The Politics of Development: Myanmar Military Regime’s Development Policy and Practice toward Ethnic Minorities

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Khet Htan’s Idea World
ခက္ထန္၏ ေဆာင္းပါး၊ အက္ေဆးႏွင့္ စာတမ္းမ်ား
The Politics of Development: Myanmar Military Regime’s Development Policy and Practice toward Ethnic Minorities
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Khet Htan

2006

Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and

fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination.

Article 3.1, International Labour Convention (No. 169)



“Reality has been colonized by the development discourse”

Arturo Escobar


Introduction

Today Myanmar military junta is a one of rhetoric rulers in the world especially in the name of development process in ethnic regions, since Myanmar was integrated with 135 ethnic groups[1]. Military regime forbidden international mass media, strictly control to domestic media and use it as their mouthpiece is a good tool of tricky to world family, they are as the real developer for ethnic and border regions by doing build the bridges, build the roads and many quantitative for-show and so-called development works. Military regime’s attempt to disguise to world is seem successful. Because often I face the similar question by westerners that ‘why don’t you like your military government, because they have done a lot of developing works for people?’. Answer for this question is as well as the main cause for ethnic conflicts between military regime and various ethnic groups. If I follow the usage of Curtis W. Lambrecht, we can say Myanmar development process by Military regime as ‘Oxymoronic Development’ not only ethnic regions as well as throughout the country.


Ethnicity was likely less important in the pre-colonial period than it is today; for as state nationalism has developed so ethnic nationalism has arisen. The population then was sparse in an extensive land, and an increased population of any ethnicity was desirable for economic and political reasons as enhancing military capacity, the labor force, and the tax base. Such expansionist policies over diverse ethnic groups also demonstrated the political efficacy of the ruler. Ethnic nationalism is a more modern phenomenon.

Background

Myanmar is a country of proud cultural and historic traditions, and it is rich in natural resources. But nearly half a century of conflict has left Myanmar with a legacy of deep-rooted problems and weakened its ability to cope with a growing host of new ones: economic and social collapse; hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people; environmental degradation; narcotics; and AIDS. These problems touch on the lives of all Myanmar citizens. But it is members of ethnic minority groups who have suffered the most, and who have had even less say over their lives and the destiny of their peoples than the majority ‘Burmese’. Many minorities claim that a policy of ‘Burmanization’ is manifest. Amidst the upheavals, gross human rights abuses have been committed, including the conscription, over the years, of millions into compulsory labor duties, the ill-treatment or extrajudicial executions of ethnic minority villagers in war-zones, and the forcible relocation of entire communities[2].




Today ethnic minority groups are estimated to make up at least one third of Myanmar’s population of 45 million and to inhabit half the land area. There has been no attempt to take an accurate ethnic survey since the last British census in 1931, which itself contained many errors. Over 100 different dialects and languages have been identified in Myanmar, and many unique ethnic cultures have survived late into the 20th century. The ethnic minority crisis is one of the most central issues facing Myanmar and its neighbors today. All the regions along Myanmar’s 4,016-mile-long land border are inhabited by ethnic minorities, often with historic ties in neighboring states, and armed ethnic opposition groups still police many of Myanmar’s frontier crossings and trade routes. The British built a two-tier system of administration. ‘Ministerial Burma’, dominated by the Burmese majority, and the ‘Frontier Areas’, where most ethnic minorities lived. This strict division set the different ethnic groups on very separate roads towards political and economic development. As a result, the new Union of Burma which eventually gained independence in 1948 was very different from any nation or state in history.

The Colonial Legacy and National Ethnic Groups

All colonial powers in Southeast Asia established strict administrative boundaries where none previously existed, and extended the authority of the center out laterally to the arbitrarily designated borders that ignored ethnicity, language, cultural patterns and unities, sometimes watersheds or other geographic features, and often complex systems of multiple tributary relationships that were deemed under European dominance to have no place in the modern world.

When the British granted independence to Myanmar in 1948, they left behind a country troubled by colonial rule with a weak regime, a restless society, and strategic vulnerability to both China and India. Myanmar was a profoundly insecure state - insecure about its own internal system and about its place in the region and the world. The colonial legacy produced two tendencies in Myanmar society and government: a strong sense of nationalism and a weak understanding of internationalism and its importance for development. Perceived threats to national unity were forces behind both the 1962 and 1988 military coups, but the international implications of that iron-fisted rule and the disregard for the 1990 election results were far greater than the Myanmar government probably predicted. Myanmar must gain a greater understanding of nationalism’s effects on internationalism if it expects to survive and grow in the region.

