Dear Friends,
This is the paper that i submitted in the EU-Burma day meeting in Brussels on October 29, 2008. Any positive and negative comments are welcome.
Htun Aung Gyaw
607-339-6054
The Strategy of the Military Regime and the Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma
(Htun Aung Gyaw)
Part I
The Strategy of the Military Regime
The strategy is simple and cruel. The regime will never start dialogue or negotiate with the opposition political party, the National League for Democracy. The regime’s main strategy is military dominant rule. Whatever it takes, the generals will hold on to power by using any means. They do not care about the development of the country or sacrifice of human lives to achieve their goal. The regime will barge ahead with its own plan to grab political power by using a one-sided, non-free and unfair election in 2010 by following steps started in 1992.
1. Time buying
2. Imposing restrictions and closing down regional offices of the opposition parties, including NLD, SNLD and democratic forces
3. Embracing the ideology of master and slave
4. Promoting a military dominated education model and degrading civilian education
5. Conducting psychological warfare on opposition politicians and political prisoners
6. Drawing up a one-sided constitution to take political power by 2010 through a fake election
Time Buying
The Burmese generals promised the UN that they would begin dialogue with the opposition political party, the NLD, after the 1990 election but it never occurred. The dictatorship's reasoning for ignoring the 1990 election was that Burma required a new constitution. The constitution was drummed up by the regime’s handpicked people. The winning party, the NLD, did not have a chance to participate freely.
NLD walked out from the National Convention and never participated in creating the constitution. Also, the Shan National League for Democracy which won the majority of seats in the Shan States also walked out from the convention. Lacking the representatives in the convention made the constitution meaningless. Even so, the regime plowed forward with its lackeys bending to the brutal boot of their desires and direction. The constitution taking 15 years to complete, from 1992 to 2007, is evidence of time buying strategy. The result of the new constitution is military-dominant rule.
At the same time the regime was slyly using the UN for its tool to buy time successfully. Former UN special envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, warmly welcomed by the regime, was praised as a fellow Southeast Asian by them. And each time, before Razali visited Burma, the regime released 10 to 20 political prisoners and fooled him into believing that there would be a positive change after his visit. But no change or dialogue has ever occurred. Releasing political prisoners has shown itself to be a Machiavellian strategy for tricking international communities and buying continued time.
In reality, many more citizens were captured again and again after the regime released some political prisoners. Sometimes people did not know if the freed prisoners were real political prisoners or criminals who were not associated with politics. Razali Ismail praised the regime, imagining that there would be a real dialogue after discussions with the generals. After more than three years of negotiation without a positive result, Razali finally urged the regime to make good on their promises. At that juncture the regime refused him passage into Burma again.
In 2007, the cyclone Nargis slammed into Burma on May 3rd, killing more than one hundred thirty thousand people in the delta region, leaving two millions homeless. It is a historical fact that the regime refused international aid and callously let men, women, and children die in agony. French and American ships were ready to come to Burma’s shores to assist people who were in urgent need, but the regime turned down their humane offer. The French Foreign Minister openly denounced this cruel act of the regime and talked about R2P, Responsible to Protect Act to save cyclone victims. Pressure from international communities and people inside Burma mounted against the regime.
The UN indirectly rescued the regime. Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General, called Burma’s top General, Than Shwe, and received no answer. Finally, Ban went to Burma and met Than Shwe. Than Shwe greeted him and assured him that the UN and NGOs could enter Burma and help the cyclone victims. The US and French aircraft carriers however were not allowed entrance into Burma’s waters.
Ban eased the tension between the international communities and the regime, but his visit only favored the regime's manipulation of the situation to make it their own game. After Ban’s visit, the US and France ships left without a chance to help victims in urgent need. International donors had to wait for three weeks or more to get into Burma. Even the UN agencies could not enter Burma easily. Most of the foreign aid workers were trapped in Rangoon and were not allowed to travel to the cyclone-hit areas; some were in Bangkok waiting for the green light.
One shocking incident was that the visa section of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok was on fire and many passports of reporters and NGOs were burned in the fire. These people were trying to get a visa from the Burmese embassy. It was not an accident; it was a dirty trick to stop the influx of foreign media and aid workers. The result was one regime manipulated Ban Ki-Moon and withdrawal of international pressure to stop blocking aid to the cyclone victims. Even though two million people became homeless and more than one hundred thousand died, the UN involvement gave the generals a way out.
