http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/21/content_11048335.htm
www.chinaview.cn 2009-03-21 19:54:52 Print
YANGON, March 21 (Xinhua) -- Myanmar is implementing a new hydropower project, Nancho, near the new capital of Nay Pyi Taw as part of its bid to add more electricity to the country, sources with the Electric Power Department said on Saturday.
The project, lying 25.6 kilometers east of Nay Pyi Taw, is targeted to complete by the year 2010, the sources said.
The Nancho power plant, equipped with two 20-megawatt turbines, can generate electricity of 152 million kilowatt-hours yearly after completion, the sources added.
According to the Myanmar authorities, since Myanmar worked out a series of state-level special projects which also include hydropower ones for implementation, six has been completed and 22 others are underway.
With installed capacity of a total of 442 megawatts (mw), the six completed hydropower projects up to 2008 are Zawgyi-2, Zaungtu, Thaphanseik, Monechaung, Paunglaung and Yenwe.
The 22 ongoing projects will add a total 16,599 mw more to the country's electric power installed capacity on completion, the department said earlier, adding that 15 more hydropower projects are being planned in addition.
The 15 hydropower projects with an installed capacity ranging from 48 mw to 2,800 mw, lie in seven divisions and states.
Of the projects, seven are located in the northernmost Kachin state, six of which range over 1,200 mw, the report said, adding that the rest of the projects are scattered in Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway and Bago divisions, and Rakhine and northern Shan states.
The 15 projects on completion in the future will add another 13,847 mw to the country's installed capacity.
Meanwhile, Myanmar claimed in its monthly statistical report that the country's electric power installed capacity reached a total of over 1,684 mw as of the end of 2008 and the power generated stood 6.603 billion kwh in 2007-08, up from 6.164 billion kwh in 2006-07.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Myanmar implements new hydropower project in new capital
Report urges more relief funds for Burma
http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/1871-report-urges-more-relief-funds-for-burma.html
by Salai Pi Pi
Friday, 20 March 2009 22:08
New Delhi (Mizzima) –The international community should take up the opportunity of the ongoing relief process in Burma to inject more funds needed for humanitarian assistance of the impoverished Southeast Asian nation, a new report urged.
US-based Refugee International (RI), in its new report, entitled ‘Burma: Capitalizing on the Gains’ released on March 18, urged the global community including the United States, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Burma is a member, to increase funding for development work in Burma.
Jake Kurtzer, who conducted the assessment on Burma’s humanitarian situation, in the report said, though Burma’s ruling military junta initially blocked humanitarian aid, with relief now being mobilized in Cyclone Nargis hit areas of the Irrawaddy delta, the international community should take advantage of the opportunity to inject more funds for humanitarian aid, in other parts of the country.
In its recommendation, the report urged the United States to join other donor nations in making a significant appropriation for humanitarian aid in Burma.
“It should allocate USD 30 million for FY10, with plans to increase its contribution to USD 45 million in FY11 and USD 60 million in FY12,” the report said.
The report said, while the Irrawaddy Delta remains the main focus of humanitarian assistance, after it was hit by Cyclone Nargis, other regions also need similar attention as they too were reeling under humanitarian crisis.
The report said it was necessary that the funding for INGOs’ operation to do assessment in the areas, outside the delta regions, such as drought prone areas of Magwey, Mandalay, Bago Division and the home of Rohingya people in northern Arakan state and the southern part of Chin state, which faces a shortage of food due to being infested by rats.
According to the report, northern Arakan State in Burma, which is home to the Rohingya Muslim minority, continues to be one of the areas of greatest concern.
“Deteriorating living standards, news of increased forced relocations, continuous restrictions on all aspects of normal life, and the expulsion of Rohingya refugees from asylum countries in the region, have focussed the attention of the international aid community there,” the report explained.
The report also urged ASEAN to apply the Tri-Partite Core Group model for use in the discussion of other issues of concern regarding Burma, such as the Rohingya.
RI also urged Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, by hiring a senior humanitarian advisor to strengthen support to the UN Country Team to receive support and adequate guidance.
India Bids to Rule the Waves: From the Bay of Bengal to the Malacca Strait
http://japanfocus.org/-Ramtanu-Maitra/1610
By Ramtanu Maitra
After years of hesitancy, India has now firmly acknowledged the strategic importance of the Andaman Sea. The Indian Navy is setting up a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands - also known as the Bay Islands - located midway between the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait - to give it "blue-water" status.
It is evident New Delhi believes that the new strategic command will remain vulnerable unless the entire Andaman Sea is brought under the full control of the Indian Navy.
A variety of factors led to New Delhi's full realization of the Andaman Sea's importance for overall regional security.
To begin with, the US's recent invitation to the Indian Navy to help patrol the Malacca Strait must have been viewed as an open US affirmation of its intent to bring India into the naval big league.
The Malacca Strait, thanks to the weakness of the Indonesian and Malaysian navies, has become a hunting ground of pirates. Bringing the Indian Navy to help patrol the strait would mean, according to some analysts, Washington's tacit approval of India's assertion of naval control over the Andaman Sea, the eastern mouth of the Indian Ocean and the waters that surround Sri Lanka.
Although India is not party to any security arrangement for the Malacca Strait, the immediate purpose of any joint patrols would be to prevent smuggling, piracy, drug and gun trafficking, poaching and illegal immigration in the region.
Oil-tanker traffic through the narrow strait, which already carries most of North Asia's oil imports, is projected to grow from 10 million barrels a day in 2002 to 20 million barrels a day in 2020 - much of that oil will be destined for the fast-growing market of China.
Even if it is true that it was Washington's wink and nudge that emboldened Indian authorities to stake control over the Andaman Sea, other reasons often debated in New Delhi's South Bloc were no less critical.
As one Indian analyst points out, in recent years, in addition to the US, whose navy has long had a presence in the Indian Ocean and has been stealthily sailing the waters of the Bay of Bengal, China has also shown a considerable interest in utilizing the Andaman Sea as an outlet to the Indian Ocean in the near future.
New command
There is little doubt that the FENC is a well thought out development. Indian naval officers have said that FENC, when fully developed by 2012, will have a chain of small anchor stations and three main bases.
As for models, Russia has a similar base in the Black Sea, and the US naval base at Hawaii comes close. FENC will be larger than the former US base in the Philippines at Subic Bay, spreading from Narcondam to Indira Point. Car Nicobar will serve as the vital link for various FENC stations.
The plan to set up FENC was set in concrete in 1995 following a closed-door meeting in Washington between then Indian prime minister, P V Narasimha Rao, and former US president, Bill Clinton. At the time, Pentagon officials made a formal request to the United Front coalition government in New Delhi to open the base, but for various reasons the Indian government did not respond.
The US is expected to partly fund FENC because it is considered part of a US-led security arrangement for Asia in which India plays a key role. US funding was cleared in 2000 when Clinton visited India.
FENC will have state-of-the-art naval electronic warfare systems that can extend as far as Southeast Asia. Also, the Russian Navy will likely assist in setting up a few armament projects.
The command will include submarines. The upgraded naval ship repair yard at Port Blair already refits minor war vessels. FENC will build and repair bigger ships. This will release more warships for operations and more operational space in alternative ports for fleet ships and submarines.
China bogey?
Some Indian naval authorities who are concerned over the increasing Chinese presence in these waters point out that with China controlling the Myanmar ports of Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein, India's approaches to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands could be threatened.
China is developing all these naval ports with facilities to handle ships considerably larger and more sophisticated than the Myanmar Navy currently possesses. A host of Indian naval analysts say that if India does not have a strong naval presence in the region, in an emergency China could enforce a sea denial on India by using its warships stationed in Coco and other islands leased from Myanmar.
Coco Island and the northern-most tip of the Andamans are separated by just 18 kilometers of sea. Officials say that Coco is visible from the Andamans, and plenty of Chinese fishermen can be seen in its port.
Others point out that the town of One Pagoda Point, located near the mouth of the Irrawady in Myanmar, is emerging as the main logistic point for the Chinese. One Indian naval analyst goes to the extent of claiming that if China acquired control over the northeastern Sri Lankan port of Trincomalee, Beijing would be in a position "to convert the Bay of Bengal into a veritable Chinese lake". Whether New Delhi sees the developments in that light is not clear. But it is likely that Washington might.
In New Delhi, there has always been a cacophony of voices concerning how to react to China's growing presence in Myanmar. While no one in New Delhi denies that China is becoming a significant military power, there are many who see no reason to push to develop an adversarial relationship with China.
They point out that the encroaching Indian naval presence in the Andaman Sea could threaten Beijing and create roadblocks in steadily developing Sino-Indian cooperation. They are not quite sure that measures undertaken by New Delhi to enhance the security of India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands will not threaten, or antagonize, Beijing even if India's intent is clearly stated and underlined.
Other threats
The increased activities of Pakistan along the Myanmar coast have also troubled Indian authorities. According to Jane's Defence, Pakistan has supplied Myanmar with several shiploads of ordnance and other military hardware, such as 106mm M40 recoilless rifles and various small arms over the past decade, and regularly trains Myanmar's soldiers to operate Chinese tanks, fighter aircraft and howitzers.