Silverstein (1980) discusses how Burmese politician leaders during the independence and post-independence periods defined the concept of national unity differently. Myanmar comprises with eight major national ethnic groups: Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine and Shan. Bamar, the largest national ethnic group, constitutes 70%, Karen 9%, Shan 8%, Rakhine 5%, Mon 2.5%, Chin 2.5% and Kachin 2%. Dr. Ba Maw[3], the wartime head of state under the Japanese occupation, insisted on the essential sameness and unity of all people living in what currently constitutes Burma. He claimed that the British colonialists had introduced artificial separations that divided Burmese and ethnic minorities. This view suited those Burmese nationalists who sought to sweep differences under the carpet in order to achieve their goal of a strong, unitary state. General Aung San, the father of state, on the other hand, recognized the different cultures and histories of the various peoples living in the territory now called Myanmar and instead emphasized the need to devise some form of political unity that took that diversity into account. This was huge problem for national reconciliation and it is need to retrospect colonial period.

Civilizing Attempts and its Impacts

In former Burma, systematic civilization attempts to peripheral people or ethnic people start in colonial period by British government and Christian missions. I want to emphasize religious case. At that time and also up to now, Buddhism does not teach to propagate its faith by force. It is against the fundamental belief and doctrine of Buddhism to act in such a manner. Theravada Buddhism strictly prohibits monks from participating in any kind of political or commercial activities. It is also tolerant towards non-Buddhist faiths. This tolerant attitude has led to the idea of religious non-interference. Thus, Myanmar is probably one of few countries where the major religions live together harmoniously. This non-interference concept was behind the response of Burmese Buddhists to Christian Missions: “Our religion is good for us, yours for you”. So the first thing is Christian Missions cannot convince to Buddhist majority, and the second thing is, but, they can freely Christianization to peripheral people, undeveloped ethnic people without interference by Buddhist majority in remote and hill areas.

In Myanmar case, religion (Christian) is a tool for colonial rule of British regime. Because by using religion, British made rule and divide system, and it prevent to unity between hill people and plain people. Not only divide religion but also possible national spirit among local people. Western missions create writing system form some certain ethnic group and create education opportunities in local and abroad. Some ethnic groups give up their writing system in Burmese alphabet and adapt by English alphabet system. Western missions success their works in Myanmar, especially in hill regions. Unfortunately, I think, that Christianization also became a seed of today’s national reconciliation problem. This view maybe controversial.

At that time, in the Taungoo area thousands of Burmese, Karen and Pa-O were organized by Abbot Mayan Chaung to rebel against the British. Similarly another abbot, U Thuria of Hanthawaddy organized the Karens and Burmese in the area to rebel against the colonial regime. But, according to Karen record, for the most part the Karens, especially those taught by the missionaries, remained loyal to the crown, colonial regime. The problem for build common national identity was start at that time. Those ethnic groups loyal to colonial regime after converse to Christian, but when British attempted occupied those regions, all ethnic groups against them with their poor weapons. Later Burmese attacked to British were assumed by those ethnic groups as attack to them. The Christian missionary priest wrote in his letter to other priest that ‘there was a very strong Christian against Buddhist leaning that saw the rebellion not so much has the Burmese people against the Colonialists, but rather Buddhist Burmese against Christian Karen’. And he remarked ‘the strangest of all is the presence of the pongyees (Buddhist monks) on the battlefield. This is unheard of in history’. He also expresses his convinced to local people as that ‘my Karens usually interpret this as God’s sign that Buddhism is to be destroyed forever’.

Immediately after independence in 1948, serious divisions emerged between Burmese and non-Burmese political leaders, who favored a less unified state. Between 1948 and 1962, armed conflicts broke out between some of these minority groups and the central government. Although some groups signed peace accords with the central government in the late 1980s and early 1990s, others are still engaged in armed conflict. From that period to today, national reconciliation is the fist and importance priority for Myanmar, and as in the words of Don McCaskill, the challenge of establishing itself as a distinctive nation-state. On the base of this conflict and later maladministration of military regime make Myanmar as unrest and poorest country. In post-colonial period, authorities try to censors the passages of the Old Testament and the Koran that may appear to approve the use of violence against nonbelievers. And then, all politico-socio situations are complicated and become the endless problems. Today, almost all Myanmar scholar and politician are agree renaming as ‘Myanmar’ to represent all national majority and minority groups, the name of ‘Burma’ suppose as represent to Burmese majority. While all are against current ruling regime, they agree to call Myanmar, although most western countries do not accept as Myanmar, without having sense on ‘name’ and at behind these deep national reconciliation problems.


