma not only does the lack of political and civil institutions and a reliable economic structure, let alone civil tolerance among diverse ethnic and religious groups, impede and prolong transition to pluralistic governance, it often sets the scene for anarchy and reversion to autocratic rule.
There is no easy answer. If the horrors of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda taught the international community what may happen when the world lets nature take its course, then the American intervention in Iraq to topple the Saddam government can be seen as a lesson in the dangers of acting decisively to force regime change. In both cases, the international community has, to some extent, inherited the responsibility for dealing with the chaotic consequences, struggling with the extreme difficulty of fostering democratic institutions and effective free market economies in societies that have not yet learned how to negotiate among themselves. I think Burma falls into this category.
Q. Can there be a forced transition by external actors from Military to Civilian rule?
There is no easy answer to the question of whether and to what degree external actors should intervene to trigger or force transition in extreme cases of autocratic or failed governance. Often in the zeal to hasten the demise of bad regimes inadequate consideration is given ahead of time to how the international community can best prepare a backward country for effective democratic governance. Burma – a prime case of arrested development brought about by decades of stubborn, isolationist military rule – provides ample illustration of this dilemma. The great hope for instant transition to democracy that was raised by the 1990 parliamentary elections in Burma was dashed almost immediately by the failure of the military regime to seat the elected parliament. Motivated by despair, many governments adopted policies making regime change a sine qua non for engagement with Burma, hoping this would force the military to follow through on its original promise to return to elected government.
Two decades later, however, the military remains firmly entrenched in power and the country's political, economic, and human resources have seriously deteriorated. Even if an elected government could be seated tomorrow, it would find itself bereft of the institutions necessary to deliver stable democratic rule. Starting from the assumption that some degree of transition is inevitable in the not-too distant future first we will have to explores the depth of Burma's deprivations under military rule, focusing on questions of how to make the country's political, social, and economic institutions adequate to the task of managing democratic governance. What are the weak points and what are the strength and how to leapfrog some of the development has to be considered and will to study the most productive policy approaches will require greater coordination and collaboration with Burma's Asian neighbors.
Q. Do you see any peaceful transactions from Dictatorship to Democracy?
To be very frank I don't see any. The chances for peaceful transition to stable, sustainable democracy in Burma are very slim in the near future, largely because the conditions required for sustainability are absent and there is no opening at present to
foster these conditions.
(1) The intractability of the economic situation and the regime's refusal to entertain reforms that would begin to deal with the severe macroeconomic distortions act as a serious inhibition to political development in the broadest sense of the term.
(2) The existing government institutions are incapable of functioning effectively to maintain central administration of the country without authoritarian control.
(3) And finally, the impoverished educational system with its severe
limits on political and social science, as well as onerous restrictions on civil society and public organizations, make it very difficult for the population to develop the civic institutions necessary to support democratic government.
Since 1945, most Asian countries -- notable exceptions being Burma, North Korea, and perhaps Laos -- have experienced significant, sometimes dramatic, economic and political advancement under a great variety of seemingly adverse conditions, such as foreign occupation, communism, insurgency, and partition. In all these countries the governments, even under communist and/or autocratic rule, have placed a premium on economic development, education, and building civilian communities to advance their societies. Why does the military regime in Burma not ascribe to the same values as its Asian friends and neighbors? We may never be able to answer this question fully, but the fierce desire of successive Burmese governments to prevent and expunge perceived foreign influence on Burmese society and culture has undoubtedly played a large part, along with the obsession of military regimes with maintaining comprehensive control over the population and severe restrictions on civilian activity in the name of security and internal stability. As the world around them moves forward in step with the global community, it will inevitably become impossible for future Burmese leadership to continue insulating their society from the rapid pace of economic and political modernization in Asia and starving their population for information. Technological development is already overtaking them.