Myanmar's officers attend Pakistan's Military Staff College at Quetta in Balochistan province. Since 2001, a full-time Pakistani defense attache has been posted in Yangon.
In 2001, three Pakistan Navy ships, including a submarine and a destroyer, called at Yangon, and this was followed by President General Pervez Musharraf's visit to Myanmar. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit mentioned the Jammu and Kashmir issue, raising concern in New Delhi as Myanmar, rarely, if at all, comments on third countries.
Security sources said that Pakistan was negotiating to build an airstrip in the Chin region of Myanmar, which is contiguous to Mizoram.
Indian naval intelligence also claims that it is through these waters that guns are run into south Bangladesh and the northwestern coast of Myanmar, to arm Naga insurgents in India and the Rohingiyas of Myanmar along the Arakan Coast, as well as the Karens and the Kachins of northern Myanmar.
In addition, India's northeast, which has remained in deep turmoil for decades, has nurtured secessionist rebels using the waters of the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Neighboring Myanmar has a number of powerful insurgent groups that are interlinked with the Indian northeastern rebels.
A large portion of illegal lethal weapons that come into northeast India originate in Cambodia. The underground route to South Asia is said to begin on the Ranong islands off the Thai coast, from where the arms are shipped through the Andaman Sea to Cox's Bazaar along the Bangladesh coast. From here, the weapons are divvied up into smaller consignments and carried to various destinations in Myanmar and northeastern India through different routes.
In early April 2004, on a tip-off, Bangladeshi joint forces seized 10 truckloads of submachine-guns, AK-47 assault rifles and other firearms and bullets in a swoop on the Karnaphuli coast in the port city of Chittagong. It was the largest-ever arms haul. Police and coast guard forces found the new submachine guns, AK-47 rifles, submachine carbines, Chinese pistols, rocket shells and launchers, hand grenades and bullets stuffed in about 1,500 wooden boxes.
But long before the big haul was reported, it was widely known that international arms smugglers were active in the coastal belts in Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. The vast coastline in the bay near Ukhia in Cox's Bazar and border points between Bangladesh and Myanmar had become a sanctuary for arms smugglers, mainly in the absence of an adequate security watch. The smugglers were bringing in sophisticated firearms, including pure military hardware such as AK-47 and M-16 rifles, long-range pistols, revolvers and grenades, among other items.
Naval diplomacy
But India's strengthening of its presence in the Andaman Sea is not just derived from negative developments in the region. New Delhi's interest in and involvement with Southeast Asia has been growing steadily over the past decade, and its concern for development of the Andaman basin has grown accordingly.
An agreement was signed in 2003 in Yangon by the foreign ministers of India, Myanmar and Thailand to develop transport linkages between the three countries. When complete, a 1,400-kilometer road corridor will be a highway of friendship linking the peoples of South Asia and Southeast Asia. India also reached agreement in principle with Myanmar and Bangladesh on the construction and operation of a pipeline that will bring natural gas from Myanmar to India via Bangladesh, according to reports by the Alexander Gas & Oil company newsletter.
The pipeline, which is likely to cost more than US$1 billion, will carry natural gas from the Shwe fields in Myanmar's Rakhine or Arakan state, through the Indian states of Mizoram and Tripura, and into Bangladesh before finally crossing back into India, all the way up to Kolkata.
India's planned building of a deep-sea port in Dawei in Myanmar, together with a new highway connecting it to Kanchanaburi in Thailand, will no doubt contribute further toward closer trade and commercial links between the two regions.
India's economic ties with Sri Lanka and Thailand, meanwhile, are growing. The Indo-Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement spanning trade, services and investment will advance this further. A land bridge has been proposed across the Palk Strait that separates India from Sri Lanka. This could also carry transmission lines to hook up Sri Lanka to India's Southern Region Electricity Grid, with the Kudankulam nuclear power plant serving as a base-load station, an observer pointed out.
These developments can also be put under India's broad "Look East" policy involving the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the "rim" states farther a field - like Japan and South Korea. It can be argued that India's diplomatic success with these nations is in large part due to India's naval diplomacy.
Eye in the Sky
Last month, the Malacca Strait's littorals - Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia - together with Thailand launched a joint air patrol initiative called "Eye in the Sky" over the strait.
While the initiative signals the continuing determination of the Malacca Strait's littorals to take care on their own the patrolling of this strategic waterway, countries such as India, which have stakes in the strait, believe that they have a role to play in its security system.
The Eye in the Sky initiative is part of the larger Malacca Strait's Security Initiative (MSSI). India is among the countries that are keen to participate in the MSSI.
After all, India is very much a part of the Malacca Strait security system, points out Vijay Sakhuja, a former officer in the Indian Navy and now senior fellow at the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.
Sakhuja draws attention to the fact that although India might not be a littoral, it is contiguous to the strait. Indira Point - the southern tip of India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands - is about 90 nautical miles from Indonesia's Banda Aceh.
The Indian Navy has been exercising with its counterpart in Singapore for more than a decade, with the Indonesian Navy since last year and with the Thai Navy since August. The naval exercises with Indonesia were held at the mouth of the Malacca Strait.
In a briefing paper "Cooperative Security in the Strait of Malacca: Policy Options for India" brought out in August, Sakhuja draws attention to the positive impression that India's naval patrolling has had on the Malacca littorals. "Many regional countries have seen the Indian Navy's vessels patrolling the Malacca Strait and are confident about its cooperative approach and its capability to challenge forces inimical to the safety and security of maritime enterprise in the Strait of Malacca. The Indian Navy has managed to play a highly positive and balanced role, fully cooperating with and augmenting the regional efforts, but always, as it were, from behind - from a secondary position. In fact, the Indian Navy's adaptable approach has won the confidence of the regional nations on the viability and the efficacy of coordinated patrols with the Indian Navy."
This positive impression and its close naval engagement with these countries notwithstanding, India has been moving cautiously with regard to carving a larger role for itself in the security of the Malacca. Sakhuja told Asia Times Online that the Indian government's approach has been to impress on the littorals that India will not force itself on them but will be "ready to provide assets when asked for".
Outlining the kind of role that the Malacca littorals would like India to play, Lawrence Prabhakar, associate professor at the Madras Christian College and research fellow at the maritime security program at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, points out that they would prefer joint exercises with the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in the region.
"Such an Indian role would have to be non-intrusive, cooperative and benign in operations," he told Asia Times Online, adding that this "would be most preferred in the event of a contingency or crisis resulting from maritime terrorism/piracy incidents rather than a staying presence".
Sakhuja said there were several ways in which India could contribute to the MSSI that would not threaten the sovereignty concerns of the Malacca littorals. Drawing attention to the outdated radar equipment for reconnaissance that is currently in use in the Malacca Strait, he suggested that India, which manufactures this electronic equipment, could supply it to the littoral states.
What it needs now is an invitation from the Malacca Strait littoral countries, not just the US.
Expanding reach
Indian naval diplomacy has now gone beyond the western shores of ASEAN. The October 3 visit to New Delhi by a Vietnamese defense delegation led by Lieutenant General Nguyen Thinh, head of the Vietnamese Defense Research Center, opened up new possibilities. Thinh is expected to ask for Indian help and technical assistance in acquiring a missile production capability.
Should India agree, what it would ask in return is a moot question. One analyst claims that Hanoi should be persuaded to allow the Indian Navy a basing option in Cam Ranh Bay, the finest natural deep water harbor in Asia.
All these developments underline the strategic importance - and, in particular, its recognition in New Delhi - of India's island territories, more particularly the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which command the Malacca Strait and the sea lanes that carry vast quantities of Gulf oil to Pacific destinations.
Additional reporting by Sudha Ramachandran, an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
This article appeared in Asia Times on October 19, 2005. Posted at Japan Focus on October 27, 2005.
China's stimulus plan lauded
http://www.thestar.com/World/Columnist/article/606027
OECD chief says Beijing could have 'very positive effect' on the world's economic recovery
Mar 21, 2009 04:30 AM
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Bill Schiller
ASIA BUREAU
BEIJING – Don't expect China to grasp "a sword and shield" and single-handedly smite the international recession, the head of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development says.
"Not even China can do that," OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria told a briefing here yesterday.
"But it can have a very, very positive effect" on the world economy, the Mexican economist added, hoping to nudge China along.
Yesterday, Gurria added his voice to a growing chorus of international experts trying to temper expectations about just how much China can help to pull the world out of recession.
He said the OECD expects China's economy to grow "between 6 and 7 per cent" this year – down from the 8 per cent the organization had predicted as recently as November.
Most economists say the country must grow by 8 per cent to avoid an eruption of social unrest over rapidly rising unemployment.
This month, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao assured the country that if everyone pulled together, China could achieve that figure.
But just this week, the World Bank also cut China's growth forecast, saying the country's economy would grow by 6.5 per cent in 2009 – down from the 7.5 per cent it had predicted earlier.
A 6.5 per cent growth rate would mark a precipitous decline: the Chinese economy grew at a scorching 11.4 per cent in 2007.
Gurria said the OECD will release more precise figures for 2009 at the end of the month.
China's export-driven economy has been hit hard since the economic downturn took hold last September.
Thousands of factories have closed and more than 20 million Chinese migrant workers have been thrown out of work as Chinese exports continue to plunge.