Colonial Legacy and Development

In an evaluation of economic progress in Southeast Asia in the immediate aftermath on the Second World War, the major economies in the region had grown at widely diverging rates. Philippines recovered rapidly from the devastation of war and occupation. Thailand and then British Malaya (including Singapore) also recovered quite rapidly and achieved positive per capita growth rates in the 1950s. But in Myanmar progress has taken the form primarily of restoring prewar levels of per capita production; it is unlikely that gains prewar levels have been achieved. By the early 1950s, per capita GDP in Myanmar, in international dollars corrected for terms of trade fluctuations, was less than 30 per cent of that in the Philippines, about 30 per cent of the Thai figure, and less than half that in India. Myanmar’s output contraction in the 1930s was entirely due to the very poor performance of the agricultural sector. The newly independent government gave high priority to reform of both the land tenure system and agricultural credit, ‘the twin evils’ of prewar Myanmar agriculture. A prosperous and productive agricultural sector was viewed as the foundation on which a more diversified economy could be constructed (William Kirk 1990). The government was also determined to use taxation and other revenues to increase spending on infrastructural development and health, education and welfare. In contrast to the prewar economy where Myanmar had made large subventions to the budget of British India and received little back in return, there was a determination to use national resources to improve the welfare of the entire population.


But, later ethnic and communist insurgencies necessitated a sharp increase in military expenditures, which accounted for around 30 per cent of total budget spending for much of the decade. Although expenditure on infrastructure development and on health and education did increase, relative to GDP, the bold ambitions of the immediate post-independence era to build a welfare state in Myanmar were only very partially realized. There were those who argued that Myanmar’s failure to achieve prewar levels of per capita GDP during the 1950s was not just due to the unfavorable colonial legacy, wartime devastation, and high government expenditures on defense. Myanmar economist Dr.Hla Myint (1967) pointed out that while all the countries of South East Asia shared a common reaction after independence to what might be termed ‘the colonial economic pattern’. Since a large share of these exports was produced by the foreign-owned mines and plantations, the governments of post-colonial countries took care to guarantee the security of foreign property and freedom to remit profits, and generally created a favorable economic environment which encouraged the foreign enterprises not only to continue their existing production but also to undertake new investments, to strike out into new lines of exports and to introduce new methods of production and organization.


In contrast, Dr. Hla Myint continued, the political leadership of Myanmar at that time “were obsessed by the fear” that once foreign enterprises were allowed to reestablish themselves or expand their operations, they would resume their old stranglehold over the economy, and re-impose the colonial economic pattern whereby most profits were remitted abroad, and the local populations gained little benefit from the exploitation of the economy’s abundant natural resources (Anna Booth (2006). Dr. Hla Myint argued that both countries did little to attract new investment and indeed nationalized a number of foreign-owned firms. They also adopted hostile policies to their Chinese and Indian minorities, so that many left either for their ancestral homelands or to settle in third countries. Nor did they encourage entrepreneurship among the indigenous majority; in both countries smallholder producers of export crops were taxed through export taxes and marketing boards, and there was little investment in infrastructure or new cultivation technologies which would directly benefit smallholder producers.


The official view was that a unity of culture existed among the peoples of the Union and that existing differences are only expressions of the same culture at different stages of development. Since post-independence period, from the time of General Nay Win to the present, Burmese language became not only the official common language of all ethnic groups of the Union but also the only medium of instruction for all education in Myanmar. A crucial problem for the minority ethnic Christians is that they do not want to use of Burmese as common language and it is assume that the government attempts to eliminate the long existing languages of minority ethnic Christians. To allow using their own languages, the problems are reinvention history and its can creating to barrier for national reconciliation, could spread hatred and hostility among different people groups. Under the maladministration of military regime, all worries of plain people, misinterpretation of hill (especially Christian) people, and chaos are lead to advantage for ruling military generals and national reconciliation for Myanmar is still dream in a deadlock.


Relocation as Development Process

In many respects, the present political and ethnic crisis in Myanmar is underpinned by the collapse of the economy and the economic and social restructuring now taking place. According to rough estimates, Manar has been losing as much as 800,000 hectares of forest cover annually since 1988. At current rates of felling, all its teak wood reserves, once the largest and best maintained in Asia, will have gone within ten years. In many parts of the Karen, Kayah, Mon, and Shan States, large areas have been stripped of all forest growth. Similar large-scale deforestation has taken place along the Chinese border in the Kachin State, of equal concern, in the 1991 monsoon season heavy flooding occurred for the first time in several remote valleys in both the Karen and Kachin States, where some of the heaviest logging was taking place: over 140 people died. Local villagers had no doubt that uncontrolled forest destruction was to blame.