Madeleine K. Albright (United States Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001) wrote an article in New York Times Op-Ed published in June 11, 2008, under the title “The End of Intervention,” referring to Burma. She wrote, “At the heart of the debate is the question of what the international system is. Is it just a collection of legal nuts and bolts cobbled together by governments to protect governments? Or is it a living framework of rules intended to make the world a more humane place? We know how the government of Myanmar would answer that question, but what we need to listen to is the voice – and cry – of the Burmese people.”
Ban Ki-Moon would not listen to the Burmese people’s cries. Instead he listened to Than Shwe’s sugar-coated words. What happened? Today cyclone victims are still suffering from lack of food, shelter and medicine. Because of Ki-Moon's involvement, the Burmese Regime managed to buy time and defuse the international intervention intended to help cyclone victims.
Ban announced that he had reached an agreement with General Than Shwe and hoped that all the donations and NGOs will enter without difficulty going into Burma. His announcement released Than Shwe from being caught exposed in a corner. With help from Ban Ki-Moon, Than Shwe managed to buy time and avoid foreign involvement whose intention was to save cyclone victims. In reality, week after week a few NGOs managed to make it to the remote areas with limited help. And now the whole world is forgetting the victims in Burma. Unfortunately, Than Shwe is safe from being removed from leadership.
Time buying strategy benefited the regime in several ways. It bought them enough time to prepare, re-organize, draw new ideas, and implement new strategy. It weakened the opposition and created confusion among opposition political parties from within which created mistrust within the NLD leadership itself. It imposed restrictions and closed down regional offices of the opposition parties. It promoted a sham national convention, while the generals loudly claimed that they would begin a dialogue with opposition political parties, especially the NLD. But they never started a single dialogue. Instead they issued an order to close down NLD regional offices by force. Landlords who rented the offices to NLD received threats and pressure from the regime-sponsored organization, Union of Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Many offices were closed down; the only offices left were in the capital, Rangoon.
NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and SNLD leader Khun Htun Oo have been detained. At the same time, the regime mouthpiece-newspapers brainwashed the people and foreign media, including the United Nations, that Aung San Suu Kyi is very stubborn and that because of her ill intentions it is hard to start any dialogue. Not more than five people are able to meet each other. If people gather around a NLD office, they are captured and sent to the court for destabilizing the public order. For this phony charge they can be sentenced to three to six years in prison. The regime is using this method to separate the public and NLD party. Regional offices being closed down and the public not being allowed to associate with NLD members made the party weaker and weaker after an 18 year period from 1990 to 2008.
Embracing the Ideology of Master and Slave
The weakening of NLD party strengthened the ideology of master and slave, further promoting the military-dominant education model and degrading civilian education.
The regime is paranoid and afraid of the civilian educated class, especially university students who are the most critical threat to the regime.
When the first military coup was initiated by General Ne Win, the university students challenged the army officers and joked that three of them combined would not exceed a sixth grade education because most of them joined the army with little or no education. The students teased that they were promoted due to their prolonged service in the army and their loyalty to General Ne Win.
In the heat of the 1988 nationwide demonstrations, a new coup was led by General Saw Maung on September 18, 1988, to save his superior, General Ne Win and his cabinet ministers. But Saw Maung was forced to abandon his position after the military regime lost the election in May 1990. The new leader, General Than Shwe, wisely strengthened his power under the watch of Ne Win’s clique, including the powerful General Khin Nyunt who was also a chief of the most feared military intelligence. Than Shwe persuaded Khin Nyunt to persecute Ne Win’s grandsons’ notorious gang called Scorpion and sentenced his three grandsons and their father to death. After he successfully freed himself from Ne Win’s influence, Than Shwe made his last move to detain General Khin Nyunt and became the new dictator.
Under Than Shwe’s rule, he closed down Undergraduate Studies in Rangoon Arts and Science University as well as closing down professional institutions such as Rangoon Arts and Science University (RASU), Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT), Medical college 1 (MCI) and MCII. Many instruments and tools which were donated by USA and Russia were taken out from the institutions and sent to the Military Medical Academy, Defense Service Technological Academy, and to a high tech computer school in the military town called Pyin Oo Lwin known as May Myo where the Defense Service Academy is located. Most of the students in military schools are sons and daughters from the military clique. The best teachers were recruited or forced to transfer to the military schools.