Almost all of those migrant workers have returned to the countryside, where life can be far tougher than in China's urban areas.
"The current recession has put into harsh relief the low level of the social safety nets and the livelihood of migrant workers," Gurria warned.
He praised China for its $730 billion stimulus package but said Chinese policymakers should be poised to take further action to stimulate the economy if necessary.
In just weeks, the Chinese economy will see more than 6 million new graduates entering the labour market looking for work.
Just to absorb those numbers – "to break even," Gurria said – China must have a far higher "cruising speed" than other countries, meaning a higher rate of growth.
But China's challenges on the job front are by no means unique: the spectre of unemployment is rising everywhere, Gurria noted.
"Jobs is the name of the game now," he said.
"It was a financial crisis, that has become an economic crisis and (is) now a jobs crisis – and therefore a human crisis."
But despite its challenges, China still has a role to play, he said.
The world economy's traditional "locomotives" were all "in the repair shop," Gurria observed.
"So we need more locomotives – and we need the aggregate demand of China and countries like India."
But at the same time, everyone needs to be realistic, he suggested.
"Even the positive growth of India and China isn't going to be able to offset the negative growth" of the developed world, he said.
"I don't think we're suggesting that China should save the world," he noted, "just that if China does very well – it will help the world."
The OECD's 30-member countries – of which Canada is one – will experience "very negative" growth this year, Gurria said.
But he wouldn't be drawn on specifics ahead of the G20 meeting in London in April.
Why aid workers put their lives on the line
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090321.waidessay21/BNStory/International/?page=rss&id=RTGAM.20090321.waidessay21
The recent kidnapping of Canadian nurse Laura Archer and four colleagues serves as a stark reminder of just how dangerous this work can be. Steve Dennis of Médecins Sans Frontières sheds light on why he keeps revisiting the world's most troubled places
Article Video Comments (14) STEVE DENNIS
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
March 21, 2009 at 12:05 AM EDT
When I first applied six years ago to work overseas with Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), I wrote on my application that my goal was to help the world become a better place. I didn't really know what that meant or how I would do that, but it sounded like a good answer at the time.
I hadn't even arrived at my first project location before I started seeing the dark side of my chosen line of work. A month before I left on my first mission in 2002, MSF worker Arjan Erkel was kidnapped in Dagestan, a troubled Russian republic on the Caspian Sea. For the next 20 months while he was held hostage, I met anxiously with my team members to discuss the weekly updates about either progress on his release or silence about his fate. I felt outraged and betrayed because the risk Mr. Erkel faced went beyond what I had expected when I signed up.
This feeling came back to me last week when I heard about the kidnapping of Canadian nurse Laura Archer and four other staff with MSF in the Darfur region of Sudan.
How could this happen to people bringing aid to a country in distress?
Laura Archer is seen in a July, 2007 photo.
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When Arjan Erkel was finally released, I breathed a sigh of relief, as did many of my fellow aid workers. Still in my early years of humanitarian work, I felt order had been restored. But that feeling was short-lived.
Just two months later, five MSF staff members were ambushed and killed in Afghanistan. My outrage turned to disbelief and cold numbness. For me, the illusion I had been living of bulletproof principles had been shattered, and order would not be restored this time.
As aid workers have increasingly fallen victim to kidnappings, sexual assaults and killings over the past decade, it's only natural to wonder how we justify taking such risks. The answer is far from simple.
THE PAYOFF
One fact that many aid workers will tell you is that being part of an organization that is in the business of saving lives and restoring dignity feels good; you are reminded that success is possible. This was reaffirmed for me in 2006, when I was in Ivory Coast working on a large hospital project.
Since the prevalence of HIV is as high as 15 per cent in some parts of the country, MSF started many HIV activities there. We established a voluntary counselling and testing centre, but in the first couple of months, fewer than a dozen people came. We worked hard to tell the community about these services, and this number quickly rose. We optimistically set the budget for an average of 300 consultations per month over the year. We reached that number in March, and by October more than 900 people were visiting the centre for counselling each month.
The demand for other activities related to HIV/AIDS rose as well.
We started a program to stop mother-to-child transmission of the virus, so HIV-positive mothers could safely deliver and care for their HIV-negative babies. And antiretroviral drugs were offered to an increasing number of patients, turning around their deteriorating conditions.
In the town, we made contact with people at school assemblies, orphanages, rebel battalions and local groups providing non-medical care for people living with HIV/AIDS. And on Dec. 1, World AIDS Day, more than 600 people came out for the events, including races, speeches from local authorities, live music, dramas and game-show-style quizzes all about HIV.
I believe that our HIV/AIDS intervention in that community significantly improved the lives of thousands of people.
But after working in various projects for six years and seeing the longer-term results of what I had been part of, I realize that it isn't always apparent how our efforts make a difference. I remember one cold day on vacation when I received three e-mails with disheartening news about how my previous work had been erased. One described how a compound I had helped build in south Sudan was looted and destroyed, another how the international team of a tuberculosis project I had started had to be evacuated for their safety, and the third one reported that fighting had broken out, ending a four-year ceasefire in Sri Lanka, where I had earlier helped wrap up our mission in peaceful times. The world I had worked so hard to make a better place had taken two steps backward.
I had a similar feeling when I heard that MSF withdrew staff in Darfur after the kidnapping of the MSF staff members last week. This act will be a devastating blow to the survival of hundreds of thousands of people there.
To many people in towns, villages, refugee camps and city slums, aid organizations do more for the populations than provide food, clean water or health care. For many people defeated by the effects of a conflict, the presence of aid organizations gives hope and restores some dignity by recognizing their plight. Conversely, the evacuation of an aid organization from an area needing its service and recognition, can extinguish that light.
TOO GREAT A RISK
In my most recent posting with MSF, I took over as co-ordinator of an emergency surgical program in Kismayo, Somalia, when three MSF staff had been killed there. In the months after the incident, after the memorials and funeral services, the organization made the difficult decision to end the project. The risk was too great.
The surgical program had given women with labour complications life-saving Caesarian sections. During the eight-month duration of the project, more than 400 (principally obstetric) surgeries and 1,200 emergency consultations were performed by the MSF team of six international and 35 Somali staff.
After MSF closed the program, patients had to pay $350 U.S. for a Caesarian section. For many Somalis, this lifesaving service became financially inaccessible, so a population of 100,000 people were left without this essential service.
We feared that many women would probably die.
Imagine in your home country a collapse of all systems and structures of authority and governance. Imagine violence chasing you and your family out of your homes to walk 100 kilometres to a safer, but desolate area. Imagine carrying some clothes, some food and a cooking pot. Imagine food running out. Imagine drinking water from a dirty river. Imagine children dying from diarrhea. Imagine simple infections leading to amputations or death. Imagine women dying in childbirth. Imagine that all of this is happening while people with the power to do something hold meetings and decide not to intervene.
People shouldn't die from the lack of a 50-cent medication or vaccine. People shouldn't die from the lack of clean water or soap. People shouldn't die from the lack of a proper shelter. But they do.
Over the years, I have seen that a medical and logistics team of just five people supplied with basic medicines, and materials can save the lives of thousands of people.
I have begun to realize that our simple actions do change the world from the perspective of each individual patient who is carried into a clinic and walks out some days afterwards.
The troubles of the world will continue, and my contribution is to be engaged in bringing life-saving aid to individuals in desperate need. The reason for taking action couldn't be any clearer. I accept a degree of personal risk, because I can't accept standing aside in the face of another person's suffering.
I fear that Laura Archer and her colleagues may not be the last aid workers to be kidnapped or harmed, but fortunately their ordeal ended with their release. For most of the aid workers going overseas every year, no critical security incidents will occur and they, too, will return home safely. Though, because of the risks they take, millions of people in precarious situations will be given a better chance of surviving that year. Walking away from this kind of accomplishment would be too hard for many people to justify.
Steve Dennis is an aid worker with Médecins Sans Frontières. When he is not working abroad, he lives in Toronto.
World Water Day: Critical water shortages in Myanmar need to be addressed
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/218926/73a20713c1f0d19b3e964dd07a48fc6c.htm
20 Mar 2009 14:40:11 GMT
Source: Merlin - UK
Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are the author's alone.
On World Water Day 2009, Merlin would like to draw attention to the critical clean drinking water shortages in the Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar.
Clean drinking water has always been a scarce resource in the Delta, but these shortages have been exacerbated by the devastating effects of Cyclone Nargis in May last year. The fact that the height of the dry season is fast approaching means that water shortages will peak imminently.
The Delta opens out onto the Bay of Bengal, meaning that southern stretches of the river are saline whilst the more northern parts are fresh water. As the dry season advances, what is known as the salt/fresh water interface moves up the Delta, as less fresh water arrives from inland rivers. Waterways in the affected area become progressively more saline as the dry season wears on.
Each year, many communities' water ponds are insufficient to last throughout the dry season, and villages without access to freshwater sources are faced with the challenge of importing water from other villages with more extensive ponds. Pre-cyclone, it was usually just a case of buying water from the nearest village, and a whole industry of boat-borne water vendors thrived during the season.