A typical threat of extrajudicial action by the military was made under an order dated 7 December 1992 issued by the ‘Committee for the Relocation of Villages’ in Paan, the Karen State capital. The inhabitants of over 40 Karen villages west of the Salween River were commanded to move with their belongings to designated armycontrolled settlements within three weeks. Those refusing to comply were warned: Any rice and cattle left behind will be confiscated if found by the military columns. If any villagers hide in the forest, they will be shot and arrested. When a foreign journalist inquired about the large numbers of deaths of Karenni villagers during the construction of the Aungban-Loikaw railway, Lieutenant-Colonel Than Han of the BADF replied: Every day people are dying. It’s a normal thing. While admitting that ethnic minority villagers did not wish to leave their homes, he complained: They do not understand that the military is carrying out the rail project in their interests (Smith).


Myanmar’s continuing political and economic crisis is also forcing ever greater numbers of inhabitants to leave their homes. In mid-1994 over 300,000 refugees, mostly ethnic minorities, were officially recorded at camps in neighboring Thailand, Bangladesh, India and China. Of these, some 75,000 were in Thailand (largely Karen, Mon and Karenni) and over 200,000 (predominantly Muslims) in Bangladesh. There were also an estimated 10,000 Kachin refugees in China and a similar number of Naga, Chin and other refugees in India. Unofficial numbers, however, were estimated at over three times that figure, meaning that over one million exiles and migrants were subsisting precariously around Myanmar’s troubled borders. These figures tell only half the story. By most estimates, there are also over one million internally displaced persons inside Myanmar itself, including relocated villagers from the war-zones, those forcibly resettled in recent SLORC development projects, and refugees still trying to survive in the hills. However, unlike the refugees abroad, these internal victims of Myanmar’s political crisis have virtually no access to international aid or support.


Dams and Hydroelectricity: Who benefits?

For many minorities, perhaps the most controversial plans are eight proposed hydroelectric projects with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, Located along the Moei, Salween (Than Lwin) and Mae Kok rivers, the dams would have a combined generating capacity of 6,399.75 megawatts, requiring an investment of over US$ five thousand million, much of which is being solicited from international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. To date, the indigenous peoples in the area have not been consulted: most of the electricity and water would go to Thailand, the profits to military regime. The environmental consequences for the region and the Karen peoples, in particular, would be enormous. The two largest dams would be on the Salween River in the heartland of Karen country in territory controlled by the KNU since Myanmar’s independence in 1948. Thousands of villagers stand to be displaced, and no studies have yet been started on such environmental dangers as loss of fisheries, silting, or the destruction of the eco-system.


Dam Politics: Sustainable Development or Destroying in Long Term?


Regional economics integration has been shaped by growing economic and political influence, and consequently demand for natural resources is increase. Dam projects are popular and geared towards selling electricity and water across national boundaries. Civil society responses to current development approaches and trends in the Mekong reflect the complexities brought on by increased regionalization, with multi-scale networks being formed within as well as between the Mekong countries.[7] Regionalization from below has created dissent to specific projects, intergovernmental process and the non-participatory and non-transparent deals, policies and programs.[8]


Unfortunately, I think in the South Asia, regionalization is imbalance, almost all about China. The more China hungry energy, the more it needs to protect the notorious country like Myanmar.[9] China’s plans for damming the upper Salween serve the Myanmar military junta’s dual goals of securing territories in conflict regions and generating revenue to further entrench the military regime. Dams are not sure for development after onward, but sure for political and commercial interest in current Myanmar. So I want to name as ‘dam politics’. Apart form various impacts by dam building, in Shan State of Myanmar, 400,000 people are suffer from force relocated to build only one dam. Other human right violation and destroying environment were endless before and after dams.