On the other hand, civilian universities were forced to shrink into regional colleges without sufficient instruments, chairs, desks, text books and skilled teachers. The regime created Regional Degree Colleges, Institutes, and University of Distance Educations, a total of 44 altogether. Moreover, the colleges were built in remote areas far away from towns and cities to prevent student protest in cities. After 1988, uprising universities were shut down for four years. When they opened again, professors only had a chance to teach two to three months a year for another six years, without sufficient teaching and study time. Every student who took the tests were passed and graduated without qualification. The regime’s strategy is that it does not want to see many students pile up in the colleges.
In contrast, the military schools were open year round with sufficient facilities and skilled teachers. The results are stunning. People now go to doctors who graduated from military medical schools because the doctors have skill; people do not want treatment from doctors who graduated from civilian medical colleges. In a similar fashion, engineers from a military engineering college can get a job easily but engineers from civilian colleges are not trusted and find it difficult to get a job. The reason was they do not have skills in the field and no connection with the ruling class.
Every year military schools produce approximately 1,200 graduates; on the other hand, the civilian college graduates are at least 10 to 20,000 people without qualifications. The narrow minded, xenophobic attitude of the generals is degrading the Burmese education system and harming the country’s development in the long run.
Than Shwe issued the order that the major ranking officers need to hold a master’s degree educational level and the officers' wives hold an undergraduate degree in order to get a promotion. Such an incentive proves that Than Shwe is promoting a dominant military class in Burma to rule the country.
In 1990, before the May election, Than Shwe was the second in command of the armed forces; he visited the military families and gave a shocking speech. He said, “I will not tell you which party to vote for. You can vote whatever way you want to, but think deeply before you vote. Do you want to live like a master or live like a slave? Think about that and then vote.” This kind of speech indicates that he sees Burmese people as his slaves and the army generals as the masters. The speech is the revelation of the dictator’s mind.
Psychological Warfare on Politicians and Political Prisoners.
The regime threatens opposition politicians by using many dirty methods. It tries to seize their properties. It fires them from government offices if they are employed by government firms. It employs thugs to attack them on the way to work or while walking down the street. It visits them at home at night and checks the list of the household members by using its sponsored organization USDA. Police and Fire Fighters line up household members, including kids under ten years old at midnight while they are sleeping. If they find a guest in the home, the household leader and the guest will pay a fine or be given both a fine and jail term for not informing the quartermaster on time.
Prominent politicians’ homes have been closely watched and everyone who visits them are questioned in front of the house. Why are they visiting the house? For what reason? What did the politician tell them? Are they politically supporting the person? How is he/she related to this politician? A lot of people are afraid of being captured and so the ultimately the politician becomes isolated.
Under the close watch of the UN and human rights organizations, the regime changed its oppressive methods regarding opposition by creating two pro-regime organizations. The main sponsored organization, the Union of Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and its new branch, the Swan Arr Shin group (Vigorous being).
People vs. People Strategy
State Peace and Development Council uses excessive measures to suppress the people’s movement in 1988, ‘89, ‘90, ‘96 and beyond by using armed forces. Now they are using their own thugs to squash activists and political parties. The USDA and Swan Arr Shin duties are to harass activists, sometimes beating them to death. They also try to squash anti-government demonstrations, disguising themselves as normal people and capturing activists.
Aung San Suu Kyi's trip to upper Burma was ambushed while traveling with supporters and members on May 30, 2003 by USDA and Swan Arr Shin groups backed by police forces and army units. It was known as the “Depeyin Massacre.” More than a hundred of her supporters were beaten and stabbed to death. Aung San Suu Kyi luckily escaped from being assassinated. No one was persecuted for this massacre. The attackers roam free but since then Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest
When the regime mouthpiece newspapers say that, “Concerned citizens cannot tolerate the people making disturbance and those people should be captured,” the words pretend the regime is not involved in taking action against the activists. Supposedly the people are taking such action on their own. The idea is that a peace loving people could not tolerate those who create disturbance (Protest and demonstration against the government are used as disturbance in regime’s terminology) within the country. The regime lets the activists demonstrate if they want to but the peace loving people will not allow such protests.
On the other hand, the regime gave a green light to USDA rallies and demonstrations in many towns and cities denouncing NLD party and western sanctions. Thousands of government employees were summoned to join the pro regime demonstrations by force. No one was captured but instead got paid. In contrast, NLD supporters were captured if they gather more than five people for a public safety act.
Political Prisoners
There are more than two thousands political prisoners languishing in Burma’s prisons across the country. The Regime never recognized them as political prisoners. They said all are criminals because they broke the law. Political prisoners face a tremendous challenge in prison. Torture is rampant and real criminals are encouraged to bully and hurt political prisoners. Solitary confinement, both legs chained with middle iron bar, lack of nutritious food and medical treatment, lack of water supply for daily bathing and washing clothes, no toilet and sanitation has become a norm in Burma’s prisons. Using unclean needles in prison hospitals create the spread of HIV disease.