However, many of the boats used by the villagers and by water vendors were destroyed in the cyclone and those who still have transport will probably have to go much further afield to find water. More critically still, people just don't have the resources they normally do to buy water, having had their assets and livelihoods destroyed by Cyclone Nargis.
Andre Steele, Merlin’s Water and Sanitation Technical Manager, says: “The immediate need is to provide clean drinking water. And in the long-term, communities need support to be able to capture and store the abundant amount of rain that falls in the wet season.â€
Since Cyclone Nargis, Merlin has carried out an extensive programme to clean community drinking water ponds, rebuild damaged water tanks and distribute jerry cans and water filters.
The water and sanitation team, consisting of two expatriates and 33 national staff, has installed and is running one water treatment unit and six reverse osmosis machines. Reverse osmosis machines are able to produce drinking water from otherwise contaminated sources including river water. Using 12 cargo boats, Merlin is distributing water to 90 villages, with a total population of 40,000 and to date has distributed 1,115,000 litres of purified water.
Dr Paul Sender, Merlin’s Country Director in Myanmar, says: “This life-saving intervention will reach all members of all households, with a particular emphasis on the most vulnerable population groups, including children, the elderly and disabled. Children are particularly important, as they are most at risk of contracting water-borne diseases. In order to provide a comprehensive and sustainable approach to the problem, we are simultaneously addressing the issue of poor sanitation.â€
Merlin is adopting an approach called Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), a process devised to mobilise a community into building and using latrines and to stop open defecation by creating an understanding amongst villages of the risks associated with poor household level waste disposal.
Sanitation teams visit villages to talk about the dangers of open defecation and support and encourage people to change their behaviour and start building latrines. This approach has rarely been tried in the aftermath of such a large-scale natural disaster but has proved to be a highly effective intervention and so far this activity has been completed in 25 villages out of the 90 villages receiving water distribution.
All of the above programmes are having an immediate impact, in terms of reducing water-borne diseases, but more sustained investment is needed to make a real difference in the long-term.
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[ Any views expressed in this article are those of the writer and not of Reuters. ]
European Union wants role in Myanmar polls, special envoy tells Bangkok
http://www.newkerala.com/nkfullnews-1-7344.html
Bangkok, Mar 20 : The European Union(EU) would like to be involved in observing Parliament elections, scheduled for the next year in Myanmar, the EU Special Envoy for the Southeast Asian country said here.
Piero Fassino, the EU Special Envoy for Myanmar, stated this during a meeting with Thailand's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Panich Vikitsreth.
The EU is keen to see progress towards political reconciliation in Myanmar based on dialogue among all stakeholders, the Special Envoy told Bangkok.
The Thai Vice Minister emphasised that Thailand was engaging Myanmar to promote economic development and democratisation within that country.
Pro-democracy activists and others have expressed skepticism about Myanmar's declared intent to usher in democracy with the 2010 general elections.
They cite continued suppression of civil liberties and freedom of speech in the country with reports that a lawyer defending pro-democracy activists in Myanmar was sentenced yesterday to four years in jail.
--- UNI
The Right to Privacy and the Value of Legal Reform as a Left Strategy
http://republic-of-teesside.blogspot.com/2009/03/right-to-privacy-and-value-of-legal.html
Friday, March 20, 2009
Traditionally in the UK, a key feature of the common law protection of civil liberties was the absence of a right to privacy. Indeed even today such writers as Noam Chomsky regard the comparative weakness of liable laws in the USA as an example of domestic freedoms and protection of democracy.
However, the right to respect for private and family life has been a part of the European Convention of Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights since the 1950s, and since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this country incorporating it has become enshrined in our law.
What should be immediately striking to any layperson who reads Article 8, where that right is contained, is that it is subject to a long list of qualifications and restrictions. Interferences with the exercise of the right by a public authority are permitted under Article 8(2) provided they are in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests of ‘national security’, ‘public safety’ or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of ‘disorder’ or crime, for the protection of ‘health or morals’, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
The first four of these justifications are obviously going to ring alarm bells when viewed through a pair of left-wing spectacles. In 1978 the European Court of Human rights held that the mere existence of legislation in Germany allowing telephone tapping by state authorities involved ‘a menace of surveillance that strikes at freedom of communication’ and therefore constituted an interference with the right to privacy contained in Article 8, however as it contained safeguards they held that it was both lawful and proportionate.
In Malone v UK in 1984, the Court held that as UK domestic law on telephone tapping was obscure and open to differing interpretations it did not satisfy Article 8(2). In sharp response to this the Thatcher Government passed the Interception of Communications Act 1985 in order to place the practice on a statutory footing.
Article 8 is therefore toothless in terms of protecting, for example, trade unionists, anti-war or other demonstrators, and anyone else MI5 might consider undesirable from being spied upon by the state. It was appalling, though not remotely surprising, when earlier this month it was revealed that major construction companies had paid for information on their employees as part of a rampant blacklisting culture.
What, however, of the justification on the grounds of ‘protecting public morals’? This appears to serve two functions:
Firstly, the requirement of capitalism to control workers by dividing them along social grounds. This has always been done on many grounds, notably nationality, religion, sex, age, sexual orientation and even minor drug users have been painted as ‘the undeserving poor’. This is essential to create cheaper pools of labour, and to ‘play-off’ one set of workers against another in order to drive down wages and conditions. It is important, therefore, that not only employers are able to discriminate within the law, but also that other Establishment players such as the media should be free to push such agendas.
Even in Naomi Campbell’s famously successful action against the Daily Mirror for printing the details and photographs of her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous, it was still nevertheless held that there was a public interest in publishing the fact that she was a drug addict.
Let’s consider for a moment Daily Mail editor Paul Dacre’s incredulous reaction to Max Mosley’s successful lawsuit last year. In a speech to the Society of Editors’ Annual Conference denounced Mr Justice Eady for coming to an ‘arrogant and amoral’ judgment, which ‘inorexably and insidiously’ imposed a privacy law on British newspapers. Also, Tom Crone, the legal manager of News International, who was of the opinion that ‘these judgments risk outlawing the traditional role of the media in exposing the moral shortcomings of those who wield power’.
Compare however the Daily Mail articles covering the Moseley affair, which included screaming headlines such as ‘What Price Morality? Judge Champions Max Moseley’s right to hold S&M Orgies’ and ‘A Man without Shame: How Can Sex Scandal F1 Boss Max Moseley paint himself as the Injured Party?’ ,with the generally more sympathetic tone towards privacy rights in an article covering the leaking of BNP members’ personal details.
Second is control, through out and out blackmail having already defined a framework of morality and having established a so-called public interest as above. This is not simply a fictional conspiracy, even though this is precisely a tactic employed by the protagonists in A Very British Coup. We have seen very real attempts to bring down controversial (i.e. left-wing) politicians through the exposure of their private lives, including notably Tommy Sheridan, George Galloway and John Prescott.
What is also notable about Article 8 is its ambiguity, which in turn leaves it with flexibility. The state, for example, was happy to prosecute a group of consenting homosexual adults in the Brown case for engaging in sado-masochistic acts, and in its eagerness to resist the removal of the DNA records of hundreds and thousands of innocent people from police records, and in the reclassification of cannabis. Within the language of Article 8, it can do so legally. Yet at the same time Article 8 has been invoked to prevent any intrusion into family life to deal with domestic violence and child abuse, with public authorities insistent on an individualistic prognosis.
What this shows is that we should never seek to depend on laws written by and for capitalists. But is that to say there is no value in attempting to reform the law and bringing legal challenges in the courts? Certainly not, and in fact where necessary left groups and unions should devote resources to doing precisely this. We should simply do so having acknowledged that laws can be interpreted in many ways and that the power to do this lies with judges, who are political appointments and thus represent the domestic power base (capital). Rather than legal action we should rely instead on political movements. This has been the historic method of achieving successful reform by the labour movement. As explained in Raymond Challinor’s brilliant biography of W.P. Roberts (the miners’ attorney):
“How was this accomplished? Not on the basis, at least directly, of the strength of the workers’ case. Rather it was on the strength of the workers themselves...”
Posted by Joe at 12:06 PM
Regime Stops Fast-Tracking Visas for Relief Workers
http://www.abitsu.org/?p=4243
March 21, 2009
Irrawaddy News: Foreigners involved in the Cyclone Nargis relief effort will no longer be given preferential treatment when applying for Burmese visas, according to diplomatic sources in Rangoon.
The sources said that shortly after agreeing to extend the mandate of the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) in late February, the Burmese junta ended a program to expedite visa applications for foreign aid workers involved in Nargis-related projects.
The TCG, which consists of representatives of the regime, the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, is the main body responsible for coordinating Nargis-related relief efforts.
The move means that foreign employees of international NGOs must now follow the complicated and time-consuming visa application process that was in place before and immediately after Cyclone Nargis struck the Irrawaddy delta last May.
Permission for NGO staffers to work in Burma must come not only from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also from other key ministries, including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.
Relief workers and diplomats said the visa fast-track program and other measures to streamline the relief effort were put in place by Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu, who was also the acting chairman of the TCG.
In early February, Kyaw Thu was reassigned to head the Civil Service Selection and Training Board, an inactive ministerial position.