China and Thailand are the two main foreign investors in military rule Myanmar.[10] Rivers and her peoples are marginalized, not only in Myanmar, including other poor Southeast Asian countries. Sadly tragedy is that, in Myanmar, dam projects are greatly affected to ethnic people, because rivers are in their settle regions. More tragedy is that there are lacks of civil society to represent ethnic peoples’ voice and military repression is beyond control. Results are not only ecological degradation but also loss of local livelihoods for thousands of people. In Yunnan, China, news report that by the year 2020 at least 500,000 people will be resettled to make way for hydropower development in Yunnan province.[11] I feel that those government and it crony abuse the word ‘development’ for their interests. China making political, social and ecological problem with other countries as well as it own. Over the past 50 years, more than 16 million people have been displaced by dams of various types, and as many as 10 million of those people are still living in poverty.[12]


Dam projects are, for military junta, the subject of getting favor form such country like China, Thailand including India to making cover their political power seizing from the critics of global family. And dam also the weapon of ethnic cleansing. Myanmar has 135 ethnic group and almost all of ethnic regions are full of conflicts and place of fighting. After independent, majority Burmese and all ethnic groups had agreement to follow federalism[13]. But military coup for that they cannot accept federalism. Until now, military talk in a loud voice national reconciliation, but any practices don’t follow it. The main reason for to control political power is nothing, but for rich natural resources and exploitable position of those ethnic regions. According to federal agreement, ethnic groups can have their own region to manage themselves including natural resources.[14]


Now under several dam projects, along the Salween River, all ethnic groups are targets. Not only for relocate, but also force labor and portering, harassment, extortion and random killing are common. Thai-Myanmar border become a refugee place for ethnic people without having recognized citizenship, while Thai business group invest of large amount in their native regions. According to a report, 92,500 ethnic people were internally displaced in 2005.[15] Almost all of people are forcibly relocated and all people, including children, pregnant women and elderly have to walk through the hills to distant relocation site. That site is lacking proper food and medical care. That is true. But some information like that women are constantly raped by armed soldiers and those who are captured escaping are kill[16], are too exaggerate.


In the region, China as a main driven of regional economics integration, I don’t believe it can sustain any situation. Although China influences other countries’ economics decision, leave other countries alone, China itself cannot control to slow and steady it running rate. It looks like time boom. Dam projects seem a good business for country income, but I found that its profit is not for majority, only for the handful of bourgeois and autocrats. It obvious that environmentally, ecological system was destroys and socially, thousand of people are abuse and still snick in poverty. Where is development? Governments used to claim that ‘those people should to sacrifice for development’, but I don’t found any effective development process in my sense. But I am sure to say that current generation ‘sacrifice’ for their so-called development, ‘a modern utopia’[17], not only that, future generation will be paying the prices for those impacts of dam politics. And I considering that no one can prevent effectively them and they do with their logical short term visions are not so strange, not to be surprise. Because any religious predict the batter world in future, but the day of destroy the world, with their own references.


Politics, Environment and Development

Although I was a journalist whom thought as ‘know something of everything’, I didn’t have awareness much about of Myanmar policy and practice of environment through development. At the first year of my studies in Chuang Mai University, I get a lot of brain storming concerning with environmental, political, gender issues and various aspects of social issues. I start to rethink all situations of Myanmar thoroughly as far as I have known. And I found myself that I can see clearly what happen inside of Myanmar before and now, by the invaluable teachings of my Ajarns[18]. Here I want to review environmental politics and the politics of development of Myanmar. How these three sectors related and affect each other?


Resently, I have read an interview with Dr. Mahathir Mohamad[19], who expresses his view on Myanmar as that they (current ruling Generals) may love their country, but they make many wrong behaviors in politics. This is a good point of what happen in inside of Myanmar, here in terms of to harmony between environmental politics and development. Since the ruling Generals took power by military coup in 1988, the regime has increased use of Myanmar’s natural resources. Urgently needing hard currency to expend its military and engage in political and armed destruction of various insurgent groups, the regime began exploiting the country’s natural resources irresponsibly at a shocking rate. If we study the case of Myanmar, we can see how politics play the critical role in environmental conservation and to achieve development in Third World country. The lack of good governance is the main cause of destroying nature. Scholars and observers point out that sustainable development in Southeast Asia should be understood with the political-ecology approach (Bryant and Parnwell 1996)


The political situation in Myanmar is at a critical stage. At this political stage, Myanmar has no constitution, no national legislative body, and no independent judiciary system. In other words, at present Myanmar lacks the fundamental structures of a stable society, such as political accountability, good governance, and effective and equitable law enforcement, that are vital to the sustainable management of environmental and human resources (Tun Myint 2003). Since lack of these fundamental structure, there are many challenges appear in environmental governance. And it is difficult to express the concerning of people in environment and development process.