The worst thing is trying to break the mentality of the person by using cruel methods. Some political prisoners are very tough and never beg or break down. People who can resist physical torture have to face mental torture. One infamous example of such torture involves a renowned journalist and one of the leading members of NLD party, U Win Tin, who had been in prison from 1998-2008.
The regime promised U Win Tin his release if he would sign the deal for not participating in politics. He turned it down several times. He is a man who will hold his last breath and never give up what he believes in. Several times he was informed that he had been released and told him to pack up all his belongings in the cell where he lived. After he finished packing up his stuff, he changed from his prison clothes to civilian clothes and waited for the warden. A warden opened the cell and escorted him to the prison gate, but when he reached the gate the head warden told him that his jail term had been extended and sent him back to the cell.
The regime gave U Win Tin the hope of becoming a free man again, only so they could destroy it. This kind of method is used to shatter the soul of politicians who believe in freedom and democracy. Some people manage to resist torture while being a prisoner, but when they were tested by this cruel method they broke down in tears and some went insane. The regime used this method several times on U Win Tin, but he is a person with wily intelligence and he overcame the test.
On September 23, 2008, U Win Tin was informed by the wardens to pack his belongings and change his clothes because he would be free that day. U Win Tin knew the drill very well and did not want to be fooled again. He refused to change his prison clothes and refused to sign the acceptance of his freedom because of bitter past experiences. As a part of a plan to cause tension and a split in the NLD, U Win Tin was freed that day in his prison clothes.
However, U Win Htein, another prominent political prisoner and NLD CEC member, was informed by the warden, the same day of U Win Tin's release that he would also be freed from Kalay Prison, north of Mandalay. His family members were also informed to meet him in Mandalay. But his release was short lived. He was sent back to prison the next day. All these inhuman tricks are practiced in Burma's prisons today as mental torture.
Drawing Up a One Sided Constitution to Take Political Power by 2010 through a Fake Election
The regime forced the people to approve the sham constitution created by handpicked individuals, without delay under extreme conditions when cyclone Nargis hit. It was more important for them to have approval of their dominant military favored constitution, over saving thousands of lives.
History repeats itself, just like in the old days when General Ne Win drew up a constitution which favored a one party system and the only political party existing was his party, the Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP). It was approved by ninety nine percent of the people under threat and close watch. Then, under the constitution, General Ne Win was elected as the first President.
Under Than Shwe, the new constitution allows the military chief of staff to appoint twenty five percent of the military representatives in the parliament directly. Also, he has the right to take over political power if necessary which means he has the right to stage a coup under constitutional rights. The regime said that they will give the Burmese “Discipline Democracy,” which sounds similar to Indonesia’s model under General Suharto rule.
Suharto used “Guided Democracy” and he was elected six times in Indonesia. His cronies and generals enjoyed wealth and power. The Burmese generals are copying the Indonesian model to exploit Burma’s rich natural resources and enslave its own people. The 2010 election is their goal to change the military rule to a civilian rule like Ne Win’s. If Than Shwe is not running for President, one of his disciples will do so under the guidance of Than Shwe’s clique.
One major shift from the Ne Win's regime is the economy. Under Ne Win’s reign it was a centralized economy. Big and small scale industries, factories, malls, and shops were nationalized. Than Shwe will allow a crony economic system under free trade where nothing is truly free or fair.
Part II
The Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma
The future prospect for democratic change is very blurry. It mainly depends on three forces: the military regime, democratic oppositions and international support. First it depends on NLD and SPDC; how honestly and willingly do they want to work together and find a command ground to overcome the dead end? The attitude of the regime is obviously very negative for democratic change; the generals are planning for a centralized political system under the military’s dominant rule. The option for dialogue is far gone from the generals’ side. On the other hand, the biggest opposition political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has been facing challenges from its youth wing to change to a more active strategy. The youth want a more central role in confronting the regime. In addition, the exile opposition groups are facing the same dilemma involving active change, while exile leaders have held their positions for nearly two decades without any progress. The third player is foreign pressure. Without any foreign pressure on the military junta no single improvement will occur in Burma.
National League for Democracy
NLD Chairman, U Aung Shwe, has been criticized for not following democratic principles and refuses to listen to the grassroots and its youth wing. Recently, selecting new youth leaders by NLD CEC sparked the resignation of more than one hundred youth members and has shocked the NLD leadership, which indicates the frustration among the youths for not achieving the goal of democracy. It seems without Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD has no movement to achieve its goal.