Thus it is important for the international community, particularly Burma's Asian neighbours, to understand the depth of Burma's economic, social, and political dislocations and the measures that will be necessary to correct them. If a relatively consistent and coordinated message about the need for basic reform in political, economic and educational structures could be delivered to the country's leadership over time, it would be much more difficult for the leadership to dismiss or ignore it, and some degree of enlightenment might eventually emerge. Just as sanctions regimes can work against our ability to help, it is also irresponsible of Burma's friends and neighbours to conduct their relations with Burma totally in pursuit of their own interests and without regard for the Burma's political future.
Q. Do you think that Burma will regain democracy?
That is a good question. Sure, eventually the people of burma will regain democracy for they have tasted democracy from 1948 to 1962 and treasure it even though the mass of the rural population doesn't know it e.g. many of the rural people in Burma do not conceptualize this forced labor as a violation of human rights, but more as a hassle and in a way a "civic duty." The idea of rights doesn't occur to them because they don't know what they are. Freedom is not different for those who have not been taught about freedom or rights. For those who can't put into words what freedom means, it doesn't mean that its not there—it just needs to be given a voice. I construe that Cyclone Nargis that affected Burma in May 2008 changed a lot for the country. The world became more aware of the level of hatred and cruelty present in the Burmese government as they effectively blocked off international aid to the millions of people affected by this storm, allowing (and wanting) so many of the citizens of their country to die.
But more than showing the world the true nature of the military junta, it also re-energized and showed the world that there is a vibrant civil society in Burma itself. The people of Burma desperately wanted to help each other, and the humanitarian assistance they were giving to each other was not political, but given out of a decency, love, and compassion for each other that is so present in Burma, even if this decency does not include the military government. One of the 5 benchmarks of democracy put forth by Linson Stephen in 1996 is a civil society, which is growing inside of Burma, so there is hope that a democratic society will emerge in Burma. It is what the people there want, as 90% of the population is against the current military government. I think that Nargis served an important role of giving the people inside of Burma a chance to engage and counter the actions of the military government, even if the actions were not political in nature. Therefore, the idea of freedom became proactive, an important shift for a country in which the idea of freedom has for so long been reactive. This will finally lead to democracy.
Q. What is your suggestion to solve this Burmese problem?
For the last half a century or since Burma came into being it has been proven that the Burmese people cannot solved their own problem. This was proven by the fighting between the people of Burma either ethnic or otherwise (communist). The common denominator among the ethnic and the pro democracy movement is that they vehemently hated the Burmese army, which is the strongest. If one were to knock out the Junta and its marauding army, then there would be Balkinization and the infighting among the Burmese themselves as the common joke says that if you put two Burmese together they will form three political parties. Reason and clear thinking cannot be put into the brains of not only the Junta but also among the leading ethnic leaders.
Hence the solution must be imposed by external power if were to stop the on going tragedy. A community of nations, basically the United States, the ASEAN countries, India, and China, to negotiate a package deal with the Burmese Junta and the ethnic groups including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (NLD and the democracy groups are behind her). If ASEAN can take the initiative it will be great but you might as well know of what Harn Younghwe said that that ASEAN needs more of Burma than Burma needs ASEAN. If ASEAN authoritarian leader is able to lead and talk to Generals follow up by sanctions and critical dialogue it will work.
Q. You have been going to Thailand for more than a decade. Can you give us some of your thoughts on the Thai Policy?
This is one of the most difficult questions to answer. Yes I have seen the various administration from Chaticha Choonhaven to the present administration. Except in the Chuan Leekpai administration Thailand has pursued a policy of dealing with the deveil who ever was in power in Burma . I could say something about the Thanksin Administration. He was known to adopt a spongy approach toward Burma, which his critics perceived as an attempt to move away from an emphasis on democratic and human rights values to a more business-oriented stance. The economic results have been evident.