In the West, a major focus of environmental issues has been on the diagnosis of continuing decline in the productivity of the world’s renewable natural resources. It is generally seen as the result of human activity. People now are destroying the resource base of people in the future. Developing countries constitute the larger part of the world’s population and are therefore also responsible for the major proportion of all human activity. But some claim that in those countries, concern about ecological decline is much less evident. In its place is found an increasingly eager demand for improvement of living conditions today through more even distribution of existing resources.


To follow this discourse, military regime blame as that Myanmar’s environmental problems were a result of ‘underdevelopment’, by the poor who use it and also as the colonial legacy. As the nation try to catch up with the rest of the world in terms of development, this trend is causing serious concern for many environmental issues in Myanmar. This national quest and campaign for ‘development’ has met the dilemma of ‘sustainable development’, where natural resources are the only available source of development capital (Tun Myint). If human activity causes ecological decline, it also lowers the limits of what can realistically be aimed for through development to improve the conditions of human activity. This conflict between behavior and ambition underlies much political activity (Spooner 1984).


As a policy response to address environmental issues, military regime established the National Commission on Environmental Affairs (NCEA) in 1990 to ‘educate the public about environmental awareness’. NCEA is also charged with the duty to formulate a ‘comprehensive national environmental strategy’ in pursuit of a ‘modern and developed nation’ (NCEA Report, 1992). In 1994, NCEA adopted the National Environmental Policy. According to NCEA, the National Environmental Policy has two major tasks: (1) institutional development, and (2) carrying out the National Environmental Action Plan (FAO Report, 1997). But what is the reality beyond policy!


But military regime’s policy of environment is on paper. The policy on paper in Myanmar is usually not practiced by the military rulers themselves. What is happening in reality is different from the policy on paper. In the absence of a constitution, a national parliament, and a legislative body, there is at present no appropriate and working mechanism in Myanmar to address environmental problems. According to the National Environmental Policy, NCEA is presently focusing on promoting public awareness for environmental protection and securing the active participation and cooperation of the public in environmental conservation efforts. Although Myanmar has a number of environmental laws and regulations, it lacks the institutions to carry out ‘protection and conservation of environment’ so as to achieve ‘sustainable development’ by implementing these laws.


Since Myanmar gained independence, NCEA and its policy framework is the first and only initiative that designed to address environmental issues in Myanmar. The military regime also announced that it fully supports the concepts of ‘sustainable Development’ for Myanmar ‘to become a modern and developed nation’. The conceptual framework of ‘sustainable development’ is ‘to ensure that it meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Our Common Future 1986).


Myanmar junta often proudly claimed that Myanmar is ‘rich in natural resources’, but it is being threatened by over exploitation of natural resources while political crisis. So some observer argue that Myanmar no longer possesses like mentioned status of being rich in natural resources. One of the most visible threats to Myanmar’s environment today is the rapid depletion of many forests. Independent observers’ estimates that remaining forest cover in Myanmar at closer to 30 percent of its total land area. The Rainforest Action Network[20] has calculated Myanmar’s annual deforestation rate at 800,000 to 1 million acres a year. The rate of deforestation in Myanmar is one of the five highest in the world.


To illustrate the gap between law and practice in environmental politics, we should see the border timber trade, especially with China. After 1980s, China promoted economics relation with neighboring countries. Myanmar has made several requests to china for the exploitation of its forest resources jointly with China, a record said. Timber has simply become the number one business on the China-Myanmar border[21]. During the dry season, 150 to 200 timber trucks cross the border per day (Su Yongge 2000). Here another question is rise that where these money go after selling these natural resources. Intelligence sources estimated that Myanmar spent between US$1.5 billion and US$2 billion to purchase arms from China alone in 1990s. It is the evidence of that they spent large amount of money in military sector rather than social and economics development sector. And other place where money keep is the own interest of junta. The emergence of close links between political and economic elites resulted in widespread environmental degradation since the politicians use the resource lease to gain personal or political interest (Bryant and Parnwell). Myanmar people are still coping with lack of health care, poor education access and very lowest status in physically and mentally.


Myanmar, a country that has suffered a great deal from political instability, war, and repression, stands to lose much of its remaining natural resources at an alarming rate. The military regime’s protection and conservation of natural resources and environment as a national endeavor, has been far away to reach the achievement. The implementation of the National Environmental Policy has yet to find appropriate institutional mechanism. Although decision-making are crucial elements for good governance, the big junta who hallucinate himself as ‘a great king’ is strongly hold decision maker role without knowing even any sense of politics, apart from the vision of environment and development.