The regime time-buying strategy has suppressed the mobility of the NLD party and created frustration among the party leaders and grassroots activists. Passive response to the military regime made active youth leaders rebellious. Some found their own way to fight against the regime and were kicked out from the party as punishment or ended in a prison cell. The current leaders only know how to request a dialogue without follow up actions and leverage power. The generals will not wake up and look at it from their comfortable beds if there is no leverage power.
The announcement of an election in 2010 alerts the democratic forces inside and abroad. NLD leadership is under extreme pressure to find a strategy for how to fight back the 2010 election by using the 1990 election results. If they accept the election in 2010, the 1990 election has no value at all. If they do not accept the election they have to fight back but NLD leadership is hesitant of confronting the regime if their demands are not recognized by SPDC.
On the other hand, if they cannot stop the election in 2010, the regime will win the election by using all its dirty tricks. NLD needs to confront the regime with courage to call for nationwide demonstrations before the election. Time is running out and NLD needs to reshuffle the leadership and unleash the young bloods who are willing to sacrifice for freedom.
Exile Opposition groups
Exile opposition groups are facing the same fate as the NLD. They tolerate prolong leadership with no progress and no strategy. They are deteriorating from freedom fighters to NGO-style activists. They are unsuccessful in working as a united entity, therefore they form sub groups within the coalition that are going nowhere.
Prolong Leadership with No progress and No Strategy
National Coalition Government of Union of Burma (NCGUB) was formed on the Thai-Burma border after the 1990 election was ignored. After more than 17 years without any single progress and success, the NCGUB leadership has never changed. The Members of Parliament Union (MPU), comprised of elected MPs from the1990 election, is a powerhouse.
The coming MPU meeting has a chance to elect a new leadership. If they dare to elect a new leader who dares to take a risk and try to unite the opposition abroad, it will become a strong entity. NCGUB formation was based on elected MPs only. No one was allowed to become ministers in the government, only the elected MPs have license to take the higher post. This needs to change by allowing in capable new bloods, who have sufficient education and show strong leadership in the exile communities. Skilled technocrats, political science professors and economics experts need to be recruited in the new government. Also ethnic resistance leaders who have leadership skills and experience with trained ethnic armies need to be embraced.
Under strong leadership with capable members, NCGUB will shake the power of the military regime. In the past, NCGUB’s role was under the shadow of the NLD policy, never daring to find its own role as an independent powerhouse. NLD does not have the liberty to do it inside Burma because its movement has been suppressed and members have been harassed and arrested by military thugs over and over again.
NLD is walking on a thin line under the close watch from the regime. If they take any anti-government action, its members would be captured and put into prison, but NCGUB has total freedom to do whatever it feels like. NCGUB needs to know its role while dealing with the regime. Confrontation and playing hard ball is the role for NCGUB. NLD’s role is to call for dialogue and find a common ground. It is a separate ball game and they need to know in which ground they are living and what kind of strategy they need to play. NCGUB does not need to follow NLD strategy because they are living in a totally different playground with one similar goal; to establish a democratic government.
Degrading from Freedom Fighters to NGO Style Activists
Some activists abandoned the armed struggle and changed themselves into non-violent activists. They know most of the donors like to support only non-violent means. That is the main reason they became non-violent activists, to get grants and funding, not for the democratic change but for their survival. They really do not have any strong belief in any method. They become grant seeking NGOs who try to sniff out which issue is hot and popular in order to get funding whether they believe in the issue or not.
That kind of change within the revolutionary area destroyed the fighting spirits among the activists. People who get funding became popular leaders with followers who need money. As salary workers the attitude of the activists totally changed. They will take a stand if they get paid; if not, they will not do it even when it is necessary for the revolution.
Most of the funding goes to the salaries of the clerks and travel expenses; only 20% of the funds go into Burma. But there are some strong committed activists who still resist this kind of shift. They are finding their own way to survive by working at some shops and collecting money and supporting comrades inside and doing what they believe in. They are not selling out human items. They are real activists who believe in themselves, that they have to fight back with no compromise.
Surprisingly, they can compete with the NGOs activists even though they can collect only a small amount of money because their comrades believe in them and only want to work with them as un-corrupt persons with dignity. The reason is they can easily beat the NGOs group which has ten thousand dollars for a project by only using tow thousand dollars for the same project. The outcome will be just as effective or better because they use all of their money for the inside movement. The NGOs spend eight thousand dollars for its staff and spending. If the real activists get funding from donors, they will do more than five fold what the NGOs are doing right now.