Right now, Thailand is one of Burma's most important investment partners. So,
it is not surprising that Thaksin's company, Shin Corporation, has invested extensively in Burma. Shin Corp, the third largest satellite operator in Asia, concluded a deal in 2003 with Pagan Cybertech, an internet service provider owned by Ye Naing Win, who is the son of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. In January 2006, Shin Corp was sold to Temasek Holdings, an investment arm of the Singaporean government. Shin Corp
got away without paying 450 million U.S. dollars in taxes on the 1.85 billion dollar sale. The whole episode sparked public anger and partly led to Thaksin's downfall.
Back in 2003, Thaksin invited Burma to participate in the Economic Cooperation
Strategy (ECS) cooperative framework, later renamed ACMECS (Ayeyawady-
Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy), in which Thailand offered the Burmese government generous financial assistance worth 45 million U.S. dollars.
In the meantime, Human Rights Watch reported that the Thaksin regime continued to clean up Burmese refugees living along Thailand's borders.
The Bangkok process, hosted by the Thaksin government in 2003 ostensibly to
advance democracy in Burma, failed to take off and came to an end when the military Junta refused to go. To the Thai leaders, a friendly policy toward Burma was important, especially since they wanted to reconnect lost contacts that they once had with Khin Nyunt. But different sectors of the Thai establishment have different approaches. The Thai military, especially in northern Thailand, is more concerned with the real issues behind the illusion of Thai- Burmese relations, namely, the flow of drugs and refugees across the border. Therefore, the military had a less favorable view of the Burmese regime than the government in Bangkok, which was obviously more interested in business ties. Thaksin and his advisors took at least some inspiration from former Prime Minister General Chatichai Choonhavan in turning Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace. However, I don't see any evidence of concerns in Thai policy toward Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos about democracy, human rights, justice and so on. So, given the public perception toward Burma, in part because of the distortion of history between the two countries, I doubt that what goes on in Burma is of much concern to most Thai people. Moreover, business opportunities in Burma are huge, and whether they are responsible, moral, or legitimate are separate questions. Every Thai businessman—from the smallest trader all the way to Thaksin—knows that Burma is full of precious stones, gold, timber, labor, and whatnot. So against this background, I am not surprised that the Thai public at large failed to question or oppose Thaksin's Burma policy. Meanwhile, Thaksin carefully depicted himself as a true nationalist, who strove for the greatness of the nation, stood up against the West, and also reached out for poor neighbors like Burma. In the meantime, he accused those who disagreed with his Burma policy of conspiring to keep Burma backward and underdeveloped, which he saw as not in the interests of Thailand.
Thaksin became the first ASEAN leader to visit the new capital, Naypyidaw. Burma's biggest export and new sales to Thailand alone are worth over one billion U.S. dollars annually. which makes up about 25% of Thailand's supply. There are also firm plans for joint hydroelectric dam projects on the Salween River. The Hugyi hydropower project is a joint venture among Burma, Thailand and China. The project is very controversial because the construction location is also home to the Karens and Kachins. No doubt from the Burmese generals' perspective, a dam project resulting in road construction would help them better control the area. The beginning of the Hutgyi hydropower project has already forced over 20,000 local residents to be relocated from their homes because of the socio-environmental impacts. The speculation here is that Thailand in may want to invest in the new gas fields in Burma in order to resell them later to other countries. I have not study much of the new Thai government as you might as well know the changes in the Thai government.
Q. Can you elaborate the role of the NGOs in Burma?
A handful of international NGOs particularly from the West are inside Burma. They work both on their own and in coordination with the UN agency programs. Like the UN agencies, these NGOs nurture and develop local talent. The bulk of their staff is Burmese and, like the UN agencies, they work with local Burmese NGOs. It is very difficult for foreign NGOs to negotiate and conclude an MOU with the Burmese government to work in the country; the process can take three or more years. Thus there is not likely to be a large increase in INGO activity in Burma so long as the Junta is in its place.