Ecology and development are unavoidably interrelated. Particular development, insofar as it is directed towards increased food and other crop production, begs the ecological question of the long-term productivity of resources. Ecological processes do frustrate development. If we can’t create the harmony between politics and environmental management, we can’t dream development. At the same time that harmony should be ‘in time’, before deplete all natural resources. If not, not only the given single country, but all countries would pay the prices for ecological impacts[22]. Ecology has no borders. So it should be possible to persuade people - all people: politicians, as well as planners, and local to accede to their imperatives and develop within the limits they set down.



Culture, Education, Language and Religion

For many citizens, the open discrimination against ethnic minority groups in matters of culture, education, language and religion is the most disturbing evidence of a long-term policy of ‘Burmanization’ carried out by all governments since independence. The Karen National Union has attacked the ‘annihilation, absorption and assimilation’ of the Karen people, and asserted that: “The Karen are much more than a national minority. We are a nation.” Cultural discrimination against ethnic minority groups, who make up over a third of the population, runs counter to the constitutional right of every citizen in Myanmar to freedom of speech, association, language, education and religion. Despite the imposition of one-party rule in 1962, equal ethnic, religious and cultural rights were still guaranteed under the BSPP’s 1974 constitution. But all these fundamental human rights have long since been whittled away. Long before the 1988 democracy uprising, newspapers, schools and universities had been repeatedly shut down at the first sign of protest.


A subtle mixture of discrimination and laws controls all literature and expressions of ethnic minority cultures. Ethnic minority writers and teachers who oppose government restrictions or encourage expressions of cultural identity and the use of their own languages have faced considerable harassment. For example, two Mon intellectuals, Nai Nawn Dho, a Buddhist monk, and Nai Manawchrod, a Rangoon University lecturer, were reportedly arrested in January 1991 for attempting to promote the use of the Mon language. And, in perhaps the most disturbing incident, in August 1990 82 year-old U Oo Tha Htun, the distinguished Rakhine historian and parliamentary candidate, died allegedly as a result of ill-treatment in jail.


Over the past 30 years, the multi-cultural system of education envisaged by Aung San and ethnic minority leaders in the 1947 constitution has been replaced by a highly Burmanized and doctrinaire curriculum in which any expression of minority cultures is denied. In a country of such obvious ethnic diversity, this discrimination appears quite deliberate. For example, although the 1974 constitution allowed for minority languages to be taught in schools, in government-controlled areas today there is no official teaching or research in any minority language in either secondary or tertiary education. Cultural and religious studies have been equally repressed. Such discrimination is not only a major impediment to the survival and expression of minority languages and cultures, but it also discriminates against ethnic minority citizens who first have to learn Burmese as the only language for education and government.


For those ethnic minority students who aspire to higher education, the regional college system is inherently discriminatory. This system was introduced in the mid- 1970s to keep Myanmar’s restive student body at home, away from the main conurbations, and it has since remained extremely difficult for prospective ethnic minority students from outlying areas to travel to the central cities for university education, due to lack of funds, contacts and the allotment of places. With the exception of Moulmein, which was upgraded in 1986, there are no universities in ethnic minority areas, only state colleges, hich local students are encouraged to attend. The government’s flagship for ethnic minority education has been theAcademy for the Development of National Groups in the Sagaing Division. But the Academy is in the heartland of Burmese culture and its initial purpose, when set up in 1964, was to propagate the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ in minority areas. To much fanfare, it was upgraded into a university in 1991, but this did not impress minority leaders: they say the university’s only purpose is to provide Burmese language teachers to spread the philosophy of the SLORC’s new ‘Myanmar’ Buddhist culture in borderland areas.


In response to requests for international aid, ethnic group leaders have argued that only aid which goes directly to indigenous peoples will ever enable the local inhabitants to develop their region, alleviate poverty and eradicate the scourge of narcotics. The official policy of the Burmese government is to suppress opium growing. This is a ‘window dressing’ policy only to impress the West. In the past the United States has even given the Burmese aid to carry out that policy. While, in fact, the Burmese officials encourage opium growing and enable its marketing for their own benefit.


Individual rights and collective rights

Human rights mainly concern the relationship between the state and individuals. However, human rights do not explicitly address the collective rights of ethnic people who would like to maintain their particularities such as culture, custom, language, literature, ancestral domains etc. It has become doubtful that particularity of the ethnic people can be maintained while human rights are being promoted.