At the recent Asean Summit in Thailand, Burmese Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein and Foreign Minister Nyan Win told delegates that the regime agreed to extend the TCG’s mandate for one more year, to July 2010.
The announcement was welcomed as a sign of improved cooperation between the junta and the international community. But aid workers said the decision to tighten visa restrictions on foreign experts was a serious setback for the relief effort.
Topics: Daily News |
Burma on the Edge
http://www.morungexpress.com/editorial/17657.html
It is not for nothing that Burma has long been the center of international attention and concern in the Asian Pacific region. Its transition from a growing democracy to a military state, and from being the rice bowl of Asia to its now present position of poverty and extreme shortages of rice does puts into historical perspective the political conditions that have caused the present crisis in Burma. Since the take over by the military junta in 1962 and the continued repression that led to the non-violent 88 pro-democracy uprising and the subsequent military crack down, Burma has been on the edge. The continuing protests by pro-democracy groups in the face of the 2010 elections indicate the polarization that exists. These political acts of defiance are demanding a new political reality.
The struggle for democracy in Burma is however just the tip of the iceberg. There are greater fundamental issues of freedom challenging the people of Burma. These issues go back into history and like most colonies, the demand for self-determination by indigenous nations continue to pose a serious political dilemma. While it is the Burmans that have wrested political power and military control over Burma since its inception as a state, it is the struggles of the various political communities such as the Kachin, Shan, Chin, Mon, Karen, Karenni, Arakan and the Nagas that have continuously questioned the legality and legitimacy of Burma as a state. Most of these groups are fighting either for autonomy or complete independence from Burma.
To an extent the political aspirations of different nationalities in Burma has been constructed as a conflict of interest with the Burmans, whose ultimate desire is to uphold the territorial integrity of Burma. And while the pro-democracy movement headed by National League for Democracy Party has some participation from the different political nationalities, it is for most part a Burman political party. Aung San Suu Syi, the leader of the party herself is a Burman, and there have been concerns around whether the negotiating process with the junta would fully reflect and represent the political aspirations of all the nationalities of Burma. There is skepticism. And considering the painful and divided history in which the Burman worldview violently suppressed all other worldviews in Burma, there are doubts whether NLDP can embody the political aspirations of the different nationality groups.
However for now, the politics of pragmatism prevails. Considering that the world opinion and solidarity for Burma has been shaped in the form of Aung San Suu Syi, due to her dedicated leadership and profound commitment to non-violence, leaders of the different resistance movements in Burma will have to unite together and evolve some basic points of consensus with the Burman leadership. This consensus can be found in their mutual acrimony with the junta. While it is self evident that Aung San Suu Syi is surrounded by the old school of advisors, it remains to be seen, whether the new generation of Burman activists will take this opportunity to reach out to the different nationalities and dialogue with them in creatively finding news ways to build a new Burma, in which the rights of all nationalities – not just Burmans – will be recognized and respected.
Burma is sitting on the edge. And apparently it is not just because of democracy, it is also because Burma is denying the different nationalities the right to decide their own political destiny.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Chinese company, called Chinnery Assents Ltd., will begin off-shore exploration along Burma’s western coast
A Chinese company, called Chinnery Assents Ltd., will begin off-shore exploration along Burma’s western coast, on March 23 where oil and gas prospects are a plenty for the requirement of energy-guzzling neighbouring economies.
2009 March 20
tags: Human Rights, Junta, Burma, Thugs and Thievesby peacerunningChinese firm to explore western offshore
by Moe Thu
Friday, 20 March 2009 21:05
Rangoon (Mizzima) - A Chinese company, called Chinnery Assents Ltd., will begin off-shore exploration along Burma’s western coast, on March 23 where oil and gas prospects are a plenty for the requirement of energy-guzzling neighbouring economies.
Exploration in the area sparked a maritime controversy a couple of months ago between military-ruled Burma and its neighbour Bangladesh mainly because of the storehouse of energy.
“The company, a division of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), is conducting 2D maritime seismic survey in deep-water offshore block AD-6, to tap natural gas,” said a company press release issued today.
The company’s exploration – from March 23 to April 30 – borders block A-1, which is already being explored by South Korea’s Daewoo International Corporation.
The Chinese company entered Burma’s offshore energy sector in January 2007, by signing a production sharing contract with military-run Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise to explore gas reserves in blocks AD-1, AD-6 and AD-8, which cover an area of 10,000 square kilometers off the Rakhine coast line in western Burma.
Chinnery Assets, which also acquired onshore block IOR 4 in central Burma, had found gas reserves that hold 300 billion cubic feet of gas. Mizzima News
from → Burma
Power and Population in Asia
http://japanfocus.org/-Nicholas-Eberstadt/2079
By Nicholas Eberstadt
Few would contest the general proposition that the population factor bears directly on the course of the friendly — and sometimes unfriendly — competition between states in the world arena today. Problems arise, however, when we try to move from the general to the specific. How, exactly, do human numbers (population size, composition, and trends of change) affect the ability of governments to influence events beyond their borders — or affect the disposition of a country’s interactions with outside actors? And this is no less important for the would-be strategist: How can we use population indicators to anticipate, with some reasonable hope of accuracy, the impact of yet-unfolding demographic forces on the balance of international power? This essay explores these questions for the world’s largest strategic arena: the great Asian/Eurasian expanse.
Auguste Comte, the nineteenth-century French mathematician and sociologist, is widely credited with the dictum “Demography is destiny.” It is a wonderful aphorism — but it promises too much and offers too little. A more operational formulation might suggest that demographic forces can alter the realm of the possible, both politically and economically, for regularly established population groupings. Demographic considerations can (but are not always required to) alter the complex strategic balance between, and within, countries.
By comparison with other contemporary forms of change — social, economic, political, technological — demographic changes are very slow and very regular. Over the past generation, for example, a 3 percent per annum rate of population growth would have been considered terribly high in Asia, while a 3 percent inflation rate would have been regarded as remarkably low. And demographic change is only sharp and discontinuous in times of utter upheaval and catastrophe (circumstances, to be sure, not unfamiliar to modern Russia, China, Cambodia, and Korea — and a number of other Asian or Eurasian populations). From the standpoint of strategic demography, momentous developments can and do occur from one generation to the next, but rather less of note can be expected to take place over the course of three to five years.
For our purposes here, we will try to peer into the Asian and Eurasian demographic future to the year 2025. To many readers, that may sound like an exercise in science fiction — but such a time horizon is by no means as fantastical as might be supposed. For one thing, contemporary Asia’s population structure invites the longer view. Apart from a few outposts, most places in East Asia and Eurasia are rather far along on the notional “demographic transition” from high birth and death rates to low ones. In practical terms, this means — barring only horrendous catastrophe — that we can expect relatively little “turnover” within a given population from one year, or even one decade, to the next. Projections by the United Nations Population Division (unpd) make the point. According to the unpd’s most recent medium variant figures, for example, in 2025 roughly four-fifths of the inhabitants of East and Southeast Asia will have been alive in 2000, and 60 to 70 percent of these future East and Southeast Asian inhabitants will be people who were already living in those regions as of the year 2000.1
We can also talk with more confidence about Asia/Eurasia’s demographic future today than we could in the relatively recent past because a great many blank spots in the region’s demographic map have been filled in over the past generation. As recently as the late 1970s, Asia — a perennial land of mystery to the Western traveler — was also tremendously mysterious to the student of population trends: Huge portions of the Asian/Eurasian landmass qualified as a demographic terra incognita. China, Vietnam, and North Korea (among other countries in the region) had never conducted a modern national population count, had not done so for decades, or had not released such internally collected data for decades — and the ussr, well into its “era of stagnation,” had taken to suppressing methodically those demographic data that Brezhnev luminaries took to be politically sensitive or ideologically embarrassing. Today, by contrast, practically every Asian or Eurasian country save Afghanistan and Burma has conducted a national census within the past decade — even reclusive North Korea. Though most countries in this expanse do not yet maintain comprehensive systems for the annual registration of births and deaths, we nevertheless have a fairly good picture of the demographic contours of the countries in the area — and of the trends that have created, and continue to form, the region’s respective population profiles.
Population explosion: Yesterday’s news
The asian/eurasian territory encompasses an extraordinary crush of humanity. Although the population patterns of the countries in question (we are deliberately excluding the Arabian peninsula and most of the “Asian” Middle East from consideration here) vary markedly, the absolute numbers under discussion are vast: As of mid-2000, over 3.6 billion, roughly three-fifths of the total population of the globe, resided in Asia. Seven of the world’s 10 most populous countries — China, India, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Japan — are located within the Asian/Eurasian perimeter.
Over the past half-century, the population of this region has grown on a scale and at a tempo without historical precedent. Between 1950 and 2000, according to the unpd’s estimates, the population of the collectivity of countries in Table 1 (see next page) multiplied by a factor of 2.5 — rising by almost 2.2 billion in absolute numbers and at an average annual pace of over 1.8 percent per year. Perhaps not surprisingly, this extraordinary Asian “population explosion” captured the attention and aroused the foreboding of commentators, scholars, and policymakers around the world. (A small library of literature was generated over the course of two generations on the purported economic, political, and strategic implications of this vast population shift.) The vision of unrelenting and unprecedented increases in human numbers in Asia continues to inform much popular and policy discussion — thanks in no small part to official alarms regularly sounded by institutions and programs established over the past few decades with the express purpose of slowing population growth.