Transition, on the other hand, will bring a plethora of new NGOs to Burma and
they will compete with each other and with UN agencies for funding from donor
governments to implement programs. In fact, these NGOs can play a unique role in
reaching the more remote areas of the country and should be encouraged in this
direction so that international assistance is not concentrated solely in the Burman areas,
but also reaches the ethnic minorities.
There is no denying that UN and INGO activity in Burma over the past decade has helped the development of small local NGOs, who often serve as implementers for their programs. The rise of these NGOs has, in turn, encouraged a second layer of local NGOs and community help organizations of various types that are not necessarily connected with or financially dependent on international aid. Even before transition is underway, the international community should consider ways to support and encourage the expansion of this trend. This could be an important element in instilling a greater sense of cooperation, tolerance, and community in the Burmese civilian population. It can also help develop benevolent community activists as an alternative to the predatory USDA or Swan Arr Shin. It must be noted that many international assistance programs in South Africa during the final years of apartheid, including that of the US, emphasized the development of local civic and nongovernmental groups in the black townships in order to foster future leaders for a democratic South Africa. Many of those who came to the fore, either as politicians or senior civil servants, in the transitional South African government after 1994 got their start in local NGOs and civic groups nurtured by foreign donors. I think Burma can be on the same lines.
Q. Will non violence strategy successful in Burma?
No. the Army come to power with the gun and will have to go with the gun. While the Buddhist monk-led demonstrations briefly raised global awareness of the Burmese people's plight, it also highlighted the failure of the opposition's long-held non-violence strategy.While outwardly a spontaneous gesture in reaction to economic woes, the demonstrations were the culmination of years of planning by opposition forces inside and abroad.
While the regime refused to honor the poll's results, the election provided political legitimacy to the NLD and a handful of opposition activists. still cling to demands that the election's results be honored, but with each passing year those claims to legitimacy become less germane. Close to 40% of the elected members of parliament have been dismissed or resigned and a full 20% have died.
The vast majority of the opposition follows Suu Kyi's guidance that political change can and should be achieved through non-violence. That doctrine was further promulgated by the Albert Einstein Institute of Geneva and New York. The opposition's adherence to non-violence has given the regime a monopoly on fear that allowed it to solidify its position, condemning generations of Burmese to life (and in some cases, death) under the military regime. Additionally, limiting the prospect of violent consequences removed one aspect which may have motivated the regime to negotiate change.
The elevated principle of non-violence made it easier for group leaders to accept the bribery. The success of the regime's effort to pursue ceasefire deals continues to haunt the opposition with fragmentation and conflicting interests. Ethnic armies whose cooperation could have tilted the "Saffron" revolution to effect real change, sat and watched, perhaps out of concern that armed rebellion would jeopardize their lucrative mining or other concessions. As a result, the regime was able to focus its military might on the unarmed protesters and monks.
Incentives and self-interest affect not only limited ceasefires and peace groups, but also some ethnic armies that continue to put forces in the field against the Burmese Army. e.g. the Mon insurgents in the area are receiving payoffs from both the regime and the Thai authorities.
Q. Now that you have come to London and meet us what advice would you give us?
Through out my travels in North America, Europe, Asia and Australia I discovered that London and the United Kingdom has the most Burmese intelligentsia and most of them are well informed. In working for Unity for Victory (U2V), I would advice Unity in Diversity for Victory (UDV). Our epic struggle must be joined by both the pro democratic Myanmar nationalities and the non Myanmar ethnic nationalities. We will have to build the trust between the two groups. The ultimate solution is the Federal Democratic Union of Burma.
London UK
(Ed Note. Prof. Win has given special lectures at the Simon Fraser University of Vancouver on 1st Nov, at the University of Winnipeg Women's club on the 6th Nov. in Manitoba. At 9 rue Courat, Paris 75020 on 13th Nov and at the Burmese Buddhist Monastery in London, UK on the 22nd Nov.
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Monday, December 1, 2008
Lectures of Prof. Win-BURMA BRIEF HISTORY
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