Ethnic people have practiced different cultural systems in Myanmar for hundreds of years. All ethnic peoples have their own languages and the majority of them have their own literature. Unfortunately, under the rule of the military junta, learning and teaching of ethnic literatures has not been allowed in government schools. Only Burmese (Myanmar), the major language of the majority Burmese people, is permitted. From 1992 to 1997, under the military’s program claiming to preserve cultural inheritance in support of “national unity”, the junta re-established “Kambawza Thardi”, the ancient palace of Burmese King Bayinnaung. The military spent 170 million Kyat (Burmese Currency) in doing so56. Under the same program, the military junta allotted 1.3 million Kyat for the extension of Shan State library57. At the same time no project was allowed for the Shan people to preserve the ancient palaces of Shan hereditary Chiefs such as Chaofas or Sawbwas. Instead, Keintong Haw, palace of Keintong Chaofas in eastern Shan State, was destroyed and replaced with a hotel.


The Karen people love their national flag very much as a symbol of the dignity of their nationality. Unfortunately, in a surrender ceremony for a group of Karen rebel soldiers, the SPDC vice-chairman, Lieutenant General Maung Aye, lay down the Karen national flag and stepped on it. These brutal actions of the SPDC leaders strike at the hearts of the non-Burmese ethnic people. These are only some of the dealings of the military junta with ethnic nationalities.




Conclusion

In Myanmar, there is no conflict between either Burmese and non-Burmese people or between non-Burmese ethnic nationalities themselves. Throughout the history of Myanmar, the source of ethnic ‘trouble’ has been the extension of military power and a centralization process by the rulers. As a result, the rights of non-Burmese ethnic nationalities were mainly neglected and peace, justice, equity and fairness were lost. Under the SPDC, which practices stronger centralization than during any other period of history in Myanmar, not only the non-Burmese and but also Burmese ethnic nationalities are suffering terrible atrocities. The SPDC deprives non-Burmese ethnic people of the right of local autonomy, which had even been permitted by earlier Burmese kings during the three Burmese empires.

Forceful conquest and annexation can be achieved by military prowess. Superficially, it may appear that the military is capable of establishing stability in Myanmar, but in essence, it has only been creating brutal oppression, fear, injustice, and loss of freedom for all people inside Myanmar. In such a terrible situation, we cannot say that national unity has been achieved. However, at the same time, national unity can really be achieved once the Burmese and non-Burmese ethnic nationalities get a chance to sit together; exchange information about past sufferings, establish common understanding for the future and produce a new constitution which will guarantee liberty, freedom and development of individuals as well as ethnic groups.



People usually love their culture and want to practice it freely. If their practices are not against public health and basic rights of other people, the practices should be allowed in respect of the fundamental collective rights of ethnic people, rather than just individual rights. Without paying due respect to the different cultures of the ethnic people in a certain country, without sharing political power and the country’s resources fairly, and without establishing a pluralistic society, genuine peace and stability will never be a reality in Myanmar. While the current practice of attempting to establish a unitary state under strong centralization continues, countless problems will continue. Additionally, trust among various ethnic nationalities has been waning, and national solidarity will never be achieved.


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[1] Martin Smith point out that the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which has ruled Myanmar

since 1988, itself refers to the ‘135 national races’ of Myanmar, but has produced no reliable data or list of names.


[2] Report of Anti-Slavery International

[3] Dr.Ba Maw (1893-1978)

[4] Buddhist monk.

[5] Buddhist monk

[6] In colonial period, Buddhist monks are played critical role to against British. Today military regime know the power and influence of monk, so they strictly control to Sanga (monk) society by arrested, change to manhood by force and send to prison.

[7] Editorial, Watershed, Vol.11 No.2,

[8] Ibid

[9] China veto (with Russia) UN Security Council on Myanmar in January 2007.

[10] Recently, China, Thailand and Myanmar make tri-partite agreement for damming

[11] Kumming Evening Daily

[12] According to Senior Researcher Chen Guokie, Chegdu Institute of mountain Hazards and Environment

[13] The Panglong Aggrement, 1947

[14] Ibid

[15] Thai-Burma Border Consortium(TBBC)

[16] Dams as Ethnic Cleansing, Watershed, Vol.11, No.2, p 53

[17] Editorial, Watershed, Vol.11, No.1

[18] Teachers

[19] http://burmadigest.wordpress.com/2006/11/16/interview-with-former-prime-minister-of-malaysia-2/

[20] http://www.ran.org/

[21] Myanmar is only country that China no need to pay foreign currency for timber import, easy to bring Chinese labor to Myanmar. (130 Yuan for per cubic meter)


[22] Here I want to point out ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy toward Myanmar and ‘energy politics’ of China and India to deal with Myanmar.