But that vision is by now outdated and increasingly misleading. The great twentieth-century demographic boom is essentially over in East Asia. It is winding down rapidly in Southeast Asia, and even in South Asia the situation has changed greatly. (Russia, for its part, has been recording negative natural increase — more deaths than births — every year over the past decade.)
China's Military and Security Activities Abroad
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29576/pub_detail.asp
By Michael Auslin
Posted: Friday, March 20, 2009
TESTIMONY
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Publication Date: March 4, 2009
In a recent congressional hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, AEI resident scholar Michael Auslin said that China's increasing efforts to modernize the naval capabilities of the People's Liberation Army has set off a modest yet potentially worrisome maritime arms race in the Asia Pacific.
I will focus my remarks on China's growing naval role and the evolution of its maritime strategy in the broader context of its security activities abroad. At the outset, let me set the stage by noting that China's naval activities are a significant, but not the only, element in the changes occurring today in the Asian Maritime Domain. The Asian Maritime Domain (AMD) comprises the great arc moving southwest from the Bering Sea through the Bay of Bengal. In practical terms, it includes the Pacific Ocean reaches at least through Guam, as well as the western limits of the Indian Ocean, including the Arabian Sea.
The Asian Maritime Domain covers over 50 million square miles, nearly 60 percent of the world's population, and over 40 sovereign states. For the past four decades, it has also been at the center of global economic production. This region, including Japan, China, South Korea, Vietnam, and India, among other important economies, accounted for nearly a third of total global economic output, at least until the current economic crisis erupted last year.
During the past decade, moreover, the Asian Maritime Domain has also witnessed a host of security-related changes that point to an increasingly complex regional future. These changes include the rise of blue water naval forces now projecting power throughout the region, the emergence of the undersea realm as a key security and economic concern, the requirement of air-sea integration for reliable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and battlespace operations, and the slow development of multilateral political organizations that may shape trading and security norms in the coming decades.
The Background to China's Evolving Maritime Strategy
The fear of a naval arms race is a real one in the world's most populated maritime region as freedom of navigation and access to strategic waterways are the lifeblood of Asia's most economically advanced states.
Historically, China has been a continental power with extensive maritime networks. The size of its domestic economy, and the sophistication of its political and technological systems, in centuries past ensured that a dense web of maritime trade routes converged on China, stretching from India all the way to Japan, roughly the same as today's Asian Maritime Domain.
On this view, China's recent maritime expansion is a reversion to a more traditional regional role. As the recently released Defense White Paper puts it, the PLA Navy is "responsible for・afeguarding China's maritime security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial waters, along with its maritime rights and interests." China's reliance on overseas markets for imports of raw materials and export of finished or semi-finished goods, has resulted in a strategic decision to build its naval capabilities beyond a brown-water force and towards a true blue-water orientation. The scope of China's recent naval activities suggest that they have achieved at least a first stage of this strategy, though they do not yet appear to have reached the capability for large-scale, extended overseas missions.
China's maritime strategy is also closely tied to its growing global political role. Few nations other than the United States have the capability of "showing the flag" on extended missions of any size. Yet, as Beijing deepens its diplomatic activity around the world, but particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a blue-ocean navy is a valuable instrument to be able to wield. As a rising power, the dispatch of PLA Navy vessels on goodwill port visits around the world, or off the coast of Somalia in recent anti-piracy operations, gives Chinese leaders' statements regarding their country's global role a credibility it would otherwise not have.
In addition to its defensive and political roles, the PLA Navy provides the Chinese leadership with the means to assert its claims to disputed maritime territory. China currently has several on-going territorial disputes with other Asian nations. These include disputes over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, with Japan; the Nansha Islands and Beibu Gulf, with Vietnam; and the Spratly Islands, with various ASEAN states. Driving much of the territorial disputes is the question of access to vast amounts of natural resources, including undersea oil and natural gas fields, and control over strategically important sea lanes of communication (SLOCs).
China's Growing Naval Role in the Asian Maritime Domain
The PLA Navy has steadily developed its capabilities and gained operational experience over the past decade. In particular, the past several years have witnessed more complex maritime deployments, each of which can be viewed as fitting into a larger strategy of developing a true blue-water and power projection capability.
The East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet provide China with a non-littoral maritime presence in Asia. The East Sea Fleet, founded in 1949, is headquartered at Ningbo, and is responsible for the East China Sea, including defense of the Chinese homeland from the Shandong/Jiangsu provincial border to the Fujian/Guangdong provincial border. Any PLA military operation against Taiwan would be supported by the East Sea Fleet, including amphibious landings. The South Sea Fleet, founded in 1950, is charged with defense of the maritime area from China's border with Vietnam up to the Fujian region.
Both commands have developed an integrated fleet of destroyers (both foreign purchased and domestically produced), frigates, submarines, and support ships. Particular focus has been made on the submarine force, which contains nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and conventional submarines. Extensive networks of bases along the Chinese coast, including the new submarine base on Hainan Island, provide a dispersion capability plus redundant supply and communications points. Future procurement and development plans of the PLA Navy have received worldwide attention, namely China's expressed plans to build at least two aircraft carriers, and outfit a former Soviet carrier, with the goal of creating full-fledged carrier groups by 2015 that could dramatically expand the reach of China's air and naval power.
China's modernization of the PLA Navy has been accompanied by a steady expansion of its maritime activities. Chinese naval vessels now make port calls throughout the world, not just in Asia, thereby demonstrating an ability to undertake extended, transoceanic voyages. For example, from July through October 2007, a PLA Navy guided missile destroyer and supply ship traveled to St. Petersburg, Russia, Portsmouth, England, Spain and France. In 2007 and 2008 alone, Chinese naval vessels made port calls in Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, as well as the European counties noted previously. These port visits provide political benefits for Beijing in Asia and around the world, simultaneously giving China a global presence and buttressing Beijing's portrayal of its "peaceful rise," yet also showcasing the strength and capabilities of the PLA Navy.
A subordinate, yet related, element of the regular global presence of Chinese naval vessels is China's interest in overseas ports and naval bases throughout the Asian Maritime Domain. This "string of pearls," as it is referred to, stretches from the South China Sea through the Bay of Bengal to the Arabia Sea. Working with countries such as Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh, China has helped build ports, bases, and surveillance facilities and received guarantees of use that provide it with a forward presence, unparalleled access to strategic SLOCs, and unimpeded ISR platforms. Again, the end result is to facilitate China's constant maritime presence in Asia and link it to a growing network of regional states that benefit from China's economic and military support.
Despite these on-going activities, China not surprisingly concentrates its maritime presence closer to home. The modernization of both the East Sea and South Sea Fleets has allowed the Chinese to institute regular patrols throughout the East and South China Seas, bringing them into proximity of Japan's Ryukyu Islands chain as well as coastal Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. As noted earlier, most of China's maritime territorial disputes are in these two seas, and constant patrolling by the PLA Navy is a reminder that China's claims to these areas is unwavering.
Starting in 2005, the PLA Navy began patrols near the disputed Chunxiao/Shirakaba oil fields in East China Sea north of Taiwan. Aerial patrols by electronics warfare aircraft have also become commonplace in this area off the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. As China increased its oil and gas exploration projects throughout the area, tensions with Japan have risen, despite a 2008 agreement to share exploration of a portion of the Chunxiao fields. The scale and complexity of Chinese patrols in the East and South China Seas continues to grow. From the initial 2005 patrol with but five warships, the Chinese Coast Guard in July 2008 sent out a fleet of over 60 vessels, including its most advanced maritime patrol ship, on a week-long voyage to the Chunxiao gas field. The operational experience gained from such voyages will lead to improved command and communications, logistical support, and ocean mapping capabilities of Chinese naval forces.
The experiences gained from a decade of regular patrols and international port visits has led to the third phase of PLA Navy evolution, the anti-piracy deployment off the Horn of Africa and Somalia. A three-ship flotilla of two destroyers and a supply vessel, replete with special forces, helicopters, and anti-ship missiles, departed China at the end of last December and has been engaged in escorting Chinese-flagged vessels through pirate-infested waters. This requires a level of operational, logistical, and communications sophistication in a potentially hostile environment that the PLA Navy has lacked until now. The experiences gained on this operational deployment will undoubtedly help the navy plan even larger, more complex international and regional missions in coming years.
Regional Reactions
China's naval modernization has not gone unnoticed by other nations, especially maritime ones, in Asia. As a result, the region is in the midst of a modest, yet potentially worrisome naval arms race. The PLA Navy is purchasing or building the most advanced platforms and weapons available, including supersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles, Aegis-equipped destroyers, and targeting systems. While the Chinese remain at least a decade behind the U.S. Navy, they are already outstripping most, if not all, other Asian navies. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces (JMSDF) and Indian Navy are the next largest in Asia and the most concerned by the PLA Navy's growth. As a result, they have both embarked on naval modernization programs, including the purchase of Aegis-class destroyers, anti-ballistic missile systems, and greater anti-submarine reconnaissance platforms, among others.