The 88 Generation Students are the future leaders of Burma because their generation is aging and now they are over forty-year-old men and women with full commitment and guts. In November 2008, 88 generation leaders who live in exile formed a core group called Burma Freedom League (BFL) with potential leaders who ignited the 1988 nationwide uprising. They will lead the revolution in the near future because they have twenty years of experience against the military regime and strong connections inside underground groups and also with the new generation. If the donors see the reality and really want to change the status quo in Burma, they need to see deep inside the movement, who is who and who has enduring commitment, connections inside, and the potential to be effective.
International Support (Pressure)
International pressure is not unanimous. ASEAN countries, China and Russia are against this option. As a result, the sanctions against Burma are not very effective but they are hurting the regime slowly. Without international involvement, the regime change will be prolonged and Burmese people will continue to suffer.
In the current history of Burma, the regime change occurred when foreign troops invaded Burma. The Burmese king was removed from his throne when the British invaded Burma in 1886. Then the British colonial regime was removed when the Japanese invaded Burma in World War II in 1944. Then the Japanese were kicked out when the allies came back. All these three models have shown that regime change in Burma occurred when foreign troop invaded Burma.
In the modern era, such foreign invasion is not easy as in the past but it has occurred in some countries. For Burma this is not likely to happen because of geo-politics. The West and the US do not want to get into Burma because of China. China will not let the US tap on its door. Burmese have to rely on their own strength and courage. 88 Generation leaders Min Ko Naing, Min Zeya, Ko Ko Gyi, Htay Kywe and the rest have proved their commitment and courage but still they need support from the US and European countries.
The US and EU need to double their funding for free Burma by selecting potential leaders and grassroots activism inside Burma and abroad. Funding together with advanced technology like mobile broadcasting stations, satellite phones, digital cameras, and computers are crucial for activists to organize and educate the people and promote awareness.
In addition, giving activists a chance at higher education and classes for forming networking and communication skills is key. Scholarships for subjects like International Law, Industrial and Labor Relations, International Relations, City and Regional Planning, Human Resources, Peace Studies, Asian Studies, European Studies, Political Science, Conflict Resolutions, Economics, and so forth will benefit the future development in Burma.
Conclusion
The future prospect for establishing a democratic system in Burma is uncertain. The military regime is planning to go forward for its election in 2010 without compromising with the opposition. The opposition is diverse and not able to form a united front. At the same time, NLD leadership is too old to lead and the exile leadership is too weak to lead and do not want to take risk and enjoy in status quo.
On the other hand, the military regime has one command, one leadership and one goal. If the opposition cannot stop the 2010 election, the regime will definitely win the election. NLD activists inside and abroad need to set up a strong underground network that covers the whole nation. The only strategy is to initiate a mass movement to oppose the 2010 election by educating the people to understand the outcome of the 2010 election which will produce dominant military rule for the next two decades if they do not dare to fight back.
The International actors, especially the United Nations need to pressure the regime to stop pushing one sided election based on a non-democratic constitution. If the UN and the West wrongfully support the 2010 election, it will not only harm the democratic forces in Burma but it will hurt democratic forces around the world who struggle for freedom as well. It will generate the wrong signal to other authoritarian states that it is acceptable to nullify free and fair elections and replace them with a one sided election.
The brightness of Burma's future depends on compromises by the military, unity of the opposition forces and strong support from the international actors for democratic transition.
Where there's political will, there is a way
政治的な意思がある一方、方法がある
စစ္မွန္တဲ့ခိုင္မာတဲ့နိုင္ငံေရးခံယူခ်က္ရိွရင္ႀကိဳးစားမႈရိွရင္ နိုင္ငံေရးအေျဖ
ထြက္ရပ္လမ္းဟာေသခ်ာေပါက္ရိွတယ္
Burmese Translation-Phone Hlaing-fwubc
စစ္မွန္တဲ့ခိုင္မာတဲ့နိုင္ငံေရးခံယူခ်က္ရိွရင္ႀကိဳးစားမႈရိွရင္ နိုင္ငံေရးအေျဖ
ထြက္ရပ္လမ္းဟာေသခ်ာေပါက္ရိွတယ္
Burmese Translation-Phone Hlaing-fwubc
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
The Strategy of the Military Regime and the Future Prospect for Democratic Transition in Burma (Htun Aung Gyaw)
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