Asian maritime nations feel the greatest threat from China's submarine force, which currently number approximately 55 vessels. From Jin-class ballistic missile submarines to Shang- and Yuan-class attack submarines, China's sub-surface forces pose a potentially devastating threat to the naval and commercial shipping fleets of other Asian nations. In response, India, Singapore, and Japan have joined with the U.S. Navy in the past on large-scale training exercises, such as the Malabar 07, which took place in the Indian Ocean. Japan continues to deepen its naval cooperation with the United States, while seeking to deepen relations with other maritime nations in the region, such as Australia and India.
The fear of a naval arms race is a real one in the world's most populated maritime region. Freedom of navigation and access to strategic waterways are the lifeblood of Asia's most economically advanced states. Since World War II, they have depended on the United States to patrol and secure the seas. Should they doubt the American commitment to maintaining naval supremacy they will be forced to make uncomfortable choices, ranging from trying to balance China to considering accommodating Beijing's maritime goals, whatever those may turn out to be. The result would almost certainly be a less stable Asian Maritime Domain, and one in which the United States would have less freedom of action.
China's Maritime Goals
The scale and scope of China's naval activities in the Asian Maritime Domain raises the question of Beijing's larger goals. China's maritime policy operates at several levels, each of which is self-reinforcing and tied into larger global strategy. A large part of the Chinese naval buildup over the past decade has been designed to allow the PLA Navy to act as a credible maritime force, from regional and global presence to operational capability. This then buttresses Beijing's desire to be seen as a major regional and international power, giving heft to its diplomatic and economic initiatives. Countries, whether in Africa or Southeast Asia, are more likely to pay attention to China's proposals if the diplomatic arm is backed by an active, credible, and recognized military.
Equally important, however, is the long-term result of a technologically advanced, operationally experienced, blue water PLA Navy. Like rising powers in the past, China's pursuit of a first rank navy is not merely a sign of its global prominence, but a key element of its ability to project national power where and when it sees fit. That does not mean that the Chinese leadership has yet decided how it will employ its navy a decade hence, nor that it has decided to challenge the United States for naval mastery in Asia, even if such a goal were realistic. These are political decisions that become possible only if the navy is of a size and quality to allow for such discussions.
Numerous questions must be answered before China's naval strategy can be fully articulated. Whether the force remains largely defensive in nature or, as seems the case, moves increasingly into an offensively-based orientation is obviously of paramount importance in divining Beijing's long-term intentions and perception of the international environment. In addition, whether the PLA Navy begins to provide public goods in the Asian Maritime Domain, as the U.S. Navy has done for decades, joined in recent years by elements of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and Australian Navy, will indicate the role that China seeks to play in the region.
Finally, how China seeks to interact with other naval forces in the region, particularly India and Japan, will show not merely its strategic thinking, but its larger political calculations for the Asian region. The United States must also consider the degree to which China shares information, reciprocates the U.S. outreach, and helps us and others in the region understand its long-term goals and intentions. These, of course, are just a sampling of some of the questions American planners and analysts need to begin considering.
Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at AEI.
Related Links
Related article on the growth of Chinese naval capabilities by Auslin
Related article on the strategic disconnect between the U.S. and China by Claude Barfield
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Myanmar uses alternative way to generate electricity in water-scare summer for supplying Yangon
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/3133960
Thursday, March 19, 2009 11:03 PM
YANGON, Mar. 20, 2009 (Xinhua News Agency) -- Myanmar is using fuel as an alternative way to generate electricity for distribution to the former capital city of Yangon when water resources, which create hydropower, are reducing in the present summer.
The reduction in water resources has led to the generation of only 300 megawatts (mw) of electricity, which include that from four gas-run power plants, to feed Yangon against the city's demand of over 500 mw for daily power consumption, the local Biweekly Eleven said Friday.
In order to enable alternate electricity supply to residential houses and 450,000-workforce industrial zones for at least five hours, the authorities temporarily stopped operation of some high power-consuming heavy industries such as some steel plants in the Myaungtaka Industrial Zone in Yangon, it said.
At a time when running of such heavy industries are suspended, Myanmar is using fuel for electricity generation, the report added.
Meanwhile, the prolonged abnormal electricity supply in Yangon has impacted the business of all walks of life.
For a successive months since the end of last year, residents in Yangon have been generally experiencing a hard time under serious electricity shortage with intermittent power supply available only in a day instead of round-the-clock supply normally.
With business and industrial enterprises mostly lying in Yangon, the city's electricity consumption takes up 60 percent or about 530 mw.
At the time of electricity and water shortage, a large number of people equip themselves with big and small petrol- or diesel- run generators to lead their lives.
The running of generators have created much noise and unpleasant smell from its exhaust which add to the environment issue, residents reflected.
(Source: iStockAnalyst )
Burma is an International issue: China
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=15341
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By WAI MOE Friday, March 20, 2009
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China’s representative in Geneva has said at the United Nations Human Rights Council that issues of development and national reconciliation in Burma are difficulties and challenges that are in the interests of the entire international community.
“We understand the difficulties and challenges that Myanmar [Burma] is confronted with in domestic development and in promoting national reconciliation, especially in the current rampant financial crisis,” said Yan Jiarong on March 16.
“The stability and development of Myanmar is not only in the interest of the region, [but it is] also the interest of the whole international community,” she added.
The statement was in response to a recent report on Burma’s human rights record by UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana who visited Burma in February.
China hoped the world would foster a conducive environment for gradually achieving democracy and development in the country, Yan said.
In the past, Beijing regularly refused to be drawn into debate on the Burmese crisis, referring to the matter an internal issue. In a 2007 UN Security Council meeting, China and Russia vetoed a draft resolution on the release of political prisoners in Burma.
However, China appears to be shifting its policy on Burma. It has cooperated on Burmese issues with other countries, such as the United States and the European Union, as well as India and Southeast Asian nations.
China has been the Burmese junta’s closest ally, particularly since 1988. It also sells arms, warships and aircraft to the Burmese regime despite international condemnation.
Chinese officials have visited Burma recently and met with high-ranking generals, including the head of the junta, Snr-Gen Than Shwe. On Wednesday in Naypyidaw, Than Shwe met Chen Bingde, chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
Li Changchun, a senior official of the ruling Communist Party of China, left on Friday for a four-country trip of the Asia-Pacific region, where he will also visit Burma.
Myanmar junta stubborn as ever
http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KC20Ae01.html
Mar 20, 2009
By Nick Cumming-Bruce
GENEVA - Once again, a United Nations (UN) investigator of human rights in Myanmar has urged its ruling generals to release all political prisoners. And once again the junta has brusquely brushed off the demand. Myanmar has no prisoners of conscience, only law breakers, its ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Wunna Maung Win, brazenly asserted.
So nothing has changed? Well, not quite.
In a report to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on Tuesday, special rapporteur Tomas Ojea Quintana painted a grim picture of conditions in the country: 400 political prisoners sentenced in the last quarter of 2008 to jail terms ranging from 25 to 64 years; a total of more than 2,100 political prisoners in the
country (twice the figure of two years ago); and a 20-year-old student union member jailed for 104 years in January.
There was more: opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi detained for the last six years under a law that permits detention for no more than five years; multiple abuses of the rights of Rohingya Muslims in North Rakhine state; continuing recruitment of child soldiers; prevalent rape of ethnic minority women by soldiers; forced labor; use of landmines; and, in a country which should have a food surplus if properly run, acute food shortages in five states.
Quintana also noted that the junta did not accede to his request to meet political party leaders because "all the leaders were held in detention, either under house arrest or in prisons in remote areas". And yet six months into his job as special rapporteur, Quintana is trying to make it as easy as possible for Myanmar's ruling junta to grasp the nettle of human rights issues that have made it an international pariah.
He defines his task as "to cooperate with the government of Myanmar and assist in its efforts in the field of promotion and protection of human rights". Within that framework, he has decided to focus attention on four "core elements" of human rights: a review of national legislation to ensure its compliance with the constitution and international obligations, progressive release of political prisoners, training for the armed forces in international humanitarian law and establishing an independent, impartial judiciary.
Reporting on his second and latest mission to Myanmar in mid-February, Quintana was at pains to find the positives. His three meetings with the junta's human-rights body, not the most conspicuously effective group, were "constructive". He met senior mandarins, including the chief justice, the attorney general, the minister of home affairs, the chief of police and the army's judge advocate general, which yielded "substantive and fruitful discussions". The junta allowed him to visit a number of prisons and to talk to prisoners, as well as a visit to the usually off-limits Kayin state.
The minister of home affairs promised to consider his recommendations for the progressive release of all political prisoners, Quintana reported. The attorney general told him that ministries were checking 380 laws for compliance with the new constitution, passed last year in a national referendum. And the chief justice insisted Myanmar's judiciary was independent, but accepted a suggestion that Myanmar should engage with the UN's rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers.
Weak assurances
Such assurances cost the junta little, but Quintana is also pressing for tangible results within a specific timeframe. Release of all political prisoners should be completed before elections scheduled for next year, he said, "If not, it's going to be difficult to talk of real participation in the elections." British ambassador to the UN Peter Gooderham set out the issue more bluntly: unless all political prisoners were released and political parties and ethnic minorities were able to participate freely in the election the outcome would have no international credibility.
In the Orwellian state the generals have created, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which elections could win international respect. The junta's mindset and approach to the elections is all too clear from its brutal intimidation of the opposition, the hammering of any dissent and the political party machinery apparatus it has established to ensure elections do not allow the opposition a repeat of the democratic victory they won in 1990.
Still, Quintana's role arguably is not to second-guess the outcome of the election, but to exploit what little space he has to try to achieve or create conditions for measurable improvement of human rights and the position of those within the country still active in trying to defend them.
To do that, Quintana is seeking to widen the agenda of discussions with the junta. In addition to pursuing issues such as the incarceration of political prisoners, where progress is locked into the junta's rigid mindset on political reform he has turned attention to the functioning of the judicial system.
"It's important to open different channels of communication, we need to start working on the rule of law," Quintana said in an interview. "This is the first time we found space to have discussion with lawyers" regarding the functioning of the judicial system.
"From our perspective it's one of the better ways to address the situation," said Michael Anthony of the Hong Kong-based Asian Legal Resource Center, a human-rights watchdog that has exhaustively documented the regime's abuse of its own legal and criminal justice system to crush dissent. The human-rights debate "has focused too long on the list of violations without addressing the system of injustice".
Quintana also emphasizes there will be little progress on human rights unless the international community and particularly Myanmar's Southeast Asian neighbors in the Association of South East Asian Nations - now establishing its own human-rights body - are willing to push them. Legal reform and adherence to international humanitarian law provides an avenue some observers think Myanmar's politically-reticent Asian neighbors may find easier to support.
Quintana can have few illusions about the uphill nature of his task. At the Human Rights Council in Geneva, non-governmental organizations were quick to spotlight potential limitations in his dialogue with the junta. Myanmar's constitution, tainted by the coercion and intimidation invested in winning its approval, hardly presented a sound benchmark for assessing judicial and legislative reforms, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development noted. Was he confident, the UK asked, that training the judiciary, civil servants and police would be effective given the dominant position in those sectors of people close to the regime?
Moreover, Myanmar's ruling generals never seem to miss an opportunity to live down to the lowest expectations of their conduct, and Tuesday was no exception. Just as Quintana delivered his statement to the council, news broke that the junta had arrested five more members of the opposition National League for Democracy in Yangon. Among them was a party member reportedly inactive for more than a year after suffering a stroke.
Nick Cumming-Bruce is a Geneva-based journalist with decades of experience reporting from Southeast Asia.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
MYANMAR: Beyond the delta, aid projects miss out
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=83543
A young girl shields herself from the sun by placing an empty rice bag on her head. Despite millions of dollars in cyclone assistance, much of the country has yet to receive the development aid it needs
YANGON, 19 March 2009 (IRIN) - The positive aspects of the Cyclone Nargis response in the Ayeyarwady Delta have yet to translate into better access or more funds for aid operations in the rest of Myanmar, where needs are great and often unmet, according to aid workers.
“The needs in the country are large and very little is done,” said Frank Smithuis, country director of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Holland. “Myanmar is the lowest recipient of overseas development aid in the world. Much more money is needed for the health of the people.”
After a frustratingly slow start, aid agencies say the humanitarian response to Cyclone Nargis, which struck Ayeyarwady Delta in May 2008 and left close to 140,000 dead or missing, has been highly effective.
Much of this is credited to the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), comprising the government, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UN, whose mandate has been extended for another year.
The government eased bureaucracy and restrictions on access for humanitarian agencies in the delta, and money and resources have poured in.
Outside the cyclone area
More on Myanmar
Coordination mechanism extended for one year
Majority of under-five deaths preventable - UNICEF
Water shortages loom in delta
NGOs cut smoother path in the delta, but challenges remain
Three-year cyclone recovery plan launched
However, this is not the case in the rest of Myanmar, where more than 100,000 children under five die each year, most of them from preventable diseases.
One third of under-fives are underweight, says the UN, and malnutrition is a contributory factor in about half those deaths.
“When Nargis happened it was impossible to focus elsewhere,” Chris Kaye, the head of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Myanmar, told IRIN in Yangon. WFP had a huge US$115 million programme to feed those who had lost their livelihoods in the cyclone.
“That was at some cost it seems now, because we have not been able to follow through and get the attention of donors elsewhere [in Myanmar].”
Last year, WFP raised half of its funding needs for areas such as Northern Rakhine State, near the border with Bangladesh.
“We had to cut back on certain activities – a very difficult decision to take – and in the end decided to cut support for vulnerable households through schools,” said Kaye.
This Food for Education project provided a family food ration to a child who attended school 80 percent of the time, often forming a major component of the daily diet during the lean June-October monsoon season.
Ongoing restrictions
The TCG mechanism does not apply outside the delta, and long-standing government restrictions on aid agencies are unchanged. Aid workers must seek permission to travel to project sites, which takes three weeks.
Photo: Stacy M Winston/ECHO
A young boy in Myanmar's cyclone-affected Ayeyarwady Delta carries a bag of donated rice. WFP says it has reached nearly one million people in the Delta and Yangon area
Some NGOs have not been able to secure agreements to work in Myanmar at all, and operate informally through local partners. Many UN agencies do not have access to much of the country.
“There are huge developmental deficits,” said Kaye.
Such constraints have added to the reluctance of donors to provide aid to Myanmar, which receives far less assistance than other countries in the region with similar poverty levels.
Laos, for example, receives $50 per person per year, and Cambodia receives $40. Myanmar, by contrast, receives $2-$3.
Healthcare needs
But the needs are great. MSF Holland estimates there are between five and 10 million malaria patients each year, in a country of 53 million. Only a small proportion receive effective treatment and thousands die each year.
“As a consequence, the people of Myanmar suffer, in particular the poorest, who can't afford to pay for their healthcare,” said Smithuis.
He argues that MSF’s 17 years in Myanmar, plus the more recent cyclone response, prove that aid can be delivered effectively.
“If there is a good monitoring system that guarantees the population benefits directly, then there is absolutely no reason to withhold large-scale assistance to Myanmar people,” he said.
Mark Canning, the British ambassador to Myanmar, said the relative success of the Nargis aid operation could inspire greater confidence among major donors such as the UK.
“The issue of confidence is fundamental,” Canning told IRIN. “A virtuous circle can be created - the more donor money is used effectively, the more money is drawn in. But the reverse also applies. Assistance needs to be whiter than white.”
contributor/ds/mw
Theme(s): (IRIN) Aid Policy, (IRIN) Food Security, (IRIN) Natural Disasters
[ENDS]
[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]
Myanmar's foreign trade rose 16 percent last year
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Myanmars-foreign-trade-rose-apf-14697771.html
Myanmar's foreign trade rose 16 percent last year; imports jump 31 percent
Friday March 20, 2009, 4:18 am EDT
Buzz up! Print YANGON, Myanmar (AP) -- Myanmar's foreign trade rose by 16.7 percent to $10.34 billion in the first 11 months of 2008 over the same period a year earlier, a government report said.
Exports rose 9.5 percent to $6.42 billion from $5.86 billion the previous year, the Ministry of National Planning and Development report said.
Imports jumped 30.8 percent to $3.91 billion compared to $2.99 billion a year earlier. Government sector imports increased 121.8 percent to $1.64 billion, representing 41.8 percent of total import value.
The report said that natural gas exports, which accounted for about 38 percent of all export revenue, declined 4.7 percent in value to $2.44 billion from $ 2.56 billion. Myanmar's gas exports go to neighboring Thailand.
The United States and the European Union have imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar to pressure the military government to improve human rights and release detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
Monday, March 23, 2009
Myanmar: Myanmar Imprisons Activist Lawyer For Four Years
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/22359?tid=37
Foreign 2009-03-20 10:58
YANGON, MYANMAR: Authorities in military-ruled Myanmar sentenced a lawyer who has defended pro-democracy and labor activists to four years in prison, accusing him of having links with "illegal organizations," opposition and legal sources said.
Pho Phyu, a lawyer in his early thirties, was arrested 15 Jan in central Myanmar on his way back to Yangon after representing two labor activists.
"We are very sad to hear about the sentencing of Pho Phyu. It's a shame that defense lawyers defending their clients are being imprisoned. Prevalence of law in the country has to be questioned," Nyan Win, a spokesman for the opposition National League for Democracy, said Thursday night (19 March).
No official announcement of the sentencing has been made, but legal sources close to the case said Pho Phyu was handed a four-year sentence Tuesday (17 March) for alleged links with "illegal organizations" after a trial in which he was not represented by a lawyer. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation by the government.
In recent months, the junta has imprisoned pro-democracy activists in an apparent attempt to clear away dissent before elections promised for next year. Military courts have sentenced hundreds of dissidents to prison terms of up to 104 years.
The two labor rights activists Pho Phyu represented were allegedly detained for complaining to the United Nations' International Labor Organization about land confiscation.
Two lawyers representing activists were freed early this month after serving four months in prison for contempt of court.
Myanmar has been under military rule since 1962. The current junta has promised it would lead the country to democracy but critics say the election will simply endorse military primacy through the ballot box. (AP)
MySinchew 2009.03.20
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